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Democracy and good 
governance 
In general, democracy can be viewed in 
both 'behavioural' terms (the existence of 
a genuine contest of ideas, real partici-
pation and effective civil liberties) and in 
'structural' terms (working electoral sys-
tems and political institutions operating 
in a multi-party context, law-making in 
accordance with agreed rules and an 
independent judiciary). Increasingly 
nowadays, 'good governance' is viewed 
as a keystone in the architecture of 
effective democracy, the concept has 
moved to the fore in donor thinking. The 
aim is to convince decision-makers about 
the merits of effective management and 
transparency, and of the need to elim-
inate corruption. Many ACPs, as well as 
countries in other parts of the world, have 
had to come to terms with the failings of 
existing state structures, and with grow-
ing pressures for démocratisation. The 
contributors to our Dossier examine these 
issues more closely, provide information 
about practical developments and take a 
critical look at how the principles of 
'democracy' and 'good governance' are 
interpreted on the ground. 
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Papua New Guinea 
One of the largest countries in the 
Pacific, Papua New Guinea is richly 
blessed with natural resources. Its 
annual per capita GDP of $1228 
qualifies it as a middle-income na-
tion. But the social indicators, in-
cluding infant mortality, life 
expectancy and unemployment, 
make troubling reading. People are 
largely dependent on subsistence 
agriculture, and there is a popula-
tion drift towards urban centres. But 
PNG does not have the industrial 
base to absorb those looking for 
jobs. The country has also tradition-
ally relied on primary exports, which 
are vulnerable to external factors, 
such as world price fluctuations or 
bad weather. The challenge is to 
find an appropriate development 
strategy that will link with its tradi-
tional economy. There are also con-
cerns that the peculiarities of PNG's 
'patronage politics' mean more at-
tention is placed on the govern-
ment's survival than on long-term 
economic planning. 
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'Leadership must pass to the younger 
generation' 
The 25th anniversary of Cari-
com was celebrated in St 
Lucia during the 19th annual 
meeting of the regional 
group's 14 Heads of Govern-
ment (June 30 - July 4)'. 
Since the Treaty of Ch-
aguaramas was signed a 
quarter of a century ago, 
Caricom has concentrated its 
integration efforts largely on 
education, health, social co-
operation and economics. 
There are no tariffs or quo-
tas on the bulk of goods exchanged, 
although less developed countries 
of the region have been allowed to 
maintain duties and quantitative re-
strictions on some items imported 
from more developed states until 
the year 2004. After the St Lucia 
meeting, Edwin Carrington, Secre-
tary General of the Guyana-based 
organisation, gave us some insight 
into the direction he would like to 
see Caricom take. He spoke of the 
development of a single market, the 
common external tariff, laws relat-
ing to intellectual property, anti-
dumping and competition rules, free 
trade within the Americas by 2005 
and the prospects for a single cur-
rency. He also commented on the 
new partnership with the EU, nego-
tiations for which will begin in Sep-
tember. 
Edwin Carrington was Secretary-
General of the ACP Group from 1985 
to 1990. Further back in his career, 
he was in charge of trade and eco-
nomic integration in Caricom. Leav-
ing Brussels in 1990, Mr Carrington 
served a year and a half as ambas-
sador of his country (Trinidad and 
Tobago), in Guyana. He was ap-
pointed Caricom Secretary-General 
in August 1992, initially for a five-
year term. He has just completed 
the first year of his second term. 
1 The Caricom member states are Antigua and 
Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Kitts 
and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
■ In your opening remarks to the 
conference, you said it was time 
for Caricom to 'shift gear'. What 
did you mean? 
- The 25th anniversary 
Conference can be seen from two 
main perspectives. First as an op-
portunity to give thanks and pass 
out the accolades to those who 
have built the organisation over 
the last quarter of a century. We 
must never underestimate the sac-
rifice involved and the tremendous 
effort and contribution by a lot of 
individuals. The private sector and 
media have also been important 
players in creating this feeling of 
'Caribbeanness'. Having handed 
out the bouquets, my concern now 
is where we set our sights, what 
kind of vision we should have, and 
in whose hands we should place 
the responsibility. 
It is time to move to agree-
ments where young people are 
more involved. We have to devel-
op institutions such as a regional 
youth forum. The ages of the peo-
ple we recruit and their level of re-
sponsibility must be looked at. I 
was given senior responsibility at 
an early age - in my thirties. There 
are some outstanding senior peo-
ple who continue to make a con-
tribution, but my view is that the 
central leadership must pass to the 
younger generation. That is why I 
am so happy to be in St Lucia, 
where there is a Prime Minister 
who is not even fifty. It is the same 
in Barbados, St Kitts-Nevis and 
Grenada. There should be a decid-
ed policy shift towards younger 
people. We should try to get peo-
ple into leadership in their forties, 
and then you will have twenty or 
twenty-five years of benefit and 
return on your investment. One 
reason why the old hands try to 
hold on to the reins of power is 
that we have not developed the 
institutional arrangements where-
by they can continue to have an 
input. We need to facilitate them 
in moving off the front row by cre-
ating mechanisms which allow 
them to remain as substantive con-
tributors. 
■ Not all Caribbean countries are 
in Caricom. What steps are being 
taken to bring in non-member 
states? 
- We expanded in 1995 to 
include Suriname. Last year, we 
decided that Haiti should be able 
to join. All that remains is to work 
out the terms and conditions. By 
the time the leaders meet again in 
March, at the inter-sessional, this 
matter could be settled. It is not 
the same for the Dominican Re-
public although we are hoping to 
sign a free trade agreement with 
them in August when all the heads 
of government will meet there. 
Cuba, of course, is the big one. 
They have not yet sought to join 
Caricom, although they have ap-
plied for membership of the ACP 
group. I happen to know that 
Cuba sees this as a first step to-
wards full integration into Cari-
com, and I would not be surprised 
when its application comes in. I do 
not see how Cuba could be left 
out of any genuine Caribbean 
community. Both the Dominican 
Republic and Cuba belong. The 
question is when they take up 
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their positions, and under what 
terms and conditions. 
■ Do you think there been enough 
political reform in Cuba yet for this 
to happen ? 
- We are concerned to en-
sure that Cuba has the right demo-
cratic credentials, human rights 
record and the rule of law. Look-
ing around the ACP group, there 
are a large number of countries 
where questions might be raised. 
Nigeria, for example, needs to 
move to meet the conditions of 
Article 5 of the Lomé Convention. 
But we do not believe that exclu-
sion is the best way forward. Con-
structive engagement is much 
more effective and in Caricom, we 
have had a joint commission with 
Cuba for many years. It functions 
well. Things are beginning to open 
up there. If you look at the private 
sector, many countries, including 
the US, are moving into Cuba. We 
believe that the country's cultural 
values in relation to human rights 
and law will change. What is 
democracy if you cannot take care 
of your people providing good 
health, good food and good edu-
cation? In some countries this is 
merely theoretical. 
M Is a hastening of pace towards a 
Caricom single market being pro-
pelled by your external commit-
ments - to a free trade area with 
the Americas and future trade lib-
eralisation with the European 
Union ? 
- A single market is neces-
sary, though I am not sure that the 
pace at which it is moving entirely 
reflects what is happening outside. 
But there is clearly a linkage espe-
cially as regards the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA). This 
is a singular agreement which 
could place strains on the 
Caribbean's interrelationships. 
It is important that we 
deepen, and move towards the fi-
nalisation of the single market. We 
are on course, but haven't got as 
far as I would have hoped. For ex-
ample, we signed two protocols 
here on agriculture and industrial 
policy. We were hoping to sign an-
other on trade policy, but that did-
not happen. There is a further pro-
tocol on disadvantaged countries, 
regions and sectors which we 
haven't yet signed. And there are 
three others still to come - on com-
petition policy, transport and dis-
pute settlement. So that makes 
five still in the pipeline. What is 
more, when you sign a protocol, 
that's only the first step. You then 
have to define, ratify and imple-
ment it. As regards the two proto-
cols just signed, the next step is to 
make sure the member states are 
implementing them. By the end of 
1999, most of the structural parts 
of the single market should be in 
place, but there is some doubt as 
to whether they will be function-
ing effectively. 
■ What will be the role of the 
Caribbean Court of Justice which 
Heads of State agreed this week to 
establish? 
- This has been adopted, in 
principle, and the issue of its head-
quarters has been settled. But the 
arrangements for operationalising 
and financing it have to be sorted 
out. It will be another 18 months 
before we can properly get this 
going. It is not only an Appeal 
Court, but will have jurisdiction for 
all matters affecting the Caricom 
Treaty. Many of our countries have 
built-in constitutional limitations 
in this respect. But we are helped 
by the fact that Britain wants us 
out of the Privy Council. They 
made this very clear when we met 
in February in the Caribbean-UK 
forum. The UK has adopted the 
European Human Rights Conven-
tion, which prohibits capital pun-
ishment, but the Privy Council has 
to handle capital cases for a num-
ber of our countries. So you have a 
situation where a court in the UK 
is being asked to adjudicate on 
matters to which the British gover-
ment is totally opposed. There is, 
in any case, a general trend away 
from the Privy Council into our 
own courts, but there is quite 
some way to go before we have a 
Caribbean Court of Justice. 
■ What about a Caribbean single 
currency? 
- That's even further off. 
What we are trying to work out 
now is convertibility - to get the 
currencies to convert at a fixed 
rate of exchange. For currencies 
like the East Caribbean dollar and 
the Barbadian dollar, you can get 
exchange rate facilities relatively 
easily, but with the floating ones 
like in Guyana, Trinidad and Ja-
maica - and these are big countries 
- there are difficulties. Who will 
take on the risk? The size of the 
discount charged by the banks to 
cover the risk is usually so large 
that it discourages you from 
changing money. You end up con-
verting into US dollars and back 
out again. 
M Jamaica's Prime Minister, Mr Pat-
terson, set out Caricom's joint posi-
tion on a future EU partnership 
when he said: 'We continue to 
view the maintenance of ACP 
unity as a critical element. In that 
connection, we will resist any 
move towards régionalisation in 
the conduct of the negotiations.' Is 
this position designed to garner 
political support from other ACP 
states for the all-important trade 
protocols, or do you see other ben-
efits of membership of the ACP 
group? 
- Both. I cannot under-
stand anyone who wants to en-
danger the solidarity of the ACP. 
The EU has benefited from having 
the ACP as a powerful force in the 
international arena. The Uruguay 
Round of trade talks kicked off be-
cause the EU was able to mobilise 
ACP voting support to back the 
position the Americans wanted. 
The National Insurance Building in Castries - the 
venue for the 19th Caricom Summit meeting. meeting point 
There are many other oc-
casions where the political 
weight of the ACP has 
been important to the EU 
- candidatures for interna-
tional positions, for exam-
ple, where ACPs have sup-
ported the EU candidate 
because of the nature of 
the relationship. The in-
ternational stature the EU 
enjoys from being able to 
influence a group of 71 
developing countries is 
not something to be 
sneered at. Anything that 
fragments that, in my 
view, is against the EU's 
own interests. 
But let's look at our inter-
ests. A breakdown into regions re-
duces our clout and strengthens the 
hand of the EU vis-a-vis each part 
of the ACP. It is folly to think that 
any region will be as strong as be-
fore, or better off, if they enter in-
dividually into critical negotiations 
with the EU. As for the proposal 
that there should be an all-embrac-
ing framework accord, with sub-
agreements in trade, which is a 
vital area for us, this is nonsense. It 
will result in a situation where my 
vital interests are here, yours are 
there - and the solidarity between 
us will dissipate. From our point of 
view, there is no benefit. Indeed, 
great harm will result. There is a 
theoretical argument that you will 
be able to focus more on the prob-
lems of a particular region. We say 
that countries will be exploited. 
Take drought for example. When 
we put in drought in Lomé II, we 
were thinking of Africa. Yet, of 
late, there have been droughts in 
the Caribbean. Stabex was added 
to the Convention, principally for 
West Africa's coffee and ground-
nuts. Yet in the Caribbean, we have 
had access to Stabex for our ba-
nanas. Where are the unique 
African problems that do not touch 
the Caribbean? So a fragmentation 
will weaken both the ACP group 
and the EU's own position interna-
tionally. 
■ In this context, what about the 
EU's decision to seek a free trade 
deal with South Africa which could 
eventually be extended to the 
wider SADC region ? 
- Even under the present 
structure, we recognise that spe-
ff' tf*?
1 Investment. 
Global Connections. 
A future in services? 
cial exceptions are sometimes 
made. The Dominican Republic, for 
instance, is excluded from the sugar 
protocol, even though it is a sugar 
producer. What they have been 
doing as regards South Africa is to 
say, 'you are part of the Lomé struc-
ture but with respect to the trade 
regime, we are asking for reciproci-
ty'. You have to understand that 
those arrangements are being 
made within a holistic agreement. 
■ Does this mean that you oppose 
any free trade agreement with the 
EU in future? 
- It will rob us of any op-
portunity to develop intra-ACP 
trade - a cross-fertilisation which is 
now beginning to happen. Lomé 
was built, not on the principle of 
developing trade with Europe, but 
of developing our own trade. Very 
unfortunately in my view, we are 
now stepping backwards. 
■ Prime Minister Mitchell of St 
Vincent said at the Summit that 
services were the future in the 
Caribbean. Does this mean that 
the old Caribbean industries, like 
the banana, are on their way out? 
- No, but diversification is 
certainly part of the exercise. Ser-
vices are undoubtedly becoming a 
much more significant component 
in the region's economy. In Barba-
dos, Jamaica and indeed, many 
African countries, services are im-
portant. Even in a country like 
Kenya, where there are serious 
problems of poverty, there is a 
major tourist industry. The Con-
vention does not currently provide 
for services, so the new arrange-
ments must respond to 
this development. We 
have stressed that we do 
not want a simple trade 
and aid agreement. What 
we want is development 
cooperation to embrace 
services development, 
human resources, science 
and technology (and its 
application to industry 
and economic life). In that 
sense, we need to ensure 
that the 21st century 
agreement is not just a 
replica of the previous 
one. At the same time, 
the accord should not en-
tail a retrograde step in 
the trade arrangements. 
■ What about the future of the 
banana industry? 
- We envisage a more 
high-tech, efficient industry, for 
which we need long-term invest-
ment and technical training. Also, 
diversification cannot be done on 
the cheap... or overnight. So we 
need continuing arrangements. 
We recognise, however, that there 
will be changes, resulting both 
from the impact of the WTO and 
from the way our own economies 
are developing. 
■ Many EU citizens value being 
able to move freely across borders 
and to reside in other member 
states. This is seen as one of the 
big benefits of the single market. 
How far is Caricom from achieving 
this? 
- Caricom leaders have al-
ready recognised the need to facili-
tate free movement of university 
graduates. But we must also look at 
other categories. So far, there has 
been no clear decision with regard 
to people like media workers, 
artistes and sportspeople. They 
have not yet settled on the criteria 
and on what certification will be re-
quired. How do you decide who 
qualifies as a sportsman or a jour-
nalist? The fact that this work has 
not yet been done properly reflects, 
in part, the weakness of our own 
institutions and the fact that we 
lack resources. But we have now 
strengthened the institutions so 
that we can carry this kind of work 
forward. There are already signs of 
increased mobility within the re-
gion. Give us another five years.■■ 
Interview by D.P. 
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In September, talks will begin on the renewal of the partnership between the 15 EU Member States and the 
71 ACP countries. Although within Member States and the European institutions, the exact content of the 
discussions is still being fiercely argued, the debate is making good progress within civil society. There has 
been a series of conferences, colloquia and seminars at universities, study centres and within NGOs, as the 
various interest groups have sought to provide their own input to the discussions. The Courier, obviously, 
has not been able to attend all these events, but we recently opted for two gatherings, each of which was 
important in its own way. The first, staged in Paris, in June, was entitled 'What should be the sphere of 
cooperation between European and ACP states?' This marked the end of a series of seminars organised by 
GEMDEV between January and May. The following week, a meeting entitled 'Couleur Lomé' was held in 
Brussels. The special subject here was ACP civil society, and some 15 rural organisations participated. The 
European Commission accepted invitations to attend both meetings. 
Drawing together the 
strands 
Although European cooperation is often 
| regarded as the 'original' in development co-
| operation, it does not carry equal weight with 
I international institutions when it comes to 
I defining development models. This was an aspect 
^^^^ raised (and deplored) at the Paris meeting by 
François Régis Mahieu, a lecturer at the University of 
Versailles. He said that developing countries appeared to 
be divided between two zones of influence - the round 
table countries (dominated by the UNDP) and the 
programme committee countries (dominated by the 
World Bank). Debate on the key aspects of development, 
including the definitions of indicators and what kinds of 
project or programme should be pursued, took place 
between Washington and New York, without any 
significant European input. How had this situation come 
about, he asked. Mr Mahieu's conclusion was that 
Europe was too involved in its own internal develop-
ment, and that the Lomé Convention offered a paterna-
listic, public-service style of cooperation with objectives 
(environment, good governance, etc.) which are ac-
knowledged but not really discussed properly. 
Other speakers, also mainly researchers, spoke in 
similar vein at the GEMDEV seminar. In addition to 
considering the Commission's proposals for future co-
operation, those present looked in more detail at the 
underlying principles of the relationship. Although the 
meeting was designed to draw together the various 
strands of the earlier conferences on future ACP-EU 
relations, the topics addressed were many and varied -
perhaps too much so. 
The proceedings of the meeting are shortly to be 
published by GEMDEV, but a number of contributors 
merit a more detailed mention here. It is worth pointing 
out that participants were asked to express their own, 
individual views, and not those of the institutions where 
they worked. Jean-Baptiste Mattel (Foreign Minister, 
France) was therefore able to speak freely when he 
acknowledged that, outside the limited circle of those 
with a direct concern, the Lomé Convention did not 
interest the vast majority of EU citizens. At the very least, 
it was languishing in a state of neglect. Some Member 
States, he said, saw support for countries in Eastern 
Europe as a higher priority while others advocated a 
more global cooperation system rather than one focused 
on the ACP states. Another point he raised was that 
Europe seemed heavily preoccupied with its own future 
as key deadlines approached. This preoccupation, he 
said, was reflected in the agenda of the Cardiff Summit 
which marked the end of the UK Presidency. 
There was widespread criticism of the fact that 
the Lomé Convention had not been mentioned in the 
Agenda 2000 document, the Commission's detailed 
strategy for strengthening and enlarging the Union. 
Also criticised was the continuing failure to integrate the 
EDF into the Community budget. These factors, it was 
suggested, contributed to the marginalisation of EU-ACP 
cooperation. There was a lot of support for the view that 
the EU needed a more comprehensive foreign policy 
component - which should embrace policy towards the 
ACP states. 
One contributor observed that EU foreign policy 
appeared increasingly to be turning away from the ACP 
states. Despite this, and the disappointments arising 
from the first four Conventions, he believed the partner-
ship had a future. Europe's 'political choice' to favour 
ACP links had been made, not in the interests of the 
ACPs, but in Europe's own interests, for the sake of its 
own identity. Another speaker noted that the Lomé 
Convention was an important part of Europe's creden-
tials. How the system will develop is, of course, another 
story. There are those who believe the model advocated 
by the Commission (at least in terms of its commercial 
aspects) is completely aligned with the Bretton Woods 
approach. Their view is that Europe no longer has any 
real choice, and that it is content simply to apply rules 
imposed from outside. 
The ACPs - a market waiting to be 
exploited 
ACP-EU cooperation will nevertheless continue, 
and it is important to establish on what basis - in other 
words, to determine the parties' common interests. 
According to Andrea Koulaimah (ECDPM, Maastricht), it 
was 'obviously' in the interests of the ACPs to cooperate 
with the EU. The EU's motives were less clear-cut. In Ms 
Koulaimah's opinion, there were three reasons for the 
latter's attachment to the Convention, apart from the 
historical and geostrategic interests of yesteryear. The 
most important of these were the EU's political and 
security interests, or so-called 'negative interdependen-
ces'. The Union is active in helping the ACP states to 
manage the instability factors that affect them. The 
second reason was economic. Despite the limited role of 
most ACPs in the world economy, they represent a 
market that has still to be won, and others, such as the 
USA and Japan, have an eye on this market. Finally, 
there were the development cooperation interests. The 
EU is keen to pursue a foreign policy in which 
development policy is a driving force. The desire to have 
more effective cooperation, geared towards poverty-
alleviation, is shared by a number of Member States. 
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The nature of any future partnership was also 
much debated. The emphasis here was on political 
dialogue which some have argued is a virtually mean-
ingless concept. The suggestion was made that the scope 
for dialogue should be made more comprehensive, and 
it was pointed out that the Joint Assembly was the only 
effective forum in this respect. Jean-Jacques Gabas, 
GEMDEV's president, said, however, that even here, the 
opportunities to examine the European policy mechan-
isms were all too rare. A number of delegates advocated 
'appropriation' of the partnership by those who bene-
fited from it and, in this context, there was widespread 
regret at the absence of debate within and proposals 
from the ACP Group itself. One of the most forceful 
contributions came from Mamadou Diouf, a research 
director from Senegal. He argued that while ACP states 
should be defining the content of the partnership, they 
'continued to demonstrate their inability' to do so. Some 
speakers were more circumspect, maintaining that the 
ACPs suffered a serious lack of suitable human resources, 
while others spoke openly about an absence of 'homo-
geneity' within the Group. There is no doubt that a 
document similar to the Commission's Green Paper, but 
emanating from the ACP side, would be useful. Another 
significant issue raised was the need to develop a 
common terminology which everyone understood -
which implies some form of training for those involved. 
Finally, the progressive evolution of the ACP-EU 
partnership towards free-trade areas was much debated. 
Sheila Page (ODI, London) offered a clear exposé of the 
practical problems raised by the Commission's proposal. 
Not least of these was the absence of free-trade zones in 
the Pacific or Africa. She added that the existence of a 
preferential relationship with a group of countries at 
different stages of development raised problems of 
inconsistency between regions and preferences. She 
cited SADC in this context, an organisation which 
includes a relatively developed country (South Africa -
which may well sign a free trade agreement with the EU 
even before wider talks begin), six developing states and 
seven least-developed countries (LDCs). Within the SADC 
area South Africa was in a customs union (SACU) with 
three of the developing countries and one of the LDCs. 
This meant that separate intermediate negotiations with 
the SACU were almost as complicated as talks with the 
group as a whole. Nor was there any immediate 
expectation that SADC states would be willing to pool 
their negotiating authority at a regional level. 
A GEMDEV speaker lamented the 'gulf' that 
existed between the actual decision-making centres and 
events such as this meeting in Paris where cooperation 
issues were discussed in depth. Presumably, there is a 
similar (or even greater) gap when it comes to the 
debate taking place within ACP civil society? The 
'Couleur Lomé' meetings, held in Brussels on 22-26 June, 
were an attempt to bridge this gap. 
Bringing Lomé into the open 
A number of rural organisations recently made the trek 
to Europe's capital from across the ACP world (Maur-
itania, Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Zimbabwe, etc.). They were in Brussels to 
voice the concerns of rural people, who make up almost 
70% of the ACP population and have most at stake 
under ACP-EU cooperation. The decision to argue their 
case in Europe's corridors of power was taken in April, 
when the groups in question met in Yaoundé at the 
invitation of SOS Faim, and the 'Collectif de stratégies 
alimentaires' (both Belgian NGOs) and SAILD (a Camer-
oonian NGO). The purpose of this first meeting was to 
set up an information system and to reflect on how 
renewal of the Lomé Convention would affect rural 
societies. The outcome was a series of proposals which 
the rural organisations passed on to the European 
Commission and the ACP Secretariat during their stay 
in Brussels. They also took the opportunity to meet 
journalists, the general public and agricultural associa-
tions from the northern hemisphere. 
Given that these organisations came to Belgium 
to state their case, we felt it was appropriate to give 
them the opportunity to explain their position to Courier 
readers. We therefore interviewed Jacques Bonou, 
Secretary-General of the Benin Producers' Unions Fed-
eration (FUPRO). We began by asking him how much 
rural people in the ACPs knew about the Lomé 
Convention. 
- Almost no-one is aware of the Lomé Conven-
tion in the rural areas of the ACP states. In my opinion, 
the same is true of the towns and cities. At the Yaoundé 
meeting, we were told about Lomé; that it was reaching 
the end of its term; and that reforms were going to be 
made to it. The idea was to 'bring Lomé out into the 
open'. But for many rural organisations, this was the first 
time they had even heard of its existence - despite the 
fact that it is a Convention from which they and their 
members are supposed to have been benefiting for the 
last 25 years! We have learned a lot from reading the 
Green Paper, but this exercise has highlighted how much 
we don't really understand, and the fact that the 
Convention has never been particularly transparent. We 
have asked associations in the North to help us get to 
grips with the contents of the Green Paper. We felt it 
was very important to gain a full understanding of what 
the current Convention contains, and to envisage how 
the Green Paper seeks to support the interests of our 
civil society. A number of proposals were then drawn up 
and we decided we had to come to Brussels to meet the 
political decision-makers and explain our concerns to 
them. I am talking here about EU staff and officials from 
the ACP Secretariat. 
■ Why didn't you have this information before? 
- 1 believe it is largely due to the fact that the 
ACP states have kept the information to themselves for 
too long. Lomé has become, if you like, a 'state secret', a 
fact which we deplored at the meeting. This morning, 
would you believe, Senegal's ambassador was applaud-
ing the amount of 'information work' undertaken by his 
government. What information, exactly, is he talking 
about? No doubt, it is something that has been handed 
down sparingly from fine offices in Europe. The truth is 
that our governments have never sought the involve-
ment of civil society in the Convention. In Benin, we had 
to set up the FUPRO so that our rural organisations 
could lobby in an effort to influence national decisions. 
We also had to find out ourselves about Stabex - what 
its purpose is and who it is aimed at. 
Ultimately, of course, we are talking about the 
involvement of civil society. This is a point which is 
highlighted in the Green Paper. But let's be frank. 
Organisations have to break down the doors of their 
government just to gain the minimum of information. In 
such conditions, how can civil society be expected to 
assume its full role in development? Reality is vastly 
different from what you hear in fine speeches. 
The information shortfall has been due quite 
simply to an absence of will. The authorities have not 
wanted to involve civil society, either in the Convention 
itself, or in the reform of the system. But if you leave 
t 
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someone for a long time without water, when they 
finally get the chance to drink, they will drink until their 
thirst is quenched. That is the reaction we are now 
seeing among rural organisations. Unfortunately, 
though, not all associations in Africa have the benefit 
of the structures we have in Benin or Senegal. 
■ The key thing that emerged from the Yaoundé 
meeting was that your organisations want to have a 
say. But up to now, the Lomé Convention has been 
negotiated at government level. Doesn't that mean that 
you can't become involved without backing from your 
governments? 
- Of course we want our voice to be heard, but 
it is not our intention to usurp the ACP governments' 
position, or to take their decisions for them. Nor do we 
want to replace or call into question everything that has 
been implemented in the past. It is too early for us, for 
example, to adopt a position on whether Lomé is a good 
thing or a bad thing overall. We have heard arguments 
on both sides. 
We do not claim that our word is gospel, and 
are certainly not rejecting the Lomé Convention. How-
ever, the people are supposed to be the ultimate 
beneficiaries of ACP-EU cooperation and 70% of ACP 
citizens live in rural areas. Civil society, therefore, has a 
right to be heard. We want to be able to speak out 
when something is not right, when our people discover 
that their interests are being disregarded. There are a 
great many aspects involved and what we have done is 
make concrete proposals. We hope that the decision-
makers, particularly in the ACP states, will take our 
propositions into account - although there aren't too 
many precedents for that! 
Let me give you an example. In 1995, Benin 
decided to organise a round table on the rural sector. 
The idea was to take stock of the situation of the 
peasant farmers with a view to asking donors to support 
the country's agriculture. The donors themselves pro-
duced a huge document which was supposed to present 
the circumstances of our daily life - but was prepared 
without our involvement. Having heard that this event 
was planned, our federation mobilised itself in record 
time, obtained a copy of the document and dissected it 
in minute detail, with the aid of consultants. We staged 
the 'first forum of rural organisations in Benin' and 
demanded to be invited to the meeting as active 
participants. If we weren't invited, we threatened to 
'march on Cotonou'. People were amazed that we, as 
peasant farmers, had been able to get together, 
decipher the document and react so quickly. We were 
invited to the meeting, though only as observers and the 
invitation arrived just a day or two before it took place. 
But the arrangements were nonetheless altered and we 
were able to voice our concerns and have our claims 
heard. It is thanks to that that we have the direct 
support of donors today. 
We would therefore like to be associated with 
the EU-ACP partnership in the future, both in the 
context of consultations on National Indicative Pro-
grammes and in defining overall policy. Take Stabex, 
for example. Too often, this mechanism has been used to 
balance countries' trade rather than serve those who 
make a living from the products in question. We propose 
a reexamination of the priorities contained in this 
instrument, to include food crops. The same goes for 
regional integration. How can that possibly be achieved 
without the active participation of the people? 
■ Another of your proposals is to exclude agriculture 
from the WTO rules. 
- We see a review of the WTO rules and the 
exclusion of aspects which prevent the development of 
our farming as of paramount importance. Similarly, we 
want to take agriculture out of the free-trade areas 
advocated by the European Commission. We keep 
hearing about free trade, but Europe still subsidises its 
agriculture through the Common Agricultural Policy. I 
must confess that I really don't understand the logic 
behind this, any more than I do the structural adjust-
ments imposed on us to prevent us doing the same 
thing! Agriculture in Europe is highly mechanised, but 
for us, in Africa or the Caribbean, the land is still worked 
as it always was, with rudimentary tools and age-old 
techniques. You must allow us a wry smile when people 
talk about the global market where everyone allegedly 
has the same opportunity. 
It is essential to take account of the problems 
that are specific to Africa and to other poor countries. 
Just what is being discussed, exactly? Something much 
bigger than simple trade, that much is certain. As Mercy 
Karanja (KNFU chief executive, Kenya) put it so well this 
morning, dealing with agriculture means dealing with 
people's lives, with our lives. Farming is more than a 
means of production for us. It is a way of life. It is the 
structure on which our daily existence is built. 
This does not mean that we are against liberal-
isation. But we want at least to have the means to 
'defend' ourselves, and become integrated into global 
trade. 
■ Apart from the outcome of the Yaoundé meeting, is 
there much coordination between associations or fed-
erations, whether rural or urban, or at national or 
regional levels? 
- It is true that one swallow does not make a 
summer, but coordination is not really an issue. We owe 
it to ourselves to collaborate because the problems are 
substantially the same for all countries in Africa. 
Cooperation could be at the level of rural organisations, 
producers of a particular commodity, or even civil society 
as a whole. A farmer's interests are the same every-
where. He has only rudimentary tools with which to 
work the land, while the cost of living goes up and up. 
The basic problem is the same - poverty. In the Green 
Paper, I read that poverty alleviation was a major 
objective. Fine. In Africa, however, we would say that 
actions speak louder than words. ^B T.G. 
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by Nde Patrice Ateh* 
I Once, it would have been regarded as an ideal 
I development project, a straightforward way of 
I generating large amounts of money with which 
I to reduce poverty. Today, it looks a lot more 
I complicated. The proposal to build an oil pipeline 
I between Chad and Cameroon promises to bring 
I jobs, government revenues, private investment, 
I economic growth and regional cooperation to a 
I troubled, impoverished area of the world. The 
I 1100 km pipeline would, of course, be costly to 
I fund - an estimated $350 million. But the returns 
I could be extensive and though the price of the 
I core commodity - crude oil - may fluctuate, the 
I product is the basis of modern industrial society 
I and will be in demand for the foreseeable fu-
I ture. In addition, several of the world's biggest 
I companies support the scheme. So does the 
| World Bank. 
So what is the problem? None, as far as 
the scheme's supporters are concerned. Let's get on with 
it, they say, and help end the poverty which plagues the 
countries at each end of the pipe. Delay, warned a group 
of businessmen in Douala recently, would have 'enor-
mous and far-reaching' effects on the economy, particu-
larly in the oil and hotel sectors. A few years ago, that 
would have been the end of the story. The project would 
have been launched with a confident fanfare. Nowadays, 
however, getting the go-ahead is beset by difficulties. 
Environmentalists such as Jean Nke Ndih, leader 
of Défense de l'environnement camerounais (Defence of 
the Cameroon Environment) complain that construction 
of the pipeline will damage forests and farms. In addi-
tion, they argue, construction will produce social up-
heaval, leading inevitably to a variety of ills, including 
the spread of diseases. Lorry routes, they point out, are 
often almost identical with epidemiological maps track-
ing the spread of AIDS. The lives of vulnerable people, 
such as the Cameroonian pygmies, will be totally disrupt-
ed, they say, and many farmers will lose their land, al-
most certainly without receiving proper compensation. 
When the pipeline is complete, runs the argument, high-
ly polluting leaks will occur - as was the case in the area 
inhabited by Nigeria's Ogoni people, which led to a pop-
ular backlash and severe repression, culminating in the 
execution of eight Ogoni leaders including the writer 
Ken Sara-Wiwa. 
Mr Nke Ndih accuses the governments and com-
panies of wanting to 'maximise profit to the detriment 
of the people'. And just as globalisation fosters the free 
movement of capital for such schemes, it also brings in 
foreign critics. A lobby group has been formed in Ger-
many to 'highlight the environmental effects' of the 
pipeline, a German foundation has sponsored seminars 
'to ensure the project does not harm the two countries', 
and Wilfried Telkämper, an MEP, has voiced concerns in 
a letter to President Idriss Deby of Chad. The President is 
reported to have accused a French environmental organ-
* Freelance Cameroonian journalist. Text supplied by Gemini News Ser-
vice, 9 White Lion Street, London N1 9PD. 
isation of 'a vast campaign to torpedo the project'. 
World Bank involvement has come under fire from one 
of its most constant critics, the US-based Environmental 
Defence Fund. The use of aid money for what is essen-
tially a commercial enterprise, argues Fund spokesman 
Korinna Horta, diverts funds from 'real development' -
health, education and other social projects - and is tan-
tamount to 'corporate welfare', a concealed way of sup-
porting Exxon, Shell and Elf, the companies developing 
the oilfield in southern Chad. Human rights activists are 
now a factor in development debates, too. Jean Nke 
Ndih accuses foreign donors of abetting corruption in 
Cameroon by making loans available for projects such as 
this. 
Disillusionment over job opportunities 
To the chagrin of the project's supporters in 
Cameroon, even some of the local people who initially 
welcomed the announcement of the pipeline are com-
plaining, as they find that there may be fewer job oppor-
tunities than they thought. 'When the project was an-
nounced, the youth saw in it hope, joy and employment', 
says Lucien Biang, who recently left school in Kribi, the 
Cameroonian port at the end of the proposed oil link. 
Many have become disillusioned already, even before 
the plans have been finalised. Their hopes were probably 
unrealistically high, but the immediate cause of their dis-
content has been the lack of local recruitment by firms 
expecting to win contracts under the project. 
'After several meetings with sub-contracting 
firms', says Fritz Ndondje, a chief in Kribi, 'only one per-
son from a list of 1000 was offered a job by a construc-
tion company.' Disappointment turned to anger at one 
meeting when a job-seeker suggested workers would be 
drafted in from outside the area. 'Local people will not 
benefit from the pipeline though they stand to suffer 
from pollution and spillage', claimed one young man. 
The mayor of Kribi, Samuel Minko, said he hoped to dis-
cuss the jobs issue with the construction firms concerned. 
He was backed up by Serge Benae, MP for Kribi, who 
commented: 'I believe it's an absolute priority to reserve 
jobs for natives of the locality'. Much of the rhetoric is 
intended to put pressure on companies before recruit-
ment really gets under way. Two groups have been cre-
ated - one to lobby politicians and chiefs for jobs, the 
other to oppose construction if job promises are not 
forthcoming. 
Anxious to head off trouble, Youth and Sports 
Minister Joseph Owona rushed to Kribi to talk to ac-
tivists. Other officials weigh in with assurances that every 
precaution will be taken to conserve the environment 
and protect the interests of affected people. 'Interna-
tional standards will be respected', promises Adolphe 
Moudiki, managing director of the National Hydrocar-
bons Corporation. 'All the necessary precautions have 
been taken', says Michael Gallet, general manager of the 
Cameroon Oil Transportation Company. But the argu-
ments continue, the start-up date is delayed, costs rise. 
And development gets more complicated. M N.P.A. 
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and the popular 
economy 
by Karim Dahou* 
I In May, EU heads of govern-
I ment ratified the establish-
I ment of a single European 
I currency (the Euro). Ques-
I tions are now being asked 
I throughout the franc zone in 
I West and Central Africa. 
I How will the CFA franc be 
I affected by the integration 
I of its reference currency, the 
I French franc, into what will 
probably be a stronger cur-
rency? Will it be possible to main-
tain the current parity? What will be 
the attitude of France's European 
partners, and in particular Germany, 
to another partnership, linking 
France to the African economies? 
These questions generally 
reflect a fear that there will be a sec-
ond devaluation before the effects 
of the first one have been fully di-
gested. Some people predict such an 
event and others, including a num-
ber in African political and economic 
circles, even welcome the possibility. 
Increased competitiveness resulting 
from devaluation, even if it is very 
limited and of short duration, will 
obviously benefit relatively ineffi-
cient companies and temporarily re-
lieve the strain on public finances! 
But do the interests of cer-
tain private operators really coincide 
with those of society as a whole? 
And can declarations of principle 
have much effect on a real phenom-
enon, the value of a currency, which 
is mainly determined by structural 
factors and market assessments? 
Would it not be better to act now to 
deal with the structural factors that 
ultimately determine the value of a 
currency, rather than speculating 
about the consequences of an event 
that is, to all intents and purposes, 
beyond the reach of economic regu-
lation? There are many problems 
that need clearing up before there 
* Enda Tiers Monde, Dakar, Senegal. 
can be any kind of meaningful and 
frank discussion between the various 
parties concerned. 
The African countries of the 
franc area must, in principle, face 
the fact that their reference currency 
will appreciate in the short or medi-
um term. This could force them to 
devalue, a step best avoided since it 
could do more harm than good in 
both the social and economic 
spheres. But, as pointed out, the 
value of a currency depends not so 
much on agreements and ad hoc de-
clarations as on long-term measures 
to deal with crucial economic fac-
tors. Stimulating local production, in 
particular by reinforcing the popular 
economy, should therefore be a pri-
ority both of African countries in the 
CFA area and of Community institu-
tions responsible for controlling EU 
monetary policy. 
Will the reference 
currency appreciate? 
As most of the CFA coun-
tries' foreign trade (about 60%) is 
with the EU, the future demand for 
Euros among these countries is likely 
to be greater than their current de-
mand for European currencies, in-
cluding the French franc. There are 
two reasons for this view. 
First, the new currency will 
make it possible to trade without ex-
change risks and charges not just vis-
à-vis France (the case at present) but 
with a group of countries represent-
ing a market of 290 million people. 
It is therefore reasonable to expect 
an increase in trade with France's EU 
partners and this, in turn, will have 
repercussions on the demand for 
currency. The second reason is that 
the Euro is expected to be a harder 
currency than the franc. Investments 
in Euros by operators in the franc 
area should therefore exceed the in-
vestments currently made in various 
European currencies, leading to an 
appreciation of the Euro in relation 
to the CFA franc. 
The question of devaluation 
will therefore have to be considered. 
It remains to be decided whether 
this is a suitable tool and what other 
policies should be implemented. 
Is devaluation a suitable 
tool? 
As already implied, it ap-
pears paradoxical to present devalu-
ation as an appropriate policy for 
meeting Africa's current needs, 
when it is rejected almost every-
where else. In fact, in most cases, de-
valuation only occurs when no other 
course of action is possible. The last 
significant devaluation was that of 
the East Asian currencies, and this 
has weakened the financial positions 
of many companies. The economies 
of South-East Asia were not suffer-
ing a lack of competitiveness. In-
deed, their enterprises dominated 
many markets. The devaluation actu-
ally occurred to prevent the forma-
tion of a speculative bubble; in other 
words, an artificial increase in the 
value of their assets. The loss of con-
fidence therefore affected financial 
portfolios which seemed doomed to 
fall in value. As frequently occurs in 
such cases, a number of large with-
drawals were sufficient, with the aid 
of rumour, to turn the initial predic-
tion into a self-fulfilling one. The 
companies of East Asia lost a sub-
stantial proportion of their value. 
The shock suffered by securities mar-
kets was rapidly passed on to the 
foreign exchanges as a result of the 
interplay of withdrawals and rein-
vestments in assets denominated in 
other currencies. The currencies of 
the region therefore depreciated. 
This has been of no benefit to these 
very specialised economies and has 
resulted in an increase in the cost of 
imports, in particular raw materials, 
on which the region (apart from In-
donesia), is very dependent. 
The crisis facing the Mexican 
peso two years ago had already 
shown the extent to which interna-
tional capital markets control mone-
tary policy decisions. In this case, 
too, a psychological crisis of confi-
dence had dramatic effects on the 
Mexican economy, which had been 
expanding at full speed. The with-
drawal of foreign investors resulted 
in a reduction in the value of compa-
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nies' equity, and this ef-
fect was reinforced by the 
fact that they were com-
pelled to refinance their 
cash requirements at ex-
tremely high interest 
rates, resulting in a large 
number of bankruptcies, 
higher unemployment and 
a reduction in the poten-
tial growth rate of the 
Mexican economy over the 
next decade or so. Devalu-
ation was therefore im-
posed as the only way of 
loosening the stranglehold 
of the markets. Far from 
being desirable for a coun-
try that was having consid-
erable success as an exporter and did 
not have problems as regards price 
competitiveness, its main effect was 
to increase inflation and make 
painful adjustment necessary. 
Developing countries are 
not alone in experiencing difficulties 
making their economies, and there-
fore their currencies, credible. Even 
France faced this problem during the 
currency turbulence of 1993, despite 
the fact that the macro-economic in-
dices relating to the French currency 
were favourable at the time. There 
was a foreign trade surplus and in-
flation was under control. Although 
the French franc had not been deval-
ued for seven years, it had still not 
acquired a sufficiently solid reputa-
tion, and while the difference be-
tween the French and German infla-
tion rates should normally have 
worked in its favour, the French 
franc would nonetheless have suf-
fered the fate of the lire or the 
pound (which both left the Euro-
pean monetary system) had it not 
been for the support of the Bundes-
bank. 
In these three examples, the 
alternative between devaluing and 
maintaining the current parity was 
presented as a way of measuring the 
ability of states to resist the fluctua-
tions affecting international capital 
markets in an open economy. The 
French example shows that market 
adjustments or speculation can only 
be properly resisted with the sup-
port of powerful partners. The link 
between France and Germany is ac-
tually unique, as it is based on a 
common vision and a community of 
interests. It can, with some justice. 
When a currency 
has depreciated, a situa-
tion which is sometimes 
difficult to avoid, it is nec-
essary to take measures 
to mitigate the effects 
rather than simply specu-
lating on when there 
might be a recurrence. 
Should we 
disengage or 
remain in the Euro 
area? 
Cobbler in Abidjan. 
Priority should be given to stimulating local production, especially by 
strengthening the popular economy. 
be claimed that this certainly does 
not apply to the link between France 
and its former colonies in sub-Saha-
ran Africa. Although the ties are 
strong, they are not actually based 
on a common vision of the future, 
and their symbolic basis makes it dif-
ficult to see them in terms of inter-
ests. And participation in EMU will 
considerably reduce the 'mother' 
country's room for manoeuvre'. 
It seems highly unlikely that 
the African countries of the franc 
area will be able to establish a rela-
tionship with the EU that provides 
them with benefits comparable to 
those currently granted by France. 
This means that, notwithstanding 
the reassurances of the French au-
thorities - which are little more 
than placebos intended to avoid sig-
nificant capital outflows - French 
support may not be sufficient to 
counter any significant disturbances 
on the foreign exchange markets in 
future. Given that often, such distur-
bances are not solely due to eco-
nomic factors, it is not enough sim-
ply to repeat the mantra that they 
are impossible because the economic 
prospects are bright. As we have 
seen, the risk of devaluation of the 
CFA franc must be taken seriously by 
everyone concerned over the coming 
months and years. 
t 
' When African central banks become insol-
vent, external payments are made thanks to 
the support of the French Treasury (i.e. 
through public financing). Participation in EMU 
will mean that France loses control of its mone-
tary policy, and will only have budgetary policy 
at its disposal to adjust disequilibria in its own 
economy. Even this instrument is likely to be 
used sparingly given the powers granted to the 
European Central Bank to supervise budgetary 
discipline. 
What policy 
should be adopted to 
avoid a devaluation or 
mitigate its effects? A first solution 
might be to correct a macro-eco-
nomic imbalance using a macro-eco-
nomic tool: the currency. The coun-
tries of the CFA area do not 
currently have monetary indepen-
dence but it is conceivable that they 
might adopt a common currency of 
their own or even individual nation-
al currencies. Such a solution would 
have the advantage of cushioning 
economic shocks and permitting ad-
justments without causing hardship 
(here it is not enough to deal with 
the political and social concerns -
persistent underemployment of sig-
nificant material and human re-
sources is also incompatible with op-
timal operation of the economy). 
Such a policy would throw 
up a great many technical problems 
(coordination of economic policies 
still in their infancy, creation of an 
institution for issuing national cur-
rencies, the time required to learn 
how to manage an independent 
monetary policy etc). And it is not at 
all certain that this option would be 
preferable to that of remaining 
within the Euro area. The retention 
of the currency link with Europe 
ought to accelerate the economic in-
tegration of France's African part-
ners and thus promote their integra-
tion into the wider world economy. 
It also has the advantage of opening 
the door to direct European invest-
ment, which would be possible with-
out currency conversion charges or 
exchange risks. Thinking along the 
same lines, as more than half of the 
CFA countries' foreign trade is with 
the EU, this solution would enable 
them to cover themselves against 
the possibility of an increase in the 
cost of their imports. Remaining in 
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the Euro area would be a significant 
inducement to continue putting 
public finances in order and to main-
tain the fight against inflation. 
Finally, the prospect of par-
ticipating in a huge joint prosperity 
area, driven by one of the main en-
gines of world growth, is an exciting 
one. A policy of withdrawal or isola-
tion would seem to be counter to 
the tides of history. 
The popular urban 
economy 
Although monetary tools 
may facilitate adjustment, they can-
not be deployed to prevent it from 
happening. The key problem facing 
the CFA countries is that they have 
small open economies that are ex-
tremely sensitive to external shocks. 
The main effort should therefore be 
focused on finding ways of limiting 
their external dependence. They ac-
tually already have a significant tool 
that will help them to achieve this, 
in the form of the urban and rural 
'popular economy'. 
This term, which has been 
taken up by the European Commis-
sion, covers a multitude of activities 
that have flourished in Third World 
countries. These activities have 
emerged to fill the gaps created by 
the modern economy (resulting from 
imbalanced development where 
growth, insofar as it occurs, only 
benefits a few, and where there are 
no safety nets). The industrial revo-
lution has shown us that a society 
must produce its own forms of pro-
tection. In Europe, all aspects of soci-
ety underwent modernisation at 
roughly the same time, resulting cru-
cially in the emergence of trade 
unions. In developing countries, this 
protective function is generally pro-
vided by traditional links. Family-
based or local community activities, 
involving the production of goods 
and the provision of services, have 
therefore expanded in the CFA 
states. What distinguishes such activ-
ities from their more 'modern' coun-
terparts is that they are not solely 
based on economic considerations, 
though the latter do have an impact 
on the way such activities are organ-
ised. 
Contrary to the main trends 
of a globalised economy - which is 
constantly striving to free itself from 
external constraints to its develop-
ment - the aforementioned activi-
ties dubbed 'popular' create an 
economy that remains integrated 
with society. Instead of controlling 
all social relationships, the economy 
is interwoven with very dense social 
networks, where it must take ac-
count of other considerations. Profit 
has its place, of course, but culture 
and solidarity are there to limit some 
of the more devastating conse-
quences. And even if the popular 
economy appears unlikely to create 
the surplus needed for rapid and di-
versified growth, it still enables sig-
nificant sections of the population 
to cope more or less successfully 
with the transformation imposed on 
them. 
For example, small-scale re-
tail trading enables many poor peo-
ple to obtain what they need at a 
lower cost. This is partly because the 
items on sale are locally-produced 
and cost much less than imports. In 
addition, they are generally family 
businesses which provide employ-
ment and income for a large number 
of people. And small-scale craft or-
ganisations bring life to communi-
ties, which organise the way in 
which they function, collect their 
profits and redistribute them in line 
with social considerations. 
But the popular economy is 
not confined to small-scale activities 
at a family or local level. Women's 
savings and loans banks in Senegal 
are an interesting example of the 
larger-scale development of an activ-
ity initially confined to specific areas. 
The first bank was created in 1987 in 
Yoff, a district of Dakar. It involved a 
few women administering a budget 
of CFAF 3.8 million (about ECU 
6000). Within ten years, the bank's 
founders had trained hundreds of 
women managing a budget of CFAF 
100m. This figure has now grown to 
CFAF 400m. These resources circulate 
throughout Senegal and enable 
thousands of people to draw on con-
venient credit facilities that would 
otherwise be inaccessible to them, as 
a result of the terms laid down by 
the commercial banking sector. 
This is an example of the 
way social and economic considera-
tions can be reconciled. In countries 
with persistent budget deficits, 
where the middle classes are poorly 
developed, the paucity of private 
and public savings hampers the cre-
ation and development of many ac-
tivities. The popular economy, which 
also includes a large proportion of 
what is termed the informal sector, 
is therefore no longer confined to 
micro-companies with little influ-
ence on national output. According 
to Senegal's planning ministry, the 
output of the informal sector ac-
counted for between 50% and 55% 
of GNPin 1996. 
It is clear that those respon-
sible for administering monetary 
policy cannot ignore such a signifi-
cant area of activity in the CFA coun-
tries. The popular economy is essen-
tially concerned with local 
production at a cost that is relatively 
accessible to the disadvantaged sec-
tions of the population. It therefore 
replaces imports to a significant ex-
tent. In the long term, its develop-
ment is accordingly a stabilising fac-
tor in foreign trade, which is, in its 
turn, an important determinant of a 
currency's value. That is why the au-
thorities responsible for economic 
policy in the CFA states must do 
everything they can to stimulate ac-
tivities that are likely to reduce their 
dependence on other countries. This 
is the price that must be paid to 
avoid the difficulties associated with 
the fear of devaluation in future. It 
is also in the interests of the EU, 
which will be responsible for admin-
istering monetary policy. The less de-
pendent the CFA states are on other 
countries, the greater will be their 
tendency to develop autonomous 
production capacity. This, in turn, 
should make their link with the Euro 
less costly for the European institu-
tions. 
In the long term, the aim 
should be to create a huge joint 
prosperity area, of benefit both to 
Europe and its African partners. This 
goal is well beyond the reach of 
monetary policy, which can only be 
one of the tools available. Let us 
hope that not too much importance 
will be attached to it, by either side, 
to the detriment of real adjustment 
involving consolidation of the popu-
lar economy.■ K.D. 
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For a seasoned observer of the EU, the 19th summit of Caricom leaders, held recently in St Lucia, gave rise to 
many comparisons as well as featuring some less familiar aspects. An example of the latter was the two-man 
show staged by local actors, Kennedy 'Boots' Samuel and George 'Fish Alphonse'. They capitivated the open-
ing ceremony with a story-telling at the 'Cosy Corner', on a set representing a typical Caribbean rum shop. 
Caricom is the 
I world's second oldest region-
I al bloc after the EU and 
I many of the subjects dis-
I cussed had the familiar ring 
a of a European summit: the 
I trials and tribulations of cre-
I ating a Single Market, the 
I issue of a growing member-
I ship, forging trade ties with 
I other regional groups, and 
I the ultimate ambition of a 
I single currency! There was 
I also the question of setting 
up new institutions. In St 
Lucia, the focus was on a Caribbean 
Court of Justice and where it should 
be sited - Trinidad or Barbados?. 
Like many EU meetings, there was 
also a dominating political issue, in 
this case the situation in Guyana. In 
the margins of the summit, the gov-
erning party led by Janet Jagan and 
Desmond Hoyte's opposition, man-
aged to agree on a solution to some 
of the political problems facing the 
country. 
Also refreshingly unfamiliar 
to those used to EU meetings was 
the united front presented on vari-
ous topics under discussion in Cari-
com. Instead of the general national 
briefings that characterise European 
summits, journalists were treated to 
issue-based briefings. Of course, it 
may be that the further one moves 
towards integration, the more vital 
sovereign interests are affected -
prompting ministers to wave their 
national flags more vigorously! 
An example of the unified 
approach was the statement by Ja-
maica's Prime Minister, P.J. Patterson 
who chairs the external relations 
sub-committee. He spoke for all 14 
Caricom members when he referred 
to the 'beneficial arrangements of 
the Lomé Convention. 'We will seek 
to maintain these,' he said, 'in a era 
where the WTO is an established re-
ality.' Caricom is also looking closely 
at the likely impact of the Free Trade 
Area of Americas (FTAA) which is 
due to be up and running by 2005 -
and the special problems this might 
create for the smaller economies of 
the Caribbean. 
James Mitchell advocates charges for overflying 
the Caribbean. 
The Prime Minister of Barba-
dos, Owen Arthur, suggested that 
the pace of Caricom's own integra-
tion should be hastened, particularly 
in view of trade liberalisation w's-a-
vis the outside world. Mr Arthur, 
who chairs the sub-committee on 
the Single Market, mentioned the 
particular difficulties of reaching 
agreement on a common external 
tariff. Nonetheless, he was optimistic 
that most of the elements that make 
up the Caricom Single Market would 
be in place by 1999. 
James Mitchell, Prime Minis-
ter of St Vincent and the 
Grenadines, also emphasised the 
need for Caricom to consolidate. 'At 
every stage in dealing with the rest 
of the world', he stressed, 'be it in 
the assertion of justice or the cre-
ation of the single market... we must 
have our own house in order. He 
continued: 'In the past two decades, 
there has been a flight of capital to 
safer havens in larger countries. I do 
not see the OECS competing in man-
ufactured goods in the FTAA. No 
matter how many attacks are made 
on child labour in other parts of the 
world, that reality will not disappear 
overnight. Nor is there any way for 
us to compete with workers in coun-
tries with severely depreciated cur-
rencies.' He saw a 'niche' for the re-
gion in sectors such as informatics 
and financial services. 
One novel idea presented by 
Mr Mitchell was that air space was 
an untapped economic resource. The 
Caricom countries lie beneath the air 
routes linking the big population 
centres of North and South America, 
and St Vincent's Prime Minister be-
lieves that they are not adequately 
compensated by the airlines that 
'pass through our territory and prof-
it from it'. He went on: 'We should 
never make transit prohibitive, par-
ticularly because air-delivered 
tourism is so important to us. But we 
should share, in reasonable measure, 
in the good fortune provided by our 
geographical position. He suggested 
the establishment of a unitary air-
space regime for the Eastern 
Caribbean - to be extended later to 
all Caricom countries - which would 
levy overflight charges. The money 
raised could be used to acquire air 
traffic control equipment, help tack-
le drug trafficking, generate em-
ployment and develop infrastruc-
tures. 
In more general terms, Mr 
Mitchell said that in the next 
decade, 'we will keep our existing 
quality of life, only if we succeed in 
the second round of restructuring 
our economies.' This was a theme 
echoed by his namesake. Prime Min-
ister Keith Mitchell of Grenada who 
argued that it was urgent to give 
more attention to applied science 
and technology. He also appealed 
for 'tangible support from all gov-
ernments for the development of 
West Indies cricket.' 
The St Lucia gathering wel-
comed a special guest in the shape 
of Nelson Mandela. The President 
spoke of forging new links between 
South Africa and the Caribbean. Pos-
sibilities include the establishment of 
a South African diplomatic represen-
tation in the region and a stopover 
for South African Airways flights en 
route between Miami and Johannes-
burg. As a much respected elder 
statesman, his pledge to support the 
Caribbean's banana production in 
international fora was widely wel-
comed.Hi D.P. 
t 
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Time to change gear? 
Papua New Guinea is a relatively 
young country, gaining its indepen-
dence from Australia in September 
1975. It is one of the largest nations 
in the Pacific region (460,000 square 
km), with a relatively small popula-
tion of approximately 4,3 million. 
There is great geographical diver-
sity, with mountainous regions, 
large tracts of rain forest, volcanoes 
and low-lying swamps. There is also 
great linguistic diversity, with about 
800 distinct languages spoken. PNG 
consists of a mainland, which is the 
eastern half of the island of New 
Guinea and makes up 85% of the 
country's land mass, and around 600 
other islands. The most important of 
these are New Britain, New Ireland, 
Bougainville, and Manus. 
PNG has often had a fascina-
tion for outsiders, viewed as a 
mysterious and exotic land, where 
stories abound of so-called 'lost 
tribes', untouched by modern life, 
still living on traditional hunting and 
gathering. Outside influence came 
late to PNG, with Germany taking 
the northern part of the country, 
and Britain occupying the south-
western portion at the end of the 
nineteenth century. The western half 
of the mainland was colonised by 
the Dutch, and is now a province of 
Indonesia, called Irian Jaya. After 
Germany's defeat in the First World 
War, her former colony was placed 
under Australian administration, as a 
League of Nations mandated terri-
tory. During World War Two, PNG 
was the site of fierce fighting be-
tween the Allies and the Japanese, 
the latter having occupied large 
parts of the territory. In 1945 the 
administration of both former colo-
nies was unified, under Australia. 
PNG would have presented a 
daunting challenge for any govern-
ment. 85% of its population lived in 
rural, often inaccessible areas. There 
were hundreds of tribal groupings, 
often mutually antagonistic and un-
able to communicate with each 
other. There was a very small edu-
cated elite. And as the society was so 
fractured, there was no indigenous 
centralised authority and little sense 
of national identity. 
Bearing all these points in 
mind, one could say that, after just 
23 years of independence, PNG has 
actually done quite well. The coun-
try is relatively stable politically and 
economically. It has a free press, a 
functioning legal system and an 
apparently independent judiciary 
(the government has lost several 
cases in recent election petitions 
brought before the courts). It also 
enjoys stable international relations. 
Problems over its one land border 
with Indonesia have been resolved, 
while the 10-year conflict on the 
island of Bougainville, which created 
tensions with the neighbouring So-
lomon Islands, has recently ended, 
following the signature of a peace 
agreement (see article on page 24). 
PNG is a member of key regional 
and international organisations such 
as the Asia Pacific Economic Coop-
eration forum (APEC) and the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO). 
On the other hand, one 
might well ask why the country has 
not done better. PNG is extraordina-
rily rich in resources, exporting gold, 
copper, oil and timber. Yet most of 
its people still live on subsistence 
agriculture, infant mortality is high 
and life expectancy rates are among 
the lowest in the Pacific. There is 
also widespread illiteracy. Large 
numbers of people do not have 
access to clean water and sanitation. 
There is a drift of people 
towards the cities and the popula-
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tion of the capital, Port Moresby, has 
climbed to almost half a million. 
40% of the city's inhabitants are 
squatters living on government or 
customary land, with no sanitation 
or basic services. A key problem is 
that there is very little formal em-
ployment to absorb the urban mi-
grants. According to Wayne Gould-
ing. Chairman of the PNG Chamber 
of Manufacturers, the formal sector 
employs just 220,000 people, and he 
predicts that unemployment will 
grow at a rate of 30-35,000 per 
annum. 
In recent times, the value of 
the currency, the kina, has fallen 
sharply, prompting higher inflation, 
and the government is now in 
discussion with the IMF and the 
World Bank. 'PNG could be the jewel 
in the crown of the Pacific', insists 
Mr Goulding. 'Our poor economic 
performance is a direct reflection on 
government management'. He be-
lieves it is a mistake for the economy 
to be too dependent on exploiting 
raw materials, which will not last 
forever, and are vulnerable to fluc-
tuations in world prices and other 
external events. Last year, the severe 
drought in PNG caused copper and 
gold production to fall, because of 
the low water levels. PNG must 
move into industries that will pro-
vide a future for the country, be-
lieves Mr Goulding. He thinks that 
opportunities to establish new in-
dustries are being lost and that 
there is not enough 'upstreaming' 
(further processing of primary pro-
ducts). In short, PNG is not making 
the best use of the resources at its 
disposal. 
Our interviewee cited the 
example of coffee, one of the coun-
try's main agricultural export com-
modities along with cocoa and co-
pra. Most of the local production is 
exported in raw form instead of 
being processed and packaged in 
PNG. At the same time, 60% of the 
raw materials used in the formal 
sector are imported. 'This,' said Mr 
Goulding, is 'absurd for a develop-
ing country'. 
Looking at the national bud-
get, spending is dominated by sal-
aries and debt servicing. As Mr 
Goulding put it, the state's finances 
are 'expense-driven, rather than pro-
gramme-driven'. Recurrent expendi-
ture has grown sharply. One impor-
tant reason for this is the decline in 
the value of the kina, which has 
fallen by about 30% against the 
dollar since the end of last year. 
According to one government 
source, this has resulted in an in-
crease in debt interest payments 
from K500m to K700m. The govern-
ment is trying to tackle the budget-
ary imbalance by imposing a wage 
freeze and reducing the size of the 
public sector. Large infrastructure 
projects such as the Poreporena 
highway (domestically financed) 
and the new Jackson International 
Airport (financed by a Japanese 
loan) put additional strains on do-
mestic credit. Debt servicing would 
not be such a problem if the loans 
had been used to address the struc-
tural weaknesses in the economy, 
according to Mr Goulding. Another 
factor which is likely to have an 
impact on the national finances is 
the phasing out of Australian aid. 
Since independence, PNG's southern 
neighbour has provided significant 
budgetary aid to PNG, and this has 
no doubt helped in balancing the 
books. But the amount of such 
assistance has been steadily dimin-
ishing over the years, and it is due to 
Most of the population still live on 
subsistence agriculture. 
be phased out altogether by 2000 
(to be replaced by project aid). 
Several sectors offer pro-
spects for contributing to economic 
recovery. According to Mr Anderson, 
of the PNG Chamber of Mines and 
Petroleum, there are 'world class 
mineral deposits' in the country, 
and 'mining could go on here for 
decades, if it's properly managed'. 
The geology is very attractive for 
petrol and mineral exploitation, he 
told us, and there are enormous gas 
reserves. The key is to find an export 
market for gas. Because of its small 
population, demand within the 
country is limited. There is a project 
to build a gas pipeline to Queens-
land, and a Chevron-led consortium 
is expected to start construction next 
year. The plans are for this to be 
operational by the year 2000. In the 
minerals sector, last year's drought 
had a serious effect, causing the Ok 
Tedi and Porgerà mines to lose at 
least half a year of production. 
Upgrading infrastructure 
As one of the largest and 
most geographically diverse coun-
tries in the Pacific region, Papua 
New Guinea faces some formidable 
challenges when it comes to devel-
oping infrastructure. Most of the 
limited road network was built in 
the 1920s and, until recently, there 
had been no major new construc-
tion. In May this year, however, the 
Poreporena highway, which was 
mentioned earlier, was opened. This 
links the country's principal port 
with its main airport. Meanwhile, 
in the north, the Ramu highway was 
being upgraded with EU funding. 
This involves 130 kilometres of road 
between Madang and Morobe pro-
vince, allowing the latter to be 
opened up for agricultural develop-
ment. The groundbreaking cere-
mony took place during our visit. 
Air transport has acquired a 
particular significance in this vast 
and rugged nation. Indeed, in some 
places, it offers a lifeline, providing 
the only effective link with other 
parts of the country. Earlier this year, 
the new Jackson International Air-
port, serving Port Moresby, was 
inaugurated and the northern port 
of Rabaul has also had a new airport 
(Tokua). This replaced the old one 
which was destroyed, along with 
most of the town itself, by a volcanic 
eruption in September 1994. papua new guinea 
Pacific Tower of Babel! 
In the South Pacific, there are a number of forms of Pidgin. The variant used 
in PNG is known as Tok Pisin. How did the language develop? The most 
common accepted view is that it is an amalgam of several tongues, and that it 
arose from the need for people, who had no language in common, to 
communicate. PNG, in addition to being a linguistic Tower of Babel in its own 
right, has been colonised by Germans, British, and Australians. The other half 
of New Guinea (Irian Jaya) now belongs to Indonesia, and was formerly in 
Dutch hands. In PNG, Pidgin is based on English, and an English speaker will 
recognise many words. Nowadays Australian words are also frequent: 
'bagarup' means broken, 'no worries' is frequently heard. 
While tok pisin is the second (or vehicular) language of most Papua New 
Guineans, the fact that it has some 800 other languages makes this country 
one of the most linguistically diverse in the world. Experts say that there are 
about 5000 languages in daily use across the globe - and PNG is home to one 
sixth of them! Some of the languages are spoken by only a few hundred 
people, and are in danger of dying out. 
The Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL), a California-based religious institute, 
has taken on a remarkable challenge. Its aim is to translate the Bible into 
every PNG language. Their workers live among the people, learning the local 
tongues. It can easily be a lifetime commitment. One SIL worker we met said it 
would take him and his wife about 25 years to complete their particular 
project - which is to translate the Bible into Tami. This is a language spoken by 
just 1800 people. 
Patronage politics 
Since independence, no gov-
ernment has lasted the full five-year 
term in office, most having been 
brought down by votes of no-con-
fidence. As a measure to promote 
political stability, the Constitution 
was amended in 1991, prohibiting 
the tabling of a confidence motion 
during the first 18 months of a 
government's term. Previously, the 
threshold was six months (in itself, 
an unusual constitutional provision). 
In a situation where governments 
are unlikely to last the full term, and 
(after a year and a half) face the 
constant threat of summary dismissal 
at the hands of MPs, it is difficult to 
develop a long-term vision or to see 
policies through. Incumbent minis-
tries are obliged to focus a great 
deal of their energy on retaining 
support. The current government, 
under Prime Minister Bill Skate, is 
looking particularly vulnerable after 
a series of scandals and corruption 
allegations. 
During the Courier's visit, it 
was frequently stated to us that 
'there is too much democracy in 
PNG'. This singular criticism, which 
it is difficult to imagine one would 
hear in many other countries, stems 
from the frequent use of the con-
fidence motion (no worries here 
about parliamentary sovereignty 
being crushed by an overweaning 
executive). Compounding the pro-
blem is the weakness of the party 
system in PNG. In Parliament, 'cross-
ing the floor' is commonplace. 'Once 
elected, MPs feel free to jump from 
one party to another', we were told 
by Dr John Nonggorr, a lawyer and 
professor at the University of Papua 
New Guinea. Electors tend to cast 
their vote for members of their tribe 
or community, who will look after 
local issues, and they are less likely 
to have a party allegiance. 'Politi-
cians, in turn, generally feel accoun-
table to their local tribe or commu-
nity rather than to the country as a 
whole'. Thus, regional, and not na-
tional interests tend to dominate. In 
some parts of the country, he added, 
people would only vote if they were 
paid to do so. 
Dr Nonggorr also observed 
that the government was the major 
player in business and public life. It 
owns important enterprises in the 
country including the public utilities 
and the airline, and has a significant 
influence over the private sector. 
A plus point is the existence 
of an independent free press which 
is often very critical of the govern-
ment. Indeed, Dr Nonggorr dubbed 
the press, 'the unofficial opposition 
party of PNG'. 
Mention was made earlier of 
the linguistic diversity which is clo-
sely linked to the traditional tribal 
structures. In fact, the pidgin word 
'wontok', which is the generic local 
term for 'tribe' or 'clan', derives 
from 'one-talk' indicating people 
who speak the same language. 
Members of wontoks have very 
strong social obligations towards 
each other. They are obliged to assist 
and support other members of the 
group and to share material goods. 
The positive aspects of this arrange-
ment are that it provides a cultural 
and linguistic identity, and a support 
network in times of difficulty. On 
the other hand, obligations to one's 
'wontok' follow a person into public 
life. The instinct to 'look after one's 
own' are not easily set aside and the 
result is a tendency towards patron-
age which many Papua New Gui-
neans would not regard as improper. 
Another factor contributing 
to the instability of government is 
the high turnover of MPs. At each 
election, large numbers of candi-
dates compete for seats, and it has 
been estimated that, on average, 
50% of incumbents are toppled. This 
does not make for continuity. 
One action taken by the 
authorities to tackle corruption in 
public life, and to improve confi-
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dence in the political system, has 
been the tabling of a bill to estab-
lish an Independent Commission 
against Corruption (ICAC). The mea-
sure is supported by the NGO, 
Transparency International. At the 
time of writing, it was not yet clear 
what powers were proposed for the 
ICAC, nor indeed whether the bill 
would get through Parliament. 
Some of those we spoke to ex-
pressed the view that it was simply 
another new body which would be 
expensive to run, but would not 
come up with solutions. One sugges-
tion was that it would be better to 
strengthen existing institutions. 
There are also fears that the ICAC 
could be misused. It is supposed to 
be granted retrospective powers 
(allowing it to investigate allega-
tions of past improprieties) but if 
this is the case, then several of our 
interlocutors were doubtful whether 
those in power would support it. 
Law and order 
Another problem of grow-
ing concern, especially in the cities, 
is law and order. 'There is a direct 
linkage between lawlessness and 
disorder, and economic prosperity' 
according to a report submitted to 
the government by the Chamber of 
Manufacturers. Clearly, widespread 
insecurity adds to business costs, as 
well as making life difficult for 
ordinary people. 
A lot of media attention has 
been focused on the issue and there 
are concerns that the situation may 
be getting worse. This could be a 
serious obstacle for foreign investors 
who want to set up in PNG, both 
because of the cost entailed in 
security provision, and the difficul-
ties of attracting personnel. Tourism 
can also be affected, and while PNG 
has great potential in this area, the 
sector remains undeveloped (an 
average of 42,000 visitors per year). 
A lot of the crime is carried out by 
so-called 'rascals'. Typically, these are 
gangs of young single men, who 
come to the cities, and, finding no 
jobs, turn to crime. A worrying trend 
is that these gangs are increasingly 
using weapons. We were told by a 
senior member of the police that 
marijuana is cultivated in PNG, and 
sold for guns. Arms have also been 
stolen from the army, and at the 
beginning of this year, the defence 
force armoury was broken into and 
eight high-powered weapons were 
taken. The police have difficulty 
getting to grips with the criminals, 
we were told, because the gangs 
hide out in the settlements where 
they will be protected by their 
wontoks. The consequence is that 
security is ever-present, with guards 
outside hotels, banks, and even 
supermarkets and restaurants. Prime 
Minister Skate considered using the 
army (Papua New Guinea Defence 
Force - PNGDF) to help the police 
quell crime, but this idea was 
dropped as such a move would have 
required special legislation. During 
the Courier's visit, a new Police Force 
Act was passed. Supported by both 
government and opposition, the 
new legislation should help to im-
prove morale and motivation in the 
force. It includes provisions on 
equality of the sexes, and a disci-
Tragedy hits 
PNG 
In July, tragedy struck the north-
ern coastline of mainland PNG, as 
deadly ten-metre high tidal waves 
wiped out whole villages. Three 
giant tidal waves brought devas-
tation to coastal areas. The tsuna-
mi were caused by an undersea 
earthquake measuring 7.0 on the 
Richter Scale. The epicentre was 
just off the northern coast. At the 
time of going to press, official 
sources reported 1600 dead, and 
thousands still missing. Rescue 
workers believe that the death 
toll could be as high as 5000. 8500 
homeless people were being 
looked after in 'care centres'. 
International aid has been arriv-
ing in the devastated zone and 
Prime Minister Bill Skate, who 
visited the area, declared a state 
of national disaster. 
plinary code. It was also reported 
that the government was planning 
to buy a helicopter to combat crime 
in Port Moresby. According to police 
statistics, 40% of the country's ser-
ious crime is committed here 
Education 
The population of PNG is 
about 4 million, and barely a quarter 
of this number has received formal 
education, according to Dr Non-
ggorr. Large numbers of rural peo-
ple, living in isolated areas, have no 
access to schooling. On top of this, 
we were told that there are signifi-
cant drop-out rates among those 
who do have a place, and the 
quality of teachers is not always up 
to scratch. This has an effect on the 
academic level of school-leavers, 
creating problems when they enter 
university. Dr Nongorr believes that 
the whole educational outlook 
needs to be changed, starting with 
the primary schools. He argues that 
there is too much expectation, built 
into the system, that education 
should lead to an office job. The 
result is that vocational education 
carries a stigma, despite the fact that 
technical education is exactly what 
PNG needs. In fact, he thinks that: 
'education contributes to unemploy-
ment'. It is an opinion that is shared 
by Lady Kidu, one of PNG's two 
women MPs. 'Education of the 
masses has been neglected,' she told 
us, 'and this has led to exclusion.' 
She believes firmly in 'empowering 
people' arguing for more emphasis 
on small-scale self-employment and 
rural development. 'The country has 
been propped up by the mineral 
boom but that was a mistake. Now 
that world prices have dropped, we 
are facing problems.' She also 
thought it was 'short-sighted' to 
localise primary education (recruit-
ing only local PNG teachers). 
Educational opportunities 
are made available, argued Peter 
Baki, Secretary at the Department 
of Education. School attendance is 
not compulsory in PNG, he acknowl-
edged, but 74% of 6 year-olds were 
attending school. And 70% of those 
who completed grade 6 (primary 
school) would find places at higher 
levels. Of those who graduated from 
vocational schools, 15% would find 
formal employment, while 10% 
would become self-employed. 
The ministry official told us 
that there were proposals to change 
the vocational system, by getting 
industry involved in developing the 
school curriculum. 'Links must be 
created between industry and edu-
cation', he stressed. He admitted 
that there was a 15% drop-out rate 
at vocational level, because of the 
lack of job prospects. 
According to Wayne Gould-
ing, education is not being geared 
towards industry. 'We have got to 
develop a syllabus that is based on 
our needs, and not on Australian 
1 
the Courier n" 171 - september-october 1998 papua new guinea 
models', he insisted. 'Industry cannot 
function without skilled labour and 
vocational education should provide 
short-term courses linked to the 
market.' 
On the subject of 'localising' 
school staff, Mr Baki defended the 
policy pointing out that expatriate 
teachers were very expensive. There 
are still pockets of other national-
ities, mainly Australians and New 
Zealanders, working in secondary 
and vocational institutions. 
The universities, meanwhile, 
face a funding shortfall, which 
threatens to undermine quality. Dr 
Rodney Hills, who is the Vice-Chan-
cellor of the University of PNG, said 
that most of the budget was used to 
pay salaries, with nothing left for 
field work, purchase of materials or 
upkeep of university infrastructure. 
He told us that this year, term 
started two months late, because of 
an electricity shortage. Because of 
the irregularity of the electricity 
supply, the university has had to 
buy four new generators this year. 
Women's role 
Women make up half of the 
population of PNG and contribute 
substantially to the productive capa-
city of the economy. Yet there are 
only two women MPs out of 109. 
Both of them are independent. 
'They were elected on their own 
merits, with no party influence' says 
Urne Wainetti, general secretary of 
the PNG National Council of Wo-
men. At the last election in June 
1997, she informed us, there were 55 
women candidates, the majority of 
them first-timers. 'They did very 
well, many coming second to the 
elected candidate, and this was im-
pressive considering that they were 
up against men who had money, 
experience, and party backing.' Ms 
Wainetti is hopeful that female 
representation will increase in the 
near future. The new 'Organic Law' 
on provincial government, enacted 
in 1997, provides for one nominated 
woman member in the provincial 
assembly, two at rural local level, 
and one at urban local level. 'There 
are many areas of PNG life where 
the woman's lot is hard', Mrs Wai-
netti told us. 'As a general rule, PNG 
society prefers to educate boys, and 
67% of rural women are illiterate'. 
What about the 'bride price' 
which is paid when a couple gets 
married? Did this indicate 'owner-
women will be the future of PNG, if 
they are empowered', says Lady Kidu. 
ship' of women, we asked Lady 
Kidu. She was at pains to stress that 
this was not a fair interpretation. 
'The payment is a recognition of the 
worth of the woman, and that her 
family is losing a valuable worker. 
Nowadays, the practice is being 
commercialised, but traditionally it 
gave women security, as there was a 
sort of bargain. If her husband beat 
her, she had the right to leave him.' 
Lady Kidu ended our discussion on 
an upbeat note. 'Women will be the 
future of PNG, if they are empow-
ered'. By tradition, she told us, the 
men did the talking and 
negotiating - while the women put 
the decisions into practice. ■■ D.M 
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Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
Positive about the 
Bougainville peace process 
Peter Tsiamalili was a former 
administrative secretary for 
Bougainville, where he spent 
10 years. He was, in fact, the 
first 'prisoner of war' when 
conflict broke out on the is-
land in 1990, but he escaped, 
and is now writing a book 
about his experiences. His 
first diplomatic posting was 
to New York, attached to the 
PNG mission to the UN. This 
was followed by three years 
as his country's representative in 
Fiji. He then spent a year as ambas-
sador to the EU in Brussels. 
The current government of Bill 
Skate has given its full support to 
finding an enduring peace agree-
ment in Bougainville, and when we 
spoke to the Ambassador, he began 
with a positive assessment of devel-
opments. 
- As you are aware, 
Bougainville has been a very com-
plex and sensitive problem. The 
conflict had been going on for al-
most 10 years, and it took the gov-
ernment a long time to find a res-
olution - because there is no 
ready-made solution. But last year, 
the leaders of the different fac-
tions in Bougainville took the ini-
tiative, by meeting in New Zealand 
to discuss how they could address 
the situation. This was facilitated 
by the government in Wellington 
who provided the venue, and as-
sisted with funding. That, in our 
view, was a breakthrough. For the 
first time, the leaders of the differ-
ent factions came together in dia-
logue. This was followed by a sec-
ond meeting to which the national 
government was invited, and 
which resulted in a ceasefire. At a 
subsequent meeting, the leaders 
signed the permanent ceasefire ac-
cord, which is called the Lincoln 
Agreement. 
What is important in all 
this is that the impetus has come 
from the people themselves - from 
the leaders of Bougainville. That is 
what is helping to hold the process 
together at the moment. Of 
course, we have the assistance of 
Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and 
Vanuatu. Our assessment is that 
there has been a great break-
through in what was seen as a 
most complicated, sensitive and 
fragile situation. 
■ At the moment there is a transi-
tional administration on 
Bougainville, with plans to elect a 
reconciliation government. When 
are these elections likely to take 
place? 
- This is part of the Lincoln 
Agreement. The first step was for 
a permanent cease-fire to be put 
in place. This has already hap-
pened. The next step was for the 
leaders to get together and discuss 
the framework in which the recon-
ciliation government would be fa-
cilitated. Under the timetable, the 
plan is for elections to be held for 
a Bougainville Reconciliation Gov-
ernment before the end of this 
year. The objective is to bring all 
the factions together. At present, 
the legitimate government is the 
Bougainville Transitional Govern-
ment (BTG), formed by the nation-
al government. There is also the 
Bougainville Interim Government 
(BIG), which is the political arm of 
the rebels, and you've got the 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army 
(BRA). So there are now three 
groups on the island - and the 
only way to bring them together, 
to have one voice, is to have a rec-
onciliation government. 
■ How much autonomy will this 
a dm in is tra tion have? 
- I assume that it would 
have the same authority as the 
other provincial governments in 
PNG. It will be given a mandate at 
the appropriate time, to look at 
future political arrangements. 
■ Some people are hoping that a 
UN observer mission will be sent to 
monitor the ceasefire. Will this 
happen? 
-That proposal has already 
been endorsed by the Secretary 
General and the Security Council. 
They will be establishing an office 
on Bougainville by the end of this 
month (June), and will help to 
monitor the peace process. 
■ Relations between PNG and 
Solomon Islands were often 
strained over this conflict in the 
past. But the two governments 
worked together in trying to find 
a peaceful solution. 
- Since the appointment of 
the new government under Prime 
Minister Bill Skate, there has been 
a significant improvement in rela-
tions between PNG and Solomon 
Islands. We are close neighbours 
and we share the same socio-eco-
nomic and cultural backgrounds. 
Some people have relatives on the 
other side of the border, so there 
is this traditional link. Because of 
this, there was always a cordial re-
lationship between the two coun-
tries. The problem that arose was 
due to the spillover effect of the 
Bougainville crisis. This was a 
source of some concern to the 
Solomon Islands government. But 
things have changed drastically 
since the new administration was 
formed in Solomon Islands under 
Prime Minister Ulufa'alu. There is a 
lot more interaction now between 
the two countries. We have con-
cluded a border treaty and are es-
tablishing a joint-border adminis-
tration which will address and 
regulate the border issues. 
t 
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package to Solomon Islands in this 
context. 
- Yes. As part of this close 
relationship between the two 
countries, and to support its near 
neighbour, the government has 
undertaken to provide develop-
ment assistance to the Solomon Is-
lands. The amount will be 10 mil-
lion kina a year for a four-year 
period. I should make it clear that 
this is untied aid. The PNG govern-
ment is not saying where the 
money should be spent. It is linked 
to development, as budget sup-
port, and can be used on whatever 
priority projects they decide on. 
This is different from most of the 
assistance we get, which is tied 
aid. 
■ Connected with the Bougainville 
issue, the Sandline affair continues 
to haunt Mr Skate, with fresh alle-
gations from his former adviser, 
Luke Lucas. What is the govern-
ment's reaction to that? 
- I have no comment on 
that. I will leave that aside com-
pletely. It is a political matter. 
■ Could I ask you about current re-
lations with another close neigh-
bour, Indonesia? There have been 
difficulties in the past over the 
border with Irian Jaya. 
- The policy of the govern-
ment, since independence, has al-
ways been that the West Irian 
problem is an internal matter for 
Indonesia to deal with, and the 
curent government reaffirms that. 
During his last visit to Indonesia, 
Prime Minister Skate made that 
very clear to President Habibe. We 
have an agreement with Indonesia 
which is not only about wider co-
operation. There is also a Border 
Liaison Committee, in which a lot 
of the frontier matters are dealt 
with. That has proved quite effec-
tive in dealing with issues like the 
border crossing problem, and 
The headquarters of the Bougainville Interim 
Government (BIG). 
spillover from the activities of the 
Free West Papua movement*. So 
we have been able to contain that, 
through a regular dialogue on 
border administration. The Border 
Liaison Committee meets every 
year, the location alternating be-
tween the two countries. PNG is 
due to host the next meeting very 
shortly. We have just concluded an 
accord on a Ministerial Joint Com-
mission. This was signed during 
the recent visit of Mr Skate to In-
donesia. It provides a framework 
for the two governments to meet 
regularly for consultation and dia-
logue. These meetings will not just 
be at the foreign minister level, 
but will also involve other govern-
ment ministers responsible for spe-
cific sectors. 
■ How are relations with Aus-
tralia, your other close neighbour? 
- Australia was the former 
administrator, and has always 
been a major donor. In fact, Aus-
tralia is PNG's principal donor, al-
though the aid will cease by the 
year 2000. They have been provid-
ing assistance since independence, 
but over the years, this has gradu-
ally been reduced, and we will 
have to take on these responsibili-
ties shortly. We have had a very 
close, important relationship with 
Australia, and will continue to 
build on that. 
■ PNG is a member of the South 
Pacific Forum. The economic minis-
ters from the 16 Member States 
will meet next month, amid con-
cern about the deterioration of 
the region's economies. What is 
the current state of play? 
- I can only make a general 
statement and say that the South 
' More commonly known as the OPM (Organ-
¡sasi Papua Merdeka). 
dossier 
Pacific is not immune from the 
global economic developments we 
are seeing elsewhere. The 
economies vary from country to 
country but one thing they have in 
common is that they are all rela-
tively small - the economic base is 
limited. The crisis in Asia will have 
a significant effect on the coun-
tries of the region, including PNG. 
What the ministers are trying to 
do is see how we can work togeth-
er, in close association with the 
various international institutions, 
to take advantage of some of the 
developments that are taking 
place, and to find ways of sustain-
ing our economies. 
■ PNG is also member of APEC, the 
organistion covering the Pacific 
rim. 
- We are privileged to be 
part of the APEC group, as most of 
the members are advanced indus-
trially, and have a much broader 
economic base. PNG has a very 
small economy that depends on 
primary products. We are confi-
dent we will continue to provide a 
constructive contribution and fulfil 
our obligations as part of that 
group. There is an action plan 
which sets out the goals of PNG 
within the APEC group. 
■ How would you characterise 
PNG's relationship with the EU? 
- We have benefited a 
great deal from the support we 
have received through the Lomé 
Convention and its various instru-
ments. At present, the EU comes 
second after Australia, in terms of 
donor assistance. 
■ What do you expect from a new 
ACP-EU agreement? 
- Many people do not 
seem to appreciate the fact that 
most ACP countries have benefited 
greatly from Lomé. The ACP group 
has always felt that while some of 
the objectives of the agreement 
may not have been fully realised, 
there have been real advantages 
arising out of this special relation-
ship. Most ACPs believe that the 
link must continue after the year 
2000. As to what form it will take, 
that will depend on the current di-
alogue on what kind of successor 
arrangement is possible.HÜ 
Interview by D.M. 
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General information 
Area: 461,691 krri2 
Population: 4.4 million 
Population density: 9.5 per 
km
2 
Population growth rate: 
2.3% 
Capital: Port Moresby. 
Languages: English, Pidgin 
(Tok Pisin); Motu is widely 
spoken in the Papua region. 
There are also about 700 
local languages, making PNG 
one of the most linguistically 
diverse countries in the 
world. 
Politics 
Head of State: Queen Elizabeth, rep-
resented by a Governor-General 
nominated by the PNG parliament 
(currently Silas Atopare). 
Prime Minister: Bill Skate 
Leader of the Opposition: Bernard 
Narokobi 
System of government: Parliamen-
tary democracy, with a unicameral 
system of government based on the 
Westminster model. The National 
Assembly has 109 members elected 
under the 'first past the post' system. 
Political parties: Political parties are 
loose alliances, with frequent floor 
crossing, and government has always 
consisted of coalitions. 
The main parties are: Papua New 
Guinea First (PNGF); People's 
Progress Party (PPP); Pangu Pati; 
People's Democratic Movement 
(PDM). 
Economy 
Currency: Kina. 1 ECU = K2.32 (July 
1998) 
GDP: $4.8 billion (1995) 
GDP per capita: $1228 
Natural resources: gold, oil, copper, 
timber, coffee, palm oil. 
Main exports: crude oil, gold, logs, 
copper, coffee, copra, palm oil. 
External debt: K2.09bn (December 
1997) 
Annual growth rate: estimated 3.5% 
for 1998 
Social indicators 
(1900-1995 figures unless otherwise 
stated) 
Life expectancy: 56 years 
Infant mortality: 68 per 1000 
Adult literacy: 71.2% 
Employment rate: The formal sector 
employs about 220,000 people 
(about 5.4% of the population) 
Enrolment in education (all levels 
ages 6-23): 38% 
Human Development Index rating: 
0.525 (128th out of 175) 
Sources: Economic Intelligence Unit, UNDP 
Human Development Report (1997), Quarterly 
Economic Bulletin, Bank of PNG (December 
1997). 
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'The people tolerate much more than 
they should from their leaders' 
A striking feature of politics 
in PNG is the weakness of 
the party system. Political 
parties are defined, not so 
much by ideology, as by 
their individual leaders, who 
are expected, above all, to 
look after the interests of 
their own constituents. 
'Crossing the floor' seemed 
to reach dizzying propor-
tions during the Courier's 
recent visit, with MPs ap-
pearing to change allegiance 
overnight. Some parties have mem-
bers both in government and in op-
position! Each successive govern-
ment since independence has been 
a coalition. Hasn't this contributed 
to instability, we asked opposition 
leader, former justice minister 
Bernard Narokobi? 
- No. There is far too much 
stability in PNG. In the beginning of 
the independence period, there was 
always the possibility of changing 
the government after a six-month 
grace period. That six months was 
constitutionally guaranteed. In fact, 
there is no other Commonwealth 
country where that is done. Else-
where, whenever the ruling party 
loses its majority, it goes. Either 
there is a general election or the 
opposition takes over. We were the 
only country that was conscious of 
the problem of instability, so we 
protected the administration by giv-
ing it six months to get its policies 
together, and put a programme of 
action in place. We found that that 
was too short a period, so the Con-
stitution was amended to give it 18 
months, during which time the gov-
ernment cannot face a no-confi-
dence motion in Parliament. So sta-
bility is not the problem. 
I think the real question you 
have rightly identified is the one of 
political parties. The party system is 
not well-developed here. For the 
most part, Members of Parliament 
are elected, not on party lines but 
on personality, and on their ability 
to convince people of their own 
merits, assisted by extended family 
networks. We use the 'first past the 
post' system, and if you look at the 
election results, you see that most 
MPs are returned on less than 10% 
of the total votes cast. Only a very 
small number get a third or more of 
the poll. So if there is instability, it 
is caused by a lack of loyalty and 
commitment to any ideology or 
particular policy direction. 
■ It has been said that Papua New 
Guinea's Parliament has a basic 
flaw, in that when something goes 
wrong, the opposition doesn't 
speak out. Is this criticism justified? 
- That may be true of previ-
ous oppositions, but under my lead-
ership, this statement is not correct. 
We are very vocal. We criticise the 
government, constructively of 
course, when it makes bad policies. 
Let me give you an example. I have 
just come from a meeting with stu-
dent leaders from our five universi-
ties. They have been trying to 
arrange a meeting with the Prime 
Minister to discuss the shortfall of 
eight million kina in funding for 
their institutions. The Prime Minis-
ter has refused to see them, and 
the police would not give them per-
mission to walk to Parliament to 
present their petition. So we re-
ceived their petition and will be 
presenting it. 
■ How would you characterise your 
relations with the government? 
- We have a constructive re-
lationship. The opposition's position 
is not constitutionally guaranteed. 
However, since independence, it has 
been recognised as an essential fea-
ture of the government system. The 
opposition leader does have certain 
functions defined under the Consti-
tution - notably in appointing the 
Chief Electoral Commissioner and 
the Chief Ombudsman. He is also 
consulted in the appointment of 
the Chief Justice. So, he has these 
constitutional obligations, which he 
exercises in conjunction with the 
government. Our relationship is 
evolving, hopefully for the better. 
Historically, governments 
are reluctant to fund the opposi-
tion, and we have had our share of 
disappointment in financing. We do 
not get as much as we would like. 
The government can offer better at-
tractions. It provides incentives, 
perks and privileges to members, 
promising them ministries, vice-min-
istries and committee chairman-
ships. And it offers project funding 
to attract members from the oppo-
sition. But in terms of political rela-
tionships, we maintain cordial rela-
tions. 
■ The government came to power 
after an anti-corruption campaign, 
promising to clean up politics in 
PNG. What progress has been made 
on this front, in your view? 
- The only progress the gov-
ernment has made so far is to hide 
its own corruption. The Indepen-
dent Commission Against Corrup-
tion is little more than a cover-up. 
The government has also been 
pushing for another Commission of 
Enquiry but only to look at corrup-
tion by others - not by itself. 
You will be aware that a 
number of serious allegations have 
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been made against top people in 
the administration. We have 
pressed time and again for a Com-
mission of Enquiry, but each time 
we are thwarted, because only the 
Prime Minister has the power to set 
one up. 
We have also revealed pay-
ments made in cash and in kind to 
newly-elected Members of Parlia-
ment. We tabled documents in the 
House but the Speaker ruled 
against us. The documents were ex-
cluded from the Hansard records. So 
though the government talks about 
transparency, things are still being 
covered up. Indeed, I would say 
there is a massive and systematic 
network of corruption that is very 
difficult to penetrate. 
■ What about the judiciary? Is it 
free from political influence? 
- I don't know. I am very 
concerned that the judiciary could 
be under threat and that it may be-
come politicised, but so far, I have 
no evidence of that happening. I 
am a lawyer myself, and looking at 
the election cases that have gone 
through the courts, I believe the de-
cisions were based on law. In fact, 
the seven seats declared vacant be-
cause of irregularities have all been 
held by government MPs. I fear it is 
the government that would like 
people to think these decisions 
were politically motivated. But as 
far as I am able to assess from the 
judgments, they are based strictly 
on the law. 
■ Moving on to the economy, what 
is your view of the government's 
performance so far? 
- I am not an economist so I 
can't speak with any authority. But 
as a layman - and somebody who 
benefits or suffers from what is 
happening in the economy - I 
would say that this is easily the 
worst government the country has 
ever had. It simply doesn't under-
stand the economic basics. The 
Prime Minister does not appreciate 
that when you have an economic 
downturn, you have very few choic-
es. One is to reduce public expendi-
ture, while not restricting it so 
much that there is no money avail-
able for essential programmes. That 
has not happened. In fact the gov-
ernment has increased spending by 
expanding the ministries. There are 
something like 28 ministers and 14 
vice-ministers. Then you have all the 
departmental heads and consultan-
cies. So there is no serious attempt 
to reduce costs. 
On the other side, you have 
to increase revenue. Again, there is 
absolutely no conception within 
government about how to do this. 
They think that simply by slapping 
on taxes, that will boost the state's 
income. They introduced a levy on 
travelling, the so-called 'fly-in-fly-
Schoolchildren in Port Moresby. 
'Schools and hospitals are not getting the funding 
they need'. 
Ë 
out' tax. The fringe benefits of air-
line workers, who get a 19% dis-
count on their fares if there is a seat 
available, have also been taxed. But 
the monies are not actually being 
collected. The revenue that is sup-
posed to be coming from aviation, 
forestry products and mining is dry-
ing up. 
There is no overall planning 
to achieve growth and economic 
development. The kina has fallen in 
value since it was floated and be-
cause of the strength of the US dol-
lar, the cost of our loans has gone 
up. We are having to find at least 
K300 million a year extra to meet 
our debt obligations. 
At the meeting I have just 
attended, the students were com-
plaining that there are shortfalls, 
and that universities could be 
closed. Schools and hospitals are 
not getting the funding they need. 
Yet there is no control on ministeri-
al travel. Just to give a small exam-
ple, the Deputy Prime Minister has 
been out of the country for the last 
two weeks. He came in for a few 
days and is off again for another 
week. 
It all adds up to totally reck-
less management of the economy. 
Let me give you another example. 
The Rural Development Bank which 
was set up to assist farmers has ef-
fectively been destroyed. Its man-
agement has been amalgamated 
with the Papua New Guinea Bank-
ing Corporation, which was estab-
lished as a commercial bank to lend 
money at the best rates available. 
The Rural Development Bank was 
never intended to be a profit-mak-
ing body. Its task was to lend 
money to farmers who in turn 
would create wealth. 
Also, there are too many 
cases of people who have a close 
connection with the government in-
volved in state enterprises. 
■ There is concern, both within and 
outside PNG, about the law and 
order situation. This appears to be 
deteriorating, and could be an ob-
stacle to economic development. 
- I totally agree. I have lived 
here most of my life and would say 
that the last 12 months have been 
the most destabilising period I have 
known. We live in real fear and 
under constant threat. I live among 
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Forests cover about 90% of PNG. 
'We shouldn't just be talking about logging but 
also replanting'. 
the people in one of the suburbs 
here called Gerahu. I've always 
been there. People have urged me 
to move out but I have not done so. 
My car has been stolen twice, and I 
was forced to build a fence around 
my property. Even with this, we live 
in extreme fear. 
We live in a country which 
has a lot of wealth in a situation 
that has been dubbed 'subsistence 
affluence'. There is enough for 
everyone if they are happy to live in 
a very basic way. But there are not 
enough modern facilities. While the 
Constitution talks about equality, 
participation, decentralisation and 
devolution of power, in fact, devel-
opment is heavily concentrated in 
the cities with most of the emphasis 
on Port Moresby. People come here 
looking for jobs which aren't avail-
able. 
It is a very complex situa-
tion, involving a combination of so-
cial and cultural issues. It is rather 
like the period of the industrial rev-
olution in Europe when the manors 
and villages were broken up and 
people found it difficult to keep up 
with the dynamics of change. I ex-
pect this to go on for some time. 
Even if jobs are available, people 
are sometimes not psychologically 
or culturally geared to working for 
others. All their lives, indeed, for all 
the 40,000 years we have lived here, 
the people have been independent. 
They have worked when they want-
ed to work and no-one controlled 
their lives. They had their land and 
their shelter. Adjusting to a lifestyle 
based on possessions - be it a 
watch, a radio or a television - is 
difficult for many people. Part of 
the crime problem is a consequence 
ofthat upheaval. 
I am often asked why a big 
country like ours, with good re-
sources and a relatively small popu-
lation, has so many problems. My 
basic answer is that we are so frag-
mented and diverse. People live in 
isolated hamlets and speak many 
different languages. You can't get a 
road to everyone. You can't build a 
decent school for everyone. To 
modernise would require a massive 
reorganisation - which would de-
stroy PNG as we know it. You would 
have to move people from their iso-
lated hills and valleys. In fact, you 
couldn't do it because people are 
'glued' to their land. They want all 
the good things of the new life, but 
they also want their land. 
I think the big thing here is 
that the people basically love 
democracy. They don't tolerate au-
thoritarianism or dictatorship. They 
are free people, and that is the 
hope that we have. Secondly, the 
land is an issue that is a blessing but 
also a curse. It is a blessing in that 
people still own their land, and if all 
else fails they can still find a place 
called home, and make a living out 
of it. The third big thing is that 
Christianity has taken hold in this 
country. Through the different de-
nominations, good things are hap-
pening which we don't always ap-
preciate. I also believe that people 
here are extremely tolerant - but I 
think they tolerate more than they 
should from their leaders. 
■ As opposition leader, what would 
you do differently from the govern-
ment? 
- I think we need to reassess 
and do a simple stocktake of where 
we are now. By that I mean estab-
lishing the basic facts and figures 
about our birthrate, infant and ma-
ternal mortality, and economic per-
formance - all the key indicators of 
progress. Second we need to priori-
tise the basic needs. The next stage 
is to marshall the resources to ad-
dress those needs. I would see main-
tenance and repair work as an on-
going priority, getting roads and 
hospitals back in operation. There is 
a big agenda of maintenance that 
needs to be tackled. Before we start 
building new institutions, we 
should reexamine the existing ones, 
see how they are functioning and 
identify the weaknesses. 
On the economic front, we 
have to concentrate on the things 
that we do best, that nature has 
provided. I have been saying this for 
many years. That means focusing on 
agriculture, fishing and forestry. If 
we can improve these things, 
tourism will develop naturally. In 
agriculture I am convinced that we 
can achieve a turnaround. As long 
as people continue drinking coffee 
and tea, as long as they still need 
rubber, cocoa and coconuts, we 
should be concentrating on these 
products. We need to divide the 
country into production districts 
and regions, and give them targets 
to produce certain quantities. When 
I was agriculture minister, we had 
maps made on the soil content and 
rainfall. We tried to develop an un-
derstanding of the land and of 
what can be produced in different 
regions. As for forestry, we should 
not be talking just about logging 
but also replanting. We should also 
concentrate on fishing. If we can 
succeed in these areas, we will be-
come the richest country in the re-
gion. Malaysia is smaller than PNG 
in terms of landmass and its soil is 
nowhere near as good as ours. But 
it is the biggest producer of palm 
oil. That is a crop that we should be 
producing in suitable areas. 
I would give a goal to the 
people, suggesting that each nu-
clear family should aim to earn a 
minimum of K2000. That is not so 
hard to do from a small plot of 
coffee, two or three pigs, some veg-
etables and possibly some fishing. 
We know that prices go up and 
down but I think it is still achiev-
able, and if we succeed, we 
can make this country prosperous. 
Hi Interview by D.M. 
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A permanent ceasefire came 
into effect in Bougainville on 
April 30 this year, ending al-
most 10 years of bitter fight-
ing which claimed about 
15,000 lives. It was, accord-
ing to Anthony J. Regan of 
the Australian National Uni-
versity, 'the most serious 
conflict in the Pacific island 
states since World War II'. 
Bougainville island 
is part of Bougainville 
Province, which was for-
merly known as the North 
Solomons. The remainder 
of the province consists of 
the island of Buka and some small-
er atolls. It is situated about 1000 
km from PNG's capital, Port Mores-
by and is geographically closer to 
the Solomon Islands, whose sea 
border is just a few kilometres 
south of Bougainville. The popula-
tion of the island is estimated to 
be between 170,000 and 200,000 
(no census has been held since 
1980 because of the conflict). The 
people of Bougainville are also 
ethnically closer to the inhabitants 
of two neighbouring Solomon Is-
lands, Shortlands and Choiseul, 
than to the rest of PNG. There are 
many close family and cultural ties 
between them. Bougainvillians are 
known for their blue-black skin 
which is said to be the darkest in 
the world. Many Bougainvillians 
feel themselves to be apart from 
people on mainland PNG, and 
some refer to their compatriots as 
'redskins'. The distance from the 
rest of the country is perhaps an-
other reason why Bougainvillians 
feel different from other Papua 
New Guineans. 
Even before PNG became 
independent in 1975, there was a 
secessionist movement in the 
North Solomons, with attempts 
being made to break away from 
the Australian tutelage. This led 
the Parliament of the newly-inde-
pendent PNG to amend the Consti-
tution providing for a provincial 
government system. The system 
was reformed in the mid 1990s. 
i 
Panguna Mine 
In the 1960s huge deposits 
of copper were discovered in Pan-
guna, in the mountains of central 
Bougainville. Bougainville Copper 
Limited (BCL) was established and 
commercial production started in 
1972. From then until its closure in 
1989, the mine produced huge 
quantities of copper, gold and sil-
ver. It was among the 10 biggest 
copper extraction operations in 
the world during that period, and 
became the national government's 
chief source of revenue, account-
ing for almost 20% of GNP. Most 
of the profits went to central gov-
ernment, with 33% going to for-
eign shareholders, 4% to the 
provincial government in 
Bougainville, and just 1% to local 
landowners. But the open cast 
mining caused huge environmen-
tal damage, creating what was 
thought to be one of the biggest 
man-made holes in the world -
measuring seven square kilometres 
and with a depth of 500 metres. 
Tailings resulted in river pollution, 
and large parts of the rainforest 
were destroyed, dramatically re-
ducing traditional hunting and 
gathering activities. What was the 
most important source of income 
for central government represent-
ed environmental devastation for 
Bougainvillians. 
The conflict has been la-
belled a separatist rebellion, but it 
appears that the grievances 
No turning back. 
Bougainvilleans are hoping that they are now 
firmly on the road to peace. 
thrown up by the Panguna mine 
acted as a catalyst to revive dor-
mant separatist feelings. 
The mine also had an im-
pact on traditional life in other 
ways. The population of the island 
grew rapidly from 80,000 in 1970 
to 130,000 in 1980. Urbanisation 
followed, and the mine spawned 
two completely new towns, Arawa 
with a population of 15,000 and 
Panguna with 3500 inhabitants. 
The majority of these were young 
male foreign workers, so the com-
munities were not balanced. 
The landowners 
The situation was exacer-
bated by tensions over compensa-
tion to landowners. In PNG, the 
traditional tenure system is com-
munity ownership of land, mean-
ing that there is a complex pattern 
of rights to the territory. In this sit-
uation, compensation becomes a 
difficult matter, as there are no 
clearly identifiable individuals to 
whom a simple payment of money 
can be made. Indeed, since the 
land is inextricably bound up with 
the traditional way of life, it is not 
at all clear how traditional soci-
eties can be compensated for the 
despoliation of their tribal territo-
ries. In 1987, a new Panguna 
Landowner's Association (PLA) was 
set up, and it soon began making 
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more radical demands. The PLA 
sought compensation for environ-
mental destruction, and demand-
ed a 20% share of the mining pro-
ject. The Association attracted 
enormous support from local peo-
ple, but BCL and the central gov-
ernment rejected its claims. This 
led to increasingly militant action, 
aimed at closing down the mine. 
The Bougainville Revolutionary 
Army (BRA), led by Francis Ona, 
was then established. Violence in-
creased and the mine closed in 
May 1989. A state of emergency 
was declared in Bougainville, and 
the defence forces (PNGDF) were 
called in. As the conflict worsened, 
calls for independence began 
again, and the Bougainville Inter-
im Government (BIG) was formed 
by the BRA. An independent 'Re-
public of Bougainville' was pro-
claimed in May 1990. The main 
reason for this was dissatisfaction 
with the central government, who 
were seen to be getting the profits 
from Panguna mine, while the 
Bougainvillians were left with the 
environmental and social fallout. 
The Port Moresby authorities re-
jected the declaration and im-
posed an economic and communi-
cations blockade on the island. 
So-called 'care centres' 
were set up by the central govern-
ment, supposedly to 'protect' the 
inhabitants from the BRA. In these 
centres, people were provided 
with food and shelter, though 
there are claims that not everyone 
went voluntarily, and there were 
allegations of mistreatment. As 
the conflict dragged on, both sides 
were on the receiving end of accu-
sations that they had violated 
human rights. In fact, as the strug-
gle evolved, the political situation 
became more complicated. One as-
pect of this was the emergence of 
a 'resistance' movement which 
supported links with central gov-
ernment. 
Attempts to achieve 
peace 
In July 1990, the BRA and 
the government agreed to meet 
on board a New Zealand vessel, 
'The Endeavour'. The result of this 
meeting was the 'Endeavour Ac-
cord' - which had no lasting effect. 
In the period that followed, there 
were more discussions in Honiara, 
the capital of the Solomon Islands, 
which also proved fruitless. How-
ever, at a peace conference held at 
the end of 1994 in Arawa, it was 
decided to set up a transitional au-
thority, the Bougainville Transi-
tional Government (BTG). The idea 
was that this should provide a 
focus for the disparate elements 
prepared to negotiate with the 
PNG administration. 'The aim of 
the BTG was to mediate between 
the national government and the 
BRA/BIG, to get the two sides to 
come together', explained Gerald 
Sinato, current Premier of the BTG. 
'But it was difficult to establish. 
The fighting was so intensive that 
we just couldn't do anything'. The 
first BTG premier was Theodore 
Miriung, a lawyer and member of 
the BRA, and when he was ap-
pointed, hopes were raised that 
progress could be achieved. As Mr 
Sinato told us: 'We knew he would 
do anything to convince the peo-
ple, and to convince Francis Ona. 
During his time, there were a lot 
of peace talks overseas, but they 
were not successful. When he was 
killed, he left everything for us, 
and I took over as Premier'. 
Mr Sinato tried to get the 
peace process going again, and 
the result was the Burnham talks 
of October 1997. 'At that time, the 
whole nation was in confusion, be-
cause of the Sandline affair' (see 
box). Despite this, he made contact 
with John Giheno, PNG's acting 
Prime Minister (Sir Julius Chan hav-
ing stepped down in the wake of 
Sandline). 'He was also an ¡slander, 
and tough. We made arrange-
ments for the BRA/BIG and BTG 
leaders to come together and that 
was the first step in the peace 
process'. 
Real progress 
The talks held in Burnham, 
New Zealand, led to a break-
through in the peace process. The 
Burnham Truce, an agreement 
which brought together the na-
tional government, the BRA/BIG 
and the BTG, included a ceasefire, 
and measures for peace and recon-
ciliation. There were several key 
factors at this time which created a 
favourable environment for reach-
ing agreement according to 
Antony Regan. One was the elec-
tion of new Prime Ministers in 
both PNG (ß/7/ Skate) and Solomon 
Islands (Bartholomew Ulufa'alu) at 
about the same time. The two 
leaders decided to give their full 
support to the Bougainville peace 
initiative, and in August 1997, Mr 
Skate made an official visit to the 
troubled island. Also, according to 
Francis Kabano, administrative sec-
retary of the BTG, 'a less extreme 
BRA/BIG grouping emerged under 
Joseph Kabui and Sam Kauona, 
providing a focus for disparate ele-
ments - and this group was pre-
pared to negotiate'. Another im-
portant factor he mentioned was 
the emergence of New Zealand as 
an independent facilitator. Addi-
tionally, because of Sandline, pub-
lic opinion was more sympathetic 
towards Bougainville. In turn, 
there was an improvement in rela-
tions between Bougainvillians and 
the PNG defence forces because of 
the latter's rejection of the merce-
naries. Finally, there was enormous 
war-weariness - the desire of the 
great majority of the people was 
for peace. 
The Lincoln Agreement 
Lincoln University, New 
Zealand, was the venue for a 
meeting held in January this year. 
It was attended by about 200 par-
ticipants from the PNG central 
government, the BTG, the BRA/BIG 
The Sandline Affair 
The Papua New Guinea Defence Force 
(PNGDF) had been stationed in 
Bougainville since 1989. At the begin-
ning of 1997, the Prime Minister, Sir 
Julius Chan, confirmed publicly that a 
'security' company. Sandline Internation-
al, had been commissioned to train the 
PNG Defence Forces on the island, at a 
cost of about $30m. The administration 
hoped that this would enable the con-
flict to be brought to a speedy end. 
However, the commander of the PNGDF, 
Brigadier General Jerry Singirok, an-
nounced on national radio that the de-
fence forces would not cooperate with 
the 'mercenaries'. Singirok was dis-
missed, and a new commander was ap-
pointed. The defence forces refused to 
accept the new commander, and there 
was wide popular support for their 
stance, leading to riots and demonstra-
tions in Port Moresby. Finally, the Prime 
Minister was forced to resign, and in July 
1997, fresh elections were held, leading 
to the formation of a new government 
under Bill Skate. 
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and representatives of religious 
and women's groups. BRA leader, 
Francis Ona, was not present, al-
though he had been invited. The 
outcome of this gathering was the 
Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Secu-
rity, and Development. This speci-
fied that the ceasefire would con-
tinue until April 30, when a 
permanent and irrevocable cease-
fire would be put in place. In 
Arawa, on April 30, a peace treaty 
was signed between the BRA and 
the PNG government. The ceremo-
ny was witnessed by some 6000 
people, including foreign digni-
taries and Bougainvillians who had 
come from all corners of the island 
to join in the celebrations. The 
agreement was signed by all par-
ties, including the resistance. 
While Francis Ona did not himself 
put his name to the accord, the 
BRA/BIG was represented by the 
aforementioned Joseph Kabui (BIG 
vice-president), and Sam Kauona 
(the BRA commander). 
'The fighting is over but a 
battle remains to be won', accord-
ing to Francis Kabano. 'Most peo-
ple desire peace, but there are still 
pockets of support for Francis 
Ona'. But he believes there is a 
readiness to negotiate - stressing 
that all levels must be involved in 
the dialogue, not just officials 
from the national government and 
the BTG. The Melanesian concept 
of dialogue, he said, is different to 
that of developed nations: 'In 
Melanesian society, the bigger the 
group, the better the result'. The 
BTG official told us that reconcilia-
tion ceremonies had been taking 
place in many parts of 
Bougainville, and that this was a 
very positive sign. 'Reconciliation is 
part of the traditional concept of 
justice. When something bad hap-
pens that affects the whole clan, 
reconciliation is a way of getting 
the people back together'. A sym-
bolic gesture is made by the par-
ties, which can be 'a handshake, 
the breaking of weapons, an ex-
change of betel nuts, or the plant-
ing of a significant tree', he ex-
plained. And while there are still 
some areas that have not been rec-
onciled, efforts are being made to 
bring them into the process. 
Monitoring the peace 
The Lincoln Agreement 
also specified that a neutral Peace 
Monitoring Group (PMG) should 
be put in place to monitor the 
ceasefire. This is made up of per-
sonnel from Australia, New 
Zealand, Vanuatu and Fiji. They 
are unarmed, and number about 
300, both civilian and military. The 
PMG has access to all parts of 
Bougainville, except a 'no-go' zone 
around the Panguna mine. The 
basic principle is that the 
Bougainvillians have to resolve the 
issues themselves, while the PMG's 
task is to facilitate this. It helps by 
providing transport, sometimes by 
helicopter, to bring people togeth-
er. Transport and communication 
links in Bougainville are almost 
non-existent because of the con-
flict, and the PMG is probably the 
only group effectively able to get 
around. They talk to people, 
arrange awareness meetings, and 
answer questions. They have a 
newsletter, and have distributed 
radios to people in remote areas 
so that they can call them to meet-
ings. The bush grapevine is good, 
we were told, but it is often a 
source of rumour and news can 
get distorted. It is important that 
people, often in very remote areas, 
are properly informed of what is 
going on. The longer this process 
goes on the better, because 
stronger links will be forged be-
tween people, and their confi-
dence will be built up. 
Demilitarisation 
Currently, Arawa is the 
only demilitarised zone on 
This market may be well-stocked but a lot of 
people face difficulties transporting their produce 
because infrastructures are in such a poor state. 
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wm, Bougainville. Here, the operation 
of the 'Call Out' Act, (which allows 
the central government to 'call 
out' the defence forces in time of 
crisis) has been suspended. The 
Lincoln Agreement specifies that a 
gradual demilitarisation should 
take place and we were told that 
this depended on re-establishing a 
'civilian authority' (providing polic-
ing and village courts). The ques-
tion of policing is a delicate one in 
Bougainville. The BRA/BIG, under-
standably, is said to prefer a local 
constabulary, but there has obvi-
ously been no police recruitment 
on the island during the crisis. The 
Lincoln Agreement says that 
weapons should be destroyed, but 
does not specify a deadline. 'Free 
elections can't take place without 
the handing-in of arms', says Fran-
cis Kabano - and elections are due 
before the end of the year. At the 
time of our visit, a group of 
Bougainvillians had just set off for 
Cambodia to see what could be 
learned from their experience. 
Bougainville faces a huge 
task of reconstruction. Infrastruc-
ture has either been damaged or 
has decayed through lack of main-
tenance. Populations have been 
displaced - at the time of writing, 
possibly 50% of the inhabitants 
were still living in care centres, ac-
cording to Mr Kabano. People 
have lost their traditional liveli-
hoods, agricultural trade having 
ceased during the conflict, partly 
because of the economic blockade 
There is no future in warfare, the future is for our 
children'. 
and partly because farms and gar-
dens were not maintained. Patrick 
Koles, assistant secretary in the 
BTG, told us that people wanted 
'assistance, not handouts'. He con-
tinued: 'They especially need help 
with transport, so that they can 
get whatever produce they have 
to market. The priority is to reha-
bilitate cash crops, especially 
cocoa.' Another problem he men-
tioned was the lack of funds and 
human capacity to deal with the 
many demands. It was not the only 
time during The Courier's visit that 
we were to hear such worries 
voiced. There is a lot of frustration 
about not being able to deliver 
help to people who are in need, 
and are desperately eager to get 
back to normality. Ben Kamda, a li-
aison official with BRA/BIG says 
that people now realise 'there is 
no future in warfare; the future is 
for our children'. But he too is con-
cerned about the frustration, par-
ticularly among young people. 'In 
return for laying down their arms, 
they were promised a peace pack-
age, including projects in areas 
such as fishing and poultry.' He 
says, however, that nothing has 
been forthcoming. He himself has 
no facilities, no office to coordi-
nate programmes, and no trans-
port. On the other hand, according 
to Francis Kabano 'we have to be 
mindful of NGO and donor inter-
vention, and avoid a hand-out 
mentality. We want dignity and 
self- respect, not a cargo-cult atti-
tude'. 
Elections 
The agreement specifies 
that elections should take place to 
a Bougainville Reconciliation Gov-
ernment (BRG) before the end of 
the year, when the mandate of the 
current legal authority, the BTG, 
will end. 'We must have the poll 
before the end of December', 
stressed Gerald Sinato. 'We must 
avoid a vacuum'. But according to 
Ben Kamda, it is too soon to hold 
elections. He believes more talking 
is needed so that people can learn 
to 'trust each other, forgive and 
forget'. The peace is still fragile, he 
stresses, and much more reconcilia-
tion has to take place. 
There are practical con-
straints too that make the dead-
line look shaky. Decisions have to 
be made about the kind of repre-
sentation that will be provided 
and the constitutional position of 
the new government. The BTG was 
established in 1995 as a new 
provincial authority to replace the 
suspended North Solomons provin-
cial government. In the same year, 
the PNG Constitution was changed 
as part of a more wide-ranging re-
view of provincial administration 
in the country and a new 'Organic 
Law' was instituted. The BTG was 
excluded from this process, howev-
er, and thus, as Mr Sinato ex-
plained, it still depends on the old 
Organic Law. According to an ex-
pert we consulted, the New Or-
ganic Law will probably not have 
any direct relevence to the new 
Bougainville government, as the 
national government has commit-
ted itself to providing special 
arrangements for Bougainville. 
The details still have to be worked 
out and it may be that a further 
constitutional change will be 
needed. 'I'm trying my best to see 
what would be a suitable political 
structure for Bougainville', said Mr 
Sinato. 'What we are doing is seek-
ing to work out things in the spirit 
of new Bougainville - a new spirit 
and a new deal.'■■ D.M. 
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fl A wealth of art and 
artifacts 
Mention has already been 
made in this report of the 
linguistic and geographical 
diversity of Papua New Gui-
nea. With some 800 distinct 
languages spoken, there are 
about as many different cul-
tures. Each linguistic group, 
or wontok, has its own tra-
ditions and sense of identity. 
Most Papua New Guineans 
live in villages. Settlements 
can vary in size from just a 
few huts to more substantial 
communities of a couple of 
thousand people. Tradition-
ally, villagers had little con-
tact with those outside their 
own area, whom they often 
regarded with hostility or 
fear. What contact they did 
have with the outside world 
was for trading or warfare. 
The diversity of the terrain -
impenetrable forests, tower-
ing mountains and coastal swamps -
has no doubt contributed to the 
isolation of the different groups, 
Ancestral figures 
and reinforced their strong sense 
of cultural identity. 
Village life 
The main activity has al-
ways been subsistence farming. 
There is evidence to suggest that 
crop cultivation was taking place in 
PNG some thousands of years be-
fore it began in Europe. Tools were 
made from stone and wood, and 
the people fashioned clay pots for 
storing water and foodstuffs, and 
bows and arrows for hunting and 
warfare. Despite the struggle of 
everyday life, not all the energy of 
the inhabitants was devoted to 
day-to-day survival. Indeed, one 
finds an extraordinary wealth of 
artistic creation, making PNG one 
of the world's most important 
sources of 'primitive' art. One fac-
tor contributing to this is almost 
certainly the technical skill of the 
people. It is often remarked that 
Papua New Guineans are 'good 
with their hands'. 
As a source of artistic in-
spiration, traditional spiritual be-
liefs are thought to have had a 
great influence. Nowadays, PNG is 
classified as a Christian country, but 
Christianity arrived here only about 
100 years ago. Before this, people 
worshipped supernatural powers, 
and various objects were created 
to represent these, or to ward off 
evil spirits. The haus tambaran or 
spirit house, was built to honour 
the spirits, and the building itself 
was often a work of art, with 
soaring, decorated eaves. It con-
tained carvings which represented 
the spirits - and only men were 
permitted to enter. In some areas, 
mountains (and the power they 
represented) were objects of rever-
ence and offerings would be made 
in their honour. The power of the 
elements also had religious signifi-
cance: a storm or flood might be 
construed as a punishment for 
some human activity. Fertility, har-
vest and initiation rites were cele-
brated, with festivals where masks 
and traditional dress were worn. As 
with religious art the world over, 
works to honour and represent the 
spiritual ¡cons of the culture were 
created by the most highly skilled 
and creative people in the commu-
nity. The advent of Christianity 
The inscription on this painting roughly 
translates as follows: 'the bird of 
paradise gives food to her babies who 
stay inside the nest'. 
The artist paints in a similar style to the 
renowned PNG artist, Mattias Kauage, 
who has just been awarded an OBE for 
his contribution to the arts in his 
country. 
almost certainly had some effect in 
undermining traditional beliefs -
indeed there are stories of mission-
aries insisting that traditional arte-
facts be destroyed. But haus tam-
Tapa cloth is made from the bark of a 
mulberry tree, which is beaten with a 
special wooden stick until it is paper 
thin. It is then painted with vivid 
designs, using natural dyes. Sometimes 
tapa cloth is worn, but it is also used as 
a decoration. 
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Working with clay 
One of PNG's best known artists, sculptor and potter, Mary Gole, was born in 
the Northern Province. Her mother was also a potter, making clay items for 
cooking and storing water. Married to an Australian architect, Mary spent 
many years in Australia where she and her husband worked on housing 
projects for aboriginal people. While there, she renewed her interest in 
pottery, as the clay she found in Australia, which is highly suitable for 
pottery, reminded her of the material used by her mother. 
It was on a visit to Sydney that Mary learned about the craft. Visiting potters 
who worked in the city, she discovered the kiln and pottery wheel for the 
first time. Back in PNG, she continued to develop her work and her personal 
style. She uses clay imported from Australia rather than local clay which she 
finds too fragile. Storage pots figure strongly in her work, and in this, she 
follows in the family tradition. But her pots are not plain objects. They 
feature intricate and often symbolic designs. A water storage vessel reveals 
the face of a woman, symbolising that it is the women who do this work in 
PNG. The photograph that we have reproduced is of a sego storage pot, 
decorated in a highly stylised form. Sego is a kind of flour, and is a staple 
foodstuff during the dry season. 
In Mary Gole's workshop, we were 
shown a number of small, intricate 
sculptures. One is of a lapung papa 
(Pidgin for an old man). Another 
depicts a woman breastfeeding a 
baby and a piglet at the same time. 
This underlines the importance of 
the pig in Papua New Guinea. 
In 1995, Mary, along with two 
compatriots and other artists from 
the South Pacific, held an exhibition 
of the region's contemporary art. 
Her work has been exhibited exten-
sively in PNG and overseas, has 
featured in a number of art reviews, 
and is to be found in a number of 
private collections. 
Mask from the Sepie region, which was 
probably used as decoration in a haus 
tambaran. The features tend towards 
the abstract; for example eyes appear 
as slits and the ears are asymettrical. 
Sometimes particularly ugly masks were 
intended to frighten women and 
children away! 
baran are still being built today, 
and artistic activity is as vibrant as 
ever. 
There are two areas in PNG 
which are said to be particularly 
rich in 'primitive' art. One is the 
series of villages along the Sepik 
river basin, sometimes called the 
'River of Art'. The other is the 
Papuan Gulf. In both areas, wood 
carvings, masks, house decorations, 
carved house posts, pottery and 
paintings are found in abundance. 
Many different styles of artwork 
are involved - and most of the 
villagers seem to be involved in 
creative activity. A lot of the art is 
produced for traditional use, such 
as ceremonies and decoration. Only 
recently have villagers begun to 
employ their skills for commercial 
purposes. 
Yet another form of art is 
found in the Highlands region. This 
is one of the most densely popu-
lated parts of PNG, containing 
about a third of the country's 
population. In the Highlands, phy-
sical artefacts such as pottery or 
carvings are rare. Instead, creativity 
finds its expression in body decora-
tion. The two most famous 'shows' 
or festivals, where this art can be 
seen in its full glory, are those held 
annually in the towns of.Goroka 
and Mount Hagen. At these events, 
wontoks vie with each other to 
create the most dramatic and ex-
travagant costumes. You will see 
participants in these spectacles dis-
guised as birds and other animals, 
covered in pale mud to signify 
death (called mudmen), or with 
their bodies painted in striking 
colours. Great inventiveness is used 
in creating head dresses and cos-
tumes. Often these are made from 
feathers, especially from the bird of 
paradise (the symbol of PNG). 
Other materials used include animal 
parts (skins, horns and tails) shells 
and plants. ■ D.M. 
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Exploiting the 
forest wisely  χ 
Flying over PNG, one is struck by the 
density and mass of forests that 
cover the country. In fact, almost 
90% of the country's land mass is 
covered in trees, and they have 
always been one of Papua New 
Guinea's most valuable resources. 
The majority of the people depend 
on the land, and make their living 
from subsistence agriculture. In ad-
dition, forestry is an important 
source of revenue for the govern-
ment, with timber sales accounting 
for 14% of total exports in 1996. 
Logging has been a tempting source 
of ready cash for local landowners, 
who have often not been aware of 
the environmental consequences. 
The key question is how to preserve 
this rich natural resource, while at 
the same time use it as a source of 
income for the local people. The EU 
has created a programme to provide 
an alternative for the local land-
owners. Operating under the some-
what unwieldy title, the Island Re-
gion Environment and Community 
Development Programme (IRECD), 
the aim is to set up income-earning 
activities in forestry which are com-
patible with sustainable develop-
ment. 
The programme started in 
1995, when concern was rising 
among communities in West 
New Britain (one of PNG's pro-
vinces) that their logging re-
sources were steadily diminishing. 
The EU was approached through 
the government, and agreed to 
set up a community-based eco-
forestry project. The goal was to 
help villagers establish small-scale 
logging operations themselves, 
where they would be involved in 
all aspects, from felling the trees, 
to selling the timber. A site was 
found in Kimbe, in West New 
Britain, on a former oil-palm 
plantation, and a 'Nature Centre' 
was built, which is the headquar-
ters of the project. An arrange-
ment was reached with the plan-
tation owner, and the land was 
made available free of charge for 
21 years on condition that a 
Marine Research Centre would 
also be built on the site, which 
would be the location of interna-
tional conferences on conserva-
tion matters. The Nature Centre, 
built on a former bamboo 
swamp, has offices, a classroom 
(called the 'hauswin' in Pidgin 
because, for ventilation purposes 
it has no walls, thus letting the 
wind in!), staff housing and 
workshops. All the buildings are 
in the traditional style, using a 
locally produced, long-lasting and 
termite-resistant timber. 
Part of the philosophy of 
this project is to instil in the local 
community a sense of responsibil-
ity and ownership of their land, 
and a sense of self-reliance. For 
this reason, the initiative must 
come from the landowners, and 
they must first contact the IRECD. 
This can be by letter, or orally, but 
to initiate a project, the IRECD 
requires a written letter, either in 
English or Pidgin which must be 
signed by at least two land-
owners. This shows that they have 
a commitment to helping them-
selves. The letter also helps to 
avoid problems later on, if dis-
putes arise over land ownership, 
or the distribution of profits. 
Many of the requests come from 
people living in remote rural 
areas, where it is very difficult to 
make a living, find a job or even 
learn a skill. The IRECD does not 
publicise its services, but relies on 
word of mouth, because the 
initiative has to come from the 
landowner. A more prosaic reason 
is that 'if you advertise your 
programme, you will be con-
tacted by thousands of people 
all wanting a free sawmill'! 
The 'Hauswin' classroom. 
1 
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a project staff member visits the 
village to explain the programme, 
and assess whether the commu-
nity is really in favour of the 
project. The meeting will be held 
when all the villagers are likely to 
be available, such as after church. 
This meeting helps to iron out 
problems such as whether there 
are land disputes or existing 
agreements with logging compa-
nies. It also clarifies what the 
villagers can expect from the 
programme, such as training and 
support, but also what they 
should not expect (machinery, 
cash). After the meeting, the 
villagers must send a second let-
ter, and the next step is for the 
project foresters to carry out 
formal surveys of the land. 
The IRECD encourages the 
group to register with the gov-
ernment forest authority, as 
going through this process will 
establish the ownership of the 
land, and its boundaries, and will 
clear up any disputes. It also 
means that clan members cannot 
subsequently sign agreements 
with other timber companies for 
use of the registered land. 
An agreement is then 
drawn up between the land-
owners and the IRECD. This covers 
matters such as which equipment 
will be loaned, which timber can 
be cut, and replanting arrange-
ments. IRECD believes in keeping 
strictly to the conditions of the 
agreement and will not tolerate 
lapses, such as cutting trees at a 
lower height than agreed, or not 
replanting. 
With all of the formalities 
dealt with, the project can get 
under way, and training will 
A walkabout sawmill in use. 
begin. A trainer will go and live 
among the community. This en-
ables him to gain the trust of the 
people involved, and to under-
stand them better. The group will 
begin with a chainsaw, and all 
equipment and fuel will be pro-
vided until they make their first 
sale. After this, they are expected 
to pay the running costs them-
selves. Any profits they make 
must be put into a bank, so that 
money will be available to buy 
their own equipment later on. At 
this point, a 'business develop-
ment officer' will help the group 
to set up their enterprise. This 
involves learning basic bookkeep-
ing, opening a bank account, and 
marketing the product. The 
group will have been more used 
to living on a day-to-day basis, 
and it is important for them to 
learn to plan for the future. 
'Walkabout' sawmill 
After about six months of 
training, the group will be given 
a sawmill on a trial basis. Typi-
cally, such a sawmill would cost in 
the region of K20.000, a lot of 
money for a community group. 
Borrowing one allows them to be 
really sure that this is what they 
want, before making a big finan-
cial commitment. The equipment 
used is the Lewis saw, one that is 
particularly suitable for PNG con-
ditions. It is portable (hence 
'walkabout'), safe and easy to 
maintain. 
Once the group has en-
ough money saved to make a 
deposit on their own sawmill, 
the 'business development officer' 
will help them prepare a loan 
request at the Rural Development 
papua new guinea 
Bank. Once the group gets its 
own sawmill, they are ready to go 
out on their own. Foresters from 
the project will still be available 
to advise them on forestry man-
agement, replanting etc. 
IRECD places great em-
phasis on teaching groups to be 
aware of safety. For instance, the 
traditional method used locally to 
fell a tree is to cut a v-shape in 
both sides of the tree trunk, 
called the 'butterfly' cut. The 
problem with this is that there is 
no control over where the tree 
will fall. Also, they teach groups 
methods that lose as little as 
possible of the wood in cutting. 
Timber that is produced is gen-
erally of 'certified' quality, and is 
exported to Australia, the Nether-
lands and the UK. 
As well as the community-
based training courses, there are 
also two-week intensive courses 
at the nature centre, covering 
similar areas of maintenance, 
safety, chainsaw handling, and 
forest management. Through the 
courses, groups are made aware 
of the value of their forest re-
sources, and of the need to 
protect them. 
At the time we visited, 
there were 32 projects on the 
go, in various stages of develop-
ment. Of these, five are indepen-
dent, the groups having bought 
their own equipment, and are 
now economically viable. One of 
these groups has been particu-
larly successful, setting up an 
enterprise called 'Gibólo Timbers', 
which is located near Sulu village 
in West New Guinea. The business 
involves three brothers and their 
families, and they have bought a 
tractor and a boat. As well as 
producing timber, they have 
started a small transport business, 
and have diversified into fishing. 
One offshoot of the project is 
that local communities are now 
tending to build their houses 
from the timber produced 
through these enterprises, using 
wood which is high quality and 
long lasting. 
IRECD now has six projects 
in Bougainville. Surveys were 
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started there even before the 
fighting ended, and Bougainvil-
lians used to come to Kimbe for 
training. With a permanent cease-
fire now in place, a trainer will be 
based on the island, and as soon 
as supplies of petrol and oil are 
available, the projects can get 
moving. 
Gary Thomas, the field 
coordinator, told us that he ex-
pects to have 50 projects up and 
running soon, and that they are 
now looking at opening a new 
office to deal with this expansion. 
wm D.M. 
Papua New Guinea - EU cooperation 1990-2000 
Seventh European Development 
Fund (Lomé Convention) 
Lomé National Indicative Programme 
Regional funds 
Stabex 
Structural adjustment support 
EIB Funds 
Own resources + risk capital 
Other Lomé funds 
Total Lomé funding 
46.200* 
1.000 
0.965 
84.600 
20.500 
64.000 
8.700 
225.965 
Focal sectors 
Human Resources Development 
Rural Environment 
Human Resources Development 
Agricultural Programme 
Palm Oil, Copra, Coffee, Cocoa 
Education 
Mining, Electricity 
Mainly interest rate subsidies 
Other EC budget lines  5.000 
0.963 
Sustainable forestry, school building 
TOTAL  231.928 
The sum foreseen for the NIP under the 8th EDF (covering the second half of Lomé IV) is ECU 50 million. 
z3S?Jx i-«. χΛί 
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Looked at objectively, the collapse 
of communism does not necessarily 
prove that Western democracy is 
viable. Nor does the disappearance 
of marxism in Eastern Europe mean 
that more subtle tyrannies will not 
turn up in Latin America, Africa or 
elsewhere. And what of the belief 
that democracy, as we know it, will 
endure? Could this be a pipe dream. 
We recently witnessed a thousand 
US businessmen jostling to be first 
in the queue at the entrance to 
Tiananmen Square in China on the 
occasion of the American state visit. 
Is this the logic of the market 
prevailing over that of human 
rights? Small developing countries, 
by contrast, are likely to have 
democracy and good governance 
brandished in front of them as 
preconditions for any cooperation 
or aid agreement. 
To a certain extent, the 
takeover of power by both Mus-
solini and Hitler can be regarded 
as events that arose out of the 
democratic system. As Tocqueville 
wrote, 'We should fear despotism 
more in democratic times', 
though this certainly does not 
mean that dictatorship is good 
and democracy bad. 
There is a popular belief 
that democracy can only be es-
tablished successfully after other 
successes, particularly in the social 
and economic spheres. According 
to this hypothesis, economic cri-
teria and performance levels are, 
therefore, preconditions. Linked 
to this is the view that democracy 
cannot be created out of a va-
cuum but must be the fruit of a 
long period of societal develop-
ment - with institutions evolving 
over centuries against a constitu-
tional background that guaran-
tees freedom. Indeed, according 
to the literature, we first have to 
set up a middle class, which alone 
can take a couple of hundred 
years. 
Applying a somewhat dif-
ferent interpretation, one might 
argue that the aristocracy that 
used to govern in Europe were 
forced to grant a degree of 
equality to other citizens, because 
society had reached such a level 
of complexity and sophistication. 
Certain duties had to be attribu-
ted to people outside the ruling 
class. In other words, to avoid 
tyranny and anarchy, populations 
have to be divided into interest 
groups committed to peaceful 
competition. 
History teaches us that it is 
precisely periods of prosperity 
that are the most perilous. The 
Greek historian Polybius, in the 
second century BC, interpreted 
what we regard as the Golden 
Age of Athens as the beginning 
of its decline. For Thucydides, the 
Athenians, enjoying the security 
and wellbeing established by Peri-
cles, were blind to humanity's 
dark forces which ended in their 
downfall during the Peloponne-
sian War. 
A variety of democratic 
theories have been developed 
over the centuries and definitions 
of democracy vary from the ex-
tremely restricted to the extre-
mely wide-ranging. They encom-
pass institutional change, socio-
economic emancipation and the 
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development of a 'democratic' 
culture. 
Arguably, there are three 
phases in the process which ends 
in democracy. The first involves 
political liberation and the estab-
lishment of constitutional guaran-
tees for a whole range of political 
freedoms. This is followed by a 
period of increasing political ac-
countability (which can happen 
even in a single-party system), 
and the introduction of measures 
aimed at increasing society's in-
volvement in political decision-
making. Finally, there is the in-
troduction of universal suffrage 
and healthy political competition, 
with free and fair elections to 
decide who will assume power. 
It is not enough to 
organise elections 
Progress towards democ-
racy is increasingly becoming a 
condition for the provision of 
development assistance, and 
many countries in Africa are ex-
periencing their first taste of 
pluralist politics. At the same 
time, structural adjustment is 
nowadays regarded as a necessary 
element in the equation. All of 
this means that new concepts 
have become important on the 
African political scene. People are 
talking more and more about the 
links between democracy and 
other aspects - such as the rela-
tionship between state and civil 
society, multi-party systems, good 
governance, the rule of law, and, 
of course, development. 
Beyond the theoretical ap-
proaches, there has been a lot 
more practical analysis of the 
specific role played by the state 
in the development process in 
Africa over the last 30 years. 
Conclusions have been drawn 
about the failure of three dec-
ades of independence and, more 
especially, the failure of models 
imposed from outside, particu-
larly the French system in the 
case of French-speaking countries 
and the British system in the case 
of English-speaking countries. 
Three reasons are put for-
ward to explain such failures. The 
first is the authoritarian, hierarch-
ical-style colonial legacy. Then 
there is the fact that the African 
state had a privileged and pro-
tected environment where any-
thing was possible, without sane-
in principle, democracy obviously 
requires both the existence of a civil 
society and respect for human rights. In 
reality, however, it is often seen merely 
in terms of the organisation of 
elections. 
tion. Finally, it is suggested that 
independence movements played 
a role. The parties that emerged 
from these organisations began 
with mass popular appeal, and 
won a majority of the votes in 
early elections, not because they 
presented any particular pro-
gramme, but because they had 
fought against colonialism. 40 
years on, many of these groups 
are battling to survive against the 
odds. 
After a decade, démocra-
tisation has developed differently 
in each of the ACP states. Overall, 
however, it appears that the 
success or otherwise of the pro-
cess is gauged on the basis of 
whether the elections were prop-
erly organised and reasonably 
free and fair, on the creation of 
multiple political parties and on 
the establishment of new consti-
tutions. For the most part, démo-
cratisation has not resulted in an 
economic boom. 
In principle, democracy 
obviously requires both the exis-
tence of a civil society and respect 
for human rights. In reality, how-
ever, it is often seen merely in 
terms of the organisation of elec-
tions. The degree of success of 
the system should be measured 
with reference to how far all the 
actors in society are actually in-
volved. 
Now that politics equals 
'show biz', another significant 
element is how it is all presented 
in the media. And the media also 
tends to see it purely in electoral 
terms, believing that things are 
not going too badly if there is a 
good choice of candidates. Never 
mind that certain candidates or 
parties may be more equal than 
others! Is it realistic to believe 
that African democracy in the 
future - the democracy which is 
on the agenda at innumerable 
conferences - will be so differ-
ent? And can we really expect 
voters, who get nearly all their 
information from the broadcast 
media, to cast their ballots in 
favour of 'poor but honest' can-
didates rather than those who are 
'at the top of the tree'? 
Clearly, Africans them-
selves must decide the course of 
their own history. Democracy, as 
it is currently percieved, does not 
offer an easy solution to the 
problems of poverty and social 
inequality. It is true that develop-
ment based on grass roots (demo-
cratic) participation can liberate 
poor people, helping them to 
tackle their physical deprivation 
and to contribute to their educa-
tion through their own organisa-
tion and management. But the 
political values of contemporary 
democracy are not clear cut. 
There is a lot of scope in modern 
democracy for personal interests 
to take precedence over respect 
for representation. 
So is the wind of change 
blowing from the East, and if so, 
what will the landscape look like 
after it has passed? In December 
1989, when the Berlin Wall was 
being torn down and the whole 
world wondered what lay in store 
for the planet in the absence of 
communism, political classes in 
Africa were expressing their in-
dignation, mobilising and asking 
questions. Today, Africa is seeking 
to redefine its role - relying 
heavily on conferences, debates 
and seminars. Something is going 
on, but no one knows how to 
describe it in precise terms. M 
M.F. 
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by Francesca Mosca* 
Consideration of human 
rights, of respect for demo-
cratic principles and of the 
rule of law in Community 
actions has increased in step 
with the Economic Commu-
nity's evolution towards a 
political entity. In the foreign 
relations context, the Treaty 
on European Union marks a 
decisive stage in this regard 
and at the same time closely 
links cooperation policy to 
the development and conso-
lidation of democracy and 
the rule of law and respect 
for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms (Article 
130u). The significance of 
this link has inspired the 
principles and objectives which are 
at the very basis of cooperation 
between the European Community 
and the ACP states. This is embo-
died in the Fourth Lomé Conven-
tion, which emphasises a participa-
tory style of development, centred 
on people. The revised version of 
Lomé IV, signed in Mauritius in 
November 1995, describes such as-
pects as an 'essential element' of 
EC-ACP relations and therefore as 
subjects of common interest, funda-
mental elements in the dialogue 
between both parties and the ob-
jective of cooperation. 
To promote this approach, 
provision has been made for an 
incentive of ECU 80m to be made 
available under the 8th EDF in 
addition to the financing of ad-
ministrative and institutional re-
forms, in the context of démocra-
tisation and the rule of law, im-
plemented by various countries 
and financed under their National 
Indicative Programmes (NIP). 
At the same time, and as a 
corollary to this positive approach, 
the Convention provides an oppor-
tunity for appropriate measures to 
be taken in the event of persistent 
human rights violations or the 
interruption of democratic pro-
cesses. It has a 'non-execution' 
clause for this purpose and also a 
specific mechanism to encourage 
consultation between the parties 
on a joint, equal basis. Before any 
sanctions are implemented, the 
preferred route to a solution is 
dialogue, except in exceptional, 
urgent cases. 
Such provisions represent 
the success of 10 years of evolu-
tion which have seen a large 
number of ACP states making a 
start on the democratic process 
and setting up reforms involving 
in-depth reorganisation of the 
ways in which political power 
devolves and is exercised. 
These reforms have been 
achieved under socio-economic 
conditions which have often been 
difficult, given that governments 
in the countries concerned were 
also having to implement structur-
al adjustment programmes. 
Actions financed 
All these processes have 
been supported by the European 
Community through the granting 
of finance from both the EDF and 
the Communities' general budget. 
Via this method, projects amount-
ing to ECU 252m were financed 
between 1992 and 1997 in a 
number of areas linked not only 
to the exercise of public authority 
but also to the strengthening of 
civil society. In the first category, 
the greater part of the credits has 
been used to support processes 
aimed at more consultation of 
the people, more than 40% of 
the total sum having been used 
for this purpose. 
Community support has 
been given both to preliminary 
measures (preparation of an elec-
toral code, electoral rolls, aware-
ness campaigns, civic education) 
and to basic equipment and flank-
ing measures (technical assistance 
for National Electoral Commissions 
or election observers). Over the 
years, progressively larger amounts 
have been spent on actions aimed 
at consolidating democracy and 
strengthening the rule of law, 
including reform of the justice 
system - the cornerstone of any 
democratic structure, giving the 
prison system a more human face 
and supporting newly-elected par-
liaments. 
As for actions aimed at 
strengthening civil society, the 
Community has been able to sup-
port awareness campaigns and 
educational projects in the area 
of human rights and has also 
helped defend vulnerable groups -
through schemes to reintegrate 
street children into society, legal 
assistance and psycho-social aid for 
people affected by conflicts. It has 
even helped local human rights 
associations gain a higher profile 
and mount campaigns. Special 
mention should be made of sup-
port for the independent, pluralist 
and responsible media. Funding 
has been provided to improve 
A conference in Uganda supported by 
the Commission. 
The creation of an environment in 
which democratic principles and 
human rights are respected is a long 
and laborious task. 
* Head of Unit at DG VIII, European 
Commission. 
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Positive human rights actions funded in the ACP states (1992-97) 
Distribution by region and type of action (in ECUm) 
Elections 
Rule of law 
Good governance 
Promotion of human 
rights 
Vulnerable persons 
Press freedom 
Local associations 
Conflict prevention 
TOTAL 
West 
Africa 
14.25 
2.15 
0.19 
1.76 
0.90 
0.84 
0.86 
0.29 
21.25 
8.4% 
Central 
Africa 
38.96 
0.02 
0.56 
0.25 
0.09 
39.87 
15.8% 
East Africa 
10.32 
22.54 
3.08 
0.17 
0.34 
1.50 
37.94 
15.1% 
Horn of 
Africa 
0.20 
1.29 
1.71 
0.12 
1.50 
0.07 
0.03 
4.92 
2.0% 
Southern 
Africa 
36.22 
19.34 
19.46 
3.16 
19.09 
1.93 
20.68 
0.56 
120.44 
47.8% 
Africa 
region 
0.08 
0.68 
0.12 
0.52 
0.71 
4.48 
0.36 
6.96 
2.8% 
Caribbean 
3.93 
1.67 
0.84 
0.32 
1.50 
0.20 
8.46 
3.4% 
Pacific 
0.24 
0.03 
0.12 
0.38 
0.2% 
Indian 
Ocean 
2.08 
0.10 
0.25 
0.01 
0.02 
0.03 
2.48 
1.0% 
Multi 
regional 
0.63 
0.03 
2.85 
1.45 
2.58 
0.50 
1.00 
9.03 
3.6% 
TOTAL 
106.04 
48.66 
20.89 
13.95 
24.22 
11.96 
22.12 
3.89 
251.74 
100% 
legislation on press freedom and 
the structure of the media world, 
to support efforts at making it 
more professional, and to enhance 
protection for journalists. 
What evolution? 
Clearly, durable, balanced 
development cannot be generated 
these days in an institutional and 
political context which is incompe-
tent and lacks respect for certain 
fundamental principles which 
should reflect and guarantee, at 
all political, economic and social 
levels of a country, recognition of 
the individual and of the latter's 
fundamental rights and duties. 
This issue was expressly 
acknowledged in the Fourth Lomé 
Convention, which was revised in 
Mauritius in 1995. Nevertheless, 
implementation of these new 
parts of the Convention in the 
context of EU-ACP relations re-
quires that this thinking be trans-
lated into reality and, despite the 
political sensitivity and the diffi-
culty involved in understanding 
the concepts to which essential 
aspects might refer, that they 
become operational. 
The Commission's commu-
nication to the Council and Eur-
opean Parliament in March 1998 
attempted to take up this complex 
challenge and was aimed at pro-
posing a definition of the con-
cepts, indicating which actions and 
support they referred to and pro-
posing a way of approaching such 
issues which would demonstrate 
respect for the individual cultural, 
social and political characteristics 
of the ACP states, while still 
attempting to accomplish the Con-
vention's objectives. 
The creation of an envir-
onment in which democratic prin-
ciples and human rights are re-
spected is a long and laborious 
task and the approach that the 
Community is proposing is first 
and foremost a constructive one 
based on four fundamental princi-
ples: ownership, involvement, dia-
logue and differentiation. It re-
volves around a number of key 
aspects: 
— essential elements relate exclu-
sively to certain underlying univer-
sal principles which are inter-
preted uniquely and individualisti-
cally in each country, depending 
on a particular country's culture 
and history; 
— there is no model and no 
quantifiable threshold and objec-
tive which could be set up as a 
benchmark and/or evaluation cri-
terion; 
— political and institutional issues 
and their necessary evaluation 
must be at the centre of an on-
going and progressive dialogue 
between countries and between 
citizens of countries. This dialogue 
is an essential instrument in estab-
lishing the objectives to be pur-
sued, stages in the process, dead-
lines, obstacles and the priority 
actions needed to achieve them; 
— these priority actions are drawn 
up by each country and depend on 
prevailing political, economic and 
socio-cultural conditions in that 
country. They must nevertheless 
respect universally acknowledged 
democratic principles and, if they 
are to be progressive, in order to 
allow those involved to adapt, 
they must also be ongoing. 
However, certain areas are 
mentioned in the communication 
as deserving particular emphasis. 
These include support for institu-
tional and administrative reforms 
(constitutional, legal and legisla-
tive), education in civics and hu-
man rights to create a culture of 
democracy, support for a free and 
independent media (essential if a 
pluralistic and transparent political 
system is to be set up), and 
strengthening the role of women 
in public life. Finally, the campaign 
against corruption receives special 
attention, given its impact on 
sustainable, equitable develop-
ment. 
These considerable chal-
lenges will, of necessity, require 
major adjustments, particularly in 
the approach to cooperation issues 
which can no longer gloss over 
topics relating to the institutional 
and political environment under-
lying them. 
Together, the EU and the 
ACP states are embarking on a 
new phase in their cooperative 
relationship. This is based on the 
recognition of certain universal 
values, which must be shared, 
and of respect for the freedom 
that everyone has - by virtue of 
these values - to give individual 
and collective expression to them 
in an original and distinct way. 
This includes acknowledging initia-
tive and creativity in women, men 
and children, without which, ulti-
mately, it is impossible to envisage 
any long-term development pro-
ject. M F.M. 
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in Africa 
by Enie Wesseldijk* 
The end of the Cold War and 
the beginning of the transi-
tion to democracy have left 
their mark, not just in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, but 
also in Africa. To Western 
eyes, it has seemed as if 
countries there have been 
progressing at a snail's 
pace - three steps forward, 
two steps back. Some of the 
problems in Africa have ob-
viously been comparable to 
those facing Central and 
Eastern Europe. The key is-
sue has been to give sub-
stance to the magical con-
cept that is 'democracy'. 
When the political trans-
formation began. Western nations 
were eager to offer assistance. 
They were spurred on by the 
euphoria of entire populations 
aspiring both to democracy and 
(perhaps more importantly) to the 
material gains they expected 
would automatically flow when a 
country declared itself 'demo-
cratic'. Through a plethora of 
organisations, the countries of 
the West began drawing up stra-
tegies aimed at helping various 
groups in the states concerned. It 
took them some time to realise 
that the task was much more 
complex than it had initially 
seemed, and that it was not 
enough merely to promote the 
establishment of democratic struc-
tures. It was at this point that 
Africa's circumstances were found 
to be somewhat different from 
those of Europe's former totalitar-
ian states. 
In the first place, the gen-
eral level of education in Central 
and Eastern Europe in 1989 was 
similar to that in Western Europe 
and North America, though the 
content of that education was 
different. In Africa, however, the 
lack of even elementary education 
across large sections of the popu-
lation was an obstacle to setting 
up genuinely democratic systems 
of government. 
* Executive Secretary, International Insti-
tute for Democracy 
Democracy is based on 
everyone who fulfils the criteria 
laid down in a country's electoral 
law having the right to a free 
vote. Literacy is not one of these 
criteria, but if one cannot read, it 
is much more difficult to vote 
with full knowledge of the facts 
and to do so freely, without any 
kind of constraint. Since most 
African countries opted, in the 
early 1990s, for a transition to 
democracy (involving the staging 
of free and fair elections) it was 
essential to mount campaigns to 
educate citizens and prepare 
them for their future role as 
members of the electorate. Sig-
nificant progress was achieved in 
a number of countries thanks to 
massive popular education pro-
grammes implemented by local 
NGOs with the support of certain 
international schemes, notably 
under UN auspices. 
Promoting awareness of 
what was at stake, together with 
higher levels of literacy, has en-
abled an increasingly large pro-
portion of the population to 
acquire or begin acquiring the 
intellectual 'baggage' needed to 
be able to act as informed citi-
zens. This is not to say that the 
situation is ideal yet, but there 
has been tangible progress in a 
number of places. It is to be 
hoped that, by widening the base, 
progress will be consolidated and 
even accelerated. 
In this context, it is worth 
underlining that modern democ-
racy is representative in nature: in 
other words, citizens exercise their 
right to take political decisions 
through representatives elected 
in free and fair ballots who are 
accountable to the voters. In 
addition, democracy requires an 
active commitment to human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Equally, transparency and open-
ness are essential factors in the 
equation and, in this sphere, the 
media have an active role to play. 
In African countries, 
power is generally concentrated 
in the hands of heads of state 
who base their legitimacy on the 
fact that they have been elected, 
either by universal suffrage or by 
parliament. They are usually sur-
rounded by a relatively large 
'clan', often made up of members 
A session of the South African 
parliament. 
of the president's own ethnic, 
religious or regional group. To 
maintain a semblance of democ-
racy, the leaders allowed elections 
by universal suffrage to be orga-
nised for other bodies such as 
national parliaments, regional 
councils or local authorities. 
What they have not ac-
cepted, or seem unwilling to 
accept at present, is the function 
that such bodies must have in 
monitoring the actions of the 
presidency, and of others elected 
to government. Similarly, they 
have failed to understand that 
the government of a democratic 
country is formed after legislative 
elections and that, in keeping 
with the principles of the rule of 
law, the roles of head of govern-
ment and head of state should 
not be carried out by the same 
person, unless the independence 
of other state institutions is prop-
erly guaranteed. 
Parliament and good 
governance 
There is another funda-
mental difference between the 
African notion of good govern-
ance and the way the concept is 
interpreted by advocates of the 
'modern' state. Under the former, 
a good leader cannot but govern 
well. In the case of the latter, 
good governance is seen to de-
pend crucially on good 
institutions - in other words, 'im-
personal' mechanisms that enable 
rules to be drawn up which meet 
the needs of the greatest number, 
with the guarantee that unbiased 
administrative bodies will apply 
such rules to all, without distinc-
tion. Another principle of democ-
racy is that all institutions should 
be subject to monitoring by ex-
ternal authorities. 
Parliament is one such 
authority, which has a particular 
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responsibility for scrutinising gov-
ernment actions. The question 
that arises here is whether parlia-
ments in sub-Saharan Africa are 
actually able to perform their 
legislative and monitoring func-
tions while, at the same time, 
fulfilling their representational 
role. Once elected, parliamentar-
ians in the governing majority 
tend to worry more about main-
taining good relations with the 
president's office than looking 
after those who elected them. 
The notion that an elected 
representative should be in the 
service of, and be ready to de-
fend, those who sent him or her 
to parliament is not yet widely 
accepted, either among elected 
members or among the voters. 
This reflects the fact that, in 
traditional African societies, only 
one person - the chief - was the 
focal point of authority. He had 
the power to make the rules with 
which society had to comply, to 
implement them and to decide on 
the way they should be executed. 
Given that the chief was respon-
sible for ensuring the proper 
functioning of the whole system, 
it was inconceivable that anyone 
should oppose him. 
It is difficult to ask re-
cently elected members who have 
grown up under this traditional 
system to change overnight into 
representatives who have ab-
sorbed all aspects of the rule of 
law and act accordingly. If we are 
to be honest, we must acknowl-
edge that, even in our Western 
democracies, not all elected repre-
sentatives achieve this, and we are 
all aware of the potentially dis-
astrous consequences. 
For this reason, it would 
seem logical for multi-party elec-
tions to be the end point of a 
démocratisation process, rather 
than the point of departure. One 
consequence of the colonial era, 
and of the period of decolonisa-
tion, was that people simply did 
what the authorities asked of 
them, without asking the why or 
wherefore. If they were urged to 
go out and vote, they did just 
that - usually casting their ballots 
for those who represented the 
very same authorities. In this 
way, they sustained the system. 
Those they voted into office were 
members of an elite that had held 
power since the end of colonial 
times, and it was precisely this 
elite that most opposed any move 
towards establishing the rule of 
law in the modern sense. 
An 'African democracy' 
worthy of the name could be set 
up if one were to take advantage 
of traditional democratic ele-
ments on the continent and adapt 
democratic procedures as under-
stood in the west to the special 
circumstances of the countries in 
question. This means, among 
other things, that African parlia-
ments must be able to create the 
conditions enabling people to 
become aware of their role as 
electors and of the influence they 
can have on the decision-making 
process. Parliaments could facili-
tate this by adopting relevant 
laws, by ensuring that the legisla-
tion is actually implemented and, 
most importantly, by demonstrat-
ing that they are fulfilling their 
role in monitoring the various 
executive powers. 
It is here that a genuine 
opportunity exists to provide use-
ful help and to facilitate the 
correct functioning of parliamen-
tary systems. Elected representa-
tives in Africa need to be in-
formed about their role as parlia-
mentarians with an emphasis on 
the independence of the parlia-
mentary institution vis-à-vis the 
executive. The role of political 
parties in parliament, including 
opposition groups, needs to be 
examined. It must be made clear 
that, in a parliamentary democ-
racy, today's majority is tomor-
row's opposition and, for this 
reason, the majority would do 
well to respect the opinions of 
the minority. 
Parliamentarians in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe are un-
doubtedly well qualified to dis-
cuss such issues with their African 
counterparts, given that they 
come from countries where the 
transition process is still ongoing. 
They should be able to refer to 
specific problems they have en-
countered and the solutions they 
have, or have not been able to 
find. They can describe their own 
experiences of societies where 
much of what appears normal 
and established to those in the 
west is still being demanded by 
voters and has still to be set up 
and consolidated. 
The functioning of parlia-
ment and its members will also 
become more efficient if a well 
trained and well-informed, neu-
tral parliamentary administration 
supports the work done by 
elected representatives. This 
should include specialist staff to 
help with writing parliamentary 
reports and drawing up legislative 
amendments, and services such as 
a library and a parliamentary 
information office. These are all 
necessary to help parliamentar-
ians in their work. 
The staff involved must 
have sufficient status to be inde-
pendent of the powers-that-be 
and they must receive a decent 
wage if they are to be protected 
against inevitable attempts at 
corruption by pressure groups. 
Parliamentarians also need infra-
structures: offices and computer 
systems that will facilitate the task 
they have taken. They need to be 
able to communicate with their 
electorate. Voters, in turn, must 
have the opportunity to question 
them on a regular basis, to ensure 
their interests are indeed being 
taken into account. 
All this requires significant 
financial resources, but it is essen-
tial if one of the crucial institu-
tions of the rule of law is to be 
effective. It is all the more im-
portant to achieve the right con-
ditions for attracting secure for-
eign investment - something that 
entails having a parliament which 
functions properly. An influx of 
funds will help governments in-
vest for the benefit of the popu-
lation, improving education and 
health provision. Governments 
will also be able to establish 
genuine public services and ad-
ministrative institutions that en-
sure the rules drawn up by the 
elected representatives are ap-
plied to everyone - thereby guar-
anteeing the equality of all citi-
zens before the law. 
It may be that these last 
few sentences read somewhat like 
a fairy tale, in which each stage is 
presented as an inevitable conse-
quence of the previous one. The 
reasoning may indeed appear 
simplistic, taking no account of 
the time needed to complete each 
step. But the fact is that it must 
be achieved as rapidly as possible, 
if citizens are to acquire a positive 
image of government action, and 
go onto become involved in 
improving the way the state 
works. 
Western democracies also 
still have a long way to go in 
terms of establishing the ideal 
democracy, and there must be 
real doubts as to whether certain 
countries can ever achieve this 
goal. But we have to hope that 
people at all levels of society - in 
Africa, the West and elsewhere -
will be motivated by the recogni-
tion that they could always do 
better, and will continue working 
to improve the system for the 
common good. H E.W. 
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There are no absolutes 
when it comes to defining 
methods of political organi-
sation. It may be convenient 
to portray the clash of ide-
ologies as a kind of boxing 
match with 'democracy' 
(the good guy?) in one cor-
ner and totalitarianism (the 
bad guy?) in the other, but 
the reality is a lot more 
complicated. Totalitarian 
systems come in various 
guises and are often fiercely 
pitted against each other, 
as we have seen this centu-
ry in the great conflicts be-
tween communism and fas-
cism. Democracy too is a highly 
flexible concept and deciding 
whether a particular country fits 
the bill is essentially a subjective 
process. It all depends on the crite-
ria one chooses. 
The main focus of this arti-
cle will be on electoral systems, 
which come in many different 
forms. But before examining this 
subject, it should be stressed that 
the system is not everything. While, 
the nuts and bolts of the ballot are 
important, so too is the existence 
of a democratic 'atmosphere'. In 
short, there is little point having 
electoral arrangements that appear 
highly representative on paper if 
campaigners cannot go on to the 
streets for fear of being physically 
attacked by opponents. There is a 
somewhat overworked sentence 
which encapsulates the principle -
'I disagree with what you are say-
ing, but defend your right to say it'. 
There are, of course, certain limits 
to this right of free speech. State-
ments that incite criminal activity 
are generally unacceptable, and at-
tempts to stir up racial hatred or re-
ligious intolerance may fall under 
this heading in those countries that 
have enacted the relevant legisla-
tion. 
A democratic atmosphere 
cannot be created overnight. It 
takes time to become entrenched 
which means that new democracies 
must devote special efforts to civic 
education. And even where it ap-
parently has strong foundations, 
complacency or disillusionment can 
pose a threat. In most established 
democracies, party membership 
and voter turnout are falling. In 
many, support is growing for par-
ties whose commitment to genuine 
pluralism is suspect. These are wor-
rying trends which suggest that 
democracy needs to be nurtured 
constantly. 
To use another overworked 
phrase, there has to be a relatively 
level playing field for the conduct 
of political debate. For voters to 
have an informed choice, political 
candidates must be able to get 
their message across. If those who 
control the media (whether the 
state or private interests) have their 
own agenda, and refuse to trans-
mit certain messages, the democra-
tic atmosphere can become pollut-
ed. The trouble is that this may be 
an insidious process, the electorate 
being left with an impression that 
nothing is wrong. Some countries 
have strict rules requiring political 
balance in the media (notably in 
broadcasting). They may also regu-
late the ways money can be raised 
for campaigns and set limits on the 
amount that can be spent during 
an election. 
While the system may not 
be everything, it is clearly a major 
part of the democracy equation. It 
is, after all, possible to have a rea-
sonably pluralist atmosphere - in 
the sense that there is free speech 
and active debate - even under an 
unelected ruler. There may not be 
many examples of benign dictator-
ship in history but it does some-
times happen. 
Community activists in Durban, South Africa. 
Political workers must be free to put their 
message across. dossier 
Voting and standing in 
elections 
A number of basic criteria 
are widely recognised as essential if 
a system is to be awarded the 'de-
mocratic' cachet. First and fore-
most, there must be universal adult 
suffrage. The definition of 'univer-
sal' may vary slightly from one 
place to another. For instance, the 
age threshold may differ (18 years 
is common but it can be 21 or high-
er). Certain categories of person 
may be excluded (such as people in 
prison). And there are usually na-
tionality and/or residence require-
ments. Many countries do not give 
the franchise to foreign nationals, 
even if they are taxpayers and 
long-term residents. The basic prin-
ciple, however, is that the great 
majority of the adult population 
must be entitled to vote. Nowa-
days, few would be prepared to 
characterise as democratic a system 
which excluded women. 
Equally important is the 
right to stand as a candidate. It 
would be strange if all could vote 
but only members of a select few 
could put their names forward for 
positions of political power. In fact, 
many places have higher age limits 
for candidates (in the US, Senators 
must be at least 35 years old and 
the Presidency is reserved for peo-
ple above 40). Again, there are usu-
ally nationality/residence criteria 
but any discriminatory provisions 
preventing the participation of spe-
cific social, religious or ethnic 
groups would fatally undermine a 
country's claim to the democratic 
mantle. 
Although it is desirable to 
give as many people as possible the 
opportunity to stand in elections, 
most systems place certain hurdles 
in the way of potential candidates, 
designed to prevent a 'free-for-all'. 
One of the most common is the re-
quirement to obtain the signatures 
of a set number of voters support-
ing the nomination. There may also 
be an obligation to lodge a finan-
cial deposit, which is reimbursed if 
the candidate (or party list) attracts 
more than a certain percentage of 
the total vote. So long as the vari-
ous thresholds involved are not too 
high, such rules are not generally 
viewed as anti-democratic. 
More problematic is the sit-
uation where party registration is 
obligatory. This can have the effect 
of excluding individual candidates 
(so-called 'independents') but also 
groups whose views may not be 
palateable to those currently in 
power. It all depends on the regis-
tration criteria and how they are 
applied. Straightforward adminis-
trative formalities pose no problem 
if they are properly implemented. 
Unfortunately, there are cases 
where parties (almost invariably 
anti-government) get bogged 
down in bureaucracy and fail to ob-
tain registration. It begins to look 
suspicious when pro-government 
groupings sail through the process 
without difficulty. In extremis, the 
administration may decide to set 
up its own parties (perhaps as few 
as two) and exclude all others. This 
is simply an attempt to give a plu-
ralist veneer to a system which is 
fundamentally undemocratic. 
What about the opposite 
situation, where individuals are al-
lowed to participate freely but par-
ties are banned? This poses a prob-
lem because it seems to conflict 
with the 'right of association' 
which many see as a basic human 
right. Yet the arguments in favour 
of 'non-party' systems cannot be 
dismissed entirely out of hand. A 
lot of countries have to live with 
pronounced social, ethnic and reli-
gious cleavages. This is particularly 
true of states with 'artificial' 
boundaries set in the colonial peri-
od. The western party-based 
model, it is suggested, may actually 
hamper the growth of real democ-
racy by entrenching division and 
undermining national unity - so 
the view is taken that it is better to 
keep parties out of the equation. 
The crucial point here is whether 
the approach is intended to be per-
manent or merely temporary - until 
a democratic atmosphere has been 
created. A long-term policy of ban-
ning political parties, some would 
say, is simply not practicable in a 
society which allows individual po-
litical participation and free speech. 
Human beings are social animals 
and like-minded people will in-
evitably speak to each other and 
work together. This is how parties 
come into being. The only way of 
keeping people associating with 
each other over a longer period is 
by progressively removing the basic 
participatory rights which the sys-
tem purports to guarantee. Anoth-
er aspect is that parties are the 
most efficient vehicle for changing 
governments in elections. It is very 
difficult for individuals to do this if 
they are prevented from organising 
together. Those in power in a non-
party system are therefore less like-
ly to be toppled by constitutional 
means. Having said this, a tempo-
rary 'freeze' on party activity, 
backed by a population which has a 
genuine choice of individual candi-
dates in an election, may give a 
breathing space in the aftermath of 
a national trauma (as is the case in 
Uganda). 
Organisation of the poll 
To be properly democratic, 
elections must be conducted in ac-
cordance with certain organisation-
al precepts. The most important of 
these is that the ballot should be 
secret. This enables voters to make 
a free choice without intimidation 
or bribery. 
More generally, there 
should be a fair and objective sys-
tem for administering the process 
from the time the election is an-
nounced up to the declaration of 
the result. It is important to have a 
reliable and up-to-date electoral 
register and proper procedures to 
record who has cast their ballots 
(preventing multiple voting). In 
some countries, voter imperson-
ation is discouraged by stamping a 
harmless but indelible dye on elec-
tors' hands once they have cast 
their ballot (the dye fades after a 
few days). Ballot boxes must be 
kept secure on polling day and 
prior to the count to prevent 'stuff-
ing'. A further safeguard against 
this practice is to have a careful ver-
ification at the counting stage. The 
number of votes in a box are 
matched against the records of 
how many were actually issued. 
For all of this to work, you 
need to have honest personnel run-
ning the polling stations and count-
ing the votes. They don't necessari-
ly have to be politically neutral 
(they, after all, are voters too) but 
they should not be associated with 
any particular candidate or party 
and must be professional in carry-
ing out their duties. Candidates or 
their representatives should have 
the opportunity to observe all as-
pects of the election process. 
D 
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Process seen as more 
important 
It is a curious fact that 
those with an academic interest in 
defining democracy tend to con-
centrate heavily on the process 
while neglecting the outcome. The 
same is true for those members of 
the international community who 
increasingly insist on 'democracy' as 
a conditionality for development 
cooperation and support. This ap-
proach is highlighted by the proto-
col to the European Convention of 
Human Rights whose signatories 
are members of the Council of Eu-
rope - and must be 'democracies'. 
At Article 3, 'the parties undertake 
to hold free elections at reasonable 
intervals by secret ballot, under 
conditions which will ensure the 
free expression of the opinion of 
the people in the choice of the leg-
islature.' In other words, the people 
must be able to express their views 
during the process but they have 
no legal guarantee that their de-
sires will be reflected in the out-
come! 
In a similar vein, when an 
emerging democracy holds an elec-
tion, international observers are 
often invited to report on whether 
the procedure was 'free and fair'. 
The type of questions likely to be 
asked are: were the electors able to 
vote without hindrance?; did the 
candidates have an opportunity to 
get their message across?; was the 
count conducted properly? and so 
on. Assuming the answers are in 
the affirmative, the election will 
probably be given a clean bill of 
health. The question; 'did the peo-
ple get what they voted for?' is 
rarely voiced. 
Clearly, deficiencies in the 
process will taint the outcome, 
sometimes fatally, but arguably, 
the most important determinant of 
the result is the voting system that 
has been chosen. And when it 
comes to this crucial subject, the 
concept of democracy - or to be 
more specific, representative 
democracy - becomes very fluid in-
deed. Electoral arrangements can 
deliver completely different results 
on the basis of the same raw voting 
statistics. In simple terms, Party A 
might win an overall majority 
under one system while an identi-
cal vote breakdown would leave 
them firmly in opposition under an-
other. Yet both systems may bene-
fit from the 'democratic' tag. How 
is this possible? 
The answer lies in widely 
divergent interpretations of the 
word 'representative'. In elections 
to multi-member institutions (legis-
latures), some argue that so long as 
defined localities have their own 
elected members whose job it is to 
represent the entire population of 
the area, irrespective of how they 
voted, representativeness is achiev-
ed. Others go much further, saying 
that the elected body should reflect 
the overall pattern of votes cast in 
the country or territory in question. 
The first approach favours individu-
als while the second tends to give 
precedence to parties. 
At this stage, it is useful to 
offer a brief description of the dif-
ferent voting system used by 
democracies. There are a great 
many variations but most fall into 
one of two broad categories based 
either on single-member con-
stituencies or party lists. 
Constituency systems 
The least complicated form 
of constituency voting is the simple 
plurality system. The country is di-
vided into a given number of sin-
gle-member seats each with rough-
ly the same electorate. Individual 
candidates are nominated and vot-
ers invited to place a mark against 
one name on the ballot paper. The 
candidate who gets more votes 
than anyone else is the winner, 
even if his or her share is below 
50%. This is often dubbed the 'first 
past the post' system, a somewhat 
erroneous description since unlike a 
horse race, there is no 'finishing 
line' to aim at. (Mathematically 
speaking, the target for the win-
ning candidate is the number of 
votes cast for the runner-up plus 
one - but this figure is obviously 
not known until the election is 
over!). 
A slightly more sophisticat-
ed variant of this is the two-ballot 
system. The first election does not 
result in a winner but simply re-
duces the field. Any candidate 
gaining less than a certain percent-
age is eliminated and those that re-
main take part in a run-off poll. In 
some two-ballot elections, only the 
top two candidates at the first 
stage go through to the second 
round. 
Then there is the alterna-
tive vote where electors have the 
possibility of listing candidates in 
order of preference (1, 2, 3 etc). 
This is not dissimilar to the second 
ballot (although, as Figure 1 shows, 
it can sometimes lead to a different 
result). It is, however, less expensive 
to organise, since there is only one 
round of voting. The votes for the 
candidate at the bottom of the poll 
are redistributed to the second 
preferences and so on, until one 
candidate achieves 50%. 
List systems 
The simplest form of list 
system involves taking the whole 
country as a single constituency 
and presenting voters with lists of 
candidates grouped in parties. The 
elector is restricted to choosing his 
or her party of preference and 
seats are allocated in proportion to 
the votes cast for each list. If a 
party polls sufficiently well to win, 
say, ten seats, then its top ten can-
didates are elected. 
Figure 1: How different methods of voting for single-member constituencies, or 
single post elections (e.g. presidential) can lead to different outcomes 
Candidate Aherne Bongo Chiluba Douglas 
system 
Simple 
plurality 
Two ballot 
1st ballot 
2nd ballot 
Altemtive vote 
1st count 
2nd count 
3rd count 
35% - elected 
35% 
45% 
35% 
36% 
45% 
30% 
30% 
55% - elected 
30% 
31% 
eliminated 
25% 
eliminated 
25% 
33% 
55% - ejected 
10% 
eliminated 
10% 
eliminated 
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Figure 2: Hypothetical result of 
% vote 
seats won 
Candidates 
on party list 
(elected 
candidates 
underlined) 
Party A 
46% 
5 
1. Mandela 
2. Chirac 
3. Abiola 
4. Kérékou 
5. Nujoma 
6. Arthur 
7. Ramgoolam 
8. Dehaene 
a simple list system election (10 seats to be filled) 
Party Β 
32% 
3 
1. Köhi 
2. Chissano 
3. Compaoré 
4. Lubbers 
5. Moi 
6. Museveni 
7. Prodi 
8. Paterson 
Party C 
12% 
1 
1. Panday 
2. Konan Bédié 
3. Rawlings 
4. Mugabe 
Party D 
10% 
1 
1. Rabuka 
2. Eyadema 
3. Préval 
4. Aznar 
There are also list systems 
that allow preferences to be ex-
pressed for individuals. In some 
cases, the voter is given a choice -
either to vote for the list as a whole 
or to place their mark against a 
specific candidate. All of a party's 
votes (list plus individual) will be 
tallied to determine the number of 
seats it has won. Various methods 
can then be used to decide the ac-
tual winners. Usually, these still 
favour people placed high on the 
lists but a particularly popular can-
didate in a lower position can 
'leapfrog' his or her party col-
leagues. Another possibility is to 
eliminate the list vote altogether, 
forcing electors to choose an indi-
vidual from one of the lists. 
List systems do not always 
involve a strictly proportional allo-
cation of seats. Under the d'Hondt 
method, for example, the first seat 
is allocated to the party polling the 
most votes. Their total is then divid-
ed by two and the second seat goes 
to whichever party is now top. This 
process continues with the divisor 
increasing by one each time until 
all the seats are allocated. The ef-
fect is to favour larger parties. In 
some places, different divisors are 
used which penalise small parties 
even more - and the count be-
comes extremely complicated. 
Some countries impose a 
minimum vote threshold designed 
to exclude very small parties and 
splinter groups. The usual range is 
between 2% and 5%. In addition, 
states often opt for regional rather 
than national lists. Figure 2 shows a 
fictitious result in a simple list sys-
tem election. 
There is nothing to prevent 
a country operating constituency 
and list systems side by side. Con-
stituency representatives may be 
chosen for, say, half the seats with 
a 'topping up' of list members so 
that party proportionality can be 
achieved. 
Single transferable vote 
Finally, there is one system 
which does not fit neatly into ei-
ther of the above categories al-
though the method of casting 
one's ballot is the same as in the al-
ternative vote. This is the single 
transferable vote (STV) which in-
volves the use of multi-member 
constituencies. For the elector, the 
process is straightforward - indeed, 
the usual slogan is 'STV is as easy as 
1,2,3'. For the officials responsible 
for counting, it is a different story. 
To win a seat, a candidate must ob-
tain a quota of the overall vote. 
The formula for this is: 
Q = [x:(y+1)]+1 
where χ is the number of votes cast 
and y is the number of seats to be 
filled. The raison d'être behind this 
formula becomes clearer if one 
takes a hypothetical result using 
real numbers. Imagine an STV elec-
tion where there are five seats to 
be filled and 6000 votes cast. The 
quota is thus 1001 - [6000 divided 
by (5+1)] plus 1. It is clear than no 
more than five candidates can 
achieve the quota and this there-
fore is the minimum number of 
votes needed for election. 
The count is conducted in a 
series of stages. Those who have 
achieved the quota on the first 
round are declared elected and 
their surpluses are transferred to 
the voters' second preferences. 
Then bottom placed candidates are 
excluded with their votes being re-
allocated. The process continues 
until all the seats have been filled. 
Figure 3 shows a hypothetical (and 
somewhat simplified) STV election 
result. 
The value of a vote 
There is an explanation for 
the fact that different democratic 
systems can deliver such variable re-
sults. It is all to do with the mathe-
matical value that is attached to 
each ballot cast - or to put it in a 
different way, the extent to which 
an individual vote actually con-
tributes to the election of some-
one. Under the simple plurality sys-
tem, all votes cast for losers are 
'wasted' - though they may well 
have a political value. Many votes 
cast for winners are also wasted in 
the sense that they are surplus to 
requirement. Thus if a successful 
candidate has a majority of 1000 
over his or her nearest opponent, 
999 of these ballots are valueless. In 
'first past the post' elections with 
large numbers of candidates, there 
are likely to be a great many more 
wasted votes than 'worthwhile' 
ones. 
Under the two ballot and 
alternative vote systems, the num-
ber of 'useful' votes is increased 
(because votes cast for lower-
placed candidates are not discarded 
and the elector effectively is given 
a 'second chance'). The proportion 
of effective votes here will general-
ly be 50% plus one (less in a two-
ballot system which allows more 
than two candidates into the run-
off). 
In list voting, the number 
of wasted ballots is far fewer, be-
cause of the inherent proportional-
ity of the system. If a representa-
tion threshold is imposed, however, 
the number of valueless votes can 
increase substantially. For example, 
if a party must win 5% overall to 
gain representation, and five lists in 
a particular election just fall short 
of this percentage, then almost a 
quarter of the votes will have been 
assigned no value. 
Under STV, it all depends 
on the number of places to be 
filled. In a two-member seat up to 
a third of the votes will be wasted, 
in a three-member seat, the figure 
is a quarter, and so on. 
From this simple analysis, 
one might draw the conclusion that 
list elections without a minimum 
threshold are the most democratic, 
because they assign value to more 
votes than any other system. There 
are other factors, however, which 
Β 
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Figure 3: Hypothetic election result under the Single Transferable Vote (STV) system 
Candidate 
Blair 
Comté 
Deby 
Diouf 
Ratsiraka 
Non-transferable* 
(Total) 
1st count 
1450 
2500 (elected) 
1600 
1550 
900 
8000 
* Non-transferable votes are those where the 
Votes 8000 Seats 3 
Redistribution of 
Comté's surplus 
+ 160 
+ 20 
+ 260 
+ 40 
19 
499 
Quota [8000 + (3 
2nd count 
1610 
(2001) 
1620 
1810 
940 (eliminated) 
19 
8000 
elector has expressed no further preference. 
+ Dl + 1 =  2001 
Redistribution of 
Ratiraka's votes 
+ 350 
+ 150 
+ 400 
40 
940 
3rd count 
1960 (elected) 
(2001) 
1770 (runner-up) 
2210 (elected) 
59 
8000 
complicate the issue. As stated ear-
lier, list voting focuses on the party 
rather than the individual and even 
where voters are allowed to ex-
press individual preferences, candi-
dates who are high on the list have 
an advantage over their lower-
placed colleagues. While voters in 
many democracies are motivated 
more by party considerations than 
by the quality of the individuals 
who are standing, the wishes of an 
elector who wants to vote for a 
specific candidate are surely no less 
legitimate. 
Another criticism of list sys-
tems is that they tend to remove 
the link between the people and 
their elected representatives. The 
idea of having 'one's own MP' to 
whom one can turn for help has 
some merit, and is frequently cited 
by defenders of single constituency 
voting systems. 
A third aspect raised by crit-
ics is that list voting reputedly leads 
to permanent coalitions and hence 
'weak' government. It is also said to 
give disproportionate power to 
smaller 'swing' parties, generally 
found in the middle of the political 
spectrum. Alternatively, it enables 
extreme candidates to win seats. 
From a democratic standpoint, 
there are a number of counter-ar-
guments here. If the electorate did 
not vote for 'strong' government -
or at least for majority rule by one 
party - then should the system de-
liver such a result? And if one small 
party traditionally has a pivotal role 
following a list election, this is 
hardly their 'fault'. It must stem 
from the inability of other (larger) 
groupings to work together. Final-
ly, while the fact that extremists 
can win seats may dismay moderate 
opinion, is it right to 'fix' the sys-
tem against them in a way which 
casts doubt on democracy itself? 
System-induced distortion 
Finally, it is worth noting 
that systems themselves may influ-
ence the way people vote. The phe-
nomenon of tactical voting is main-
ly seen in elections where large 
numbers of votes have no value. 
Thus, under 'first past the post', 
while people may wish to see a 
candidate or party elected, they are 
induced to vote for someone else 
because they know their first 
choice has little prospect of win-
ning. This risks being a self-fulfill-
ing phenomenon, the election re-
sult being the main weapon 
deployed next time round to con-
vince the same voters that their 
candidate is not in the running. In 
seats that are considered safe for a 
particular party, the system may 
also induce non-voting on all sides. 
Supporters of the incumbent fail to 
turn out because they think their 
party will win anyway. Opponents 
can be demotivated by the appar-
ent futility of a trip to the polling 
station. In list systems which em-
ploy a percentage threshold, sup-
porters of very small groupings, 
recognising their ballot papers may 
have no value, may also decide to 
opt for a larger party instead. 
From this point of view, the 
STV system is probably the least dis-
torting since a first preference for a 
candidate with little popular sup-
port is not one's last word. The 
vote will normally retain its value, 
assuming subsequent preferences 
have been expressed, until it is de-
ployed in helping to get someone 
elected. STV also has some of the 
advantages of local representation 
(though the constituency will be 
larger) and enables voters freely to 
choose among individuals. Its main 
disadvantage is its complexity. This 
means that the results may be less 
transparent to the electorate (par-
ticularly if literacy is not high) and 
highly trained officials are needed 
to run the poll. 
In deciding which is the 
most appropriate voting arrange-
ment for a particular society, one 
must weigh-up the various advan-
tages and disadvantages. In coun-
tries where parties are weak and 
local communities are strong, a sin-
gle constituency system may be the 
most appropriate. Where there are 
ethnic or other divisions, it may be 
better to accommodate these in 
proportional systems (guaranteeing 
minority representation). And 
where administrative and human 
resources are limited, one of the 
more straightforward methods 
might be appropriate initially ('first 
past the post' or simple party list). 
While it may not satisfy the 
democratic purist, one could argue 
that in the final analysis, any prop-
erly organised system which gives 
everyone the opportunity to vote 
freely (and at regular intervals) is 
democratic - so long as a clear ma-
jority of the electorate regards the 
outcome as legitimate. Democracy, 
after all, is preferable to tyranny, 
even if it is loosely defined.■■ 
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transcultural values 
by Mamadou Diouf* 
Since the 1980s, sub-Saharan Africa has experi-
enced a dual trend. On the one hand, there has 
been the process of economic liberalisation. On 
the other, we have seen what pessimists might 
term political liberalisation and optimists de-
scribe as democratic transition. This dual trend 
merits a dual examination which seeks to review 
African reality differently. There is the interpre-
tation proposed by researchers and then there is 
the one advanced by politicians, heads of 
international finance agencies and donors. The 
common concern behind their thoughts and 
prescriptions is: how can the economic, political, 
social and cultural gulf between Africa and the 
developed Western world be bridged? In other 
words, how can Africa be incorporated into the 
general economic and political system and 
become part of contemporary economic, political and 
social globalisation? Concomitant with such a review is 
the urgent need to adjust African economies and 
cultures to guarantee sound economic and commercial 
participation in the global economy. 
For many years, Western and African politi-
cians viewed Africa as a single entity. Many still do. 
Yet Africa is not ready to take on board democratic 
principles for organising and regulating African 
societies. Nor are such principles suited to it. The 
path of African history is completely different to that 
taken by Europe. 
The precolonial period 
This period has three main features. First, 
there was an all-important affinity which imbued 
social relationships of all types (public and private, 
political and economic) and formed networks of 
subordination, inequality and loyalty, to the detri-
ment of responsibility and accountability and, natu-
rally, of positive or negative sanction. Then there was 
a lack of clear division between public and private 
spheres - these tended to overlap. Finally, there was 
the entrenched position of religion in politics and 
social issues, and of economics (enrichment, accumu-
lation, redistribution, the power to enrich or to 
alleviate poverty, etc.) in politics. 
Such factors, emerging from specific historical 
circumstances during the precolonial period, varied in 
their intensity, providing areas for participation 
between certain players and groups in society which 
were larger or smaller depending on whether they 
were hierarchy-based societies (kingdoms or empires), 
egalitarian or segmented. But under these conditions, 
even in the most egalitarian or segmented systems, a 
* Director of the Council for the Development of Social Science 
Research in Africa (CODESRIA). Extract from a work by the author, 
entitled Libéralisations politiques ou transitions démocratiques. 
Perspectives africaines. Dakar, Codesria, Nouvelles Pistes, no. 1, 1998. 
structure based on older and younger generations 
wholly replaced the principles of deliberation, com-
petition for public posts and the legitimacy (or 
otherwise) of power. Such changing and jarring 
historical trends do not allow particularly for lengthy 
discussion or a search for consensus - a particular 
African feature which opposes confrontation be-
tween civilisations, and open conflict. Nor are they 
likely to be seen as democratic formulae or formulae 
that genuinely guarantee involvement by individuals 
or social groups at all times and in all places. At 
certain stages, they have undoubtedly favoured the 
upholding and consolidation of alternate powers, but 
in many different situations and in African societies, 
for diverse reasons, alternate powers have disinte-
grated when faced with the development of a 
centralised state and the militarisation of political 
systems. This was happening well before the colonial 
period. 
This submission of local and alternate power 
to the logic of centralised politics is a feature that is 
fairly characteristic of African history, particularly 
between the era of the slave trade and the colonial 
conquest. It is probably the basis for the ideology of 
total subordination to the chief which was celebrated 
and implemented by the founding fathers' of the 
African nations and their heirs. The single party, the 
single youth movement, the single movement for 
women and for trade unions are its principal instru-
ments. 
The colonial period 
The colonial systems that were set up, in their 
various guises, shared a number of common traits. 
They were in no sense democratic - indeed, they were 
completely and naturally inegalitarian, hierarchy-
based and repressive. The geography of power and 
the machinery of French colonial rule were concerned 
mainly with selecting go-betweens to tie African 
societies successfully to the colonial state. The search 
for completely loyal leaders explains the extraordin-
ary difficulty experienced by the 'Jacobin' colonial 
powers (France, Portugal and Belgium) in producing, 
through their intervention, forms of local domination 
in 'egalitarian' or 'fetishistic' societies. 
These circumstances produce special figures 
who are able to survive colonial domination. It is a 
system characterised by strict control of all political 
expression, policy implementation and administra-
tion, and by the absence of any indigenous civil 
consciousness, beyond that of the colonisers and, 
subsequently, of the post-colonial elite. Special em-
phasis on communities and their customs - produced 
by manipulating traditions - has imposed an admin-
istrative justice and tradition of force and authority, 
as opposed to the authority of the law. The most 
dramatic result of this, for Africa today, is the 
Î 
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complete absence of inter-ethnic political dialogue 
and the restriction of political, social and cultural 
expression to an exclusively community context. The 
ethnic fundamentalism of ethnology and colonial rule 
has thus generated a fragmentation of indigenous 
societies whose only link will be the colonial power. 
This cements the absence of a common expression 
and political space for the inhabitants of the same 
colony. 
Independence 
The first period, considered here as the 
nationalist period, was based on the key idea that it 
was necessary to establish a strong state to reduce 
diversity in African societies, mobilise the nation's 
strongest forces, face up to the world market, achieve 
national development and catch up with European 
societies. It was a view prevalent among Western and 
African researchers, and political leaders, in their 
common desire to modernise African societies. The 
undertaking to develop and modernise, which 
formed the core of the nationalist project, was 
transformed into a deliberate move to construct 
authoritarian states governed by corrupt elites. 
This was manifested in several ways, notably 
by surveillance, restriction and repression. Through its 
administrative obsession, the state successfully in-
stilled into Africans the idea that its institutions and 
ruling class
1 were the only instruments, and rightful 
beneficiaries, of power over society and the economy. 
The total centralisation of the state had incalculable 
consequences for the establishment of the African 
nations. Those holding state power faced no direct 
competition for leadership, having suppressed or 
subordinated, in one way or another, any other focus 
of power, enrichment or social prestige for at least 
two decades. 
Those holding power in the post-colonial 
state tried to come to terms with those whose 
concern was not to usurp their position but to keep 
a low profile in order to escape their violence. Faced 
with surveillance, restriction and punishment, African 
societies constantly tried, by dissimulation, to avoid 
the totalitarianism they would have liked to frustrate 
or exploit. A number of hypotheses were tested in the 
academic spheres of political science and African 
studies, in an effort to describe and conceptualise 
these so called exit options, characterised by distor-
tion, evasion and intractability. 
According to P. Ekeh, it was the continuation 
of this type of government after the transfer of 
power, which explains the divorce between real Africa 
(that of communities and ethnic groups) and official 
Africa (that of nationalist leaders and their bureau-
cracies)
2. 
Meanwhile, current political and economic 
discussions, which emphasise good governance (de-
' For the moment, I disregard the fact that this social group is the 
'elite' and stress only its dominant position in terms of power. In this 
connection, useful reference may be made to Fawzi Mellah, 'Le 
développement politique: Rôle et limites de l'administration pub-
lique. Eléments pour une analyse de l'Etat en Afrique'. In Annuaire 
du Tiers Monde, VIII, 1982-83, (77-85). 
fined according to the rules of the Bretton Woods 
organisations), make the issues of popular represen-
tation and democracy more complex still, against the 
background of the most serious economic depression 
Africa has ever known. 
Contemporary projects 
Three factors led to a breakdown of the 
nationalist project: the adoption of structural adjust-
ment programmes; the development of social move-
ments; and the restoration of African societies' 
methods of political management through institu-
tions and constitutions. Analysis of these three factors 
has given rise to controversy, touching both on their 
nature and on theoretical issues related to good 
governance, civil society, democracy and popular 
participation. It has, in fact, resulted in a variety of 
paths, including pre-colonial variations, colonial tradi-
tions and post-colonial breakdown (restoration of the 
multi-party system/elections and national conference/ 
elections). 
Although one of the shortest sequences in 
African history, the contemporary situation is also one 
of the most dramatic and inconsistent. There are 
domestic economic crises, combined with and accen-
tuated by the non-involvement of African economies 
in the global market (together, the ingredients of 
'Afro-pessimism'). At the same time, there is a 
restiveness within the population. New areas are 
opening up to everyday, collective 'sociability' in the 
fields of economics and politics. Alternative circum-
stances and ways of political expression are being 
defined. Some see what is happening as a sign of the 
'advent of barbarism'; others see in it, the stirrings of 
a 'second African independence movement'. These 
are African expectations which differ from the Afro-
pessimism of modern Western society. 
The period we are now in is a time of 
profound upheaval on the African political front. 
We have seen the restoration of democracy but also 
repeated attempts by former authoritarian regimes to 
retain their powers and privileges (Gabon, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Mauritania, Kenya). Meanwhile, new demo-
cratic regimes try expand the powers they have 
recently acquired (Benin, Niger, Madagascar). This 
swinging of the pendulum is one reason for the 
violence (ethnic, religious, domestic, public and 
private) and of the breakdown of the public arena 
which has accompanied political liberalisation pro-
cesses. The violence and breakdown combine to fuel 
uncertainty, creating tension between the desire and 
ability of authoritarian powers to recover, corrupt or 
suffocate the démocratisation process, and the inter-
vention of societies' 'lower echelons' in the shape of 
legitimate counter-demonstrations, rioting, looting, 
murder and delinquency on a daily basis. In short, 
2 P. Ekeh, 'Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical 
Statement' in Comparative Studies in Society and History, 17, 1, 
January 1975, (91-112), p. 8. See also B. Davidson's lament, The Black 
Man's Burden. Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State. London, 
James Currey, 1992, in the face of the highly disappointing results of 
African nationalism, and M. Diouf, 'Les paroles politiques africaines. 
Des luttes anti-coloniales aux conférences nationales' in Gemdev 
(ed.), L'Intégration régionale dans le monde. Innovations et 
ruptures. Paris, Karthala, 1994, (264-272). 
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there are people who willingly take the side 'against 
democracy'. 
The violence of Africa's political transition also 
appears closely linked to the problem of moving on 
from the mobilisation of social movements, which 
had their own interests and motivations - and which 
brought an abrupt end to authoritarian regimes - to 
the consolidation of democracy, which the literature 
says should be the task of the political elite. However, 
the ability of the latter to move around and their 
philosophy of division fosters systematic recourse to 
violence. 
According to some analysts, progress towards 
democracy is the result of the inherent drive of 
African political systems. For example, the most 
decisive claim, that of a multi-party system, has often 
been no more than a phase in clan conflicts within 
established regimes or single parties. During the 
nationalist phase, social groups mobilised only to set 
themselves up as the preferred or 'acknowledged' 
partner in dialogue with the authorities. The crisis of 
the redistribution system caused by the reduction in 
public resources, and the multiplication, aggressive 
stance and diversity of the 'partners in dialogue' have 
prompted a competitive drive that, in itself, is capable 
of fostering chronic violence. Obviously, the state's 
new processes of regulation and appropriation, the 
privatisation of public forces (army, state police, 
forces of law and order, militia), and the multi-
plication of hidden or illegal income-generating 
activities (drugs, the arms trade, traffic in animals, 
precious stones and, counterfeiting) lead increasingly 
to civil war (Liberia, Sierra Leone) orto large portions 
of national territory being removed from the author-
ity of central government. 
In such highly complex situations, institutional 
and constitutional aspects are unable to keep pace. 
The approaches cover a broad spectrum. In some 
countries, certain communities wield a degree of 
autonomy beyond the reach of the state. In others, 
groups are in open and often bloody conflict with the 
central authority for control of power and/or certain 
resources. By slowing down the renewal of the ruling 
class and by making it difficult for the advocates of 
modernity to show themselves, and gain pre-emi-
nence, the African crisis has cleared the way for new 
systems and major upheavals. Democracy has 
launched a new generation onto the African political 
stage, a generation born after the founding event of 
African nationhood - independence. 
Unable to break free from reinvented tradi-
tions combined with the values of a global world, 
excluded from post-colonial largesse and its social 
components (recognition, right of expression, right to 
work, education, etc), numerically in the majority 
and, in political terms, reduced to the status of silent 
social juniors, they invent their own social forms in 
collective or religious enterprises
3. All kinds of 
political violence are fomented - urban rioting. 
Islamic fundamentalist armies, warlords, criminal acts 
of gratuitous violence, vandalism and student strikes. 
Young people use violence to demonstrate their 
disillusionment with democracy. 
Demographic change has also called into 
question a number of 'certainties', including the 
homogeneous nature of urban life and the city's 
ability to invent a homogenous culture in the face of 
individualism. The reversal which underlies this is the 
loss of the vision of an elite united in interests and 
values that were undoubtedly associated with an 
urban population very much in the minority in 
relation to the mass of networks". 
Inconsistency among advocates of modernity 
has led to the acceptance, by each of its segments, of 
a discourse that is specific to it. The physical break-
down of the space where authority is exercised is 
combined with a fragmentation of leading groups in 
society (government, trades unions, students, pupils, 
entrepreneurs). New networks (economic, political, 
ethnic, women, etc) are filling the spaces left by 
physical dispersal and ideological fragmentation and 
they are gaining increasing significance. They are 
claiming a variety of identifying references (locality, 
age, sexes, common objectives and so on). Their often 
contingent fluidity, plasticity and origin have a 
considerable impact on social and political demands. 
The continuing break-up of the state, and the 
intensity of social competition within and between 
groups, which are less and less subject to the 
authority of the powers-that-be, are the expression 
of an increasingly radical rejection of the integrating 
model of the elites. This is the case for Nigerian 
traders, Algerian or Tunisian fundamentalists, Chris-
tian revivalists (born again Christians, Pentecostalists, 
etc), Zimbabweans, Ghanaians, Nigerians, Zambians, 
the South-Sudanese, the Tuareg, Ugandans, Joola, 
Zulu dissidents and so on. 
Two cases provide a precise illustration of the 
defiance of certain groups in the face of the 
transformations presented above: traders and wo-
men. The former have, for somewhat more than 20 
years, maintained highly complex, sometimes conflict-
ing relationships with political elites, often involving 
complicity in the obtaining of import/export licences 
and monopolies. The crisis of the 1980s, and political 
and economic liberalisation, have given them re-
newed vigour, based on their stranglehold over 
commerce in goods and agricultural inputs, and their 
control of the informal sector. This, to a considerable 
extent, guarantees social equilibrium and consolidates 
their ascendancy over peasant farmers (who, in turn, 
attempt to organise themselves into associations). 
As for women, the major transformation of 
their political role and position in society appears 
closely linked to their newly-acquired economic 
status, both at home and outside, assigned them by 
3 On this subject, R. Marshall, 'Power in the Name of Jesus. Social 
Transformations and Pentecostalism in Western Nigeria', in T. O. 
Ranger & O. Vaughn (eds). Legitimacy and the State in Contempor-
ary Africa. Oxford, McMillan, 1993 (213-246); R. Otayek, 'Une 
relecture islamique du projet révolutionnaire de Thomas Sankara' 
in J-F. Bayart (ed.), Religion et Modernité Politique en Afrique noire. 
Dieu pour tous et chacun pour soi. Paris, Karthala, 1993 (101-160). 
4 OECD/ADB, 'L'émergence de la compétition. Transformations et 
déséquilibres dans les sociétés ouest-africaines; Draft, 1994, p.6. For 
an analysis of demographic issues, I drew considerably on my 
association with the work of the Cinergie/Club du Sahel team, which 
carried out the WALTPS work. 
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the crisis. No longer just a political resource, they 
have become fully-fledged players in their own right, 
thereby redefining both the relationship between the 
state and society's players and the overlap between 
public and private domains. The way today's African 
women are taking over areas freed by economic and 
political crisis rejects sectarian affiliations precisely 
because they emphasise the common memory of their 
exclusion from the formal economic sector, political 
institutions and structures, and their experience of 
managing informal, small and autonomous organisa-
tions. Women's organisations do not necessarily 
undertake to engage in a head-to-head fight with 
the state. Instead, they are so firmly established that 
they present a multitude of facets offering them 
varied and different possibilities from the most 
collective in nature to the most public. 
Fighting against the state or intervening at 
central or local level are not decisive elements in 
associative activities whose mission is to assume 
responsibility for the diversity of individuals' and 
groups' lives. Consequently, the transition, regardless 
of its form (restoration of the multi-party system/ 
elections or national conferences/elections), is closely 
linked to the diversification of social groups and to 
the weakening of the state in its capacity for 
redistribution, repression and geopolitical haggling 
on the international stage. This has generated a new 
geography and new power distribution mechanisms 
directly influenced by the interplay of forces between 
the various groups. 
This new geography of the exclusive return to 
collective usage, including the public (groups and 
associations) and private (modern ruling class) area, is 
highlighted by a shift in the driving force behind 
development, from mobilisation towards technocracy. 
The latter, if one listens to the IMF and World Bank, 
postulates a reduction in the political and civic rights 
of individuals and of certain groups (trade unions, 
civil servants, pupils, students) as a prerequisite for 
the autonomous manifestation of market forces. 
Technocracy is not the only force caught in a 
vice between the contradiction between political 
restorations and the requirements of restoration of 
macro-economic balance. If the context has reacti-
vated the role of players excluded too early from the 
political scene (trade unions and organisations of 
young people and women) and the entry on to the 
stage of new players (religious leaders and economic 
entrepreneurs), the rhetoric of those in power in a 
nation, during discourse at national conferences, 
cannot, as in the case of Nigeria, conceal the 
marginalisation of rural society which is over-sensitive 
to the influence of the ancien régime. Organisers of 
national conferences, like those who take part in 
political activities after the restoration of a multi-
party system, are recruited from those excluded from 
authoritarian power. As a number of observers have 
remarked, this is more a new redistribution of the 
cards amongst an élite which has been amazingly 
stable for 30 years. 
It is difficult to draw a conclusion from these 
jarring, sometimes convergent, often changing but 
always violent paths taken by social, individual and 
collective, institutional and economic players led 
forward by transformations they generate or experi-
ence on the basis of rival interests, forms of appro-
priation, motivations and resources and different 
sites. How can dissimilar entities be made to converge 
towards a common desire to live communally? Is it 
possible, and under what conditions, to create a 
sociability and civility capable of guaranteeing demo-
cratic methods of managing societies and economies 
in Africa? In any case, according to the Nigerian 
political scientist, Claude Ake, neither democratic 
procedures nor the institutions of good governance 
are sufficient without deep roots in the values of 
African societies and the ways in which they establish 
and legitimise forms of representation. 
Between hope and violence, African societies 
are drifting towards a future which offers them two 
options: generalised violence or rebirth. African paths 
are challenging institutional and constitutional re-
storation projects, but they cannot be reduced to a 
dichotomous reading of the state against civil society 
insofar as the players concerned have strategies 
beyond and/or within the state, depending on their 
contemporary interests, memories and experiences. 
They are travelling between separate areas of bureau-
cracy, from the ruling political class and indigenous 
areas to multiple referents which have slowly paved 
the way for negotiation or confrontation. 
Naturally, those involved do not limit them-
selves to mastery of a single language or a single 
mode of expression in the public area. Their plasticity, 
just like systematic recourse to different methods of 
intervention, places them at the heart of the state, 
but also in places where the state is absent. 
Can one or should one restrict these unex-
pected and concomitant courses, these multiple, legal 
and illegal, undertakings, this diversification of public 
and private players and of the latter's interests to key 
categories of the new bilateral forms of intervention 
which have been imposed together with concepts of 
good governance, decentralisation, local develop-
ment and, above all, civil society? They organise a 
general discourse on state reform and the redefini-
tion of the latter's role in the economy. Most 
observers agree that this approach depoliticises the 
issue of démocratisation, being concerned only with 
the technical aspects of good governance. 
Consequently, it cannot take into considera-
tion the inherent dynamism of African societies and 
the responses the latter offer both economically and 
politically speaking. On the contrary, it would be 
necessary to take account of the rationale of overlap 
and multiple undertakings on the part of players, 
who impose transactions and negotiations at all levels 
and places of power, in order to go beyond technical 
reforms and to move on to an in-depth reform of 
African societies. It would require a reform which 
takes account of internal dynamics and the historical 
authenticity of events specific to societies in Africa 
and the ways in which these can be integrated into 
globalisation. Neither the appropriation of income 
generated elsewhere (ownership) nor the transposi-
tion of projects which have succeeded elsewhere 
(success stories) can conceal or counteract the extra-
ordinary energy driving local variables. M M.D. 
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pressure from the West 
by Abdoulaye Niandou Souley* 
'Good Governance in Africa' 
is an expression coined by 
the English-speaking world 
that has spread, since the 
beginning of the 1990s, like 
a powder trail across the 
globe. Its repercussions have 
been particularly far-reach-
ing and long-lasting in Africa 
south of the Sahara. This 
part of the world is seen as 
having the lowest incidence 
of democracy, while the eco-
nomic development that 
should have come with in-
dependence is still awaited 
in vain. Given these circum-
stances, it came as no real surprise 
when France's Cooperation Minister 
at the time, Jacques Pelletier, stated 
in his 1990 New Year address to the 
press: 'Africa must not be left 
behind by the great freedom move-
ment that is sweeping both through 
the so-called popular democracies in 
Europe, and through Asia and Latin 
America'. From that year on, the 
concept of good governance was to 
move high up the agenda in various 
parts of sub-Saharan Africa. But 
what exactly does it mean? 
Good governance is an 
expression that should not be 
overworked. If it is allowed to 
become hackneyed, it will lose its 
true significance. Political experts, 
sociologists, jurists, economists 
and historians have realised, only 
by observing and analysing the 
working logic of the African 
state, that errors in political man-
agement are the root cause of 
the economic crisis currently rava-
ging sub-Saharan Africa. At the 
same time, we cannot totally 
discount the complacency of wes-
tern democracies that adopted an 
approach based on the notion of 
'stability'. It took the disintegra-
tion of ideological models, the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall and 
the démocratisation of so-called 
* Doctor of Political Sciences. Lecturer/ 
Researcher at the Faculty of Economics and 
Law (FSRJ), University of Niamey. 
socialist political structures for 
western attitudes to change. This 
notion of 'stability' has now been 
replaced with 'conditionality' and 
'human rights diplomacy'. And 
the change has given much great-
er momentum to the concept of 
good governance, the essential 
elements of which are as follows: 
- Openness. This presupposes that 
those in power adopt transparent 
policies in the economic and 
political spheres. People must un-
derstand the reasons behind any 
major decision that concerns na-
tional politics, and the way in 
which public affairs are con-
ducted. This leads naturally to 
the second element of good 
governance which is accountabil-
ity. 
- Accountability means that poli-
tical leaders are duty-bound, in 
the name of openness, to answer 
for their political decisions. We 
should, however, avoid oversim-
plifying the concept. It is a com-
plex issue involving the political, 
moral and economic accountabil-
ity of those who govern towards 
those who are governed by them. 
And it is precisely because of this 
relationship between the 'gover-
nors' and the 'governed' that the 
latter are entitled to know how 
public affairs are being run, and 
to be consulted and involved 
where necessary. This takes us to 
the third element which is parti-
cipation. 
- Popular participation implies 
that the people must be involved, 
not only in the decision-making 
process, but also in implementing 
and following the decisions made 
by their leaders. It goes even 
further, encompassing what legal 
and political experts refer to as 
political participation. Taken to its 
logical conclusion, it implies the 
right to free and open elections. 
It is widely held that leaders who 
enjoy popular credibility are likely 
to be more efficient - the fourth 
facet of good governance. 
- Efficiency. The theory here is 
that those who come to power as 
a result of free, open and multi-
party elections will, as a rule, 
enjoy the people's trust. If that 
is the case, they should be able to 
take decisions that are not just 
beneficial but essential for social 
progress and the economic and 
political development of the 
countries whose destinies lie in 
their hands. On that basis -
although there is no clear scien-
tific or empirical evidence to sup-
port such a view - some western 
writers have established a link 
between democracy and develop-
ment. They have consequently set 
conditions for access to develop-
ment aid and to structural adjust-
ment funds. 
Link between democracy 
and development? 
'There can be no democ-
racy without development, but 
neither can there be true devel-
opment without democracy... By 
not taking an active role in the 
democratic revolution, Africa will 
condemn itself to having no part 
in the economic revolution - in 
other words, in establishing sus-
tainable growth'. 
Thus was the link between 
démocratisation and the granting 
of development aid unequivocally 
stated by the late President Fran-
çois Mitterrand, at the La Baule 
Summit of African and French 
Heads of State. 'When I say 
democracy, I naturally have a 
ready-made scheme in mind: a 
representative system, free elec-
tions, multipartyism, freedom of 
the press, an impartial judiciary 
and the rejection of censorship. 
That is the structure available to 
us'. He went on to stress that it 
was up to sovereign African states 
to choose their own path and to 
set their own pace along that 
path. In conclusion, he pledged 
that France would commit all its 
resources to support the efforts 
made in the progress towards 
greater freedom. 
In a similar context, we 
should also recall the words of 
Michel Camdessus, Director of the 
International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) who said that Africa was 
the continent most in need of 
economic reforms. 'Anything that 
encourages open political dialo-
gue,' he insisted, 'has got to be 
good for economic reform in 
these countries'. 
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Confronting the 
challenges of 
démocratisation 
In the light of the pressure 
coming from the West
1, it is not 
difficult to see why Africa must 
face up to the challenges of 
démocratisation - with the aid 
of its foreign partners, of course. 
Experimenting with the 
democratic model is a real chal-
lenge, but one worth pursuing. 
For a long time, it was thought 
that the démocratisation of Afri-
can political systems was not 
possible for cultural reasons. 
There was also a belief that the 
level of development in these 
countries hindered democratic 
progress. And yet, Senegal and 
more especially, Botswana, 
proved the contrary. All the same, 
it is true that Africa must deal 
simultaneously with the economic 
and the political challenges of 
démocratisation. 
On a political level, there 
are two main problems to be 
overcome. First, we have to re-
cognise that démocratisation on 
the continent is occurring at a 
time when the economic base is 
contracting, leading to a cash 
flow crisis in national exchequers. 
Experience teaches us, moreover, 
1. Discussed by Sophia Mappa, in 'Dével-
opper par la démocratie? Injonctions occi-
dentales et exigences planétaires' (Develop-
ment via Democracy? Western Orders and 
Global Demands), Karthala, Paris 1995. 
that the démocratisation process 
brings greater political demands 
than a state can satisfy. Evidently, 
this poses something of a chal-
lenge. There is no doubt that 
African economies must be inte-
grated into the world economy, 
especially now that there is such 
emphasis on globalisation. But 
integration presupposes efficiency 
(one of the essential elements of 
good governance), competitive-
ness and increased production 
capacity. 
Second, it is up to the 
African people to prove wrong 
the exponents of the 'culture' 
argument. Those who govern, 
and those who are governed, 
must show through their conduct 
in the political arena, that democ-
racy is not just the prerogative of 
certain cultures, but that any 
nation can remodel itself along 
democratic lines. 
From an economic view-
point, Africans must realise that 
democracy cannot be financed by 
their foreign partners forever. 
This means they need to stop 
employing 'strategies' aimed at 
securing revenue for democratic 
reforms. Also, they must endea-
vour to maximise and use their 
own countries' resources to satisfy 
the numerous political demands 
that their leaders face daily from 
public officials, the unemployed, 
young marginalised people, those 
involved in education, and rural 
dwellers. 
Voters in front of a polling station in 
Mali. 
Popular participation implies the right 
to free and open elections. 
Such measures become all 
the more necessary and urgent if 
we remember that committed 
and unconditional support for 
démocratisation will not be forth-
coming unless it is first proved 
that the experimental stage has 
been successful. In addition, the 
African people must bear in mind 
that, even if undeniably useful, 
foreign aid has its limits. It is, 
therefore, vital that they believe 
genuinely in the democratic ideal 
and rely on themselves to make it 
succeed. It is worth reiterating 
that African states will be obliged 
to face the challenges of globali-
sation and they should already be 
preparing themselves for this. 
Their survival will depend on it. 
As we have seen, the 
challenges of démocratisation in 
Africa are numerous. Western 
pressure may be necessary but, 
more than anything else, it is up 
to the African people themselves 
to realise that building democracy 
has become a global requirement. 
And if they succeed in fulfilling 
the requirement, they are likely 
to discover that it has been worth 
their while. 9M ANS. 
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gl Regulating the market to promote 
democracy 
I Samir Amin has been described variously as a 'neo-Marxist' and a 'champion of Third-World issues'. He is un-
I doubtedly one of the greatest economists to emerge from the developing countries. He studied economics in 
i Paris, gaining his doctorate in 1957. His thesis evolved into a book entitled 'The accumulation of capital on a 
I world scale'. He taught in France and Senegal, worked as a planner in Mali and Egypt, and was director of 
Ι the UN African Institute for Economic Development and Planning from 1970 to 1980. He describes himself as 
I 'a campaigner for socialism and popular liberation ' and his research centres on the way capitalism has gener-
i ated uneven development. Since 1980, Professor Amin has been director of the African Bureau of the Third 
3 World Forum in Dakar. The Courier interviewed him at the second P7 summit in Brussels. It was an opportu-
ni nity to hear his thoughts on regional integration, the Lomé Convention and globalisation. He was asked first 
I to explain his concept of democracy and good governance as a prerequisite for receiving development aid. 
- Multilateral or bilateral 
development organisations often 
advocate the principle of good 
governance as a prerequisite but, 
in my view, the phrase is inappro-
priate. It sounds like 'good govern-
ment', which is, naturally, better 
than poor government. The solu-
tion is to democratise society as a 
whole, a multifaceted process 
which, in political terms, requires 
the organisation of normally elect-
ed government into a framework 
which tolerates opinions it does 
not share. In social terms, market 
regulation enables democracy to 
influence actual circumstances. 
Lastly, socio-cultural aspects have 
to be addressed, such as the rela-
tionship between men and 
women, ethnic differences and di-
verse religious beliefs. 
But we must not allow our-
selves to get caught in what I re-
gard as a 'false dilemma'; in other 
words, a choice between single, 
autocratic party rule and a 'sub-
standard' multiparty system. Tak-
ing the former, if you look at the 
old single party in Côte d'Ivoire, 
for example, you see it was just as 
autocratic as so-called 'socialist' 
parties. As for multipartyism, this is 
often nothing more than the divi-
sion of the ruling class into com-
peting segments. It is a power 
struggle without direction, the 
only agenda being pure dema-
gogy. This is what happened at the 
end of the Mobutu era, and it hap-
pened in certain African countries 
at the time of national confer-
ences. So, a multiparty system 
should not, in itself, be a condi-
tion. What we must do is give seri-
ous consideration to genuine dé-
mocratisation and examine the 
very bases of society. 
There is a corollary to good 
governance, you know, which is 
globalisation. There's nothing new 
about this phenomenon! The capi-
talist system has always been glob-
al in nature. It is worth reminding 
ourselves that globalisation began 
with colonisation, though the phe-
nonemon we are familiar with 
nowadays does include new fea-
tures. 
The word 'market' is cur-
rently in vogue and misuse of it 
can lead the unwary into danger-
ous territory. Yet this is not a mod-
ern phenomenon either. Despite 
what some people think, socialist 
societies were aware of it. But up 
to now, the 'market' has never ex-
isted outside the context of social 
regulation. The market is always 
regulated. What we should be ask-
ing is who regulates it and how. 
There are two types of reg-
ulation: social and democratic reg-
ulation and Opaque' regulation, 
as practised by the multinationals. 
The first type involves political in-
tervention by social forces, operat-
ing within a capitalist framework. 
Such intervention comes not just 
from companies and employers, 
but also woikers and other organi-
sations that reflect social life in all 
its aspects. By its very nature, this 
type of regulation is transparent 
and democratic. It permits the 
adoption of 'consensus' rules 
which are widely accepted by soci-
ety and which give a certain legiti-
macy to the way economies and 
the market function. 
The second type is 
'opaque', clandestine regulation, 
practised exclusively by companies 
and particularly by the biggest of 
them - the multinationals. This is 
'underhand' regulation concealed 
behind business confidentiality 
and it is presented as 'deregula-
tion'. But this is a misuse of lan-
guage. It has nothing to with 
deregulating, and a great deal to 
do with replacing social and demo-
cratic regulation with rules solely 
devised by monopolies and 
transnational organisations. I 
would even go so far as to say that 
it operates along the lines of a 
mafia, with its own internal rules. 
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These days, the actual negotiations 
take place outside the conference 
room, in the corridors of the WTO 
and, in the near future, the MIA 
(Multilateral Investment Agree-
ment), where representatives from 
multi-national companies make 
their decisions and then effectively 
impose them on governments. 
■ Access to development aid is 
nonetheless conditional on a tran-
sition to democracy. Given the way 
you link democracy and the mar-
kets, will the ACP countries be 
locked into this 'everything-for-
the-market' logic? 
- The two issues are indeed 
linked. We have to offer a truly 
democratic and social alternative 
to globalisation and not accept 
everything our adversaries say. We 
shouldn't be getting into a discus-
sion about deregulation and its 
virtues, but, on the contrary, 
demonstrating what it conceals. 
From the spatial stand-
point, market regulation takes 
place on three levels - national, re-
gional and global. Looking at the 
first of these, you can be assured 
that states will continue to exist -
even in Europe where the EU is be-
ginning to take shape. The nation 
Processing maize in Niger. 
'The ACP countries have hitherto been subject to 
the old system of international division of labour'.' 
will still be based on the state. This 
is the place for debate, conflict 
and political decision-making and 
thus, the place where, ultimately, 
the social, democratic and trans-
parent systems for regulating the 
market can be set up. 
However, we recognise 
that this basic level is not enough 
and what we currently need to do 
is strengthen it at regional level. 
The Europeans have understood 
this and are making gradual 
progress, though they have run 
into a number of stumbling blocks. 
The same is true for all the world's 
regions. Yet regional regulation 
cannot be set up mechanically and 
exclusively by the market, because 
this throws up not just social but 
also intra-regional differences and 
inequalities. Such regional regula-
tion is achieved by means of com-
mon economic policies which in-
corporate national regulation, and 
this is what we need at world 
level. 
It would be wrong to make 
the link with globalisation as it is 
perceived unilaterally by multina-
tional companies. They give ab-
solute priority to their own inter-
ests to the detriment of all other 
social interests, whether it is those 
of workers in the northern hemi-
sphere or those of people in the 
South. This is neo-liberal globalisa-
tion, regulated by transnational 
companies, and it is unacceptable. 
It generates poverty. Everyone 
talks about eradicating poverty. 
But we have set up a system which 
has created it and are now com-
plaining about the results. 
It is a utopian project on 
the part of directors of major com-
panies, who think they are the 
world and make it what is - and 
that other people do not exist. 
This is a vision of a destructive 
utopianism and an absurd dream 
of a better society. The arrogance 
of this neo-liberal deregulation de-
bate is beginning to diminish, but 
the consequences of it are so cata-
strophic in the short term that the 
World Bank is forced to try to com-
pensate for it. What is needed is a 
positive, not a defensive, internal 
discussion, with suggestions for 
genuine alternatives rather than 
denunciations of neo-liberal glob-
alisation. 
■ Negotiations on the renewal of 
the Lomé Convention are due to 
start next September. In your view, 
what is the future of ACP-EU rela-
tions? 
- One question that is 
often asked, fairly but insufficient-
ly to my mind, relates to the choice 
between 'globalised universalism' 
and regionalism (or 'universalism' 
attenuated by certain precautions 
taken at regional level). This is the 
context for an examination of EU-
ACP relations. For historical rea-
sons, which are related, amongst 
other things, to colonisation, histo-
ry has created a special relation-
ship between certain European 
countries and a major part of the 
African continent. Moreover, de-
colonisation in Africa was relative-
ly late and, according to the 
African national liberation move-
ments, this delay and the absence 
of a modern industrial and politi-
cal system have helped these rela-
tionships develop into a kind of 
neo-colonialism. There are still 
links between the former imperial-
ist states and the African countries 
which emerged after indepen-
dence, and these links have been 
codified by the various Lomé Con-
ventions and, before that, by the 
Yaoundé agreements. 
For certain of its support-
ers, Lomé was a wonderful cooper-
ation instrument, although there 
are obviously some critical points 
of view to which I would also sub-
scribe. The future of Europe-Africa 
relations has reached a critical 
point. The various European gov-
ernments each have their own 
opinion and no one is able to say 
how things will develop within the 
EU itself. In Africa, some govern-
ments have regarded Lomé as 
nothing more than a source of fi-
nance and continue to view it as 
such. They are naturally defensive. 
My impression is that other states 
would like Lomé to be dismantled 
because they prefer the diktats of 
transnational companies. We 
ought to go much more on the of-
fensive. This is a political battle 
within society both in Europe and 
in Africa. 
We need to have some 
idea of what we want society to 
be so that we can define how mar-
kets should be regulated (Euro-
pean and African internal markets 
and open, common markets gov-
erned by Euro-African relations). 
This is, in fact, one of the Third 
World Forum's programmes and 
has been widely discussed by 
Africa's top economists and 
thinkers from all regions of the 
continent over the last two years. 
We would like to make Europeans 
aware of our discussion and invite 
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them to take part, just as we 
would like to take part in theirs. 
Although European organisations 
operate on democratic principles, 
the EU has a political and financial 
responsibility in the organisation 
of these discussions. In this connec-
tion, such organisations maintain 
that their priority is to negotiate 
just for the period after Lomé, 
which is just not acceptable. In my 
view, this is non-negotiation, and 
it would result in an empty text 
which avoided problems because 
they were not ripe for solution, 
whether within Europe or Africa. 
Rather than burying our 
heads in the sand and prioritising 
'non-negotiation', we should allow 
the diplomats to get on with their 
work. We ourselves should make a 
enable that illusion to be nur-
tured, then the situation is a dan-
gerous one. 
However, other Third-
World countries are beginning to 
industrialise and are already 
emerging on the world market as 
competitive exporters of industrial 
goods. 
As regards the MIA, this is 
an instrument which does not real-
ly have any bearing on the lives of 
people in Africa. Speculative capi-
tal and direct foreign investment 
head for China, Korea, Taiwan, 
Brazil or Mexico, not Côte d'Ivoire, 
Kenya or South Africa. The MIA is 
a way of regulating such invest-
ment to the exclusive benefit of 
transnational, and to the detri-
serious effort to prepare for the 
future through debate in Europe 
and Africa. 
■ Thanks to the WTO, trade looks 
set to become increasingly liberali-
sed, with the probable erosion of 
preferences. What lessons should 
we draw from the 'banana episo-
de'? 
- You are perfectly correct, 
but I should perhaps point out 
that the ACP countries have hith-
erto been subject to the old system 
of international division of labour. 
They are still regarded as no more 
than exporters of primary prod-
ucts. Indeed, Lomé contributed to 
the continuation of the view in 
Africa that they could carry on liv-
ing like that. If all the Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP) does is 
A Beijing street scene. 
'Speculative capital and direct foreign investment 
head for China and Korea, not Côte d'Ivoire, 
Kenya or South Africa. ' 
ment of national and social inter-
ests in these countries. Africa can 
offer nothing but a wretched 
labour force, its agricultural pro-
duce and a few mining products, 
which, although produced, in legal 
terms, by African companies, are in 
fact controlled by the multination-
als. 
■ As one possible solution, the 
EU suggests setting-up regional 
groups within the ACP system, 
which would lead to regional inte-
gration. Do you feel this is viable? 
- This is one problem on 
the agenda for our Third World 
Forum discussions in Africa. We 
will be examining régionalisation 
and its history up to our times, 
again discussing in-depth the 
problem of régionalisation. Some 
20 years ago, the predominant 
view of régionalisation projects 
was very simplistic. It involved 
opening up markets in a manner 
that was somewhat similar to what 
was going on in Europe, although 
the circumstances were fundamen-
tally different. Europe was inte-
grating markets which already ex-
isted. What I am talking about 
here is powerful, industrial 
economies of the most advanced 
type. To open up markets in 
Africa, without industry to under-
pin them, would come to nought. 
We have decided to re-
open the régionalisation debate, 
beginning with Southern Africa. 
The reason for this is the economic 
importance of South Africa and 
the fact that countries which were 
in the front line of the anti-
apartheid struggle have grown ac-
customed to mutual cooperation. 
As a result, it is more likely that 
there can be a serious debate 
there on this issue. 
■ Forty years after your first work 
appeared, on the accumulation of 
capital on a world scale, what is 
the current position of 'Third-
World' thinking? Have we come to 
the end of economic thought on 
development, with the victory of 
neo-liberalism ? 
- Economic thought is a 
never-ending story linked to social 
interests and social relationships. 
Contrary to what many people, 
particularly neo-liberals, think, 
there is not just one set of eco-
nomic principles which always fits 
the bill. Neo-liberal thought, to my 
mind, involves utopian, unrealistic 
and deductive speculation about 
'pure' economics - which do not 
exist. However, there are socially-
oriented currents of thought 
which make it possible to advance 
reflection on the economic dimen-
sion of problems. Marxists are part 
of this school of thought. So, as 
you see, the debate continues.· 
Interview by M.F. 
S 
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Professor Etienne Le Roy is Director of the Legal Anthropology 
Laboratory in Paris (University of Paris I). The author of a number of 
books on Africa, his work has covered more than 30 countries on the 
continent from Senegal to the Indian Ocean. His analysis has 
concentrated on the State in the context of the various shocks that 
African nations have experienced in their history (including the slave 
trade and colonisation). His interest in Africa is a long-standing one -
reflected in his numerous publications on justice, the formation of 
the State and land policy. The Courier spoke to him in Paris and in 
our wide-ranging discussion, we touched on the themes of the 
State, good governance and the future of democracy. We asked first 
about the establishment of democracy in the countries of sub-
Saharan Africa. 
— We have to see this in terms 
of the history of ideas and 
institutions: particularly how 
European societies came to 
ignore all human experience 
by inventing the monster that Thomas 
Hobbes, in 1650, called 'the State' or 
'Leviathan'. That year saw the first 
English revolution. Charles I was be-
headed in the name of a republican 
concept of English society. The con-
vention up to then was that the 
monarch embodied the state, and the 
English were intelligent enough to 
master, control and ultimately divide 
up this concept in order to apply it 
effectively in other situations. 
By that time, quite a lot was 
already known about other societies -
African, Amerindian and Chinese 
(which the Jesuits had Interestingly 
described). In inventing the State, 
European societies took a big risk, 
which immediately prompted another 
invention, namely the concept of hu-
man rights. The State might be por-
trayed as a poison with human rights 
as the antidote. In a very real sense, 
those who took these ideas forward 
were embarking on an adventure. It 
was all linked to the advent of mod-
ernity, which crystallised with the 
natural law movement of the 18th 
century, although it really dates back 
to the Protestant reformation between 
1525 and 1535. Then there was the 
notion of indivisible sovereignty which 
emerged in the early 19th century, 
though it has been undermined by 
world wars. Now, slowly but surely, 
mankind is entering a new era. 
I prefer to speak of 'trans-
modernity' rather than 'post-moder-
nity', in order to emphasise the gra-
dual nature of processes spread over 
eight centuries. The main categories of 
Roman Catholic canon law were estab-
lished in the 12th century, with the 
first key text relating to law and the 
legal edifice - and hence, the State. 
This was Gratian's 'Decree', the first 
pontifical document, which was writ-
ten in about 1140. Its central hypoth-
esis, which is modern in terms of its 
perception and the way it was written, 
was that a distinction had to be made 
between two types of human being -
Christians and others. It is a way of 
thinking that Louis Dumont, an 
anthropologist specialising in Indian 
societies, referred to as the 'principle 
of incorporating the opposite' ('Essais 
sur l'individualisme, une perspective 
anthropologique sur l'idéologie mod-
erne', Paris, Seuil, 1983). 
'Hierarchy and 
equality are 
contradictory 
principles' 
While all human societies are 
based on the idea of hierarchies, 
modern society wishes to create a 
new system based on broad equality. 
Hierarchy and equality are contradic-
tory principles. The principle of incor-
porating opposites was invented for a 
society that liked to think of itself as 
'rational'. The commitment to equality 
reflects the view that we are all part of 
the same human family. At the same 
time, we absorb what we do not know 
and do not seek to validate the 
opposite. It is an approach based on 
duality - Christian versus pagan, civi-
lised peoples versus savages. It is 
founded on the idea of developing 
one's own identity, culture, 'world 
view' and method of organisation. 
■ This approach seems to involve 
transferring something - say a con-
stitution, a concept of democracy or 
a certain way of living, to all 
humankind. Isn't this the equivalent 
of an organ transplant? 
- It goes further than that. 
Taking up the imagery that you em-
ploy, humankind is a living body which 
is seen to have a malfunctioning 
organ. This is removed and a new 
organ is transplanted. Through the 
State, colonisers and developers com-
pletely reprogrammed the body, with 
the aim of transforming Africa and the 
African so completely that the latter 
was forced to view the world, its 
organisation and its vital principles in 
a different way. This was not so much 
a revolution as a transformation - the 
creation of a genetically modified 
organism. It was in the name of this 
modern ideology that Africa had the 
State imposed on it. And it happened 
over a very short time-scale. Previously, 
there was no concept of the State in 
Africa, and no need for it, because the 
African way of regulating society was 
built on different foundations. 
The experience of the State 
was not made available to Africans by 
French colonisers until 1956. In France, 
the concept began to take shape in 
the 14th century. People were brought 
up to develop a devoted attachment 
to the idea, and to accept the fact that 
it was right to die for one's country. 
Yet this idea took four hundred years 
to take root. It was only in 1792, with 
the declaration that 'the motherland is 
in danger', that people were really 
forced to acknowledge the State's 
power. The African view of the world 
is completely different and individua-
listic. It is not at all connected with the 
Judaeo/Christian concept which justi-
fies the ideas of unity and centrality. 
Because they are effective, these ideas 
will mobilise material and human 
resources, and facilitate domination 
over other societies and therefore the 
latter's exploitation. We are face to 
face with a system that justifies mas-
tery of the world by the accumulation 
of material things, which the State 
machinery makes possible, through 
capitalism and individualism. 
The basic principle underlying 
African society is that of the comple-
mentarity of differences. Unlike the 
Judaeo/Christian concept found in the 
Book of Genesis, according to which 
the world was created from nothing, 
in Africa the world is created from 
chaos. In African eyes, the world is a 
series of interactions and connections 
between diverse components. Ex-
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changes concern relationships be-
tween humans themselves and with 
everything that surrounds them, be it 
visible or invisible. 
The principle of the comple-
mentarity of differences is opposite to 
that of the equality of modern socie-
ties and, above all, of equality based 
on uniformity. African societies, 
trapped by three centuries of slavery 
and 150 years of colonisation, are 
faced with a principle of organisation 
not in keeping with the way their own 
system of regulation functions. Theirs 
is a pluralistic, separational and seg-
mented structure, with centralised 
powers divided until a balance is 
found between the principles of divi-
sion and of complementarity of differ-
ences. 
This complementarity finds ex-
pression via the African theory of 
chieftainship. It is a concept of society 
that was systematically rejected, cari-
catured and transformed by colonisers 
and then by developers/modernisers, 
because a number of Africans, particu-
larly those of lower social status, 
rapidly came to see collaboration with 
the colonial power as a path to riches 
or a way to improve their social 
condition. 
'Betrayal of the 
African elite' 
Collaboration led to a be-
trayal, a weakening and a moral 
degeneration among the African elite. 
This process is recounted in the Story 
of 'Wangrin', and in the memoirs of 
Amadou Hampate Bâ, which show 
how intellectuals yielded to tempta-
tion, adhering to the model of the 
colonial and then the post-colonial 
State, because it served their interests. 
One has to ask whether it is actually 
possible directly to transpose the mod-
el of the State and its institutions and 
find a way to accommodate Africa's 
own modernity? 
Neither the colonisers nor the 
African attempted to do this. The 
latter not only declined to take up 
the challenge, but actually took to 
themselves all the resources of the 
State model: notably the characteris-
tics that are most autocratic (and 
therefore unacceptable) and employed 
them to create a unique concept of 
'democracy' based on presidentialism 
and the single-party, unitary State. 
There was one system of law which 
denied to Africans their 'common', 
unwritten laws. The idea of unitarism, 
based on the modern Western model, 
became a caricature of itself. 
In the early 1990s, alienation 
led the system to be called into 
question. There was dissatisfaction 
within the political and financial 
authorities, under pressure from public 
opinion, for an end to the chaotic and 
untenable situation that had devel-
oped (cooperation organisations, in-
cluding notably the World Bank 
decided to change the rules of the 
game in the late 1980s and the con-
cept of good governance began to 
emerge). There was also agitation 
from groups claiming to represent civil 
society. Although these developments 
had the effect of undermining the 
most intolerable aspects of the mono-
cratic system and presidentialism, Afri-
cans still failed to reflect on what their 
own State should be like, on the basis 
of their own innate character. 
■ Against this background, what is 
your perception of the 'National 
Conferences' that were held in Afri-
ca as part of the transition process 
towards democracy? Was the La 
Baule Summit a watershed? 
- National conferences are all very 
well, but their results have been dis-
appointing. Initially, the approach 
seemed to be to set up never-ending 
discussions. Intellectuals agreed to 
scrutinise their own experiences. They 
distanced themselves from their own 
actions and even, in some cases, criti-
cised them. Unfortunately, the confer-
ence participants soon began to quib-
ble over constitutional principles and 
to lose sight of the essential - which is 
The State might be portrayed as a 
poison with human rights as the 
antidote. 
to work out how modern Africa can 
live in peace. For example, Benin's 
national conference enabled a veil to 
be drawn over the past, but it made 
no use of the wealth of experience of 
Benin's centuries-old and diverse socie-
ties in its construction of the future. 
They contented themselves with a 
hollow imitation, bearing no relation 
to the needs of societies. The latter 
thus found no place in the new 
institutions which ended up being 
monopolised by a small élite. This is 
the syndrome in which sharing comes 
to an end. 
La Baule then put the finish-
ing touches to the process, especially 
by discrediting the positions of a 
number of authoritarian governments 
in Africa. In that continent, what the 
outside world sees does not always 
correspond to what is actually happen-
ing. The agenda set by the interna-
tional community only gets taken up 
by a small, committed minority of 
people. At best, one might say that 
the legitimacy of certain authoritarian 
State models is now discredited. But 
this does not mean that democracy is 
the rule everywhere. 
■ We recently saw hordes of US 
businesspeople jostling for position 
at the entrance to Tiananmen 
square. At the same time, poor 
countries are being told: 'No aid 
without democracy and good gov-
ernance'. Are business notions now 
supplanting those of human rights 
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and democracy. As an observer of 
the international scene, how do you 
interpret this dichotomy? 
- As in any dichotomous situation, the 
phenomenon of US businessmen rush-
ing to China must first be seen in the 
short term context: against the back-
ground of President Clinton's visit and 
the opportunity to ease tension be-
tween China and the US. Above all, 
they have realised there is an enor-
mous, genuinely emerging market 
with an extraordinary capacity for 
monétisation and marketing. Whoever 
gains control of this pool of jobs, 
services and sales can be sure that his 
future is guaranteed for several dec-
ades. 
There are also other factors, 
such as the crisis in Asia. China, by 
virtue of its quasi-dictatorial structures, 
seems much more resistant to the 
turbulence than democratic-type socie-
ties. Here, we have the reverse effect 
of what I mentioned earlier: the very 
fact of being democratic creates weak-
ness and leads to problems and even 
failures! This attraction to the Chinese 
market should not be justified without 
question, but there is an aspect of Asia 
that ought to be taken into account. 
This is that China is currently a refuge 
for those fleeing the Japanese market, 
which is unstable. So, you see, within 
Asia there is a kind of compensatory 
mechanism involving certain countries 
and China, at least for the time being, 
is benefiting from this. 
In these processes, Africa loses 
out on a number of fronts. Interest-
ingly, World Bank requirements on 
good governance and democracy are 
being applied to African societies but 
not to those in Asia. There are coun-
tries like Singapore, for example, 
which are not entirely democratic, 
though they are capitalist. One has to 
be extremely careful how one uses 
words and particularly how one ap-
plies them to situations which are 
quite dissimilar. 
That is a problem with the 
concept of good governance. It is 
based on a highly subjective criterion, 
namely apply to others what you 
yourself practise. 'Good governance' 
is interpreted as acceptance of a 
'superior' model of organisation and 
government. 
■ The Multilateral Investment 
Agreement is due to be signed soon, 
the WTO has now been set up and 
nationalism is on the rise in many 
parts of the world. Considering 
these developments, could it be that 
the democratic ideal is just a fleeting 
moment in the history of mankind? 
- I would have to answer yes to that 
question. You don't need a degree, 
just a passing interest in social history, 
to understand what is going on. The 
age of modernity is already coming to 
a close, though quite slowly. The 
process has been going on since 
1945. People have come to realise that 
State socialism, individualism and ca-
pitalism, the three pillars of modernity, 
are dangerous. We have to learn to 
control them and transcend them, 
despite the fact that, currently, they 
appear to rule our lives absolutely. 
'We are moving 
towards systems 
other than the 
democratic one' 
However, it will take perhaps 
50 years, maybe even two or three 
hundred. Human society has a limitless 
capacity for invention, but history 
suggests that we tend only to be able 
to reach agreement on a new project 
at times of conflict or significant 
institutional crisis. But we are moving 
ineluctably towards systems other than 
the democratic one. 
You might imagine that we 
are in the process of rediscovering 
pluralism - combining this with mod-
ernity's unitarian systems - along the 
lines of what is beginning to emerge 
in the South but also in the North. 
There is a kind of 'interbreeding' of 
systems which is becoming more com-
mon. This will progressively lead us to 
formulae in which modern unitarian 
models and endogenous African plur-
alistic models merge. South Africa is 
currently the continent's most impres-
sive and important democracy, notably 
in the way it combines unitarian and 
pluralist principles. The shapes such 
formulae will take will depend entirely 
on man's genius. Differences are a 
source of wealth, so, on that basis, 
mankind is rich. But it is the comple-
mentarity of such differences which is 
the key to a good life. 
Instead of principles being 
pitted against each other, they should 
be considered more in terms of their 
complementarity, on the basis of an 
intellectual and political, progression. 
■ What is your view of the radical 
neo-Marxist movement found in An-
glo-Saxon cultures which advocates 
'Democracy for all'? 
- One should never underestimate the 
importance of being able to federate, 
stimulate and orient societies. The 
African State and the Asian State are 
based on two different views of the 
world. The former has to reconcile and 
regulate social relationships, while the 
latter is professional and promotes 
development. The role of democracy 
should not be overvalued or devalued. 
The question is not posed as the 
Africans ought to pose it, because, 
once again, they have been unable to 
reflect on their conceptual and institu-
tional heritage and have gone in 
search of other people's words which 
convey a meaning given to them by 
such people. The Africans use them to 
caricature their own reality and speak 
of traditional democracy, for example. 
This does not mean that de-
mocracy has no place in Africa, nor 
that the democratic enterprise is to-
tally inconceivable. Quite the contrary, 
in fact. It is conceivable insofar as 
Africans will put so much into this 
reality of popular involvement in poli-
tical decision-making that they will 
make it their very own, describe it in 
their own words and employ all their 
resources in so doing. The fundamen-
tal idea is not to say that democracy is 
not a good thing for Africans, which 
would be totally scandalous. The gen-
uine response should be provided by 
Africans on the basis of a reinvention 
of their experience, not of tradition as 
such, but of what they have gone 
through in order to build their society 
with its own cultural references. So-
ciety's problems need tailor-made solu-
tions. 
■ Is 'African-style democracy' or 
'democracy pure and simple' a poli-
tical reality in anthropological 
terms ? 
- The main problem is the establish-
ment of African democracy - not an 
'African-style' democracy - based on 
the innate genius of African societies. 
Only Africans themselves can achieve 
this. It is their future, their freedom 
and their way of thinking and living 
that are being challenged. I am 
amazed at Africans' reluctance to face 
these problems head on and come up 
with solutions to them. As an aca-
demic, I am always trying to inspire my 
students to enter the struggle and to 
make their own contribution to resol-
ving what is for me a great enigma -
the abdication of the intellectual. 
It can be understood in a 
historical context. Africans were de-
prived of the means to organise mod-
ernity along their own lines by slavery 
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done as a result. The burden has been 
borne by successive generations and 
today's new generation is very much a 
'chip off the old block'. Yet it is this 
generation which should accept the 
challenge and take the historical in-
itiative. They should not use a stereo-
typical, traditionalist history but in-
stead society's current problems as 
their basis for examining all kinds of 
experience. In this way, the solution 
will suit the problem. There is an 
extraordinary amount to be gained 
by looking at how one's ancestors 
approached life, and it is the new 
generation's responsibility now to seek 
solutions to suit the African genius. 
^H Interview by M.F. 
Civil society as a dynamic force 
I
by Athanassios Theodorakis" 
The concept of 'civil society' 
is defined in terms of the 
State. Gramsci's theory de-
scribing the respective roles 
and potentials of these two 
components of an industrial 
society has applied fully to 
and been borne out by the 
facts. After the 1960s, the 
social evolution of industrial 
societies demonstrated that, 
as far as the State (in the 
widest sense) was con-
cerned, a multitude of social 
forces (associations, trades 
unions, NGOs, social solidar-
ity groups) had developed, 
claiming and ultimately ac-
quiring genuine power and 
considerable influence in 
public life. Such forces often 
make their presence felt well 
beyond national frontiers, with the 
organisation of regional and even 
international networks. The most 
well-known of these associative 
movements and networks have ac-
quired their high profile through 
spectacular initiatives in such sensi-
tive areas as environmental protec-
tion, medical aid for refugees and 
humanitarian actions. 
Two aspects which merit em-
phasis are, first, the sense of initiative 
and, second, the mobilisation of inter-
national public opinion. Civil society's 
forces thus contribute to a new dis-
tribution of political influence and 
thereby to the formation of a multi-
polar world. 
More particularly, as regards 
development and North-South rela-
tions, civil society as embodied in 
* Deputy Director General at the Commis-
sion, DG VIII (Development). 
industrial societies in Europe and 
North America, principally, has contrib-
uted: 
— to a better understanding, aware-
ness and revitalisation of the interest 
the northern hemisphere and the 
world as a whole has in sustainable 
development in the South; 
— to the development models pro-
posed by the North to the South being 
challenged, with all the criticism im-
plied by such a challenge in terms of 
choice of methods, instruments, prac-
tices and objectives; 
— to the promotion, in international 
debate, of new paths to solidarity and 
cooperation with the South (particu-
larly at local and 'micro' level, North-
South cooperation, coordination of 
the forces of civil society, and South-
South cooperation). 
As regards the role of civil 
society in developing countries, the 
debate should address three levels: 
— the political level: for example, the 
role of civil society in the South in all 
its variants and forms, the 'reclama-
tion' by the powers-that-be of societal 
forces (which find expression in NGOs, 
in particular); and restrictions on the 
activity of civil society in a given 
context, due to objective social con-
straints such as the low level of citizen 
involvement, illiteracy and bad com-
munications; 
— the institutional and social level: 
the various forms of expression used 
by civil society in the South are de 
facto a positive element, because they 
help strengthen social forces and un-
dermine political monopolies, thereby 
constituting a challenge to monolithic 
power; 
— the level of the political culture: 
social forces project the image of a 
more transparent, multi-faceted so-
ciety where a sense of responsibility 
and balance can be found, particularly 
among the younger generations. In 
this context, the dynamism of the 
private sector and of professional 
associations can have a considerable 
impact on the future. 
The role of civil society is 
particularly important also in terms of 
promoting and monitoring the imple-
mentation of decisions taken by the 
international community on issues of 
global interest. The activities of South-
ern NGOs should, therefore, make a 
very useful contribution, as they will 
provide a link between local society 
and world evolution, act as a staging 
post, and promote universal values, 
particularly in the fields of informa-
tion, human rights, and initiatives in 
the area of sustainable development. 
Aside from these general con-
siderations, I would like to present a 
few personal thoughts on more speci-
fic issues and areas, and particularly 
the future of EU-ACP cooperation, in 
the new context. Professor Pinheiro's 
general approach, which consists of 
involving all social and political players 
in the ACP-EU partnership, including 
civil society, may lead to a change in 
outlook and mutual acknowledgement 
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non for achieving complementarity in 
our action, and a qualitative change in 
our cooperation. 
The mandate recently adopt-
ed by the Council of Ministers regard-
ing negotiations on the future of our 
cooperation prompts the following 
reflections. In the first place, there is 
a need to be more open about 
cooperation with civil society in the 
ACP States. This means that the part-
nership must be opened up realistically 
and specifically to the forces of civil 
society. New approaches, such as de-
centralised cooperation, local initia-
tives, and easier citizen involvement 
at grass roots level, are better re-
sponses and tools with which to tackle 
the problems posed by poverty in all 
its forms. 
There is also an urgent need 
to take action to create an environ-
ment that is favourable to private 
enterprise in the southern hemisphere. 
Currently, the ratio of public aid to 
private investment is one to five. I 
Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré, 
former President of Mali, who handed 
over power to a civilian government to 
devote himself to humanitarian work 
with his NGO. 
Civil society helps to reduce political 
monopolies. 
believe we need to combine all our 
efforts (the EU, international organisa-
tions and ACP governments) so as to 
integrate private investment into con-
sistent and forward-looking develop-
ment strategies which ensure that the 
political, social and economic rights of 
citizens in the southern hemisphere 
are respected. 
There is also an urgent need 
to open a debate, at international 
level, on the current contradictions of 
development (an explosion in the 
numbers of those living in poverty, 
increasing debt, the risk of margin-
Weaving project organised by a 
Somalian NGO. 
Civil society in the ACP states must be 
the expression of local traditions, 
cultures, principles and experience. 
dossier 
alisation of less-advanced countries 
from the global economy and, finally, 
the failure of programmes and macro-
economic reforms to internalise social 
costs). 
The new century will un-
doubtedly see a significant level of 
interdependence between the North 
and the South at all levels. All those 
involved in the debate must contribute 
to raising awareness and to defining a 
new context. This will allow not just a 
new departure on a sound basis, but 
also a future that is different from the 
one we have become familiar with 
from the daily news bulletins in this 
latter period of the 20th century (a 
century which has seen colonisation, 
independence, authoritarianism and 
social exclusion). 
Obviously, civil society in the 
ACP States has to be the expression of 
local traditions, cultures, principles and 
experience. It is only by reevaluating 
experience and tradition that we can 
envisage the emergence of forces that 
are able to convince doubters and act 
credibly and effectively in the field. 
Against this background, the 
particular importance and the role of 
forces in civil society should be em-
phasised in: 
— the fight against corruption at all 
levels; 
— transparency, responsibility and the 
promotion of good governance; and 
— the creation of local, national and 
international networks to ensure con-
sistency between development strate-
gies. ^M AT. 
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The international IDEA 
experience in Burkina 
Faso 
by Roel von Meijenfeldt* and Carlos Santiso** 
The international communi-
; ty began providing democ-
ί racy assistance in the mid-
1980s and expanding their 
j support significantly in the 
early 1990s. This was in re-
; sponse to the 'third wave' 
j of démocratisation which 
I brought another 60 coun-
tries from authoritarian rule 
to some kind of democratic 
government. The promotion of 
democracy not only focused on ad-
vancing democratic principles, but 
also on enforcing human rights, 
applying the rule of law, and on 
good governance. Lately, conflict 
prevention has been added as one 
of the virtues of democratic gover-
nance. Much of the assistance was 
initially provided with enthusiasm 
and benign naivete. A lot of em-
phasis was put on the organisation 
of regular competitive elections. 
However, the establishment and 
practice of democracy has proved 
far more challenging, requiring a 
much wider time horizon than was 
first anticipated. With the experi-
ence gained and the lessons 
learned, the focus is now turning 
toward consolidating democracy. 
In this context, the International 
Institute for Democracy and Elec-
toral Assistance (International 
IDEA) was created in 1995 as a new 
multilateral organisation with a 
mandate to promote sustainable 
democracy and to assist electoral 
processes. This article discusses the 
challenges facing international de-
velopment cooperation in the ef-
fort to promote democracy and 
* Director of Programmes at the International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assis-
tance (International IDEA) 
** Senior Programme Officer responsible for 
programmes on democracy assistance and 
good governance and Project Manager of the 
Programme in Burkina Faso. The views ex-
pressed are the sole responsibility of the au-
thors and do not necessarily reflect those of 
the Institute, its Board of Directors, or its mem-
bers. 
good governance, and looks at the 
experience of International IDEA in 
Burkina Faso. 
The dynamics of democracy 
and démocratisation often fluctu-
ate in unpredictable 'waves'. The 
initial euphoria early in the 1990s 
about the new wave of democracy 
on the African continent, for exam-
ple, has subsided in the face of dif-
ficulties encountered in consolidat-
ing the initial gains. Of the 48 
sub-Saharan states, the vast majori-
ty have held multi-party elections -
of which less than half have been 
judged to be free and fair. In fact, 
scholars have calculated that a 
third of these states meet the mini-
mum criteria of electoral democra-
cy and only a fifth the criteria for 
liberal democracy. In short, the 
wave of democracy has been partly 
real and partly an illusion. The de-
velopment of a democratic system 
of government, encompassing the 
various institutions which form the 
architecture of the state, the regu-
latory frameworks which guarantee 
the rule of law, political parties 
that function as the political con-
ductors between civil society and 
the state, and a political culture 
conducive to the practice of democ-
racy, is proving highly complex. 
Transition to democracy 
cannot be properly understood if 
the multiple internal and external 
demands under which governments 
and political systems operate are 
not recognised. The factors of time 
and the rhythm or pace of change 
that provides the democratic mo-
mentum, need to be taken into ac-
count - without endangering the 
stability of the system as a whole 
(this is often incorrectly used as an 
argument to maintain the status 
quo). 
Governments and political 
systems are under pressure from a 
variety of perspectives. Transform-
ing single party systems into demo-
cratic ones requires a different style 
of governance. Both governing and 
opposition parties need to adapt 
from a mentality of Owning' the 
state for the benefit of particular 
interests to managing it in the com-
mon national interest. The polity 
also needs to adapt - from being 
passive recipients of government 
largesse or passive victims of gov-
ernment control, to energetic part-
ners. 
To ensure the political sys-
tem remains dynamic, open elec-
toral competition at all levels of 
public office is required at regular 
and set intervals. This competition 
must be organised in a strictly im-
partial manner to assure the legiti-
macy of those elected. The level of 
participation of the voting age 
population (not just those regis-
tered) is one significant indication 
of the trust of the population in 
their government. The competition 
for power requires accepted sys-
tems of alternation and provisions 
for dignified retirement from pub-
lic office. 
To enhance the stability of 
the political system, democracy en-
tails the fairest representation of 
all groups within the major institu-
tions of the state, and in particular 
the legislature. In many countries, 
this means that current electoral 
systems need to be revisited, with a 
view to bringing all interest groups 
into the process - with specific em-
phasis on the participation of mi-
norities and achieving a better gen-
der balance. The practice of 
designing electoral systems to con-
solidate the power of the incum-
bent government will prove self-
defeating and will not guarantee 
stability. Political stability is a con-
ditio sine qua non for attracting 
and retaining foreign investment 
to generate economic develop-
ment. 
It goes without saying that 
inclusive and participatory political 
systems are guarantors of long-
term peace. Conflict cannot be pre-
vented - indeed it is the fuel of any 
political system - but in democra-
cies, it is managed through mecha-
nisms based on such universally 
shared values as tolerance, equali-
ty, fairness, consensus, participa-
tion, transparency and accountabil-
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ity. These mechanisms allow con-
flict to be resolved peacefully. 
The transition to democracy 
is taking place in parallel with the 
transition to open market 
economies, driven by the forces of 
globalisation. This is placing huge 
demands on systems of governance 
that must strive to find a new bal-
ance between the needs of the 
modern sector and the traditional 
sectors which most people still de-
pend on for their livelihood. 
The complexities of gover-
nance are compounded by the fast 
integration of global technology 
and communication. There is some 
merit in the view that many of 
today's problems are too big for 
states to handle, while states are 
too large to cater for the small 
problems. A shift has occurred in 
the role of the state and the pace 
of change is accelerating. While it 
took many generations to move 
from a farm-based to a factory-
based economy, it has taken only a 
single generation to move from an 
industrial to a computer-based one. 
The challenge is to determine how 
people, their institutions and their 
procedures of governance can ad-
just to this increasing pace of 
change. 
Recognising the shifts tak-
ing place and the complexities of 
the transformation is not the same 
as arguing for a reduced role for 
government. On the contrary, in 
today's world, this role is becoming 
more significant, although the style 
and functions will need to adapt to 
the changes. 
A new generation of re-
forms is required which takes ac-
count of interrelationships at three 
multi-dimensional levels. The first is 
the relationship between a com-
plex array of concepts including 
democracy, socio-economic devel-
opment, peace and security, and 
human rights. The second is the re-
lationship between different ac-
tors: the state, civil society and the 
market. The third involves the rela-
tions between the local, national, 
regional and international levels of 
governance. The promotion of 
democracy must be considered in 
all these contexts to ensure that re-
forms reinforce each other and are 
sustainable in the long-term. Key 
concepts in this respect are partici-
pation, inclusivity and ownership. 
The international communi-
ty has responded to the challenges 
of démocratisation by making assis-
tance for the process one of its core 
priorities. A key feature of the 
changing policy environment has 
been the gradual 'mainstreaming' 
of democracy promotion in the 
agendas and funding policies of 
donors. Increasing numbers of ac-
tors are active in the field of 
democracy promotion and electoral 
assistance. 
In the past decade, the 
world of development cooperation 
has been transformed by the ad-
vancement of democracy and the 
promotion of good governance. 
The democracy assistance arena has 
expanded rapidly and now includes 
a myriad of organisations: govern-
mental, inter-governmental, non-
governmental and even private. 
Their number and the scope of 
their reach has also gradually been 
expanding to include a complex 
range of interrelated activities, 
such as assistance to institution 
building, state and public sector re-
form, decentralisation, civil society 
development, political parties, 
women's empowerment, the 
strengthening of the rule of law, 
and administration of justice. 
But this new international 
environment is also contributing to 
the complexities of managing polit-
ical change. The need to attract 
foreign investment has prompted 
many governments to respond to 
donor conditionalities rather than 
focusing on strengthening their le-
gitimacy and accountability in rela-
tion to their national constituen-
cies. By no means all democracy 
assistance has been successful. 
International IDEA'S man-
date is to function as an interna-
tional professional resource base 
for democratic development, to 
provide an impartial meeting place 
for reflection, and to act as a forum 
for developing initiatives to 
strengthen democratic reform 
processes around the world. Its core 
programmes focus on establishing 
an international consensus about 
the normative framework for de-
mocratic practice (the 'Rules and 
Guidelines' Programme) and on 
strengthening local capacity (the 
'Capacity Building for Sustainable 
Democracy' Programme.) 
Capacity-building for 
sustainable democracy 
The capacity-building pro-
gramme has dual objectives. It 
aims, through consultation and dia-
logue, to widen choices and im-
prove the performance of local in-
stitutions and actors who perform 
key functions in the démocratisa-
tion process. It also aims to assist 
the international community in im-
proving the quality of its interven-
tions both in political support and 
in resource allocations to démocra-
tisation processes. 
The programme started ini-
tially with a specific country focus 
and nine states were selected 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, 
Burma, Guatemala, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Romania and 
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Zambia). In these countries, follow-
ing an initial analysis of the démoc-
ratisation dynamics, International 
IDEA'S contribution is to: 
- facilitate inclusive and participa-
tory dialogues about democratic 
development (the heart of the pro-
gramme) 
- produce an assessment of the dé-
mocratisation process, including 
policy recommendations for demo-
cratic reform; and, 
- generate locally-driven democrat-
ic reform agendas. 
These national dialogues 
are consolidated into new institu-
tional capacity at the national level 
for promoting democratic develop-
ment, either in the institutionalised 
form of Democracy Foundations -
such as the Democracy Foundation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Center for Democratic Develop-
ment of Nigeria - or in a flexible 
form of democracy networks - such 
as the task forces in Nepal, Roma-
nia and Burkina Faso. 
The initiatives which arise 
from International IDEA'S pro-
grammes are brokered to the inter-
national community, which is in-
volved at an early stage in the 
process to ensure funding commit-
ments. This stems from the fact 
that International IDEA has not 
been conceived as an implementing 
agency. The outcome of activities 
under the programme has been the 
establishment of a number of local 
institutions to promote sustainable 
democracy. 
Burkina Faso 
In 1991, after more than a 
decade under 'exceptional' military 
rule, Burkina Faso, began a transi-
tion to democracy through the in-
troduction of a multi-party system, 
the enactment of a democratic 
Constitution and free - though 
highly controversial - elections. In 
this process, the country had the 
undeniable asset of political stabili-
ty. The lack of ethnic polarisation
1 -
reflected in the absence of an eth-
nic vote - and the limited recourse 
' The two words in the country's name are 
from two of the three national languages. 
'Burkina' is Moré, the language of the Mossi 
who are the largest ethnic group. 'Faso' is a 
Dioula word. The third national language is 
Fulfude, used by the Peul, while French is the 
official language. 
to political violence explain the rel-
ative peacefulness of the process to 
date. In addition, Burkina Faso has 
a strong and dynamic civil society. 
Finally, although this is one of the 
poorest countries in the world, 
with an illiteracy rate of nearly 
70%, the management of macro-
economic policy in the last decade 
has contributed to well-balanced 
development and stability. 
In terms of legal texts and 
institutions, the framework for 
democracy exists today in Burkina 
Faso. The political system replicates 
the French one. The major structur-
al elements of the transition to a 
constitutional state were the 
restoration of the multi-party sys-
tem in 1990 and the enactment of 
a democratic constitution, adopted 
by referendum, in June 1991. The 
latter is very liberal compared to 
other countries in the region. It 
provides for a separation of powers 
and two houses of Parliament, the 
National Assembly (Assemblée Na-
tionale) and the House of Repre-
sentatives (Chambre des Représen-
tants - made up of members of civil 
society). It established direct univer-
sal suffrage as the method for 
electing both the President and 
deputies. It has taken time, howev-
er, to set up the institutions fore-
seen in the Constitution. The High 
Court of Justice, mandated to pros-
ecute high public officials for 
crimes against the state, was only 
established in June 1998. 
Section 13 of the Constitu-
tion recognises and guarantees the 
existence of a multi-party system, 
and the governing party generally 
respects the rights of the opposi-
tion. There are few barriers to the 
creation of political parties and, as 
a result, these have flourished. In 
1992, there were 67 parties and 
groups of which 27 took part in the 
elections. Nine won seats in the As-
sembly of the People's Deputies 
(now the National Assembly). In 
1997, the figures were 47, 13 and 
four respectively. The adoption of 
the Constitution was followed by a 
series of elections (presidential in 
1991, legislative in 1992, municipal 
in 1995 and legislative in 1997). The 
electoral timetable has generally 
been respected and the next poll is 
the presidential contest, due in No-
vember 1998. 
Freedom of expression is 
generally guaranteed and widely 
respected although human rights 
infringements still occur. Civil soci-
ety is present and active, especially 
in the areas of human rights and 
election monitoring. The pluralism 
of the press is effective. Decentrali-
sation, and the corresponding im-
plementation of a local participato-
ry democracy, has been initiated 
and is gradually expanding, even if 
numerous problems still exist. 
Civil society, in the shape of 
various associations, human rights 
movements and NGOs, have played 
a crucial role in Burkina Faso's de-
mocratic transition, providing 
checks and balances and observing 
the conduct of elections. They have 
also monitored the operation of 
democracy between elections. 
The authorities have clearly 
stated their willingness to promote 
democracy and strengthen good 
governance. Assessing what has 
happened since the transition 
process began in 1991, one may 
conclude that good progress has 
been made overall in institutional 
and political development. This ob-
servation has to be qualified, how-
ever. A recent assessment of the 
transformation process also reveals 
a number of concerns. 
Concerns 
In the first place, the move 
to a multi-party state and political 
pluralism has not yet led to any di-
lution of the symbiotic relation be-
tween the party in power and the 
state. The ruling party appears to 
dominate the executive, legislative 
and judicial branches and the civil 
service. It also has a strong follow-
ing among prominent traditional 
chiefs, and is supported by the 
major economic actors. The opposi-
tion has thus only a very narrow 
political margin within which to 
operate. The private press, without 
necessarily expressing hostility to 
the opposition, is not yet an active 
counter-balance to the political es-
tablishment. 
A second aspect relates to 
the principle of separation of pow-
ers. If this principle is not applied, 
there are insufficient checks and 
balances and a key requirement for 
democratic governance is missing. 
The Inspection Général de l'Etat 
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and parliamentary committees, 
which have the task of overseeing 
the Executive, cannot be effective 
in curbing corruption and ensuring 
accountability if they are, or are 
perceived to be partisan. Depolitici-
sation of the administration is an-
other central element. The credibil-
ity of public institutions, and of the 
civil service in general, lies in their 
being impartial and trusted by the 
citizens. 
A third point is that the 
electoral system favours the ruling 
party (the Congrès pour la Démoc-
ratie et le Progrès). In the 1997 leg-
islative elections, the CDP got 91% 
of the seats with about 70% of the 
vote. A system which gives the op-
position a fairer share of the seats 
in the National Assembly, reflecting 
the popular vote, should be consid-
ered. 
Fourth, the President has 
recently amended the Constitution 
to allow for an unlimited renewal 
of the presidency's seven-year man-
date. This has been criticised by the 
opposition, which reads in it a pro-
vision for a president 'for life'. 
Since the amendment was hastily 
adopted, it leaves some doubt 
about the prospects for strengthen-
ing democracy. Looking at this de-
velopment in the context of the 
CDP's dominance, the possibility of 
democratic alternation in power in 
the foreseeable future - another 
key element in consolidating 
democracy - is limited. 
Fifth, the role of the legisla-
ture needs to be strengthened. The 
task of this relatively young institu-
tion is to prepare laws that reflect 
the interests of the people and to 
exercise a countervailing power to 
the authority of the executive 
branch. The current National As-
sembly, dominated by the CDP, will 
find it difficult to fulfil this role, al-
though under Speaker Maurice Tra-
oré (since 1997), it is in the process 
of asserting itself as the main 
forum for democratic debate. 
A sixth point is that the in-
dependence of the judiciary needs 
to be reinforced - both vis-à-vis the 
Executive and in terms of its capaci-
ty to perform efficiently. While ju-
dicial independence is affirmed in 
the Constitution, the reality is more 
nuanced. The careers of judges de-
pend on decisions made by the 
government-controlled Upper 
Council of the Magistracy (Conseil 
Supérieur de la Magistrature). Also, 
in the seven years of its existence, 
the Supreme Court has never struck 
down a law or executive decree on 
the grounds of unconstitutionality. 
Moreover, the proper administra-
tion of justice is inhibited by a lack 
of administrative capacity, both 
human and financial. There are 
only 10 High Courts (Tribunaux de 
Grande Instance) and two Courts of 
Appeal (Cours d'Appel). For democ-
racy to consolidate, the rule of law 
must be upheld. 
A seventh problem identi-
fied is the endemic weakness of the 
opposition. Democracy implies a 
majority and an opposition, yet the 
latter has great difficulty making its 
presence felt on the political scene. 
Opposition parties generally lack a 
support base, leaders and financial 
resources, and offer little in the 
way of long-term strategies and 
programmes. They are divided and 
heterogeneous. Divisions may be 
based on ideology, but also on 
deep-seated personal enmities, 
which makes it difficult to build the 
electoral alliances needed to com-
pete with the CDP. Parties are 
often formed around prominent 
political figures rather than visions 
of society or policy programmes. In 
addition, the opposition faces an 
uphill struggle on a playing field 
which is not yet completely level. 
But democracy cannot subsist with-
out countervailing powers and 
competition for public office. A sta-
ble majority, a credible opposition 
and the possibility of alternation 
are all key aspects of the democrat-
ic process. 
Eighth, the role of the army 
remains ambiguous. In theory, it no 
longer intervenes in political mat-
ters but in practice, its presence in 
the shadows of power cannot be 
ignored. Attitudes and reflexes at-
tributable more to exceptional rule 
than to the rule of law have been 
observed on occasion. For instance, 
the handling of the university crisis 
in the spring of 1997 raised con-
cerns - although these were effec-
tively addressed by the intervention 
of the Faso Mediator (Médiateur 
du Faso), the country's ombuds-
man. 
Finally, there are worries 
about voter participation. Turnout 
is generally regarded as an indica-
tion of the democratic health of a 
country in transition, and - to a 
lesser extent - the legitimacy of the 
government. In Burkina, election 
turnouts remain low, although 
there has been a significant im-
provement in recent years. Partici-
pation rates in the 1991 presiden-
tial poll and in the 1992 and 1997 
legislative elections were respec-
tively 25%, 34% and 45% of regis-
tered voters. The Head of State was 
elected by 19% of the 3.4 million 
voters on the register (7% of the 
total voting age population of the 
country, estimated at the time at 
nine million). 
So although there has been 
some remarkable progress towards 
democracy in Burkina Faso, the 
transition remains incomplete and 
fragile. On the other hand, an au-
thentic democratic culture is gradu-
ally developing among the political 
elite and in wider civil society. 
IDEA'S capacity building 
programme 
Recognising the significant 
progress made by Burkina Faso, 
IDEA decided to accept an invita-
tion to visit the country and to in-
troduce itself to the key stakehold-
ers in the democratic process across 
the political spectrum. This enabled 
it to gauge the degree of interest 
in cooperating with a programme 
to strengthen the democratic re-
form process. The outcome was 
positive and a programme entitled 
'Democratic Development in Burki-
na Faso' was subsequently initiated. 
This aims to assess the ca-
dence of démocratisation in Burki-
na Faso, identify the challenges and 
opportunities for further democrat-
ic development, and articulate an 
agenda for démocratisation, 
through specific and practical poli-
cy recommendations. The broad 
objective is the long-term consoli-
dation of democracy. Implementa-
tion entails facilitating political dia-
logue among the main national 
stakeholders about the challenges 
and opportunities for democratic 
reform, in an inclusive and partici-
patory manner. 
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This dialogue has resulted 
in an 'assessment report' entitled 
'Democracy in Burkina Faso' which 
includes a democratic reform agen-
da with concrete suggestions for 
action. The various concerns and 
challenges enumerated above are 
detailed in this document. 
The programme was initiat-
ed in 1996 with the consent of the 
national authorities, the active in-
terest of civil society and the sup-
port of the international communi-
ty. A more substantial dialogue 
about the opportunities for and 
constraints on democratic develop-
ment was initiated with key re-
source persons across the political 
spectrum. This group of trusted 
counterparts - known as the Con-
tact Group - are the main Owners' 
of the programme. They determine 
the priority areas and design con-
crete initiatives, facilitated and sup-
ported by International IDEA. 
After a series of consulta-
tions, the Contact Group identified 
the main issues in the democratic 
debate and drew up an agenda for 
action. In June 1996, a seminar, the 
Dialogue for Democratic Develop-
ment, was held in Ouagadougou, 
with experts from the country and 
the region. This was chaired by 
Adama Dieng, Member of the 
Board of Directors of International 
IDEA and Secretary-General of the 
International Commission of Jurists 
(ICI). This seminar dealt with the 
following substantive issues on the 
democracy agenda: 
-the reform of the state (including 
good governance and decentralisa-
tion); 
- strengthening the rule of law (in-
cluding the Constitution, electoral 
law and procedures, and the ad-
ministration of justice); and, 
- the consolidation of a democratic 
culture (including the role of civil 
society and the political participa-
tion of women). 
The objective of the meet-
ing was to reach a shared under-
standing of the main challenges to 
democratic consolidation and to 
develop concrete proposals for 
deepening the démocratisation 
process in Burkina Faso. 
In January 1998, the assess-
ment report (available in French 
and English) was officially launched 
in Ouagadougou, by an interna-
tional delegation under the leader-
ship of Grâce d'Almeida Adamon, 
former Justice Minister of Benin. It 
was presented to the government, 
state institutions (including the 
Supreme Court), civil society organ-
isations, political parties, the 
media, the university, and repre-
sentatives of the international com-
munity. It received extensive press 
coverage. 
The report assesses democ-
ratic governance critically and ob-
jectively, and offers a first compre-
hensive analysis of the 
opportunities for deepening the 
democratic reform process. It in-
vites the Burkinabé to engage in 
political debate on the many con-
crete proposals developed in this 
local dialogue. Using actual elec-
tion results, it also provides notion-
al outcomes based on various possi-
ble amendments to the electoral 
system. This is intended to facilitate 
the debate on reforming the elec-
toral system. The document con-
tains an overview of current 
democracy assistance programmes 
for Burkina Faso provided by the 
international community. This en-
ables an assessment to be made of 
the gaps that exist vis-à-vis the pri-
orities articulated by the Burkinabé 
in the dialogue process. It th us 
provides the international commu-
nity with a tool which should help 
in allocating the available resources 
more effectively. 
The dialogue (in which the 
launch of the report is an impor-
tant milestone), has already had 
some positive impact on the politi-
cal process. It has been suggested 
that the report, and the Interna-
tional IDEA programme, have pro-
vided a constructive impetus for in-
tense debate - on the professional 
and impartial running of elections, 
on improving the electoral system, 
and on levelling the playing field 
for political parties. 
In February 1998, 10 oppo-
sition parties formed a coalition -
the Front Démocratique Uni pour la 
République (FDR) in advance of this 
year's presidential election. Two of 
the main opposition parties have 
opted for full merger. 
In April, an independent 
and permanent electoral commis-
sion was established by law after a 
wide debate in the National Assem-
bly. A new electoral code was also 
adopted. The authorities are cur-
rently considering a reform of the 
electoral system and are examining 
the simulated results presented in 
the report. In addition they are 
considering vesting the opposition 
with legal status in the National As-
sembly. 
During this year, the As-
sembly will hold a special plenary 
session to discuss the report and to 
advance the political dialogue a 
step further. The report serves as a 
reference document for a number 
of meetings and institutions - in-
cluding the government's Good 
Governance Action Plan drafted 
with the assistance of UNDP. A 
radio programme is currently being 
considered to widen the debate 
and reach out to the population. 
Burkina Faso sets an exam-
ple of peaceful and gradual democ-
ratic change in a region of the 
world where conflict is all too com-
mon. The presidential poll of No-
vember 1998 and, more particular-
ly, the next legislative elections in 
2002, will be important landmarks 
for the consolidation of democracy 
in this Sahel country. 
The inclusive and participa-
tory approach of the IDEA pro-
gramme, and its emphasis on iden-
tifying challenges and options for 
change rather than prescribing so-
lutions, has been positively ac-
knowledged. As one government 
official put it, it is an 'invitation to 
dialogue' in the cause of further 
democratic development. 
Promoting democratic re-
form processes is a sensitive issue. 
Initial experience in Burkina Faso 
suggests that this unique new in-
ternational instrument can make a 
positive contribution. The interna-
tional nature of IDEA'S member-
ship, together with its emphasis on 
impartial and professional support 
for complex transition processes, 
are the main features allowing 
IDEA to work effectively for the ad-
vancement of democracy.^ 
R.v.M. a cs. 
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Human rights are more 
than an election 
by Lotte Leicht* and Jean-Paul Marthoz** 
Drawing a distinction be-
tween 'democratic' and 
'non-democratic' govern-
ments in Asia can be very 
misleading. The word 'de-
mocracy' tends to be applied 
to countries that have had 
meaningful elections and a 
peaceful transfer of power 
to the opposition, but there 
are problems with that defi-
nition. The focus on elec-
tions often obscures on-
going human rights violations, so 
that countries that have had suc-
cessful elections are often also suc-
cessful in escaping international 
censure for a variety of abusive 
practices. It was the high turnout 
in the 1993 UN-sponsored elections 
in Cambodia that led the interna-
tional community to effectively de-
clare victory and turn a blind eye to 
the deep political problems just 
beneath the surface. Even experi-
ments with elections at a very local 
level can earn a government the 
positive cachet of 'democratising,' 
so that the much-touted village 
elections in China are presented by 
the EU and Commission as positive 
proof that the country is opening up 
politically. 
The 'democratic' label ap-
plied to a political system too 
often implies that the system is a 
monolith - the cliché of 'India, 
the world's largest democracy', 
for example, ignores the fact that 
some parts of India are under 
'president's rule,' where the local 
legislature is suspended, or sub-
ject to draconian laws that effec-
tively remove basic civil rights. 
The cliché also ignores the fact 
that for many tribal and lower 
* Director of the Brussels Office of Human 
Rights Watch. 
** Human Rights Watch European Press 
Director. 
caste segments of society, the rule 
of law hardly exists. Other diffi-
culties with the label are that 
once applied, it tends to survive 
even when democracy is clearly in 
retreat, as was the case in Sri 
Lanka under the United National 
Party during most of the 1980s 
and early 1990s, and that it often 
fails to take the political repre-
sentation of women into consid-
eration. 
In Asia, there are two 
other problems with the democ-
racy label and how it is applied. 
One is that Asian governments 
often see European promotion of 
democracy as meaning the effort 
to establish a carbon copy of 
Western political institutions 
rather than as a way of support-
ing indigenous efforts at political 
and social change. A second is 
that the two countries that seem 
to have emerged as nascent 
democracies after long periods 
of authoritarian control, Taiwan 
and South Korea, are seen by 
many to provide a model for 
other countries in the region. 
That model posits that, by put-
ting economic development first, 
political openness will inevitably 
follow. There are both serious 
flaws with that model, and ser-
ious questions as to how applic-
able the Taiwanese or Korean 
experience is for the rest of Asia. 
Rather than trying to 
group countries into categories 
such as 'democratic', 'non-demo-
cratic' and 'democratising', it 
would be more useful to look at 
respect for basic civil rights that 
are often identified with democ-
racies: the freedoms of expres-
sion, association and assembly. 
Expanding the protection of 
these rights is often seen as 
critical to the development of 
civil society, another term that is 
fast becoming a meaningless 
buzzword. In fact, it means all 
those social organisations and 
networks operating outside the 
official sphere, including profes-
sional associations, trade unions, 
charitable groups, women's orga-
nisations, political parties, the 
press, social clubs, and NGOs. At 
the same time, the various ele-
ments of civil society can them-
selves become an important 
source of pressure on a repressive 
government. But in Asia, there 
are no obvious trends or patterns. 
In Cambodia, the political 
space established during the brief 
UN transitional administration al-
lowed a wide range of NGOs to 
emerge, as well as trade unions 
and newspapers. Without restrict-
ing the ability of those NGOs to 
function, however, the govern-
ment began a gradual stifling of 
freedom of expression and assem-
bly, and there was an escalation 
of political violence. No amount 
of support for NGOs or judicial 
institutions, and there was a lot, 
could by itself have prevented the 
coup in July last year. What was 
needed was more sustained inter-
national attention to and pres-
sure on the executive branch of 
the Cambodian government. The 
mistake now is to assume that 
this month's post-coup elections, 
in the absence of pressure to 
secure full freedom of expression, 
assembly, and association which 
should have been applied well 
before the polling date, will do 
anything but further entrench 
Hun Sen in power. 
In China, Vietnam, and 
Burma, freedom of association is 
tightly controlled by the state, 
and NGOs as such do not exist. 
In China, during periods where 
state controls have relaxed some-
what, 'social groups,' some of 
them taking on the functions of 
NGOs, particularly in the social 
welfare and community develop-
ment fields, have emerged. But 
almost all have government spon-
sorship or links to official govern-
ment bodies. Such groups run 
into trouble as soon as they are 
seen as a challenge to the party. 
Likewise with freedom of expres-
sion: any public challenge to the 
political system remains a highly 
risky undertaking. In such a cli-
mate, programmes which support 
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nical assistance to village elec-
tions are useful, but there should 
be no illusion that they will 
fundamentally alter the political 
landscape without significant 
change at the top. 
Sri Lanka is sobering evi-
dence of the fragility of the rights 
to freedom of expression, associa-
tion and assembly, even when a 
democratic tradition, a long his-
tory of NGOs, and a strong legal 
system are all in place. In this 
case, the manipulation of ethni-
city by politicians looking to ex-
pand their popular vote led to an 
increase in political tensions and 
then to civil war. The war was 
then used by a determined ex-
ecutive branch as a pretext for 
curbing basic freedoms. 
It is important to note 
that throughout Asia, we are no 
longer dealing just with problems 
of repression within particular 
national boundaries. In East and 
Southeast Asia in particular, there 
is an increasing tendency of the 
more authoritarian countries to 
try and export their controls on 
basic rights to their neighbours -
Indonesia's efforts to stop meet-
ings on East Timor taking place in 
the Philippines, Thailand and Ma-
laysia in 1994 and 1996 are cases 
in point, as was the pressure by 
Singapore on the Foreign Corre-
spondents Association there to 
cancel a scheduled speech by 
Indonesian opposition leader, 
Megawati Soekarnoputri. Malay-
sian Prime Minister Mahathir's call 
during the July 1997 meeting of 
the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) to review 
the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights, with a view to mak-
ing it more compatible with 
'Asian values', was greeted with 
horror by human rights activists 
in the region. Almost every coun-
try in Asia seems to be under-
taking efforts to control access to 
or material on the Internet. The 
uncritical acceptance by govern-
ments in much of Asia of the 
thesis that trade liberalisation 
brings about the greatest good 
for the greatest number has led 
to incentives being offered to 
foreign investors that directly un-
dermine freedom of association, 
particularly insofar as it involves 
labour organising. Even India, 
with one of the strongest trade 
union movements in Asia, has not 
been immune from corporate 
pressure in this regard. If the 
struggle of Asian NGOs in the 
1980s and early 1990s was largely 
focused on developments inside 
their own countries, the effort in 
the late 1990s, by necessity, was 
extended to the wider region - to 
ensure that their own gains were 
not undermined by government 
leaders in the name of Asian 
solidarity. 
Campaign poster for Hun Sen in the 
recent Cambodian elections. 
Pressure to secure full freedom of 
expression, assembly, and association 
should have been applied well before 
polling day. 
All this raises questions 
about various 'democracy promo-
tion' programmes sponsored by 
individual EU countries and the 
European Commission. The ques-
tion is not whether they are 
intrinsically valuable, because 
most of them are. The question 
is rather whether they do, in fact, 
contribute to democratic change. 
Too often, power relations that 
underlie and in many ways deter-
mine a country's political life are 
ignored - for example, in the area 
of judicial reform. Cambodia is 
undoubtedly a case in point. 
There is no question that help 
for building up the legal structure 
in the aftermath of the destruc-
tion wrought by the Khmer 
Rouge was, and remains, badly 
needed. But that assistance loses 
much of its potential impact 
when the EU does not speak out 
forcefully on the failure of the 
government to prosecute officials 
suspected of human rights 
abuses. 
Funds are currently sup-
porting a wide range of NGOs in 
Asia. The money is, by and large, 
well spent and provides both 
support and, in some senses, 
protection to the recipient orga-
nisations, many of which are 
I 
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highly critical of their govern-
ments. But it is illusory to think 
that the NGOs by themselves will 
be a catalyst for political change. 
Asia shows us that strong civil 
societies can exist in a highly 
repressive political atmosphere. 
Like the economists who said it 
was impossible to have stagna-
tion and inflation at the same 
time until confronted with the 
phenomenon of 'stagflation', the 
people who believed that a lively 
NGO movement and authoritar-
ianism could not survive together 
may also, unfortunately, be 
proved wrong. Again it should 
be emphasised that such pro-
grammes are useful and should 
not be set aside. But if the aim is 
to bring about protection of basic 
rights, more attention needs to 
be directed to the source of those 
abuses - and that is the executive 
branch of government. 
In China, those who are 
genuinely concerned about hu-
man rights, but worried about 
offending China or jeopardising 
EU-China relations, have focused 
on rule of law programmes as a 
constructive way of addressing 
both concerns. Again, these pro-
grammes are useful. Legal educa-
tion, support for legal aid clinics, 
exchanges of judges and so on 
are unquestionably desirable, but 
their impact should not be over-
estimated. Despite some tentative 
steps toward reform, the legal 
system in China remains highly 
politicised, the judiciary still 
serves the Party, and penalties 
for political dissent have, if any-
thing, increased. Moreover, it is 
not clear that less arbitrary appli-
cation of the law would consti-
tute a step toward démocratisa-
tion. Singapore is a good example 
of a legal system that manages 
both to meet the needs of the 
business community in terms of 
impartial resolution of contract 
disputes and of the state on 
political or freedom of expression 
cases, in an overall political en-
vironment that is anything but 
democratic. It should be noted 
that entrenched political power 
structures are not the only ob-
stacle to protection of basic hu-
man rights. Corruption, emer-
gency legislation, and civil war 
are others. 
In highly corrupt govern-
ments, programmes aimed at ju-
dicial reform, strengthening civil 
society, or supporting elections 
may be wasted efforts unless the 
corruption issue is tackled head-
on. In China, for example, busi-
nesspeople have been detained 
by police upon pressure from 
business rivals. Trafficking of wo-
men and children takes place 
across the region with the com-
plicity of corrupt police and im-
migration officials. In Pakistan, 
India, Bangladesh and Nepal, po-
lice act as the henchmen of rural 
landowners, often helping keep 
Political activists in the Philippines at 
the time of the fall of 
the Marcos régime. 
Asia shows us that strong civil societies 
can exist in a highly repressive political 
atmosphere. 
agricultural labourers from sched-
uled castes or tribal groups in 
conditions akin to slavery. 
Subversion laws and other 
forms of internal security legisla-
tion can also act to undermine 
any gains in the protection of civil 
rights, one reason why the recent 
spate of laws passed by the 
provisional legislature in Hong 
Kong is so distressing. The Armed 
Forces (Special Powers) Act in 
India, the Anti-Terrorism Act in 
Pakistan, the National Security 
Law in Korea, the Internal Secur-
ity Act in Singapore and Malaysia 
- all these have been used to 
highly negative effect by the 
powers-that-be in Asia. 
It is civil war or strife that 
tends to cause the most severe 
human rights violations and give 
a pretext to governments to curb 
democratic freedoms. Some of 
the worst human rights abuses 
in the region have been com-
mitted in the context of such 
conflict in Kashmir, the northeast 
of India, Sri Lanka, East Timor, 
Cambodia, and the Thai-Burmese 
and Bangladesh-Burmese border. 
Some of the perpetrators have 
been militaries and paramilitary 
groups attached to ostensibly de-
mocratic governments, but the 
distinction between democratic 
and authoritarian systems quickly 
gets lost. Democratic govern-
ments may not make war on each 
other, but they frequently make 
war on their own people with 
disastrous consequences. 
In conclusion, the promo-
tion of democracy in Asia is not 
necessarily the same as protection 
of human rights. Elections do not 
guarantee that protection, nor do 
they always secure a democratic 
form of government. Democracy 
assistance programmes are impor-
tant, but they are not a substitute 
for sustained, direct pressure on 
the sources of human rights 
abuse. As already mentioned in 
the case of China, there has been 
a tendency to support pro-
grammes that would strengthen 
human rights without offending 
the Chinese government. An in-
offensive programme, however, 
may ultimately be one without 
impact. H L.L & j.-p. M. 
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Africa 
by Satta Niang* 
For many years of secondary 
importance in Africa, women 
are now linking up to form a 
united front to put an end to 
all the unequal treatment 
they have received since the 
dawn of time. For slightly 
more than a decade now, 
they have, slowly but surely, 
made resolute progress in 
economic life. They are wa-
ging their campaign on all 
fronts: equality of rights in 
terms of access to employ-
ment, working conditions, 
social protection and a fairer 
distribution of power. Gone 
forever is the era of the 
submissive woman with no mission 
in life other than to take care of her 
home. This is the age of the inde-
pendent woman who is finding the 
time to bring up children, have a 
career, campaign and take an inter-
est in the wider issue of women's 
concerns. In short, she is broadening 
her field of vision. Nevertheless, 
such 'superwomen' account for only 
a very small proportion of the 
female population, a fact borne 
out by statistics. There is still a great 
deal of work to be done in this area. 
In the 1990s, women in Africa are 
entering centre stage and making 
their presence felt everywhere. 
Their involvement in economic life, 
long concealed, is now to the fore, 
in the full, cruel light of the general-
ised crisis. 
Omnipresent in the do-
mestic sphere, women are now 
to be seen on many fronts in 
society. Solidarity associations, 
economic interest groups and 
women's rights associations are 
springing up everywhere - wo-
men have entered civil society en 
masse and, to a lesser extent, 
public life. They are no longer 
restricted to 'social' activities, 
which keep them 'in their place' 
as good wives and mothers. They 
are also enjoying a higher profile 
in politics. 
Yesterday's reality in 
today's images 
Contrary to accepted 
stereotypes, African women have 
always had real power within 
their household and extended 
family, despite the formal hierar-
chy of gender-based roles which 
might appear to subordinate 
them. Literature on the role of 
women during the démocratisa-
tion process is sparse, despite the 
fact that huge numbers took part 
in the heated demonstrations 
that rocked Africa's towns and 
cities from 1989 to 1993. None-
theless, women in Africa are still 
discriminated against both politi-
cally and socially. 
Attempts to establish de-
mocracy in a number of countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 
1990s illustrated women's firm 
determination to become in-
volved in the process of change. 
Freedom of speech was a neces-
sary consequence of the national 
conferences that were held and 
there was a veritable blossoming 
of independent media in certain 
countries. As a result, women and 
their groups had a vehicle for 
expressing themselves as never 
before. In some countries, albeit 
faltering democratic practices 
provided them with further scope 
for expression through the ballot 
box - 'One woman, one vote'. 
The role of electoral 
systems 
One only has to look at 
the statistics to see that the 
countries with the highest num-
ber of women involved in politics 
are those with a proportional/ 
mixed systems, conversely, coun-
tries with low female participa-
tion in politics usually operate 
majority/mixed systems. But the 
electoral system alone does not 
fully explain the differing levels 
of women's political representa-
tion. Other factors come into 
play. These include: 
— Political parties: Aspects here 
include their ideological affilia-
tion, selection criteria and pro-
cesses, the party structure and the 
amount of encouragement given 
to promoting women within the 
political hierarchy - including 
how far it is willing to enable 
women to gain places on elector-
al lists; 
— Quotas and anti-discriminatory 
measures: At both national and 
party level, there can be volun-
tary or legally binding measures, 
aimed at guaranteeing a specific 
number of female representa-
tives, giving women positions of 
executive power, and ensuring 
their position on electoral lists; 
— Cultural and socio-economic 
factors: These include education 
and profession, family responsibil-
ities, the existence of child-mind-
ing services and patterns of work 
that are compatible with family 
life. 
The concept of democracy 
cannot take on its full dynamic 
meaning until political decisions 
and those relating to national 
Women have entered civil society en 
masse and, to a lesser extent, public life 
* Development consultant 
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men and women, with fair con-
sideration of the interests and 
aptitudes of these two compo-
nents of society. If the concept of 
democracy is to mean that all 
groups are equally represented, 
men and women, both of whom 
have something to offer to so-
ciety, should be involved in deci-
sion-making bodies on as near to 
a 50/50 basis as possible. 'Fair' 
democracy also implies that men 
and women should genuinely 
share family responsibilities and 
reconcile their working lives with 
family life. 
The recommendation 
adopted in Beijing seeks a com-
mitment from governments to 
establish a system under which 
men and women are represented 
equally in governmental bodies 
and committees (as well as in 
public authorities and the judicial 
system). This objective must be 
achieved by applying quotas and 
other forms of positive action. It 
is a matter of working out what 
type of actions will have a long-
term effect on the numbers of 
women involved in politics. 
Mechanisms adopted by 
the parties 
One of the main functions 
of political parties is to nominate 
and support their candidates. This 
gives them a key role in deter-
mining who ultimately gets 
elected. The candidate-selection 
process is thus crucial in terms of 
women's involvement. Many par-
ties, however, have no specific 
strategy for encouraging women 
to put their names forward. 
Various measures could be 
adopted by parties with a view to 
encouraging women to take part 
in political and public life. At the 
lowest level, these could be orga-
nisational, educational or logistic. 
The purpose of government-im-
posed quotas is to influence the 
result of an election, i.e. to 
guarantee that a certain number 
or percentage of seats are re-
served for women. When positive 
action programmes were intro-
duced (by national governments 
and political parties), the number 
of women successfully chosen as 
candidates and obtaining posi-
tions of responsibility within gov-
ernment increased significantly. 
However, the use of quo-
tas remains controversial. Criti-
cisms based on equity have been 
raised. There can also be a dichot-
omy between those elected on 
'merit' having gone through the 
successive phases of the electoral 
process and the female represen-
tatives who have been elected to 
reserved seats. 
Those who attack quota 
systems talk of their discrimina-
tory, interventionist and funda-
mentally non-democratic nature. 
In French-speaking Africa, many 
countries have eschewed the use 
of quotas at national level, de-
claring that they are contrary to 
the precept of equality of the 
sexes written into their national 
laws or constitution. Moreover, 
quotas aimed at increasing the 
number of women involved in 
politics would discriminate 
against other under-represented 
groups in society. 
The case of Senegal's leg-
islative elections illustrates the 
obstacles faced by women in 
political life. The COSEF (Senega-
lese Women's Council) has 
launched an awareness campaign 
to 'normalise' the position of 
women in political and decision-
The level of representation of women 
in politics is higher in countries with a 
proportional electoral system 
making spheres. Women have 
long been under-represented, 
rarely appear at the top of elec-
toral lists and have held few posts 
of political power. Despite their 
superiority in numbers, they re-
main a minority in political for-
mations. 
In the May 1998 legislative 
elections, the percentage of wo-
men nominated on electoral lists 
was 30% for the opposition par-
ties and 20% for the party in 
power - reflecting the numbers 
involved at the grass-roots. The 
Senegalese Socialist Party has four 
women out of 12 members in its 
political bureau, 110 out of 600 
on its central committee and one 
minister out of 27 in government. 
33% of the opposition's political 
bureau, national secretariat and 
management committee are wo-
men. 
A similar situation is seen 
in the legislature. From 1957 to 
the present, Senegal has had 
eight five-year parliaments. The 
first had no women at all; the 
second had one, the third two 
and the fourth four (out of 80 
Numbers of women in executive and legislative posts 
in selected African countries 
Country  Proportion of women 
in government (%) 
Proportion of women 
in parliament (%) 
Senegal 
Burkina Faso 
Togo 
Benin 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Cameroon 
Guinea 
7 
17 
5 
6 
8 
3 
9 
5.3 
12 
4.3 
5.3 
9.6 
4.5 
14.8 
8 
6 
6.4 
6 
5 
12.2 
-
7.7 
3.7 
1.2 
4.6 
8.3 
12.2 
8.8 
Source: UNDP 1995, Women and decision-making power in Africa 
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fifth set of elections, the size of 
the legislature was increased to 
100 of whom eight were female 
members. The last three parlia-
ments have had 13, 18 and 14 
women, respectively, out of a 
total of 120. 
Women see their under-
representation as the result of 
internal democracy and believe it 
would be worse without the 
quota system which is currently 
in place. They also acknowledge 
the rearguard role played by 
traditional customs and practices, 
which are justified and legiti-
mated not only by religion but 
also by illiteracy (68% among 
women as against 38% among 
men). 
This political situation is 
thus unfavourable to women 
and is unacceptable from the 
following standpoints: 
— 7"he practical standpoint: com-
plementarity between men and 
women no longer has to be 
demonstrated and women have 
proved they understand the 
changes that are occurring at 
the core of modern life; 
— The democratic standpoint: 
women should be present where 
political decisions are taken and 
should be accorded their full 
demographic weight since, in a 
democracy, influence is a form of 
power; 
— The legal standpoint: men and 
women are defined biologically 
as human beings and, as such, 
their rights converge in the un-
ique nature of the universal va-
lues of law. 
A single alternative is 
therefore available to women if 
they are to solve the problem of 
their marginalisation: a demo-
cratic struggle. If they do not 
fight, there will be no change. 
Hi S.N. 
Globalisation, transition 
and international 
security 
by Claude Nigoul* 
When the Berlin Wall and 
the political order estab-
lished at Yalta crumbled in 
the late 1980s, Europe cele-
brated the victory of democ-
racy and of security redis-
covered after 40 years of 
communist dictatorship and 
nuclear anxiety. Francis Fu-
kuyama announced the end 
of history. The driving force 
of ideological confrontation 
had been halted, central Eur-
ope was embarking on the 
reforms needed for transi-
tion to democracy, and Rus-
sia itself, exhausted but resolute, 
was turning to the models she had 
fought against throughout the 20th 
century. Thus, even before the term 
had become fashionable, globalisa-
tion now seemed to be part of 
everyday reality - in the shape of a 
universal model of a political society 
which all states were invited to 
imitate. 
It was a rosy but all too 
brief illusion. On the world's 
'peripheries', there were still the 
disputes stemming from the 
break-up of the former empires -
the legacy of unthinking colonial 
division. There were still the age-
old, indigenous hatreds. Very few 
of the conflicts that one assumed 
had been fuelled by superpower 
rivalry actually came to an end. In 
Europe, nationalist aspirations, 
temporarily subdued by even 
more implacable forces, awoke, 
engulfing Yugoslavia in bloody 
conflict, while in the Caucasus, 
memories of genocide reopened 
wounds that had never totally 
healed. In Africa, entire regions, 
delivered up to gang leaders, 
were sinking into anarchy while 
ethnic massacres on a large scale 
were being prepared elsewhere. 
Meanwhile, in Asia and Latin 
t 
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Higher International Studies, Secretary-Gen-
eral of the Academy for Peace and Interna-
tional Security. 
America, states whose entire 
economies were based on the 
proceeds of drugs trafficking 
were in decay. 
With the spectre of nucle-
ar war fading, the world now 
discovered a primitive violence 
against which it was helpless. 
The end of the Cold War meant 
that the two pillars of interna-
tional security had been irreversi-
bly weakened. The order set up 
at Yalta, based as it was on a 
simple 'balance of terror' formu-
la, had crumbled away. Previously, 
the two superpowers divided the 
world into spheres of influence 
and effectively agreed to main-
tain a mutual balance of forces, 
embodied in the two 'defence' 
organisations - NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact. There were arms 
limitation accords for which ne-
gotiations were ongoing. Despite 
a number of hitches, it was 
possible under this system to 
prevent an escalation. 
It was just as well that 
various institutional and diplo-
matic mechanisms were in place 
to manage crises. The principle of 
the inviolability of frontiers in 
Europe was written into the very 
foundations of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Eur-
ope. Both camps took steps to 
prevent an unstoppable increase 
in the level of the peripheral 
conflicts with which they were 
involved. Thus, they avoided the 
risk of uncontrolled escalation 
which might result in direct con-
frontation going beyond the 
'point of no return'. 
With the conversion of 
the Soviet camp to the virtues of 
democracy and the free market, 
there was no longer any purpose 
to the communist system. The 
Warsaw Pact disappeared, NATO 
came up with an improvised, 
vague reform, the CSCE tried to 
fill the gaps by becoming a 
structured organisation geared 
to managing security problems, 
and the European Union worked 
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on its inchoate ideas about 
autonomous security. 
It looked like a good 
opportunity to restore the system 
of collective security born out of 
the Second World War. Conceived 
at a time when the outlook was 
one of global peace, the system 
was established by Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. The Security 
Council was the central cog of 
the organisation, responsible for 
condemning aggression and re-
conciling aggressors, through di-
plomacy initially and, if necessary, 
by the mobilised force of the 
international community. Only 
the division of the world into 
two opposing blocs had pre-
vented this arrangement from 
functioning. 
It is worth recalling that 
when Iraq invaded Kuwait, it 
provided an exemplary case for 
the unprecedented application of 
the system. The act of aggression 
was undeniable and it involved 
two sovereign states as defined 
under the Charter. Unfortunately, 
although the diplomatic stage 
went exactly according to the 
rules and procedures of Chapter 
VII, and gave a fine illustration of 
the way the mechanisms provided 
were linked together, it did not 
allow for the stubbornness of 
Iraq's dictator. Force, therefore, 
had to be envisaged and the 
international community mobi-
lised. 
The system then began to 
show its limits, revealing that the 
UN was incapable of setting up its 
own force in a still divided world. 
Unable to act as the world's 
policeman, the United Nations 
had to content itself with sanc-
tioning the intervention of a 
coalition which was little more 
than the United States in disguise. 
President George Bush was then 
able to call for the establishment 
of a 'new world order' which 
bore a remarkable resemblance 
to an American world order. 
The ambiguous nature of 
the concept of globalisation suits 
the universal and instant success 
accorded to it. This 'fair idea, 
fixed idea, vague idea?' conceals 
complex and disparate realities, 
the least controversial being that, 
in the wake of revolutions in 
physical and other means of com-
munication, space and time have 
contracted. Globalisation is, first 
and foremost, the instantaneous 
connection of people and organi-
sations around the world and the 
phenomenal multiplication of the 
opportunities for exchange which 
arise from this. The concept of 
'humanity' has hitherto been the 
prerogative of poets, philoso-
phers and prophets, but it is 
now being given concrete form. 
Admittedly, international 
law began some decades earlier 
to give it a legal formulation 
through concepts such as 'crimes 
against humanity' or 'humanity's 
common heritage', but human-
kind specifically can now begin 
to think in global terms of its 
solidarity and dependence and no 
longer only in terms of the nar-
row limits of sovereign states. 
This awareness that the 
whole of humankind belongs to 
one and the same global entity is 
only expressed occasionally (for 
example, more than a third of 
the planet's inhabitants watched 
the World Cup Final on televi-
sion). But, by manifesting itself 
through shared moments of emo-
tion, it is a good illustration of 
the emergence of a common 
cultural system of reference. The 
globalisation of culture was an-
ticipated by Marshall MacLuhan 
30 years ago. But in the global 
village, there is more than just a 
range of universally standardised 
products, of which Coca Cola, 
McDonalds and CNN are symbols. 
There is also a general rallying to 
forms of societal organisation 
based on the Western concepts 
of human rights, parliamentary 
democracy and the market econ-
omy. 
Economic globalisation 
has the capacity to spread itself 
over these cultural substrate 
using modern technical means. 
The factors have become more 
fluid with an emphasis on max-
imising the efficiency of circula-
tion. Those who use the optimum 
and most rapid routes can take 
advantage of the best opportu-
nities wherever these arise. Eco-
nomic globalisation is not, there-
fore, just the huge capital flows 
($1300 billion daily - more than 
40 times world trade) set in train 
by a mere hundred or so financial 
operators. It is also the move-
ments inspired primarily by the 
concern to obtain an optimum 
return on investments. 
It includes the appearance 
of globalised enterprises ('mega-
firms') which adopt competitive 
strategies to enable them to 
integrate their resources and pro-
ducts by mergers, alliances or 
global networking. These finan-
cial and economic giants are 
becoming major players in inter-
national relations and even some 
nation states do not carry as 
much weight as they do. 
Set out in this way, globa-
lisation appears to be the emer-
gence of a partition-free global 
area in which new players, by 
virtue of their power or widely 
accessible technical performance 
levels, escape the control of states 
and international organisations, 
and confront one another on 
the world market with no rules 
other than the ones they them-
selves set, and no constraints 
other than the inherent limita-
tions of the market. 
Before attempting to as-
sess the impact of such phenom-
ena on international security, it is 
important to view what is hap-
pening in relative terms. A global 
awareness is perhaps taking 
shape, but an awareness of dif-
ferences which sometimes appear 
blurred at continental level is 
easily exaggerated when laying 
claim to a local identity. 
While most are concerned 
with celebrating a world where 
images, ideas and, therefore, 
knowledge circulate instanta-
neously, others, such as Jean 
Christophe Ruffin, point, with 
concern, to the appearance of 
new terrae incognitae, which 
spread patches over the surface 
of our planispheres where the 
benefits of a globalised civilisa-
tion never penetrate. 
If one remembers that 
half the world's population has 
never dialled a telephone num-
ber, it is easier to understand why 
the Club of Lisbon preferred the 
word 'triadisation' to 'globalisa-
tion'. It was referring to 'the fact 
that the technological, economic 
and sociocultural integration 
amongst the three most devel-
oped regions of the world (Japan 
plus the NICs from South East 
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Asia, Western Europe and North 
America) within the general con-
text of the globalisation of hu-
man and social development, is a 
more prevailing tendency than 
integration between the most 
developed countries and the less-
developed or poor countries 
themselves'. 
This analysis implies a 'de-
linking' phenomenon - a process 
whereby, on account of globalisa-
tion, certain countries and re-
gions gradually loosen their ties 
with the most economically devel-
oped countries and regions. It is a 
hypothesis that is hotly disputed 
by others, who draw attention to 
the formidable impulse that the 
emergence of a global free mar-
ket brings to the global economy 
and the inevitable, according to 
orthodox liberalism, spin-offs 
from which the most deprived 
should necessarily benefit. 
A factor for integration or 
a factor for exclusion? This is the 
first question arising from an 
examination of the effect of 
globalisation on international se-
curity. One cannot seriously claim 
to be unaware of the social 
consequences of a planet-wide 
economy abandoned solely to 
market forces. The OECD Secre-
tary-General, Donald Johnson, re-
commends that we should be-
ware of the social consequences 
of globalisation. 
James Wolfensohn, Presi-
dent of the World Bank Group, 
regards the current situation as a 
time bomb which might explode 
in our children's faces, adding 
that, if world leaders do not take 
appropriate measures immedi-
ately, the number of people living 
in poverty will perhaps increase 
from three to five billion over the 
next 30 years and environmental 
degradation and the threat of 
war will also increase during that 
period. 
In economic terms, the 
development of an unplanned 
globalisation process would ob-
viously be significant for both 
international and domestic 
instability - even for the most 
powerful, as appears to be de-
monstrated by the current evolu-
tion of the Japanese situation. 
While waiting for an invisible 
hand 'equitably to distribute the 
product of worldwide global 
growth', it is the logic of max-
imum profit at any price which 
prevails. After all, what is the 
essence of the market? Michel 
Camdessus, Director-General of 
the IMF, has a clear response to 
this, saying that pricing is as free 
as possible, but if the market 
were left entirely to its own 
devices there would be a high 
level of danger. He goes on to say 
that it is not necessary to look 
back to the nineteenth century 
for evidence of this - the weakest 
are trodden underfoot. In pure 
terms, pricing may be killed off. 
The number of people living in poverty 
will increase from 3 to 5 billion over 
the next 30 years 
The picture which 
emerges therefore seems a long 
way from the promise of near-
universal support for human 
rights - when we were offered a 
glimpse of a historic victory of 
democracy over dictatorship. 
Abandoned solely to the antag-
onistic forces which inhabit it, the 
globalised market is destined for 
the social and political shocks 
that flow from exclusion, inequal-
ity and the confrontation of large 
predators. Is this different in any 
meaningful way from the existing 
world of sovereign states? That, 
in effect, is the paradox. A world 
which is fought over by the 
strongest and which tramples 
the weakest underfoot mirrors 
the contest among states and 
warlords who are incapable of 
subordinating their egotistical in-
terests to the general good of the 
planet. 
This is undoubtedly the 
most worrying challenge to inter-
national security brought by ad-
vancing globalisation. Alongside 
a world of nation states which, 
admittedly, is sometimes unjust 
and uncontrolled, but which is 
regulated by international law 
and diplomacy, a second world is 
emerging in which unbridled vio-
lence appears to be the only rule 
of the game between unpredict-
able and often elusive players. 
The latter monopolise skills for 
their own benefit, pursue their 
ambitions of commercial, ideolo-
gical, criminal or small-group con-
quest and domination, with no 
regard for the territorial or legal 
divisions which hitherto kept 
them in check. 
The major economic op-
erators are developing globalised 
strategies to impose their pre-
sence and take on the worldwide 
competition, in the process con-
fronting even the strongest 
states, investing in the most vul-
nerable and ignoring the weak-
est. Meanwhile, another space for 
violence is opening up - that of a 
planet-wide den of thieves. Dis-
regarding devalued frontiers, a 
changing, terrorist nebula com-
bines with organised crime to 
weave a mafioso web across the 
planet, as can be seen in the 
Italian mezzogiorno and big cities 
in the USA. dossier 
Terrorism - one-off acts of 
extreme violence carried out for a 
'just' cause by minority groups 
against non-combatant targets, 
with a view to influencing 
opinion - is now in the throes of 
change. First, in the means it 
employs, which combine tradi-
tional and sophisticated, cyber-
terrorist techniques. Change is 
most evident, however, in its 
inspiration. The cause of a people 
fighting for independence and 
attacking the symbols of the 
oppressive state is being replaced 
by extraordinary motives that 
drive sectarian fanatics, advocates 
of technical purity and of a 
purified nature. 
One rung up are the 
guerrilla fighters. Once able to 
bask in extended Guevarist ro-
manticism and imbued with ideol-
ogies supported by allied powers 
from abroad, such fighters have 
achieved independence. In Africa, 
South East Asia or Latin America, 
they no longer defend any parti-
cular cause and their strategy has 
been reduced to accomplishment 
through violence. 
The terrorist or guérillero 
is now little removed from the 
criminal, pure and simple, en-
gaged in a reverse process of 
rationalising his activities. Using 
technological change in the in-
formation sector, it has been 
possible for criminal gangs to 
extend their field of illicit opera-
tions and maximise their profits. 
By becoming Transnational Crim-
inal Organisations (TCOs), the 
Italian, Turkish and Russian ma-
fias, Colombian and Mexican car-
tels, Japanese yakusas and Chi-
nese triads are setting up a crime 
economy where drug trafficking 
and the laundering of dirty 
money are taking over from tra-
ditional criminal activities. The 
superpowers of crime no longer 
have any connection with the 
gangsterism of past decades. The 
most significant of them are gen-
uine multinationals, operating ac-
cording to a flow chart which 
would do Exxon or Coca Cola 
justice and generating colossal 
sums in turnover. 
These new participants in 
this type of unbridled violence 
are, without doubt, the products 
of globalisation. Better than any 
other, they have been able to 
take advantage of the removal 
of divisions and the ease of 
exchange which ensues to extend 
and develop their markets, refine 
their processes and frustrate state 
regulation. Dirty money is now 
laundered as part of the huge 
capital flows of daily financial 
transactions. 
A further paradox of glo-
balisation arises here in that it 
has created the right conditions 
for the démocratisation of vio-
lence. The processes of history 
have been slow but they finally 
led to a situation where the state 
was seen as the only repository of 
legitimate violence. The idea may 
not have become fully en-
trenched but, by and large, the 
state obtained a legal monopoly 
over violence, to be used for its 
own benefit. This is the supreme 
attribute of sovereignty. But the 
monopoly seems now to be 
breaking down. Undoubtedly still 
illegal, violence is increasingly 
being privatised because states 
do not have the means to oppose 
its expansion in the hands of 
players both new and old. The 
uncontrollable violence which is 
the natural modus operandi of 
such actors prospers in the face of 
the powerlessness of national or 
international security systems -
which are ill-adapted to an in-
creasingly globalised theatre. 
Towards an era of chaos? 
As we have seen, a num-
ber of forces are in competition. 
Unleashed by globalisation, they 
are seeking to fill a planet-wide 
space. Usually driven by the 
search for profit at all costs, any 
notion of a general global inter-
est is foreign to them and their 
incorporation into an organised 
order can only be imposed on 
them by a forceful, federating 
power. Could this emerge from 
the parallel order of states? Glo-
balisation has revealed a process 
which has long been in opera-
tion: the decline of the state as 
the exclusive structure of any 
political organisation. So, is it 
about to disappear? This must 
be doubtful. Absolute, unchecked 
sovereign rule belongs to a by-
gone age, but the universal fed-
eration has not yet arrived. 
So the state continues to 
underpin the various levels at 
which the human solidarity move-
ments which transcend them are 
confirmed. Certain regional 
spaces, such as the European 
Union, provide original models 
of organisation which seek to 
manage the general continental 
interest, leaving grass-roots com-
munities essential freedom of ac-
tion. This method has been seen 
to work: a Europe continually 
torn apart by international war 
has become a security-oriented 
community where, for a good 
half century, weapons have been 
silenced. So, is global subsidiarity 
conceivable? 
The universal pseudo-de-
mocracy of states that the UN 
attempted to set up is being 
replaced by 'boards of manage-
ment' consisting of the major 
regions of the world, themselves 
freely recomposed, which should 
become the guarantor of man-
kind's general interests and thus 
of international security. Samuel 
Huntington, for one, sees such a 
future as constituting a violent 
shock for civilisation. Others, such 
as Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his 
Agenda for Peace, has a more 
harmonious view of 'the UN co-
operating with regional agree-
ments and organisations'. 
What if the worldwide 
empire forming before our eyes 
becomes the order known as 
'globalisation' and its existence 
the only alternative to chaos? 
We would then do well to re-
member the appeal made by 
Javier Pérez de Cuellar, UN Secre-
tary-General at the height of the 
Gulf Crisis: 'It is unclear to me 
what President Bush means by a 
'New International Order'. To my 
mind, this means worldwide de-
mocracy, that is to say a fairer 
distribution of wealth. Unfortu-
nately, this is not the case for 
countries in the Third World and, 
over ten years, we have made 
extremely poor progress. None of 
the world's problems can be 
solved if there is no resolution 
of the North-South imbalance. 
World peace does not just flow 
automatically from the ending of 
the Cold War', mt CN. 
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former Soviet-Union 
by Yevgeny Kozhokin* 
In this article, the Director of the Institute of 
Strategic Studies in Moscow analyses the state 
of democracy in the countries of the former 
Soviet Union. 
The USSR had a unified structure of 
government with a clear system of interdepart-
mental coordination in the decision-making 
process. Actual decisions were taken in the 
Politburo and the Central Committee of the 
; Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 
elevation to these top bodies being based on 
personal loyalty, bureaucratic intrigue and pro-
motion of the interests of the 'most important' 
republics. However, in the 1970s and the first half 
: of the 1980s, the political and governmental 
decision-making process became slow, with long 
delays, and decisions were tied to compromises. 
The near chronic inability of the Head of State to 
act during that period (the sick Brezhnev was 
followed by the ailing Andropov and the ill Chernenko) 
paralysed the system. In the end the country was going 
nowhere. 
There was a deep dichotomy in Soviet society in 
the period before Perestroika. All aspects of political life 
and any analysis of political and economic reality had to 
fit in with clearly defined ideological canons. Mean-
while, the everyday life of society, including culture, was 
not only estranged from ideology but was actually 
opposed to its dogmas to a significant degree. The 
deeply rooted consumerism of society was strengthened 
by the lack of normal intellectual analysis of what was 
going on and by the oppression of new spiritual 
aspirations. 
One aspect of the 'quasi' consumer revolution 
imprudently set in train by Gorbachev was a vague 
aspiration on the part of the Soviet intelligentsia for a 
more effective and just form of government. However, 
society was not ready for the creation of a new political 
and administrative regime. There were no figures like 
Rousseau or Montesquieu in the Soviet period. The 
system collapsed incredibly quickly. The initial building 
blocks for the new state order were structures from the 
recent past. The soviets (representative bodies) at various 
levels were opposed to the Communist Party, and free 
elections gave them renewed legitimacy and genuine 
power. 
The intellectually impoverished Communist Party 
feebly opposed the emerging democratic soviets in 1989 
and 1990. Gorbachev soon became the first victim of the 
dismantlement of party power he had himself initiated. 
The top-level move to establish the post of President of 
the Union contribute nothing fundamentally new to the 
break-up of the Soviet state. The degradation of the 
party and state system opened up opportunities for 
those bent either on getting rich quickly or on seizing 
power using nationalistic and democratic slogans. 
The disintegration of the USSR was the conse-
quence, not of a national liberation struggle, but rather 
of the cumulative effect of structural economic crisis and 
the long-term decay of the Soviet bureaucracy. 
The 1991 crash and the Gaidar reforms of 1992 
were victories for a counter-revolution that came 70 
years late. The dangers of such a futile counter-revolu-
tion were described as far back as the 1930s by the great 
Russian philosopher, Nikolai Berdyaev, in his book 'The 
sources and sense of Russian communism', finally 
published in Moscow in 1990. Though a staunch 
opponent of Bolshevism, he considered even at that 
time that, in the absence of an organised force capable 
of assuming power (not to carry out a counter-revolu-
tion but for the purpose of creative development, 
building on the social achievements of the revolution) 
the sudden collapse of Soviet power would constitute a 
danger for Russia and bring with it the threat of 
anarchy' (¡bid. p. 120). 
The peak of anarchical democracy in the post-
Soviet area came in 1991-1993. Having obtained genuine 
power and legitimacy in the Gorbachev period, the 
Supreme Soviets of the various states strove for more 
than just legislative powers, and found themselves 
fighting rearguard actions against presidents who had 
established tight control over the entire state apparatus. 
With the exception of Ukraine and Moldova, the new 
parliaments were outmanoeuvred in all the CIS coun-
tries. Eastern authoritarian regimes were strengthened in 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Slightly more moderate 
regimes, with a genuinely functioning, though power-
less, opposition, were established in Azerbaijan, Kazakh-
stan and Belarus. 
During the 1990s, Russia has not determined the 
type of political development in the other countries of 
the CIS, although the general direction, the constitu-
tional set-up and the political institutions in many post-
Soviet countries were established not without a certain 
Russian inspirational influence. 
The instruments used in Russia in the transition 
from anarchical democracy to authoritarian democracy 
were subsequently taken up by many leaders of CIS 
countries in order to solve their own problems, different 
from those of Russia. The most striking example was the 
use of referendums to strengthen personal power. 
Following the Russian referendum in 1993, which led 
to the replacement of the country's constitution in the 
second half of that year, referendums were held in 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. These plebis-
cites prolonged the extensive powers of the respective 
presidents for a period of several years. The Presidents of 
Kazakhstan and Belarus followed the example of Yeltsin, 
who, in his struggle with the Supreme Soviet, had used 
an unconstitutional body, the Constitutional Convention. 
This brought together representatives of various political 
and social organisations, local self-government and state 
institutions. N. A. Nazarbayev relied on the Assembly of 
the Peoples of Kazakhstan he had convened himself, 
while A. G. Lukashenko convened the Congress of the 
People of Belarus as a counterbalance to that country's 
Supreme Soviet. 
Russia, Ukraine and Moldova share similar 
problems regarding the paralysis of left-wing forces. 
The Communist opposition draws its support from the 
dissatisfaction of the population but is unable to exploit 
its political capital to work out an alternative solution to 
the crisis. In the final analysis, the Communists are 
unable to exert effective influence on government in 
terms of establishing a more rational economic regime. 
Their political activity simply worsens an already difficult 
situation. The archaic Communist opposition is unwit-
tingly creating the conditions for a postponed political 
crisis. Boris Yeltsin won the 1996 presidential contest 
largely because the Communist candidate was a 'non-
Î 
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starter'. But the incumbent did not enjoy sufficient 
support in the country, even in 1996, to govern 
effectively. His lack of political backing has become 
evident long in advance of the next presidential election 
scheduled for 2000 - being clearly revealed during the 
first major domestic shock, the 1998 financial crisis. The 
political extent of this crisis was obvious from the 
demand made by many demonstrators for the President 
to resign, and the unprecedented pressure exerted on 
him by financial groupings. The latter obtained the 
government team they wanted, as well as a firm 
commitment from Yeltsin that he would not seek a 
third Presidential term. In Ukraine, a situation is devel-
oping that echoes, in many respects, the position in 
Russia, only one cycle later. The most likely winner of the 
1999 presidential poll is the somewhat unpopular 
incumbent Leonid Kuchma. His chances of victory were 
boosted by the partial setback suffered in parliamentary 
elections by two of his opponents, former Prime 
Ministers E. Marchuk and P. Lazarenko, and by the 
failure of his main rival, Socialist leader, A. Moroz, to 
become parliamentary speaker. The unfortunate actions 
of certain Ukrainian Communists contributed to Moroz's 
defeat. However, at regional level, in the autonomous 
area of Crimea, the Communists succeeded in reaching a 
compromise with the governing party leading to the 
formation of a coalition government. Given Ukraine's 
dire economic situation, a Kuchma victory in 1999 may 
well be followed by a crisis similar to the one currently 
being experienced by Russia. 
The fact that the Communist opposition in 
Russia, Ukraine and Moldova exists quite legally and 
has been incorporated into the ruling class to a certain 
degree (through parliamentary structures) makes it less 
dangerous ana far more predictable than the under-
ground, radical Islamic opposition in Uzbekistan and 
other Central Asian Republics. 
As far as the situation in Central Asia is 
concerned, the threat is not so much to democracy but 
rather to the minimum level of human rights still being 
observed in eastern authoritarian states such as Turkme-
nistan and Uzbekistan. This human rights baseline must 
be nurtured because, while the situation could well get 
worse in the foreseeable future, it will certainly not get 
any better. 
The regimes in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
may turn out to be short-lived, as their stability depends 
largely on the personal qualities of their heads of state. 
However, there is no chance of their being replaced 
either by Western-type democracies or by authoritarian 
democratic systems along Russian lines. 
To preserve stability in Central Asia, it is essential 
that Russia becomes stronger rather than weaker. The 
advocates of secular government in this region continue 
to look to the north for support, from Russia. 
The main threat to democracy in Russia is 
basically the same as the threat to the existence of the 
Russian state itself, namely the moral decay that affects a 
significant proportion, not just of the ruling class, but of 
the people as well. No-one has managed to pull the 
nation together. In fact the very concept of nation has 
no generally accepted meaning among Russians. They 
undoubtedly have a tremendous will to survive, but 
there is no basic set of shared ideas to underpin wider 
efforts to re-establish the state - and to organise a new 
national economy sufficient not only for extensive 
regeneration of Russian society but also for its rapid 
modernisation. There is no doubt that Russia has a 
sound moral core. The difficulty lies in finding a political 
will to express this. Efforts are being made to find 
common national ideas and to formulate them in a 
generally comprehensible way. And yet, none of the 
country's present leaders aspiring to become president in 
the year 2000 has a clearly formulated set of ideas. It is 
no secret to the Moscow elite that Alexander Lebed in 
unprincipled and that Georgy Zyuganov is slowly but 
surely losing his character of champion of the down-
trodden and disinherited (and that his red Communist 
colours are turning pink). It is not so much Zyuganov 
himself as the Communist Party which continues to 
garner a considerable proportion of the Russian protest 
vote, but neither he nor his party has been able to draw 
up a positive programme, and they are unlikely to be 
able to do so in the future. 
Y M. Luzhkov and G. A. Yavlinsky have more 
clearly defined sets of ideas. The former is associated 
with a series of colourful symbols: the Orthodox Church 
of Christ the Saviour, Sevastopol as the town of Russian 
glory, the protection of Russians in the Baltic states, and 
an economic approach designed to renew Russian 
industry (on closer examination, his economic ideas and 
practices may be described as communal statism.) 
The latter, in the view of many in Russia, is the 
most consistent supporter of democratic values and 
principles, and is capable of reforming the social safety 
net for the poor. He is the idol of members of the 
intelligentsia who are deeply disappointed with Yeltsin 
and who reject Chubais and Gaidar. They see him as a 
conscientious, honest person capable of conducting a 
sensible economic policy with the support of the West. 
However, Luzhkov, Yavlinsky and Zyuganov share 
one drawback - they are too well understood. The 
population basically knows what to expect from them. 
The vast majority of the people are completely confused 
and their mood is one of 'a bad end is better than an 
endlessly bad situation'. In these circumstances, an 
enigmatic and charismatic figure has a greater chance 
of becoming a national leader. Ordinary Russians want 
to see an end to the interminable crisis. The simple, 
crude, but always somewhat insinuating aphorisms of 
Lebed, with his fierce appearance and aggressive facial 
expressions, largely meet these hopes for a sudden 
change - if not for the better, then at least for 
something different. 
Lebed is a myth and has a colourful exterior, but 
he has no substance. More precisely, his substance boils 
down to an absolute hunger for power. In this respect, 
he is following exactly in the footsteps of Yeltsin. 
However, his experience in Afghanistan and Transdnes-
tria prepared him mentally for more radical approaches 
to problem-solving than Yeltsin has ever used. What is 
more, in the foreseeable future, Lebed will be far more 
active than the current President, who is ill and 
periodically shows complete indifference to matters of 
state. 
The country will find out just how tough a 
military disciplinarian Alexander Lebed is if he ever 
comes to power. He has already created a new deep 
division in society, with a significant number of people 
refusing to believe the myth, having decided what this 
general and governor is really like. Many in the Russian 
Federation, who have already become accustomed to 
freedom, have no yearnings whatever for despotism. 
Democracy, in spite of all the threats it faces, 
remains vital for the countries of the CIS, not least for 
Russia and Ukraine. The success of democracy in these 
two states is imperative if there is to be gradual progress 
towards systems based on the rule of law in the Central 
Asian area. It is essential that the specific Eurasian 
characteristics be understood if the dialogue between 
Western Europe and the CIS countries is to help the 
people of the post-Soviet region to recognise the merits 
of democracy for themselves. ■ Y.K. 
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Back to the roots of 
I African jazz 
Momo Wandel Soumah is 
part of the network of Afri-
can musicians condemned by 
circumstances to years of 
painful anonymity. He may 
not be as well known as 
Youssou N'Dour, Mory Kanté 
or Alpha Blondy, but, if you 
look more closely, his humi-
lity and the sheer depth of 
his talent will captivate you 
and you will be irresistibly 
seized by a desire to know 
more about him and his 
music. Wandel very quickly 
understood that a mixture of 
genres was the way forward in 
music, but success, for him, was late 
in coming. The perfect combination 
he has achieved of different musical 
styles was worth The Courier going 
to meet him during a recent trip to 
Guinea. 
He is a large, cheerful man 
with an engaging personality. His 
face still looks young, with few 
signs of age, as if Nature were 
indulging him so that he can play 
his music for as long as possible. 
Now 73, the Guinean saxophonist 
Momo Wandel Soumah, better 
known as Wandel, delights in the 
international recognition his musi-
cal style is receiving, a style accom-
plished by dint of talent, work and, 
in particular, his thirst for creativity. 
Wandel has little trouble achieving 
a fusion between traditional Afri-
can music and jazz. With him, this is 
a new genre which, some time ago, 
had only a virtual existence, but has 
since become very real. It is well 
known that jazz was essentially 
black music, but, until recently, it 
was unusual, on the African music 
scene, to find a combination of 
different rhythms and, above all, 
different instruments and sounds. 
This artist, who has made a number 
of attempts to seize centre stage, is 
known in Guinea for his skilful mix 
and amalgam of tunes, cadences 
and other melodies borrowed from 
his country's cultural, ethnic, lin-
guistic and historical diversity. 
Wandel took up music in 
1947, well before his country 
gained independence. Sent by the 
colonial authorities as head of post 
at Labe, in Fouta Djalon, he began 
to play the Bailöl, a traditional Peul 
instrument, moving on to the banjo 
and subsequently the mandolin. 'At 
that time, we were playing a lot of 
rhythms from abroad, such as the 
biguine, paso doble or mazurka', 
he told us. His first contact with 
wind instruments also dates from 
that period. He explained that, one 
day, when his group was getting 
ready to play, the clarinettist had 
still not turned up. 'I was really 
angry and went up to our band 
leader. I asked him just how diffi-
cult it was to play this 'piece of 
wood'. I told him I would like to 
try, so he demonstrated the first 
few scales to me and I began to 
play'. It was an easy move for him 
to take up the majestic saxophone, 
playing the intoxicating jazz tunes 
he himself composes. 'Jazz is in my 
blood', says Wandel, without any 
hint of boastful ness. He is a disciple 
of some of jazz's most prestigous 
personalities: Coltrane, Armstrong, 
Gillespie, Parker, Miles Davis and 
Hawkins, to mention just those 
who have inspired this Guinean 
musician. 
With Guinea's indepen-
dence in 1958 and the confirmation 
of a certain national identity, the 
great majority of Guinean musi-
cians returned, not without pro-
blems, to the grass roots of tradi-
tional music, particularly music 
from the country's folklore. Hither-
to, this type of music had been 
largely the preserve of griots and 
folklore ensembles. As a member of 
the 'Kelitigui' National Orchestra, 
Wandel was also to discover, with 
his African group Sex Tet, the joys 
of mixing the tonal qualities of 
African instruments (bolon, bala-
fon, kora, flute, percussion instru-
ments, etc.) with the graceful 
sound he could produce on the 
saxophone. The composition of his 
group, which is a comprehensive 
representation of his country's cul-
tural and musical styles, counts for 
a great deal. The artist chose his 
musicians with great care. 
In 1988, at the first MASA 
(African Art and Entertainment 
Market) in Abidjan, the Guinean 
composer's creative genius was a 
revelation to all. He won first prize 
for his successful marriage of tradi-
tional instruments and modern me-
lodies, thereby opening up new 
vistas for music in Africa. Yet tuning 
traditional instruments successfully 
to achieve this musical 'graft' is by 
no means easy. He had to juggle 
skilfully with hundreds of scales. 
'That's all there is to the secret of 
my success', Wandel confesses, mak-
ing it sound easy! Invited several 
Momo Wandel Soumah. 
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the stages of a number of festivals 
(Limoges, Nantes, Taiwan, Bogo-
tá...) Meanwhile, he trained at the 
International Music Centre in Paris 
and at the School of Jazz, and 
played in New Morning. 'Match-
owé', his first album on compact 
disc, is now widely available in 
Europe. To avoid the copyright 
infringement to which many Afri-
can musicians fall victim, it has 
unfortunately not been possible 
for the album to appear on 
cassette - illegal cassettes are com-
mon in Africa. 
Momo Wandel is optimistic 
about the future. His long years of 
experience have not made him any 
less eager to pursue and refine his 
art. He is currently seeking a ser-
ious, experienced promoter to help 
him gain a higher profile. Many 
Western musicians have already 
shown an interest in this original 
type of music and some have 
indicated they would like to meet 
him. Technical and financial sup-
port would enable him to play, 
and, above all, share the result of 
his work throughout the world. 
Wandel's serious side means that 
he is now a member of a group of 
creative artists and is involved in 
Guinea's most prestigious selection 
boards. 
Momo Wandel Soumah 
urges the new generation of Afri-
The wealth of Guinea's musical 
landscape needs no further illustration. 
can musicians to follow in his foot-
steps. Aware that he has to pass on 
his knowledge and skills as soon as 
possible, he has taken a few young 
talents under his wing with a view 
to schooling them in the tricks of 
the trade. His message to them is 
clear: courage, patience and work, 
backed up by the will to learn 
music in depth and without taking 
shortcuts. These, he believes, are 
the keys to success. He deplores the 
attraction held for young people by 
the piano or the guitar, which are 
easier to master than wind instru-
ments. 'Ten good years of regular 
and assiduous practice are needed 
to be able to claim a thorough 
knowledge of the saxophone', he 
stresses, echoing the remarks of 
Manu Dibango, Africa's greatest 
saxophone virtuoso from Camer-
oon. 
Wandel is therefore cam-
paigning for the establishment of 
a major music school in Guinea and 
he is confident that his ideas will be 
taken up. However, he is fully 
aware of the problems that culture 
in his country currently experiences. 
Funding is extremely limited and 
the priorities of the government, 
concerned with consolidating the 
economic upturn of the last few 
years, lie elsewhere (a Country 
culture and society 
Report on Guinea is planned for 
the next issue of The Courier). 
Guinea's rich musical land-
scape needs no further illustration. 
Talents such as Mory Kanté, now 
settled in Europe, completed their 
apprenticeship in that country. Gui-
nea has also produced very good 
percussionists. Next year will see 
the organisation of an interna-
tional percussion festival, with EU 
funding, which could lead to the 
setting-up of an 'international per-
cussion centre'. 
As far as dance and ballet is 
concerned, Guinea can boast one of 
the most prestigious if not the most 
impressive corps de ballet in Africa. 
The African Ballet of the Republic 
of Guinea has danced throughout 
the world for more than 40 years 
and has no cause to be jealous of 
the famous corps de ballet of 
London or even the Bolshoi. The 
crop of medals it has won abroad is 
proof enough of this. The choreo-
grapher and composer, Italo Zam-
bo, who has directed the company 
for over a decade, also urges the 
establishment of a music and dance 
centre to develop the enormous 
potential Guinea possesses. 
It cannot be repeated en-
ough: music and dance in Africa 
express the entire continent's joie 
de vivre and charm. They are still 
one of its most lively means of 
expression and the incarnation of 
its historical and cultural heritage 
which are essential to its wider 
recognition. To try to dissociate 
them from development targets 
would be the world's misfortune. 
■■ K.K. 
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London 
by Anthony Acheampong 
In the thirty years or so since 
independence, says Dr 
Adotey Bing, Africa has 
chalked up some impressive 
advances in literacy, educa-
tion, the output of raw ma-
terials, science and technolo-
gy, and enlightened social 
policy. And it has had some 
notable achievements in the 
artistic, intellectual and 
sporting fields. Despite this, 
he bemoans the fact that the 
rest of the world tends to ig-
nore the continent or to 
focus almost exclusively on the neg-
ative aspects. Africa persistently suf-
fers from an unfavourable media 
profile, he acknowledges, portrayed 
as a place wracked by political crisis, 
endemic corruption, social disinte-
gration and self-induced penury. 
Dr Bing, who is the Direc-
tor of The Africa Centre in London, 
is unhappy about this one-sided 
view of his native continent. And 
he is in the business of trying to re-
dress the balance. He believes that 
the Centre he runs has a special 
role to play in ensuring that Eu-
rope gets a more balanced picture 
of African affairs, and in offering a 
platform for African opinion lead-
ers (outside the usual diplomatic 
channels) to get their views across. 
The Africa Centre is an in-
dependent charity located at 
Covent Garden in the heart of the 
British capital. For more than three 
and half decades, it has been a 
focal point for African culture in 
the UK. Leading African artists, 
writers, politicians, business-peo-
ple and musicians have met there 
over the years to draw inspiration 
from each other and to share their 
vision with people in the host 
country. 
The Centre was set up in 
1961 with the aim of informing 
the British public about Africa. It 
was officially opened in 1964 by 
Kenneth Kaunda, the first Presi-
Centre in 
dent of Zambia. Over the years, it 
has become something of a 'home 
from home' for members of the 
African community in London in-
cluding artists, musicians, writers, 
intellectuals and political exiles. It 
is also a focal point on Africa for 
the British population. 
The Centre houses, among 
other things, a gallery, two meet-
ing halls, an African restaurant 
and bar, a craft centre, and a 
bookshop specialising in publica-
tions from and about the conti-
nent. It is also home to the African 
Education Trust. Around 80,000 
people make use of its facilities 
every year. 
The Centre has attracted 
many notable speakers including 
President Yoweri Museveni, Julius 
Nyerere, OUA Secretary-General 
Salim Ahmed Salim, Archbishop 
For more information about 
the Africa Centre, contact: 
Dr Adotey Bing, 
Director of the Africa Centre, 
38 King Street, 
London WC2E 8JT, 
UK. 
Tel.: (44) 171 836 1973 
Fax: (44) 171 836 1975. 
e-mail: africa@gn.apc.org 
Desmond Tutu, Sir Shridath Ram-
phal, Wole Soyinka, Maya An-
gelou. Graça Machet, Chinua 
Achebe and Bernard Chidzero. 
Among the British politicians who 
have addressed meetings there are 
Malcom Rifkind, Baroness Chalker, 
Barbara Castle and David Steel. Its 
exhibition of Zimbabwe stone 
sculpture, staged at the Barbican 
in 1988, was opened by Prince 
Charles. 
Mary Robinson, the former 
Irish President, who is now UN 
High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, was a recent visitor. She de-
livered a lecture entitled: 'Africa 
Dr Adotey Bing 
welcomes Mary Robinson, UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights to the Centre. 
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and a Rights-Based Approach to 
Development'. 
The Centre was also instru-
mental in organising the European 
musical tour Women of Africa fea-
turing Oumou Sångare, Hanitra 
Rasoanaivo, Sally Nyolo and Si-
bongile Kumalo. 
Objectives 
The objectives of 
the Centre, as set out in its 
mission statement, are to: 
- organise performances 
and exhibitions of African 
art and culture; 
- provide opportunities for 
collaboration between 
African and European 
artists, and between leaders 
in cultural and intellectual 
circles; 
- encourage the cultural ac-
tivities of African communi-
ties in Britain and Europe; 
- organise talks, lectures, 
briefings and conferences 
on social, political, and eco-
nomic issues concerning 
Africa; 
- act as a resource centre 
for information on African 
art, culture, and society. 
Its programme is organised 
around four areas: 
- A Resource Centre provid-
ing information on Africa, 
including newspapers, mag-
azines and journals. There is 
a reading room with seat-
ing for 15 people; 
- Performances and exhibitions of 
African art and culture; 
- Talks, lectures and conferences 
on social trends in contemporary 
Africa; 
- Talking Africa, a weekly radio 
discussion and phone-in pro-
gramme, broadcast on Saturdays 
on Spectrum Radio (558AM/MW). 
New projects 
Recently, the Centre has 
embarked on a number of new ini-
tiatives in pursuit of its objectives. 
In 1997, it launched Managing 
Contemporary Africa, a series of 
lectures by eminent Africans. The 
aim here is to facilitate dialogue 
between decision-makers in Africa 
and those in Britain and other Eu-
ropean countries whose actions 
have a bearing on the continent. 
Keynote speakers so far have in-
cluded Cyr/7 Ramaphosa and Prime 
Minister Hage Geingob of Namib-
ia. 1997 also saw the establishment 
of a monthly literature forum 
called 'Kulture K lash'. 
Africa's shop window in London 
Key initiatives begun this 
year have included a monthly sem-
inar on investment and trade 
prospects in Africa (especially for 
small and medium sized enterpris-
es), the establishment of the 
'Africa Centre Business Club' which 
is open to firms with business in-
terests on the continent, and a fur-
ther forum entitled 'Under the 
Baobab - talking till we agree?' 
This last is a monthly discussion 
meeting led by a prominent 
African journalist which explores 
contemporary issues and develop-
ments. 
From focal point to 
flagship 
The Council of Manage-
ment recently agreed that the pro-
file of the Centre should be raised. 
They want to make it a 'flagship' 
for Africa in Europe, promoting 
the best of the continent's art, cul-
ture and opinion. The decision is 
based on a business plan that 
seeks to ensure the Centre's long-
term financial viability in Covent 
Garden - which some re-
gard as the cultural heart of 
Britain. Detailed work by 
architects and consultants 
has produced a package 
combining programme 
ideas (some of which are 
outlined above) and an ar-
chitectural scheme. The in-
tention is to redevelop the 
attractive listed building 
where the Centre is located 
to provide modern confer-
ence facilities, a cinema, an 
art gallery, a business club, 
a music venue and a mod-
ern computerised informa-
tion centre. There are also 
plans to refurbish the 
restaurant, cafe, bookshop 
and craft centre. The total 
cost is estimated at around 
£4.3 m. The proposals, de-
signed to take the Centre 
into the new millennium, 
have already attracted in-
terest from bodies as di-
verse as the Organisation of 
African Unity, the UK Gov-
ernment, the EU and the 
Covent Garden Trust. The 
Centre has obtained a pro-
visional award from Nation-
al Lottery Funds, through 
the Arts Council of England, for 
updating the feasibility study. The 
Centre, for its part, must demon-
strate a strategy to raise £1m to-
wards the redevelopment. Assum-
ing all goes according to plan, the 
work should be completed by early 
2000. 
It is an ambitious scheme 
which Dr Bing hopes will enable 
the Centre to build a bridge to a 
new era of relations between 
Africa and Europe. ■■ A.A. 
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at the Couleur Café 
No, not everyone necessarily spent the last few days of June glued to the World Cup football. Proof of this 
was the large number of people who flocked to the Couleur Café weekend in Brussels on 26-28 June - just 
as the second round matches were being played. In its ninth year (held for the fifth time in succession at the 
Tour & Taxi site), there was a full house on the Friday evening, 15,000 people having crowded through the 
doors of the former bonded warehouse. 
Couleur Café is not, 
of course, the only event 
of its kind. All over Eur-
ope, countries stage simi-
lar festivals. In Belgium 
alone, for example, the 
Sfinkx festival (held in the 
north of the country at the 
end of July) has become 
something of a model for 
this type of event. Like the 
other festivals, Couleur 
Café offers a chance for 
anyone and everyone to sample 
what is rather too broadly termed 
world music (basically, any music 
which comes from outside the 
American-European 'region'). 
Many people brought their chil-
dren along, sometimes even in 
prams and pushchairs. This was an 
interesting development, particu-
larly given that, with the arrival 
of summer, certain radio and 
television stations have begun 
bombarding our ears with world 
music smash-hit style (enough to 
put you off it for good, some 
might argue!) - guaranteed to 
last two whole months. This is not 
to say that there were no inter-
nationally renowned artists at this 
year's festival - far from it. Other 
participants, less well-known in 
Europe, delivered some very plea-
sant surprises to the Brussels 
audiences. 
The three evenings each 
had a different theme. Friday was 
dedicated to World Beat for Per-
cussion. It could equally have 
been called African Beat. The 
impact of the continent's drum-
beat was so powerful that it is 
probably still reverberating today 
in the ears of listeners! The high-
light of the evening was a 
'Djembé follies'. To celebrate the 
tenth anniversary of his group 
Sewa Kan, the Guinean Mamady 
Keita had invited a number of his 
associates to join him on stage for 
a fabulous show lasting nearly 
three hours. Guest artistes in-
cluded a number of notable 
performers - Doudou N'Diaye 
Rose, Mory Kante, Manu Dibango 
and Khadja Ni n. 
The warm-up was pro-
vided by Jean-Louis Daulne, who 
delivered a much talked-about 
version of Brel's Vésoul. Other 
bands, including the one led by 
Madagascan Jaojoby, performed 
on the two adjacent stages, and 
the reggae group Steel Pulse 
brought the proceedings to a 
close. Rasta hats and dreadlocks 
were in evidence again on the 
following day in the shape of the 
One of the grandads from Vieja Trova 
Santiaguera with his claves. 
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legendary Jamaican, Jimmy Cliff. 
He performed as stylishly as ever, 
with his cap pulled tightly down 
on his head. In fact, devotees of 
music from the Caribbean were 
thoroughly spoilt this year, parti-
cularly on the second evening 
which was entitled Fiesta Mun-
dial. This was essentially a cele-
bration of Cuba, and was a 
reflection of Europe's current pas-
sion with sound, a type of music 
exported from the largest island 
in the Caribbean. It was also 
evidence that, very often, the 
best surprises come from the 
supporting stages. Candido Fabre 
and Sin Palabras were two such 
revelations - not to mention the 
five grandads who make up Vieja 
Trova Santiagueral These are 
genuine 'senior citizens' with an 
average ago somewhere in the 
region of 75, who delighted lis-
teners with their skilful manipula-
tion of guitar, double bass, mar-
acas, tres (a guitar typical of 
Cuba) and claves (small wooden 
sticks). Haiti was not forgotten, 
either, represented by one of its 
brightest bands, Tabou Combo, a 
leading exponent of Compas and 
its furious rhythms (strongly influ-
enced by the merengue of Santo 
Domingo). 
The third keynote of this 
festival was women. The Sunday 
evening was entirely devoted to 
them, in a programme of varied 
styles, origins and tones. On the 
main podium the Belgo-Anglo-
Moroccan, Natacha Atlas, served 
up a cocktail of oriental dance 
melodies. This was followed by 
the salsa-rumba-chacha mix of 
the all-female Cuban group Ana-
caona. Then we had Daniela 
Mercury, the 'queen of Bahia', 
whose presence on stage was 
not so much regal as tornado-
like. On other stages, the six 
Moroccan Berber women of B'net 
Houaryiat were impressive but I 
particularly liked the warm, 
'groovy' voice of the British singer 
Daniela Mercury, tornado of Bahia. 
Chezeré - another exciting discov-
ery in 1998 Couleur Café vintage. 
Talking of vintages, I 
might as well come clean and 
admit that I sampled a rather 
special little Cape Verde rum, 
which was not at all bad. For this 
festival was not just about the 
music. The huge venue contained 
what the organisers called a 'glo-
bal village' - an area of stalls and 
restaurants set out in a more 
intimate way. All kinds of tradi-
tional foods were available from 
Mexican tacos to Congolese 
maombe. Those with a strong 
constitution could wash down 
their Indian curry with an explo-
sive cocktail straight from Havana 
before moving on to demolish 
the sweet pancakes. 
The village was also a 
souk offering an enormous selec-
tion of artefacts and other goods. 
In anything from a Berber tent to 
an Indian tipi, you could find an 
infinite variety of musical instru-
ments, fabric lanterns, second-
hand clothes and wooden masks. 
A number of organisations such 
as Amnesty International, Oxfam 
and Max Havelaar were 
represented - all seeking to 
heighten awareness among visi-
tors just a little. SOS Faim had 
even set up a 'Lomé Village'. 
There, around a palaver tree, 
you would find Thomas Dorn's 
'Drums and Colour' photo exhibi-
tion, featuring renowned African 
musicians (such as Youssou 
N'Dour, Myriam Makela), and less 
well-known ones. You could even 
start learning Lingala in the vil-
lage, or get yourself an African 
haircut. 
The people who attended 
may have decided to try and 
escape from the World Cup for 
an evening or two, but I noted 
that the football had not been 
entirely forgotten (for some rea-
son, Brazilian jackets sporting a 
number 9 on their back seemed 
to be in fashion at the festival 
this year). Football fanatics had 
the benefit of a giant screen (set 
somewhat apart). This meant that 
we were able to witness the 
fourth goal hammered past the 
Nigerians from the boot of the 
Danish striker Helveg. More than 
a few crestfallen faces were visi-
ble round about. As for me, one 
last little glass of rum and I back 
was off to imbibe the intoxicating 
dance steps of Daniela Mercury. 
M TG 
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child deaths 
by Dan Palmer* 
Nutrition experts are closely studying a project in 
the Gambia which offers hope of greater life ex-
pectancy for children from poorer regions. The 
scheme is based on something that expectant 
mothers around the world have always known -
that 'eating for two' makes sense. 
Researchers' findings - outlined in June 
at a 'New Frontiers in Science' exhibition at the 
Royal Society in London - should help to target 
limited aid resources to where they can best 
protect child health. 
Medical workers used to believe that 
improving a mother's diet after pregnancy 
would produce a better quality of breast milk 
and, in turn, a healthier baby and a longer-liv-
ing adult. 'That, unfortunately, was a simplistic as-
sumption,' said Ann Prentice, head of micronutrition 
for the British Medical Research Council's Dunn Nutri-
tion Unit. This government-funded agency, based in 
Cambridge, UK, has been conducting extensive re-
search in the Gambian village of Keneba. 
The region has two main seasons: dry and wet. 
In the dry season, lasting from November to April, food 
is plentiful and babies have good birth weight. In the 
wet season, food is scarce and infants are born lighter. 
Yet in both seasons, the quality of breast milk does not 
change because the mothers' metabolism slows down, 
compensating for the lack of food in rainy months. The 
team believes that natural hormonal changes regulate 
the metabolic rate in this way. 
They discovered that improving diet during 
pregnancy did not help because mothers' milk was al-
ready good enough during both seasons. The quality 
was as good as breast milk in Britain. The only things 
that increased were the women's own weight and 
their fertility. Consequently, many soon became preg-
nant again - defeating the natural contraception of 
the fallow wet season. The team found that the best 
way to boost children's survival rate was to prevent 
foetal growth retardation by improving the mother's 
diet during, rather than after, pregnancy. 
Tim Cole, a statistician for the unit, said they 
were lucky to be able to refer to research work carried 
out in the area in 1949 by Sir Ian McGregor, who had 
been studying malaria for the Medical Research Coun-
cil. McGregor, now in his 80s, recorded local births. This 
provided current researchers with a database of 6000 
people, and allowed team members to study links be-
tween month of birth and child mortality. 
Infants born in both seasons were found to 
have similar mortality rates early in life - many times 
* Canadian journalist working with Gemini News Service in London on 
a fellowship arrangement with the School of Journalism and Communica-
tions at the University of Regina. 
The best way to boost children's survival rate is to improve the mother's diet 
during pregnancy. 
higher than in the West - but there was a big differ-
ence between wet - and dry-season babies when they 
reached later childhood and adolescence. Those born 
during the wet season, when food is scarce, were ten 
times more likely to die of a range of illnesses. This 
finding suggests that the immune system is influenced 
by birth conditions and that more resources should be 
directed at improving diet during pregnancy. 
The unit put their discovery to the test by im-
proving Gambian mothers' diets. The team gave expec-
tant mothers peanut biscuit supplements: three a day 
during the dry season and four during wet months. 
They found that birth weights increased and the infant 
mortality rate fell - particularly during the rainy sea-
son. 
Now the unit plans to study the long-term ef-
fects of these supplements on children born in the wet 
season to see how they match with the records from 
McGregor's database, and whether overall life ex-
pectancy is substantially increased. They would also like 
to pinpoint the exact cause of such increased life ex-
pectancy. Ann Prentice explained that the biscuits 
could be countering a specific vitamin deficiency, or 
some other factor may have been overlooked. But, 
she said: 'The most likely bet is nutritionJjjjM D.P. 
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by Joséphine Marthe Môuko* 
Many African countries are 
undergoing adjustments 
that have had a negative 
impact on the most vulner-
able sections of the popula-
tion, including women. Most 
people depend for their sur-
vival on the informal sector, 
which is kept going mainly 
by women. And yet, in many 
respects, they still lack full 
citizenship rights. 
The participation of 
African women in socio-
economic development is 
no longer in doubt. From 
early childhood to the end 
of their lives, women now 
toil in a wide range of social and 
economic sectors. This has come 
about because of the changing 
structure of African societies and 
the resulting division of labour. 
There is now a need to reappraise 
the female role and give it a value, 
taking account of the new require-
ments thrown up by a society 
undergoing change. 
The speed with which jobs 
are being created in a city such as 
Yaoundé in Cameroon, for exam-
ple, provides a clear indication of 
the increasing power of women 
on the labour market. As noted by 
F. Roubaud, 45% of new jobs are 
occupied by women, even though 
they only account for 40% of the 
total workforce at present. J.P.La-
chaud estimates that in African 
urban areas, depending on the 
country, between 50% and 80% 
of women operate in the informal 
sector. For all its dynamism, the 
sector only provides them with 
insecure, marginal and unpro-
tected employment. This is a sig-
nificant factor in their social exclu-
sion. Women doing 'informal' 
work therefore continue to oper-
ate on the margins of the wage-
earning workforce, frequently on 
a freelance basis. They make them-
selves felt solely as a result of the 
amount of labour they contribute. 
Like most African conurbations, 
Yaoundé has come to depend very 
much on their services. The pro-
blem is no longer to ensure their 
* Socio-economist, trainee with DGVIII, 
Unit A2 (Gender and Development) 
full involvement in economic ac-
tivity, but rather to guarantee 
them proper recognition in their 
role as economic agents. This in-
cludes their genuine integration 
into social, economic and political 
structures. 
As a number of authors 
have pointed out with regard to 
the Caribbean, the phenomenon 
of 'female heads of household' is 
leading to a change in social 
relationships, making it necessary 
to establish new forms of family 
and social organisation. To return 
to Yaoundé, the results of the 
survey carried out in 1993 by 
Roubaud revealed that the percen-
tage of families with a female 
head of household had increased 
from 21% to 25% (between 1983 
and 1993). C. Tichit provides 
further details, distinguishing be-
tween single-person households 
(24%), non-family households 
(21%), lone-parent nuclear house-
holds: (20%), extended lone-par-
ent households (32%) and other 
types of household (3%). 
Moreover, thanks to their 
commercial and agricultural activ-
ities and in particular their con-
tribution to the informal sector 
(sale of food surpluses, handi-
crafts, clothes workshops, small 
restaurants, tontine arrangements 
etc.), women are starting to take 
charge of financial matters such as 
rent and water payments, and 
education and health costs. Tradi-
tionally, these have been a male 
preserve. They come to the aid of 
brothers, husbands or boyfriends 
who have been destabilised by a 
lack of demand for their export 
goods, or have lost their jobs as a 
result of cutbacks in the public 
and parastatal sectors, which used 
to be big employers. This structur-
al change at the level of the family 
unit is a kind of labour redistribu-
tion, which will inevitably alter 
wider society, although the altera-
tion is taking place slowly because 
of various obstacles. 
Too many obstacles 
The need to reconcile the 
commitments of family and work-
ing life is one such obstacle. It is 
quite clear there needs to be a 
redistribution of responsibilities 
within family and working life. 
between men and women. The 
increasing involvement of women 
in the labour market means they 
are becoming less available for 
domestic work, for childcare and 
education, or for voluntary work 
in the community interest (all of 
which have been dubbed 'non-
productive'). What is required is a 
reassessment of domestic activities 
and of activities carried out in the 
general interest - both hitherto 
female preserves. The work in-
volved seldom receives much at-
tention and is undervalued. 
The weakening of family 
ties is making life difficult for 
many women, who are obliged to 
reconcile domestic and family 
commitments with paid work per-
formed in a structure originally 
conceived for men. Sharing roles 
in the family/household and im-
proved time management would 
make it possible to increase the 
supply of female labour, encou-
rage better use of human re-
sources, promote equality of op-
portunity and improve the quality 
of life. This conclusion, reached by 
the OECD, in fact applies to wo-
men in both the southern and 
northern hemispheres. In other 
words, it will not be possible to 
raise the status of women's work 
without a revision of their social 
status (involving a change in social 
relationships and organisational 
structures within family units and 
within society as a whole). Political 
decision-makers and governments 
need to take account of the con-
tributions, ideas and views of 
women. Considerable socio-cultur-
al and structural obstacles will 
have to be faced, however. 
Because of their role as 
bearers of children, African wo-
men are more highly valued by 
society as wives and mothers than 
as producers. It is also generally 
the case that the level of educa-
tion and training of women (and 
the level of education and training 
in their families of origin) essen-
tially determine the type of jobs 
that they do. This means facing up 
to the sensitive question of cultur-
al barriers. One could, for exam-
ple, draw attention to une<~ 
access to school of boys ¡>
m 
in most African societi--
the number of gir 
school is growing, th 
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serious differences between ethnic 
groups, regions and religions. UN-
ESCO studies have shown that 
almost everywhere, fewer females 
than males attend school. In Ca-
meroon, 72% of boys go to pri-
mary school as against 59% of 
girls. The equivalent figures at 
the secondary level are 32% and 
23% respectively. 57% of adult 
women are illiterate as against 
34% of men. 
There is also little doubt 
that stereotypes and other preju-
dices make it more difficult for 
women to develop. Experts some-
times take a rather blinkered view 
of women, and this has repercus-
sions on certain types of action. 
Analyses and evaluations essen-
tially based on a one-dimensional 
interpretation of reality really do 
hinder the socio-cultural develop-
ment of women. In the case of 
illiterate women, for example, we 
find that analyses by people from 
other cultures frequently fail to 
take account of local complexities. 
These analyses are often based on 
different cultural standards and 
codes; ideological baggage stem-
ming from obsolete historical 
views or simply entrenched preju-
dices. Confusion often arises be-
cause of a failure to understand 
the difference between a lack of 
knowledge of facts due to the 
inability to read a language (illit-
eracy) and a basic lack of intelli-
gence. From the outset, the illiter-
ate's view of the world is devalued 
and discredited, and hence, rarely 
taken into account. There may also 
be frustrations and complexes that 
prevent illiterate women from de-
veloping themselves to the full. 
Another substantial obsta-
cle is that women still do not have 
any real control over the social, 
economic and political forces that 
govern their lives, despite now 
being a pillar of economic activity 
in Africa. The problem is under-
lined by the fact that women are 
under-represented in the decision-
making structures of their coun-
tries. Taking Cameroon again as an 
example, and looking at the public 
sector, one finds female represen-
tation in all departments, but 
heavily concentrated at the lower 
levels. This is a conclusion that 
does not just apply to less-devel-
oped countries. One also notices a 
lack of women in certain types of 
profession, such as pure science, 
statistics, engineering, industrial 
management, mining/geology, civil 
engineering and agricultural engi-
neering. By contrast, the so-called 
social professions (nursing, social 
work, teaching) have a high level 
of female representation. Positions 
in the hierarchy, such as governor-
ships, prefectships and sub-pre-
fects' posts are never occupied by 
women. These jobs seem to be 
reserved exclusively for men, de-
spite the fact that they require 
intellectual and moral qualities 
rather than physical attributes 
such as strength and endurance. 
It is interesting to look at 
the distribution of female workers 
within Cameroon's industrial work-
force. In 1985, 96.7% of the total 
were employed in manufacturing. 
The extraction industries, utilities 
(electricity, gas and water) and 
housing/civil engineering only ac-
counted for 0.3%, 0.4% and 2.6% 
respectively. This situation reflects 
the paucity of women in scientific 
and technical disciplines. 
What it shows is that there 
is a need to widen the choice of 
professions open to women and to 
tackle the disparities between 
male and female employment 
(the segregation of jobs according 
to gender). Work codes should be 
revised and, in particular, more 
resources should be devoted to 
female education (with no 'ifs' or 
'buts'). Special measures are re-
quired to boost the numbers of 
women at decision-making levels, 
and especially in posts of a repre-
sentative nature. It is not a ques-
tion of giving women pro rata 
representation automatically. It 
must be based on their 
suitability - enhancing their skills 
and know-how to enable them to 
make an effective contribution to 
economic and structural decision-
making in their countries. I cer-
tainly do not wish to defend the 
widespread idea of 'a battle of the 
sexes'. I am concerned in particular 
with the legitimate demand for 
equal rights between the sexes -
in other words, the right to full 
citizenship, which will be brought 
about, in my opinion, by changing 
attitudes and adopting a consen-
sual approach. 
Need for intelligent 
cooperation 
Women's demands should 
not be seen as a desire to 'take the 
helm at all costs'. Nor does it 
involve reducing men to the status 
of adversaries who need to be 
'seen-off'. All change is slow and 
this change should be accompa-
nied by a comprehensive process 
of reflection. For this to work, we 
must not make the same mistakes 
as men, who for a long time 
excluded women from their dis-
cussion groups and public debates. 
There is a need for intelli-
gent cooperation between men 
and women on the one hand, 
and women and society on the 
other. This means that men should 
be involved in women's discussion 
groups, and their support must be 
sought to enable us to act more 
effectively. It also involves advocat-
ing full citizenship for women, by 
creating new rights to take ac-
count of their abilities and respon-
sibilities in dealing with current 
economic problems. In other 
words, women will only be able 
to manage resources effectively on 
a permanent basis if there is a true 
concentration of all social forces: 
initiatives from men and women 
within civil society, and the sup-
port of national and international 
institutions. 
The performance of struc-
tural adjustment will not improve 
until decision-making systems are 
able to respond to structural 
changes. There must be new rules, 
involving the setting of minimum 
standards and conditions, so as to 
eliminate endemic discrimination 
in the way that societies are 
organised. It is also essential to 
ensure fairness and justice in 
working life. 
The scale of the challenges 
we face regarding the status of 
women requires us to restructure 
the relationship between the sexes 
in society, and the legal system. 
We must view the current situa-
tion in a different light and re-
arrange matters in the social, eco-
nomic and political spheres. This is 
vital to create a new order that is 
not imposed on people. It can only 
be a change in response to genu-
ine aspirations and ¡deals resulting 
from the social and economic 
constraints on a particular group. 
The search for a social equilibrium 
is mainly a task for women - but if 
we are not to repeat past mis-
takes, men cannot be excluded. 
H J.M.M. 
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W tourism 
by Dr Auliana Poon* 
Warm weather, spectacular 
scenery, secluded beaches, 
accessible wildlife, cultural 
attractions, a wide range of 
quality accommodation and 
good value for money: just 
some of the ingredients that 
make a successful tourism 
destination. Other man-
made factors - safety and se-
curity, a warm welcome and 
good service - are also vital. 
Indeed, successful 
destinations are those where 
visitors feel a complete sense 
of welcome - where the lo-
cals that smile are not only 
those paid to do so. Yet, so little en-
ergy is spent on creating the reasons 
for locals to smile. Much of the ef-
fort of tourist authorities goes into 
awareness and 'smile training'. They 
do not realise that unless local peo-
ple feel tourism in their pockets and 
on their tables, all the smile training 
will not help. It is not surprising that 
when a journalist asked a Johannes-
burg resident why he stole a hand-
bag from a tourist, he replied: 'They 
say we should benefit from tourism, 
so I am just benefiting.' According to 
Sábelo Mahlalela, head of 
Mpumalanga Tourism Development 
in South Africa, 'you do not teach 
people to eat; you just give them the 
food'. Similarly, you do not teach lo-
cals to smile at tourists, you give 
them the reason to do so! 
There is a belief that respon-
sibility for involving local communi-
ties in tourism lies with the govern-
ment. Many private operators give 
little thought to the relationship 
they should be building with their 
neighbours. Yet, they expect their 
guests to be safe, with everyone 
smiling at them. The evidence sug-
gests that far-sighted entrepreneurs, 
who build up local links, are most 
successful. A good example of this is 
Umngazi River Bungalows in Eastern 
Cape, South Africa. This facility has 
an annual average occupancy rate of 
about 85% - one of the highest in 
the country. The management has 
taken decisions designed to ensure 
happy workers and a happy commu-
* Economist with a D. Phil, in Tourism from 
the University of Sussex, UK. Leader of the 
team that developed the tourism policy and 
strategy for the new South Africa in 1996. 
nity. All staff are drawn from the 
surrounding communities, workers 
get a 13th month's salary and share 
in the annual profits, the hotel has 
helped financially with the building 
of a local school, it provides free 
space for locals to sell their crafts to 
tourists, and it is committed to buy-
ing produce locally. Every morning 
sees a procession of people arriving 
at the hotel with baskets on their 
heads. Continuous training and skills 
upgrading is also provided. Not sur-
prisingly, the staff and community 
are content and a safe and happy 
environment is created for visitors. 
There is no staff turnover and 70% 
of Umngazi's guests are repeat visi-
tors. This all translates into a better 
bottom line. 
The management has a 
number of other ideas. It would like 
to support a community entrepre-
neur to develop a piggery (the 
kitchen waste makes good fodder). 
It aims to encourage a campsite de-
velopment where one family would 
be responsible for taking care of 
each unit. Umngazi would supply 
the fresh water and assist with reser-
vations. And it foresees a cultural vil-
lage where guests can learn about 
the local culture first hand. These 
are the types of initiative that sus-
tainable, responsible tourism are 
made of. 
Missing ingredient 
Involving local people is 
surely one of the missing ingredients 
undermining the success of many 
tourist destinations. In South Africa, 
where there is an urgent need to in-
volve previously disadvantaged com-
munities, many initiatives have not, 
unfortunately, brought in the pri-
vate sector. NGOs and donor agen-
cies have tried to work with local 
people, identifying their needs and 
supplying them with what they 
want. But without private sector 
input, the sustainability of these sup-
ply-based initiatives is questionable. 
Associating the private sector is one 
of the keys to unlocking the poten-
tial of local communities in the 
tourism industry. It may be a good 
idea to set up a craft village, but if 
you involve an established tour op-
erator in the project, you can help 
ensure that the products suit the 
needs of the market, that the centre 
is in an optimal location, that it has 
the services guests are looking for, 
and that tour buses will stop to en-
able visitors to make a purchase. 
Where hoteliers 'buy-in' to a com-
munity project (such as horse riding), 
this can go a long way to ensuring 
its success (the hotel then advertises 
the attraction to its guests). 
There are a number of unex-
plored ways in which the private sec-
tor can support community involve-
ment in tourism. These include: 
- advertising community products 
and services; 
- sourcing goods and services from 
the community (e.g. eggs, bread); 
- providing training and 'mentoring' 
for small businesses that supply the 
hotel; 
- out-sourcing certain services (laun-
dry, gardening, water sports); 
- employing persons (e.g. nannies) 
as free agents, to build enterpre-
neurship; 
- ensuring that community services 
are employed in building and con-
struction; 
-training and skills upgrading; 
- employing people from surroun-
ding communities; 
- identifying key opportunities for 
local producers (e.g. fresh herbs, or-
ganic vegetables); 
- introducing new services to guests 
(e.g. cooking classes for the prepara-
tion of local food, local language 
training, story-telling, traditional 
games, catch and release fishing, 
and offering local cuisine on the 
menu); 
- identifying career opportunities 
for locals; 
- encouraging staff and local schools 
to experience being a tourist at the 
hotel,. 
The key approach to local in-
volvement in tourism should not be 
aid, but private sector development 
in the relevant communities. In 
other words, to paraphrase a well-
worn saying, 'don't give people fish 
but teach them how to fish'. The fu-
ture of tourism in South Africa and 
indeed, elsewhere in the world, will 
be more secure when the Umngazi 
experience ceases to be just a 'good 
example', and becomes 'best prac-
tice', β A.p. 
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g| A project for the people 
gl of the tropical forests 
I by Serge Bahuchet* 
In 1995, three years after the Rio Summit, the European Union decid-
| ed to launch the APFT programme (Future of the Peoples of Tropical 
j Forests), an original and ambitious five-year anthropological scheme, 
j financed through the 'tropical forests' budget. 
The programme aims 
I to combine natural and so-
I cial sciences to work towards 
I a single goal: promoting 
9 greater awareness of the 
I human element and ensure 
I sustainable development. We 
| all agree that action is need-
[ ed to preserve the tropical 
forests. But good intentions 
on their own are not enough. They 
need to be founded on a thorough 
knowledge of the facts - and of the 
human facts first and foremost. 
There are many preconceptions con-
cerning tropical forests that only 
hinder the effectiveness of any ac-
tion that is taken. For example, we 
talk of 'virgin forests', conjuring up 
an image of an immaculate environ-
ment. Yet many people have been 
living in the forests for thousands of 
years, a point we just cannot ignore. 
Any project designed to create pro-
tected areas, that does not also take 
account of the people who actually 
live there, is doomed to fail. The 
APFT goes a step further, firmly be-
lieving that to achieve sustainable 
development we need to work to-
gether with these people. Indeed, 
* APFT Science Director and Research Director 
at the CNRS (National Centre for Scientific Re-
search). 
the programme's most distinguish-
ing characteristic is the importance it 
attaches to the inhabitants of the 
forests. 
Our initial aim is to assess 
the extent to which the human and 
natural environment have become 
integrated, in order to establish en-
vironmental management models: 
- Ethnoecology within the forest en-
vironment; extent of use and distur-
bance of the forest environment; 
- Ecology of agricultural practices: 
impact of agricultural activities on 
forest dynamics; 
- Relationships between urban and 
forest areas: impact of the pressures 
exerted by towns on the forest envi-
ronment and the way in which city 
dwellers perceive forests; 
- Social, environmental and develop-
mental dynamics: social impact of 
operations to develop participative 
management of forests and protect-
ed areas. 
APFT action in ACP countries 
is focused on achieving four major 
objectives. First, to expand our 
Pygmy people in Central Africa. 
'Aiming to promote greater awareness of the 
human aspect, and ensure sustainable 
development.' 
Coordination Unit 
Programme Director: Pierre de 
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Faculté universitaire des Sciences 
agronomiques de Gembloux (B) 
ORSTOM (F) 
knowledge of the inhabitants of 
tropical forests and find the best 
way of developing forest resources. 
Second, to make decision-makers 
more aware of and sensitive to the 
social and cultural realities of the 
forest environment. Third, to con-
duct specialist research and studies 
into the imbalances created by the 
outside world (demographic and 
urban pressures, but also through 
the creation of protected areas) and 
provide means of adjusting to such 
pressures. Finally, to set up a data 
bank accessible via the Internet. 
At the end of the first three 
years, an initial assessment of the 
work carried out shows broadly posi-
tive results. With a presence in 10 
ACP countries, 60% of the APFT bud-
get has been used to fund field pro-
jects. Numerous specialist studies 
have been conducted. A close-knit 
institutional network, made up of 90 
researchers - including 32 from ACP 
countries - and 35 official partner in-
stitutions, has been set up. In addi-
tion, there are various information 
networks (APFT News, colloquia, 
briefings, etc.). As a result of all this, 
the specialist work undertaken has 
gained international recognition. 
In the years to come, we will 
be concentrating our efforts on es-
tablishing operational tools to help 
development and conservation pro-
fessionals. An information session is 
already being planned in DG VIM 
specifically for that purpose. It will 
give the officials responsible for the 
programme the opportunity to high-
light the special features of the APFT 
project and, more importantly, to 
stress its support for those working 
in the development field.■■ S.B. Clinical waste 
incinerator for rural 
hospitals 
by Nigel Wakeham* 
In 1992 I went to the 
Solomon Islands for the UK's 
Department for Overseas De-
velopment (DFID), to man-
age two rural construction 
projects in the health sector. 
I was also asked to look at 
providing a clinical waste in-
cinerator for the main hospi-
tal in Honiara, the capital of 
the Solomon Islands. There 
had been a project in exis-
tence for several years to 
supply an incinerator but a 
suitable one had not been 
found. A large diesel-run incinerator 
had been proposed but the hospital 
could not afford to run it. I had 
come across similar problems when 
working in Southern and West 
Africa and had been looking for 
some time for a simple incinerator 
suitable for rural health centres or 
hospitals that could use wood or 
other locally available biomass ma-
terials as fuel. 
I eventually contacted a firm 
in Australia, Biomass Energy Services 
and Technology PTY Ltd (BEST), who 
specialise in renewable energy tech-
nology. They expressed interest in 
the problem and were commissioned 
to develop an incinerator that could 
use wood, coconut shells or similar 
materials as fuel. 
DFID (then still known as 
ODA) agreed to enlarge the project 
in order to supply all the provincial 
hospitals as well as the main hospital 
in Honiara with incinerators. Infor-
mation on the quantity and nature 
of the waste materials to be dis-
posed of was collected and sent to 
BEST. The waste consists mainly of a 
mixture of bandages, syringes, 
sharps (hypodermic needles, scalpel 
blades etc.), paper and body tissue. 
The nature of the waste is such that 
highly toxic substances such as diox-
ins and furans are generated when it 
is burnt in the open and poor com-
bustion can lead to some of the con-
* Consultant architect. E-mail 
- WakehamN®aol.com 
taminated waste 
burnt or sterilised. 
not being fully 
BEST developed two sizes of 
incinerator, a large one for the main 
hospital and a smaller one for the 
provincial hospitals, both of the 
same basic design and constructed 
of an outer skin of stainless steel 
lined with fire-clay bricks. The princi-
ple behind the design is that, in 
order to avoid the formation of 
dioxins and furans, it is necessary to 
burn the waste in an oxygen-starved 
environment and to break down the 
long chain and ring molecules by 
passing them through a bed of char 
closes into a water seal) at the top of 
the first chamber with alternate lay-
ers with dry wood or similar com-
bustible material until the chamber 
is full. The ash door at the bottom of 
the chamber is opened and a small 
fire started. Once the first layer of 
fuel is burning the ash door is 
closed. Secondary air is introduced in 
the second, smaller combustion 
chamber that links the first chamber 
to the third, much larger one where 
the final reaction between the 
volatile gases takes place. The result-
ing gases are then discharged 
through a flue at the top. Once the 
incinerator is started it requires no 
further attention until the burning 
process is completed (in approxi-
mately three hours) and the inciner-
ator has cooled down. The ash door 
is then opened and the ash and re-
maining materials that are com-
pletely sterile are removed. Even 
sharps are reduced in size and 
strength and can be safely handled. 
Schematic of Clinical Waste Gasifier 
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with superheated steam. Once the 
plastics and other hydrocarbons 
have been decomposed, then oxy-
gen is introduced to convert the 
volatile gases to carbon dioxide and 
water vapour. For complete combus-
tion, it is necessary to ensure high 
levels of air turbulence, high tem-
peratures and sufficient combustion 
chamber volume to allow oxidation 
reactions to be completed. 
The incinerators consist of 
three combustion chambers. The 
waste material is put in small plastic 
bags and fed through a door (which 
A series of tests was 
carried out on a prototype and it 
was found that after combustion 
was started, the temperature rapidly 
reached 1000 degrees C, there was 
no visible smoke and no measurable 
hydrocarbons (<10ppm). The inciner-
ators therefore provide a cheap, safe 
and very effective method of dispos-
ing of medical waste, which is badly 
needed in many rural areas. They 
have now been installed in most 
of the hospitals in the Solomon Is-
lands and are working very success-
fully. Mi N.W. 
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The case of the Tropical Timber Network 
by Jean Clément* 
A workshop jointly organised and financed by SILVA, the CTA, the European Commission (DGVIII), the FAO, 
the French Cooperation Ministry and the Ministry of the Environment of the Republic of Niger. 
The creation of the 
Tropical Timber 
I Network 
It is now increas-
ingly acknowledged that 
I trees and forests play a 
major cultural, social, eco-
^^β nomic and ecological role 
in the daily life of millions of men, 
women and children and of future 
generations. Food security, which 
is still one of the major challenges 
of our age, largely depends on 
trees and forests in many rural 
communities. Climatic balance, soil 
* President of the Internzational Tropical 
Timber Network, Director of the FAO's 
Forestry Resources Division. 
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The Technical Centre for Agri-
cultural and Rural Cooperation 
(CTA) was established in 1983 
under the Lomé Convention 
between the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) States and the 
European Union Member States. 
CTA's tasks are to develop and 
provide services that improve 
access to information for agri-
cultural and rural development, 
and to strengthen the capacity 
of ACP countries to produce, 
acquire, exchange and utilise 
information in these areas. 
f 
fertility and water resources de-
pend on the future of the trees 
and forests and two billion human 
beings rely on wood for their daily 
domestic fuel. There are myriad 
other examples. However, despite 
this level of awareness, the impor-
tance accorded trees and forests in 
international and national budgets 
and programmes remains extre-
mely limited. It appears that, 
although political decision-makers 
are often aware of the significance 
of the problem, they are yet to be 
persuaded that proposed actions 
are relevant and genuinely feasi-
ble. 
By setting up the Tropical 
Timber Network in 1987, the 
French Cooperation Ministry 
wanted to make a contribution 
to resolving this paradox and 
promoting both reflection on the 
role of trees and forests in society 
in tropical countries and, above 
all, proven actions and methods. 
The Network is a forum for infor-
mation and the exchange of ex-
perience and also offers action-
oriented training and education. 
Designed as a grouping 
together of people and organisa-
tions interested in receiving, pro-
viding and analysing information 
on conservation and forestry in 
forest or woodland/pastoral eco-
systems and on the use of timber 
in agriculture, the Network's ob-
jectives were as follows: 
— to encourage meetings in de-
veloping countries between repre-
sentatives of the authorities, civil 
society and international coopera-
tion organisations; and 
— to promote individual or collec-
tive reflection with a view to 
implementing new development 
strategies and practices. 
Development of the 
Network 
On the basis of these ob-
jectives, the Tropical Timber Net-
work progressively developed, 
achieving, in 1994, a total of 
approximately 4000 members, an-
nual renewals amounting to ap-
proximately 200 members. Of the 
4000, 3500 are in Africa, the rest 
being concentrated in Europe, 
principally France. Fewer than 150 
members are located outside Afri-
ca and Europe. Approximately 
16% of members are from the 
authorities, 17% from training 
establishments, 22% from NGOs 
which disseminate information 
and organise actions and, finally, 
29% from NGOs, cooperatives, in-
dividual enterprises and projects 
working directly in the field. 
To provide a link with the 
work of the technical secretariat, 
national representatives were ap-
pointed in 35 African countries. 
About 15 of these have duties in 
addition to those of representa-
tives and act as national or sub-
national organisers. Via their 
work, it was possible to set up 
fully-fledged secondary networks 
which, at national level, have a 
function similar to that of the 
technical secretariat based in 
France, which is the focal point 
of the Network. Its essential func-
tions are; to maintain up-to-date 
files on members; organise meet-
ings of the Management Commit-
tee, technical committee and var-
ious working groups; arrange 
other meetings, study trips, collo-
quia and training courses; provide 
a question/answer service on tech-
nical matters; maintain the link 
between members of the Net-
work; visit the countries and sup-
port national networks; provide a 
link with other networks, other 
organisations and other technical 
journals and reviews; prepare and 
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distribute technical information to 
be used by field workers; and, 
finally, prepare and edit the Net-
work's technical journal (Le Flam-
boyant) which is sent to all those 
involved. The contribution pro-
vided by African members has 
continued to grow in terms of 
the material they provide for the 
journal, and national or sub-na-
tional organising committees have 
been set up in a number of 
countries. 
The need for a review: the 
Torodi workshop 
The Tropical Timber Net-
work, managed by a dynamic 
team supported by the SILVA As-
sociation, the Forestry Department 
of the Centre for International 
Cooperation in Agronomical Re-
search for Development (CIRAD) 
and the French Association of 
Volunteers for Progress (AFVP), 
has worldwide representation, 
particularly in Africa, and is achiev-
ing positive results. 
Nevertheless, a new stage 
is now beginning which will see 
the setting-up of genuinely auton-
omous national networks which, 
in each country, will implement 
initiatives, ideas and actions devel-
oped in the international frame-
work of the current Network. 
These national networks will thus 
be able to work to the benefit of a 
greater partnership to promote 
each country's timber and forests. 
This need to create further part-
nerships is a response to the 
current objectives of the EU and 
its Member States and organisa-
tions such as the CTA. The need 
for a review and to collaborate 
with other partnerships led Net-
work organisers to suggest an 
international workshop on the 
general topic of communication 
networks to promote tropical tim-
bers and forests. 
The upshot of this was a 
workshop held from 17 to 23 
November 1997 in Torodi (Niger). 
This was attended not just by 
representatives of bodies asso-
ciated with its organisation (Ni-
ger's Ministry for Water Supplies 
and the Environment, European 
Commission DG VIII, French Coop-
eration Ministry, FAO, CTA, ODI, 
CIRAD, AFVP) but also 30 or so 
national delegates representing 14 
African countries (Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Cameron, Congo, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Maur-
itania, Niger, Senegal, Chad, Togo 
and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo). 
The two main motivations 
behind this workshop were: 
— to carry out a review of the 
Network and highlight original 
experiences which might be useful 
for other networks, such as, for 
example, the Rural Development 
Forestry Network organised by the 
UK-based ODI and the FAO's 'Tim-
ber, Forest and Rural Communities 
(FTPP)' network; and 
— to study, as closely as possible, 
ways of promoting the structural 
independence of national net-
works, specifying their individual 
potential and role in the fields of 
communication and information 
management. This is a key topic 
for the CTA, whose objectives are 
improved access to information on 
agricultural and rural development 
and a strengthening of the ACP 
states' information-management 
and communication capabilities. 
The first three days were 
devoted essentially to a review of 
the Tropical Timber Network and 
to establishing future objectives. 
The four topics for reflection 
were: the objective of a network; 
rights and obligations of a net-
work member; the financing and 
structure of a national network; 
and communication and exchange 
both within and outside a net-
work. 
Remaining days provided 
the opportunity for an exchange 
of 'original' experiences in the 
area of promotion and manage-
ment of timber and forests in 
tropical regions (there were some 
20 contributions on this subject by 
delegates) and for field visits to 
current project sites. 
This workshop laid the 
foundations for the future of the 
Tropical Timber Network, which 
includes a number of key elements 
(see below). 
The Network's future 
Now that it is ten years 
old, the raison d'être of the Tropi-
cal Timber Network was confirmed 
by all participants, for whom the 
Network's global objective is 'to 
make a significant contribution to 
the exchange and dissemination of 
information relating to relation-
ships between trees and man on 
the one hand, and between so-
ciety and the forest on the other, 
with a view to sustainable man-
agement of tropical forest re-
sources'. The Network will thus 
Tropical forests in Africa (Gabon), in 
the Caribbean (Trinidad) and in the 
Pacific (Fiji). 
The Network's area of interest is not 
limited to tropical Africa 
continue to provide a forum for 
exchange and communication to 
promote trees and forests in tro-
pical regions. Its area of interest is 
therefore not restricted to tropical 
Africa. The Network is able to 
bring together people interested 
in timber and tropical forests in 
Africa, Asia and America, and 
indeed, throughout the world. 
Specific objectives were 
identified to provide guidance for 
activities to be carried out by 
national networks in the short, 
medium and long term, on the 
basis of a precise communication 
strategy. The Network needs the 
support of dynamic, organised and 
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well-structured national networks, 
each of which carry out work in 
their respective country in colla-
boration with the technical secre-
tariat. The secretariat acts as co-
ordinator for any national net-
works and sub-regional bodies set 
up by the national networks and it 
also has to publicise the Tropical 
Timber Network and maintain its 
high international profile. The 
concept of national networks in-
volves the setting-up of well-struc-
tured, independent units which 
have their own identity and re-
ceive due recognition. 
A Network charter 
The Tropical Timber Net-
work's charter, drawn up in Torodi, 
defines the Network's objectives 
and the undertakings supported 
by all members. Although there is 
a distinction between active and 
passive members, no one is ex-
cluded, because it is acknowl-
edged that all individuals can be 
involved to a greater or lesser 
extent in the running of the 
national network (every situation 
evolves). Admittedly, specific ac-
tions requiring a degree of avail-
ability can be implemented only 
by the more active members, but 
other members also have a role to 
play, albeit behind the scenes (dis-
tributing information, for exam-
ple). 
Increasingly autonomous, 
well-structured national 
networks 
If national networks are to 
have an ongoing, long-term exis-
tence, they must be structured in 
such a way as to have a specific 
identity and to be able to find 
sufficient financing. There are sev-
eral possible structures (with or 
without a specific legal set-up) 
and it is for each country to 
choose the formula best suited to 
its circumstances. A recognised 
legal structure is not necessarily a 
priority in certain countries, but, in 
the long term, all national net-
works must be based on a recog-
nised legal structure or set them-
selves up such that their structure 
has legal status. It was also stipu-
lated that national networks 
should opt for a structure that is 
compatible with the Network's 
objectives (which a priori excludes 
profit-making organisations). 
Various methods of finan-
cing (self-financing or external 
support) were discussed. Each net-
work chooses the way in which it 
is financed, although it was 
agreed that several national net-
works still need financial support 
from the technical secretariat. 
However, this outside aid will be 
only a part of the funds they 
receive. National networks will 
have to work towards a degree 
of self-financing (contributions in 
kind or cash) as soon as possible, 
and, according to the circum-
stances, identify external sources 
of funding. 
A communication and 
information-distribution 
strategy 
The Tropical Timber Net-
work's communication strategy 
was addressed at various levels. 
First, there is a need to improve 
communication within the Net-
work: members need to be better 
acquainted with one another, to 
receive information that is useful 
to them both in technical terms 
and in terms of experiences and 
ideas, and to be able to produce 
information relating to the life of 
the Network and the topics of 
interest to it. 
Next, it is necessary to 
communicate with the outside 
world, not only nationally, but also 
regionally and internationally, by 
publicising the Network's exis-
tence, and by distributing informa-
tion about experiences and Net-
work members' opinions, so as to 
influence decisions in the field of 
management of timber and natur-
al resources. The content of the 
message to be put across needs to 
be tailored to suit the recipient; 
for example an awareness-raising 
campaign for the general public 
and information/training/proposals 
for those actively involved in pro-
moting tropical forests and timber, 
ranging from the 'populariser' to 
the political decision-maker. 
A number of tools were 
proposed as communication sup-
ports, again left to the choice of 
the individual country. Recommen-
dations for the technical secretar-
iat (international level) were for-
mulated. In addition to written 
information, which is always re-
commended, a desire was ex-
pressed for increased use of mod-
ern audiovisual and traditional 
oral communication techniques. 
In addition to actual tools and 
products, organised meetings must 
be the preferred method of com-
munication for national networks 
and the secretariat. The provision 
of basic communication equip-
ment for local branches of na-
tional networks will become ne-
cessary at some point if national 
networks are to run smoothly, 
their mission, first and foremost, 
being to gather and disseminate 
information. A strengthening of 
relations between the technical 
secretariat and national networks 
will probably also require an over-
haul of the secretariat's means of 
communication. 
Expansion into other lan-
guages appears to be essential. At 
international level, in parallel with 
French, it was recommended that 
English be used for information 
purposes. At national-network le-
vel, it was recommended that local 
languages also be used. 
National and 
international 
undertakings 
As a corollary to recom-
mendations regarding the running 
and communication strategy of 
the Tropical Timber Network, both 
internationally and locally, the 
budget allocated by the technical 
secretariat to the national net-
works will initially, inevitably, have 
to be increased to allow them to 
implement certain recommenda-
tions. In parallel, the national net-
works must actively seek ways to 
diversify their sources of funding 
and of becoming independent of 
the technical secretariat. 
It was agreed that each 
country should set up a work 
programme and budget for such 
activities. Co-funding proposals 
will then be submitted to the 
technical secretariat which under-
took, through the Network presi-
dent, to contribute as much as it 
can to financing national network 
structuring activities and to sup-
porting national organisers when 
the latter are seeking funds and 
distributing information. 
Aside from these financial 
aspects, each national delegation 
undertook, via national guidelines 
drawn up at Torodi, to inform 
members about decisions taken at 
the workshop and to encourage 
them to implement the activities 
proposed for each national net-
work in the short term. The tech-
nical secretariat will implement 
the workshop's recommendations 
at international level and organise 
a new international meeting be-
tween now and 2000. 
I 
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After Torodi? 
The technical secretariat 
will act more as international co-
ordinator while the national net-
works will play a greater, more 
visible role in decision-making, 
both as regards Le Flamboyant 
and in their own day-to-day run-
ning and internal financing. The 
technical secretariat will no longer 
be the only body to decide what 
each network does, but will decide 
on the level of means available for 
an individual country and each 
country will decide how to allo-
cate these resources. The national 
networks will play a greater part 
in selecting the information for 
inclusion in the journal, the latter's 
editorial stages being taken care 
of later on in the process. 
The international Network 
intends to collaborate with profes-
sional associations in Europe and 
at international level. The initial 
steps in this process were taken at 
Torodi. It will also approach var-
ious bodies, particularly the EU, 
with a view to seeking funding. 
Although the Workshop's 
recommendations apply to the 
Tropical Timber Network, the par-
ticipants are convinced they will 
be of relevance to other networks 
working to similar ends. 
Conclusion 
Clearly, development now 
covers a wider range of topics 
than those originally envisaged 
when the Tropical Timber Network 
was set up, the global environ-
ment and the long-term manage-
ment of resources undeniably hav-
ing become topics of interest for 
everyone. However, within the 
context of global efforts to under-
stand and reorientate develop-
ment processes, one of the main 
features of the Tropical Timber 
Network is that it listens to people 
on the ground. When meeting the 
major challenges of the next cen-
tury, the key to success probably 
lies in the ability to move away 
from the traditional policy-making 
processes which are often auto-
cratic, sector-based and fragmen-
ted towards participatory, inter-
sectoral and continuous processes. 
With this in mind, networks will 
have to be wide-ranging in the 
topics they cover, receptive and 
non-institutional, to circulate and 
exchange information, to promote 
the interaction of those involved 
with due regard for their diverse 
nature and to support partnership 
in all its guises. Any partnership 
must be an expression of the 
varied nature of those involved in 
network activities, of rights and 
obligations and of responsibilities. 
■i J.C. 
CTA - Completing the picture 
The previous CTA-Bulletin (In issue 170 of The Courier) carried 
the third of a series of four articles which explain how CTA's 
operational Departments contribute to the Centre's overall aims 
and objectives. In the last of this series, we outline the work of 
the Publications and Dissemination Department. 
Providing information on demand: 
CTA's Publications and Dissemination 
Department 
The value of the written 
word has been acknowledged by 
the great and the good not just in 
recent centuries, but for several 
millennia. 'Without books, history 
is silent, literature is dumb, science 
is crippled, thought and specula-
tion at a standstill', wrote the 20th 
century historian Barbara Tuch-
man. A century earlier another 
historian, Thomas Carlyle, ob-
served: 'All that mankind has 
done, thought, gained or been: it 
is lying as in magic preservation in 
the pages of books'. Predictably, 
therefore, the production and dis-
tribution of books and other pub-
lications has long been the corner-
stone around which CTA's pro-
grammes to meet the demand for 
agricultural information from the 
ACP countries have been built. 
Weaknesses and opera-
tional difficulties currently facing 
the publishing and bookselling 
sectors in ACP countries mean that 
they cannot yet satisfy the level of 
demand for printed information 
on agriculture and rural develop-
ment. Among the hindrances are 
the lack of equipment and trained 
staff, the absence of national book 
policies, linguistic diversity, low 
public purchasing power and un-
der-developed book distribution 
channels. 
The principal objectives of 
CTA's publishing and distribution 
programmes are: 
— to improve the availability of 
scientific and technical informa-
tion, and information for develop-
ment, by providing appropriate 
information mainly in the form of 
publications sent directly from CTA 
(there are currently over 700 pub-
lications available); 
— to improve the access of poten-
tial ACP readers to such informa-
tion through co-publication with 
ACP and EU publishers, whilst at 
the same time establishing co-
publishing partnerships; 
— to provide information to CTA's 
partners about the Centre's pro-
ducts and services; 
— to promote awareness of the 
help others can offer; 
— to encourage networking 
among CTA's partners. 
Whilst the work of the 
Publications and Dissemination De-
partment centres around publish-
ing, co-publishing and distribu-
tion, it also embraces a broader 
range of activities. The Depart-
ment is responsible, for example, 
for the formulation of policies and 
strategies for book production and 
distribution, and for the develop-
ment of partnerships, which will 
advance CTA's publishing objec-
tives. A significant part of the 
work involves evaluating manu-
scripts, whether they have arisen 
from CTA's own activities or from 
elsewhere. The predominant activ-
ity is the supervision of such 
specialist work as compilation, 
editing, photo searching and edit-
ing, translation, post-translation 
editing, design, layout and 
printing - most of which is con-
tracted out to specialist organisa-
tions. The Department also com-
piles CTA's list of subscribers and 
promotes its publications through 
the Centre's Publications Catalo-
gue, its bimonthly bulletin Spore 
(see below) and its Website, as 
well as through targeted mailings 
and book fairs. Finally, the Depart-
ment contracts a fulfilment agency 
to dispatch its publications accord-
ing to CTA's requirements. 
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CTA publications at its headquarters 
(Wageningen, Netherlands). 
The Department's output, 
which is mainly in French and 
English with some Portuguese, 
may be summarised as follows: 
— CTA Publications. These are of 
two kinds, institutional and tech-
nical. Institutional publications in-
clude the Centre's Annual Report 
and its Publications Catalogue. The 
wide range of technical publica-
tions includes the CTA bulletins 
Spore and Esporo (published every 
two months in English, French and 
Portuguese), the proceedings and 
summary reports of CTA seminars 
and co-seminars, CTA study reports 
and study visit reports. 
— Co-publications. Co-publications 
consist mainly of periodicals, 
stand-alone titles and series. The 
most important serial co-publica-
tions include The Tropical Agricul-
turalist/Le technicien d'Agriculture 
Tropicale (with Macmillan in the 
UK and the French-based publisher 
Maisonneuve et Larose) and the 
Agrodok series, which is produced 
with the Dutch-based organisation 
Agromisa. These series now ac-
count for a combined total of 57 
titles in English, 61 in French and 8 
in Portuguese. 
Co-publishing enables CTA 
to benefit from the pre-press and 
commercial production facilities of 
commercial publishers and allows 
access to their distribution and 
marketing channels. It has also 
enabled a great many titles on 
agricultural development in ACP 
countries, which would have been 
rejected on normal commercial 
criteria, to get into print; and it 
has helped many ACP authors to 
find publishers. 
Potential authors and pub-
lishers, especially those based in 
ACP countries, are encouraged to 
submit proposals for co-publishing 
with CTA. In assessing these pro-
posals, CTA considers many as-
pects, among them their relevance 
to CTA's sphere of activity; their 
cost-effectiveness and geographi-
cal relevance; the technical level, 
style and reliability of the content; 
and the practicality of the infor-
mation given. Innovation is va-
lued, whilst duplication is always 
avoided. 
CTA nowadays operates a 
subscription system for the distri-
bution of its publications, with 
each publication being valued in 
credit units and each subscriber 
being given an annual allocation 
of credit points. Details of the 
availability of this service can be 
found in Spore; alternatively, read-
ers are invited to write to CTA or 
to consult CTA's Website (http:// 
www.cta.nl/). 
The orientations of the 
Department's work are constantly 
evolving. Among the current pre-
occupations are the establishment 
of partnerships with organisations 
in ACP countries to enhance the 
effectiveness of our book distribu-
tion; the development of closer 
co-publishing links with ACP pub-
lishers and writers; the completion 
of a major new co-publication 
which will facilitate self-help in 
veterinary medicine; the develop-
ment of two new series on agri-
business and opportunities in 
food-processing; the establishment 
of an electronic photo-archive fa-
cility; efficiency improvements 
(time and cost savings) in the 
publication production process; 
and, of course, Websites and other 
forms of electronic publishing. The 
Department's initial priorities have 
been to use the CTA Website to 
enhance the availability of Spore 
and the Publications Catalogue 
and to make available basic infor-
mation about CTA's publication 
policies; reports of CTA seminars, 
workshops and studies will follow. 
Ten to fifteen years ago 
there was widespread speculation 
that electronic information and 
communication technologies 
would so decrease the demand 
for books worldwide that their 
unit cost would become prohibi-
tively expensive and thus hasten 
their demise. This was a false 
prophesy indeed. The electronic 
and printed media each have their 
niches, and are complementary. 
Both struggle to meet the world-
wide demand for information. Be-
sides being new additions to the 
information scene which have di-
versified its character, electronic 
information sources have actually 
facilitated the compilation, pro-
duction and distribution of the 
conventional printed word. Pub-
lishing in all its forms goes from 
strength to strength and becomes 
ever more accessible. The good 
news is that the benefits are 
reaching the ACP countries and 
that CTA will continue to ensure 
that they are directed towards the 
needs of the agricultural develop-
ment sector. 
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objective of CDI's assistance 
By providing varied and tai-
lor-made assistance to ACP 
enterprises, the CDI enables 
them to better target their 
markets, whether regional or 
international, with the aim 
that enterprises sell more, 
thereby helping to boost 
the ACP private sector. 
Public aid generally 
deals with the enabling en-
vironment of the enterprise 
and provides it at this level 
with all the assistance that 
will allow it to grow. The CDI 
has chosen, for its part, to 
assist the enterprise directly 
by giving preference to di-
rect contact. In order to 
achieve this, it uses its own 
expertise, specialised consultants, 
and the resources of its European 
and ACP network as well as foster-
ing collaboration between the en-
terprises themselves. In fact, experi-
ence shows that the best support 
one can offer a private enterprise 
comes from a client or partner 
enterprise with a complementary 
activity. Furthermore, it is in doing 
business that the ACP enterprise can 
best improve. Indeed this CDI ap-
proach is complementary to other 
aid programmes which aim to foster 
a proper entrepreneurial environ-
ment. It is worth noting that often 
enterprises backed by CDI decide to 
create or strengthen their sectoral 
association. 
CDI 
The Centre for the Development of Industry 
(CDI) is a joint ACP-EU institution created in 
the framework of the Lomé Convention 
linking the European Union with the 71 
ACP countries (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific). 
Its objective is to support the creation, 
expansion and restructuring of industrial 
companies in ACP countries. These partner-
ships may take various forms: financial, 
technical and commercial partnerships, 
management contracts, licensing or fran-
chise agreements, sub-contracting, etc. 
Editor: 
Mr. Surendra Sharma 
Director of the CDI 
Avenue Hermann Debroux, 52 
B-1160 Brussels, Belgium 
Tel: + 32 2 679 18 11 
Fax: + 32 2 675 26 03 
e-mail: director@cdi.be 
Internet Website: www.cdi.be 
Helping to sell 
It is thanks to the strict 
selection of enterprises or consul-
tants who have direct knowledge of 
distribution circuits and through 
which CDI provides its support that 
the ACP enterprise receives assis-
tance adapted to its commercial 
needs. It can be the definition of 
the products themselves, technical 
production assistance, rehabilitation 
of obsolete installations or their 
upgrading to required standards, 
the implementation of a quality 
assurance or personnel training. In 
any case, intervening within the 
enterprise guarantees the mastering 
of competence which allows it to 
tackle international exports - if it so 
desires - or, at the very least, to 
improve its performance in its niche 
and in a chosen region. It is indeed 
much more effective to develop a 
niche - for instance, passion fruit in 
Germany - than to launch exports in 
all directions without a well-devised 
strategy. 
A first conclusion is clear: 
the commercialisation of the ACP 
products on the local, regional and 
international markets is the real goal 
of any technical, commercial or 
managerial assistance provided by 
the CDI. 
Identifying profitable 
markets 
Export promotion is natu-
rally easier in markets where inter-
national demand is strong. This is 
the case for marble and granite 
exported to Europe, Caribbean or 
Pacific wood, tropical fruit, sashimi 
tuna to Japan, etc. In that context, 
the CDI organises Industrial Partner-
ship Meetings, putting ACP enter-
prises in direct contact with EU firms 
which have distribution channels in 
Europe. The CDI was able, however, 
to associate European enterprises 
also with sectors whose market is 
strictly ACP. For instance, by putting 
poultry farming entrepreneurs from 
Senegal, Cameroon and Côte 
d'Ivoire in contact with European 
counterparts, the CDI has contribu-
ted to the development of a modern 
poultry-breeding industry in these 
countries. Thanks to their greatly 
improved production methods, the 
ACP enterprises are able to produce 
cheaper poultry which helps reduce 
the protein deficiency in the region. 
It also contributes to increased use 
of local raw materials (corn, millet, 
etc), gives work to laboratories -
thus supporting their activity - and 
even generates interest from Eur-
opean industrialists. In fact, these 
industrialists have found poultry-
farming in West and Central Africa 
to be a profitable outlet for a 
complete series of products: input 
for chicken feed (premix), disease 
control, inoculation of chickens, con-
struction of buildings, etc. 
The enterprise: a 
development role 
The means used by the CDI 
to help ACP enterprises are numer-
ous and complementary. A prerequi-
site to any action undertaken by the 
CDI is the knowledge of regulations 
and major trends in markets of 
interest to ACP operators. Another 
factor of success: the CDI has for 
many years established a large net-
work of consultants - both Eur-
opean and ACP, independent or 
operating within the framework of 
an enterprise - in a number of key 
sectors. Furthermore, the CDI has 
learnt from experience that Eur-
opean enterprises in direct contact 
with their local market constitute an 
excellent means of transferring 
know-how. Who, indeed, knows 
the market and its nuances better 
than the importer himself? It is 
equally he who can better advise 
the ACP firm on the required stan-
dards and the quality to be 
achieved, the right packaging, etc. 
By becoming technical, commercial 
or financial partners, these European 
enterprises are called upon to play 
an effective development role. 
To be more specific, the 
assistance provided by the CDI to 
ACP enterprises (about 450 every 
year) indirectly benefits European 
companies as about half of the ACP 
enterprises export to two or three 
European operators. The latter, in 
turn have the opportunity to specify 
their needs and help the ACP en-
terprises bring their products up to 
standard, thus securing themselves a 
supply of quality products. The pro-
cess works both ways: a European 
importer who is after raw material, 
semi-finished or finished quality pro-
ducts, and the ACP enterprise which 
is seeking export outlets. It should 
be noted that the CDI endeavours to 
find partners whose operations are 
of a similar size so as to facilitate 
balanced exchanges. 
As a privileged tool to bring 
together potential partners, more 
and more Industrial Partnership 
Meetings are being organised by 
the CDI. The principle: 20 to 25 
ACP enterprises representative of 
their sector are put in contact with 
an equivalent number of EU opera-
tors in the same sector which are 
interested in cooperating. CDI ex-
perience has shown that these selec-
tive and targeted meetings promote 
rapid commercial and technical con-
tacts as well as both North-South 
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and South-South cooperation. In the 
medium term, such links, built on 
the basis of solid business relations, 
frequently lead to genuine technical 
or financial partnership. 
As a result of these meet-
ings, and the seminars frequently 
organised as a follow-up, the CDI 
increases its knowledge in the spe-
cific industrial sub-sectors in the 
targeted region. Using specialised 
consultants, it has thus built a 
state-of-the-art competence in a 
whole range of sectors: wood, poul-
try farming, fisheries, leather, orna-
mental stones, ceramics, fruit and 
vegetable processing, etc. Finally, 
another result is worth mentioning: 
the relationship built with the pro-
fessional associations of the sector in 
Europe as well as the dynamics 
established in the ACP countries 
themselves, where very often, a 
national or regional sectoral associa-
tion is created as a result of a 
partnership meeting. 
A wide range of facilities 
Direct assistance to existing 
enterprises in the framework of 
'Facility 3' is certainly not the only 
kind of assistance to the private 
sector that the CDI provides. Experi-
ence shows that many ACP promo-
ters appreciate being supported well 
before the investment, namely, be-
tween the time the feasibility study 
has been completed, the financial 
package approved and the start-up 
of the factory. There are many who 
need ad hoc assistance: launching of 
invitations to tender (for the pro-
duction equipment), choice of 
equipment, granting of licences 
and authorisations from the national 
authorities, etc. If the ACP promoter 
is in partnership with a European 
enterprise, it is often this enterprise 
which carries out such operations. If 
not, he appreciates the help that the 
CDI can bring at this level. 
The same approach applies 
to commercialisation of products. 
One role of the CDI is to enable 
ACP promoters to participate in 
Commercial Fairs (see page 98 on 
the SIAL). The CDI helps the ACP 
enterprise to identify European cli-
ents or the distribution channel, and 
also helps it to adapt its product to 
the demand and, for instance, to 
develop suitable packaging. 
Individual or grouped 
assistance 
The CDI targets individual 
enterprises or whole sectors for 
assistance. Everything depends on 
the size of the enterprise and the 
sector in question and on the cir-
cumstances which triggered the 
CDI's intervention. In all cases how-
ever, the ultimate goal of the assis-
tance is illustrated by the better 
The training of 6500 farmers in Madagascar 
In Madagascar, Lecofruit produced gherkins in small quantities (it used to buy 
the production from about 100 farmers) but wished to develop its export markets. Not 
only was it put in contact with the French company Segma Maille which assured 
regular outlets for the company's gherkins in Europe, but Lecofruit also began to 
diversify its production - with the help of the CDI - in the feasibility study and in the 
training of farmers. Today Lecofruit is firmly established in Madagascar and produces 
string beans, snow peas, asparagus and mini vegetables so as to ensure an annual 
production. As a result, Lecofruit has multiplied its turnover by five in five years. Better 
still, the company buys the production of 6500 farmers and itself employs about a 
hundred permanent workers, 200 seasonal workers and 1300 day labourers depending 
on the season. Between now and 2000, the company will increase its cultivated area 
from 250 to 350 hectares and the number of farmers from 6500 to 8300. 
capacity of the enterprise to sell. 
Two good examples of ad hoc 
assistance, where the competence 
of specialised CDI consultants was 
used to enable enterprises to export, 
are Lecofruit and Phael Flor, both 
based in Madagascar (see box). 
The CDI also frequently as-
sists several enterprises belonging to 
the same sector. This has occurred, 
for instance, with the textile sector 
in Fiji, Mauritius, Ethiopia and Ma-
dagascar. In Mauritius, the CDI has 
supported the EPZDA (Export Proces-
sing Zones Development Authority) 
in a three-year programme offered 
to around 20 textile companies. At 
EPZDA's request, the CDI provided 
consultants to implement the train-
ing programme. The objective: to 
increase the productivity of selected 
enterprises to counterbalance the 
rising cost of local labour, improve 
the quality and the design and, 
eventually, to offer higher added 
value products. The repercussions of 
this programme are significant. The 
enterprises increased their produc-
tivity by 30% on average. Addition-
ally, they have diversified their ex-
port markets - traditionally confined 
to France, the UK and Germany - as 
a result of an Industrial Partnership 
Meeting organised in February 1997 
by the CDI. This brought together 
Spanish, Belgian, Finnish, Italian and 
other importers and led to trial and 
firm orders to the value of more 
than ECU 8m. Finally, the EPZDA 
technicians are themselves now able 
to provide sound advice to other 
local enterprises. 
In Madagascar, the CDI has 
made a significant contribution to 
the consolidation of the textile in-
dustry. Following a study by the 
European Commission which empha-
sised the development potential of 
the clothing sector in Madagascar, 
the CDI has brought about a major 
transfer of technology over a five-
year period (particularly for the 
training of supervisory staff) and 
has encouraged the creation of 
many mixed enterprises - mainly 
Adapting to 
the export market 
The CDI consultant for essential oils in 
Madagascar was used to organise 
training on the techniques of extrac-
tion of concrete and resin oils for the 
Phael Flor company. In collaboration 
with the CDI and Protrade, this com-
pany was able to participate in a 
professional fair and to establish con-
tacts with the importers. As a result, 
Phael Flor has increased its turnover in 
one year and has also signed interest-
ing contracts with the United States. 
Î 
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ments in the free zones. Once more, 
the CDI objective has been to ensure 
that the production from Madagas-
car is 'in tune' with the demand 
from the European markets and that 
the enterprises enjoy a high profile 
on the international scene (for ex-
ample, during the Industrial Partner-
ship Meeting organised in Mauri-
tius). Since 1988, the CDI has helped 
22 enterprises in all and has thus 
contributed to the revitalisation of 
the sector in which the work force in 
the free zone has expanded from 
5000 to approximately 40,000. 
Coooperation with 
European sectoral 
associations 
There are numerous exam-
ples of assistance given by the CDI in 
cooperation with professional asso-
ciations, chambers of commerce, co-
operation institutions or export pro-
motion organisations. Clearly, com-
plementarity of means and 
competence are targeted. This is 
particularly illustrated by the export 
promotion of tropical products from 
the Caribbean (see box below). 
The CDI has encouraged about a dozen 
Ugandan fisheries to form an export 
group. 
Very often the CDI en-
courages ACP companies to form 
their own professional association. 
A case in point is lake-fishing com-
panies in Uganda. Facing new sani-
tary standards enacted by the EU 
(HACCP and others), several of these 
companies which specialise in Lake 
Victoria Nile perch, approached the 
CDI for technical assistance. Exports 
of Nile perch have been steadily 
picking up for three or four years, 
generated by a shortfall of fish on 
the EU markets. Calling on the 
services of veterinary experts who 
are fully aware of the new stan-
dards, the CDI supplied the necessary 
assistance. It also encouraged the 12 
or so companies concerned - includ-
ing the six leading ones -to form an 
Export Group, the Ugandan Fish 
Processing Exporters Association. In 
1995, the CDI organised an Industrial 
Partnership Meeting to attract the 
European investors and buyers on 
the spot. And twice since then, 
when major problems hit the sector, 
the CDI provided specific assistance 
which resolved the difficulty. The 
Moving from 'ethnic' to large-scale consumer markets 
Traditionally, sauces, spices and jams made 
from Caribbean tropical fruits were sold as 
'ethnic products' on the North-American and 
British markets and were virtually unknown 
elsewhere. In association with Protrade, 
which encourages the import of products 
from developing countries onto the German 
market, the CDI has selected some 75 
enterprises in five countries likely to develop 
their exports towards Germany. Already used 
to selling to occasional German tourists, the 
Caribbean companies made the effort to 
improve their packaging (the CDI had in fact 
provided ad hoc aid to this effect). But with 
the new assistance, they have had the 
opportunity to participate in the Anuga Fair 
and to conclude trial orders for an amount 
of ECU Im. CDI ¡s pursuing its interventions 
in 1998, by continuing to improve the 
products and the packaging following the 
advice of the German importers and by 
helping to introduce the tropical products as 
'current consumption items' in the major 
distribution circuits. 
cdi partnership 
The first African 
Leather Fair 
In Europe, the growing demand for 
finished leather and semi-processed 
tannery products (crust and 'wet-blue') 
offers unprecedented development po-
tential for African leather, on condition 
that the skins are treated with care, as 
the European importers had already 
expressed during the industrial part-
nership meeting that the CDI organised 
in 1994, in Zimbabwe. At that time, it 
was clearly unrealistic to expect local 
companies to meet the requirements of 
the export market: rather, they were to 
be directed towards the local and 
regional markets for finished products 
and CDI was to focus on tanneries. To 
achieve this, the CDI cooperated closely 
with Italian and European leather tan-
ners associations (UNIC and COTANCE) 
as well as with ESALIA (East and 
Southern Africa Leather Industries As-
sociation). The aim was to encourage 
45 tanneries from West, East and 
Southern Africa to participate in two 
important events which were organised 
in 1997: the Lineapelle Fair in Bologna 
(Italy) and the 'African Leather Fair' in 
Johannesburg (South Africa), this being 
the first international fair in the leather 
sector to take place in Africa. 
same approach was used for the 
poultry-farming sector in Central 
Africa: The Poultry and Animal Feed 
Producers Association of Cameroon, 
set up at the close of an Industrial 
Partnership Meeting organised by 
the CDI, almost immediately suc-
ceeded in securing a reduction in 
customs duty on inputs coming into 
the country. 
Sustained assistance to 
the enterprise 
To support an economic sec-
tor efficiently, it is often important 
to provide sustained assistance over 
a long period. The ornamental stone 
sector is a case in point. In the first 
phase, the CDI realised that there 
was strong demand for top quality 
stone blocks at reliable prices by the 
European marble industry and gran-
ite producers. Since 1992/93, the 
Italian firms became aware of envir-
onmental problems and a growing 
scarcity of quality stones in Europe -
and have prospected several African 
countries to find new supply sources. 
Soon afterwards, the CDI took the 
first step and drew up an inventory 
of marble producers in the Carib-
bean, East and Southern Africa. In 
the second phase, it assisted the 
producers (mainly ACP) to improve 
their products and to exhibit them, 
particularly at the specialised fairs in 
Carrare and Madrid. Today, the CDI 
has entered a new phase, namely, 
the organisation of sectoral missions 
of European industrialists to ACP 
countries. This was done for Ethio-
pia, last year, Namibia, this year (see 
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A new cash crop 
Ten years ago, only a few wholesale markets (notably Alsmeer in the 
Netherlands) were accessible to the producers of cut flowers from East Africa. By 
providing them with technical and marketing assistance, and helping them to adapt 
their products to the specific requirements of the EU markets, the CDI has enabled 
them to access direct markets. To achieve this, the CDI has employed the services of a 
specialised consultant in the field. In November 1996, a first Industrial Partnership 
Meeting attracted European industry lea-
ders to Nairobi (Kenya). As a result, thanks 
to the creation of several partnerships and 
the setting-up of joint ventures, the CDI 
contributed to the development of an 
atypical agricultural sector in an ACP 
country and encouraged a significant 
transfer of technology. In certain areas of 
East Africa, rose cultivation is a real cash 
crop, allowing farmers to remain on the 
land, secure their basic income and be in a 
position also to grow food crops. Here, the 
CDI's support was not only technical but 
also marketing, notably, by encouraging 
the producers to adhere to the 'eco-
marketing' label which guarantees the 
protection of the environment. 
page 95) and one is planned in the 
Caribbean in November. The results: 
the CDI convinced the Europeans of 
the quality of ACP products and on 
that basis, technical partnerships 
were concluded. Several Italian firms 
are now ready to enter a joint 
venture to develop production in 
Namibia, Ethiopia and Eritrea and 
have already placed firm orders for 
blocks. Among the ACP industrialists 
invited to the Industrial Partnership 
Meeting in Borba (Portugal), some 
have decided to create Afristone, an 
association regrouping the produ-
cers of African marble and ornamen-
tal stones, and the CDI organised for 
its President a visit of European 
sectoral organisations to discuss with 
them and to learn from their opera-
tions. Finally, the local markets for 
general construction and hotels are 
being developed for marble slabs 
and squares. 
Promote whole sectors 
The CDI has also provided 
several types of assistance to an 
entire sector. This has been done 
for cut flowers (see box above), 
processed fruit and vegetables, 
leather (see box 'The first African 
Leather Fair'), poultry farming and 
In Suriname, Artline is one of those 
companies which has received technical 
assistance thus allowing it to produce 
more sophisticated products to satisfy 
market requirements. 
wood. In the area of processed fruits 
and vegetables, the CDI has contrib-
uted to improving production tech-
niques, introducing total quality 
programmes, meeting sanitary stan-
dards (HACCP) and, above all, devel-
oping new packaging. Since 1996, 
several Industrial Partnership Meet-
ings, seminars and workshops which 
have encouraged technical and com-
mercial partnerships and presented 
new packaging techniques have 
been organised particularly in West 
Africa, East and Southern Africa as 
well as in the Caribbean. 
The wood sector is also one 
of the CDI's priorities - it has been 
active for a long time in the Car-
ibbean and in the Pacific. Companies 
at different stages of wood proces-
sing have received technical assis-
tance from the sawing of logs to the 
finished product. In 1996, an Indus-
trial Partnership Meeting organised 
in Suriname stressed the interdepen-
dence of wood operators, drying 
being by far the most important 
process as it determines the final 
quality of the wood and hence its 
exportability. To guarantee this step, 
the CDI called on specialised con-
sultants in wood drying and in-
stalled new drying kilns in several 
companies in the Caribbean and in 
the Pacific. The CDI has also pro-
vided varied technical support which 
will allow them to diversify their 
production: management control to 
monitor production costs, better 
plant layout, the installation of 
new equipment (saws, lathes, etc). 
This will help create more sophisti-
cated products, introduce design to 
establish a brand image (furniture), 
provide marketing assistance and 
the introduction of new clients with 
clearly defined technical specifica-
tions. 
And as the markets are con-
stantly evolving, the CDI continues 
to keep watch for new elements 
which can help ACP products con-
solidate their position. This is parti-
cularly so for recently-developed 
labels: the green label which guar-
antees proper forest management, 
the social label which guarantees 
that the products did not involve 
child labour, the environmental label 
which prevents the use of pesticides 
or weed-killers harmful to the envir-
onment, the ISO 9000 and HACCP 
standards. All these technical aspects 
have become part of the selling 
equation - and naturally, the CDI 
wants to pass them on to ACP 
operators. 
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Namibia, springboard into Southern 
Africa 
At present, CDI is supporting two major pro-
grammes involving Namibian companies and 
authorities: a partnership initiative with German 
companies in selected sectors and a partnership 
initiative with Italian companies in the natural 
stone sector. 
Namibia has developed an excellent 
reputation as an all-round investment location. 
Factors such as infrastructure, availability of 
finance, minimal red tape, licensing rules, eco-
nomic risk and foreign exchange constraints are 
quite favourable and result in attracting many 
foreign investors. The two areas where room for 
improvements have been identified are availabil-
ity of local promoters and skilled labour. Short-term 
investment risks are considerably lower in Namibia than 
in its African competitors. The country's credit risk rating 
tells a similar story. According to the Economic Intelli-
gence Unit in London, Namibia has the lowest risk rating 
among countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Much of Namibia's attractiveness is due to 
coherent economic policies and visibly favourable eco-
nomic indicators. For instance, the gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita is relatively high at approxi-
mately US $1750. Foreign aid as a percentage of GDP is 
amongst the lowest in the region and the ratio of debt 
to GDP is the lowest. 
The incentives for manufactures were introduced 
in 1993-94 and are applicable to existing as well as new 
manufactures. They include tax abatements or deduc-
tions amongst other incentives. Moreover, the newly 
opened Walvis Bay Export Processing Zone offers free-
dom from corporation tax and from stamp and transfer 
duties. 
With the improved facilities in Walvis Bay and 
the construction of the new TransCaprivi and TransKala-
hari highways, Namibia may be regarded as a spring-
board to neighbouring countries in Southern Africa. 
Current CDI interventions in Namibia are two-
fold: participation in the German-Namibian Business 
Initiative and the organisation, together with the Italian 
Foreign Trade Institute (ICE), of a mission on natural 
stone that took place last June. 
Area 
Population 
Language 
Capital 
Political system 
GDP growth 
Currency 
Exchange rate 
Main exports 
Key facts about Namibia 
824,269 square kilometres 
1.6 million 
English (official language) 
Windhoek (pop 182,000) 
Multiparty parliamentary democracy 
3.5% (1992) 
Namibian dollar 
USS = NS5.2 (July 1998) 
Diamonds, other minerals, fish products, meat 
and meat products 
German-Namibian Business Initiative 
The overall purpose of this initiative is to assist 
the Namibian Government in its efforts to promote 
investment, encourage the development of industry and 
create jobs. Through a German-Namibian partnership, it 
aims at economic development in the areas of technol-
ogy transfer, training of staff and operators, technical 
assistance and possible financial cooperation as well as 
the establishment of new companies and joint ventures. 
It is expected that the project will support export 
of products to Germany, in particular. Special attention 
will be given to quality control and to creating value-
added activities in Namibia. CDI supervises the initiative 
together with the Namibia Investment Centre. 
Italian Mission on Natural Stone 
Given the availability of high-quality granites 
and marbles in Namibia and the rising demand in 
Europe for these types of ornamental stone, CDI 
organised a sectoral mission from 15 to 19 June together 
with the Italian Trade Commission (ICE) and the Namibia 
Investment Centre, the CDI antenna. Representatives of 
15 Italian marble and granite companies visited 12 
marble and granite quarries and one processing plant 
in the regions of Karibib, Usakos, Swakopmund and 
Omaruru. The Port Authority in Walvis Bay also orga-
nised a visit of the port's infrastructure. The Italian 
companies expressed an interest in the Namibian marble 
and granite, especially the white, pink and Palissandro 
marble which commands high commercial value in 
Europe. The visitors also had an opportunity to explore 
the excellent physical infrastructure such as transport 
and telecommunications, as well as take cognisance of 
the attractive investment climate. The on-site visits 
brought about negotiations between Italian and Nami-
bian companies and as a result, two joint ventures and 
ten technical and commercial agreements were nego-
tiated. Three Italian companies have expressed readiness 
to acquire mining licences in order to start the mining of 
block stones for export. Another two Italian firms 
ordered blocks for the European and South African 
markets. All participants considered the mission very 
successful in generating promising prospects and CDI is 
planning a follow-up programme that will assist the 
Namibian counterparts in their future business and 
partnership negotiations with the Italians. 
The assistance programme will be discussed and 
implemented in coordination with the Ministry of Mines 
and Energy and under the SYSMIN financing facility. The 
first assistance activities are expected to take place 
during September 1998 and will involve geological and 
drilling campaigns, marketing of some types of granite, 
feasibility studies and training of personnel. ■■ 
CDI Contacts: Jorge Borges (German Initiative), 
Sid Boubekeur (Natural Stone) 
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United Apparel: 
it's only the beginning 
Thanks to CDI's support. Uni-
ted Apparel (Fiji) has been 
successfully developing ex-
port markets. Now it is in-
augurating a brand-new 
state-of-the-art factory and 
plans to expand its work-
force by 40%. 
It was in the presence of the 
President of Fiji, Ratu Sir 
clean, modern and comfortable en-
vironment. United has plans to 
expand its workforce even further 
in the near future, adding another 
400 workers to cope with the 
increased business that will be 
gained from new orders. 
The CDI's first assistance package to 
the company dates back to 1991. 
Since then. United Apparel has 
received a number of different 
types of assistance (to suit the 
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Kamisese Mara, and of about 600 
guests that the new Nadawa plant 
of United Apparel was inaugurated 
at the end of April 1998. The plant 
is the outcome of thorough re-
search around the world. United's 
Managing Director, Ramesh Solan-
ki, travelled throughout Europe 
and Asia to identify the technology 
that would meet his factory needs. 
The result is a complex which 
boasts state-of-the-art equipment 
including computerised precision 
pattern-making and cutting ma-
chines, fully automatic compu-
terised cloth spreaders, compu-
terised pressing equipment, high-
tech sewing machines and a com-
plex rail network to move garments 
around the factory. 
Created in 1989, United Apparel is 
the leader of the Fijian textile 
industry which employs a total of 
14,500 people and generates more 
than 20% of domestic exports. 
United itself currently employs 
some 1000 people who work in a 
From left to right, Ramesh Solanki, 
Managing Director, Ratu Sir Kamisese 
Mara, President of Fiji and Josephine 
Solanki, Director, visiting the new 
installations. 
evolution of the company's needs) 
including marketing help (partici-
pation in various international Gar-
ment Fairs in Europe), travel assis-
tance (to South Africa to select 
appropriate production managers), 
diagnostics of the operations, a full 
feasibility study (resulting in the 
establishment of the new factory 
complex in Nasinu), technical and 
training assistance (attachment of 
two South African production man-
agers). 
The overall development of Fiji 
benefits from United's results: addi-
tional foreign export earnings, 
creation of local jobs, and the 
projection of a very good image 
of the country through the export 
of high quality garments to inter-
national markets. ■■ 
CDI contact: Vana Catsica 
Nylacast: new 
industry, state-of-the 
art production 
Producing composite materials, Ny-
lacast Southern Africa is the first 
operation of its kind in Swaziland 
and is the result of an efficient 
technology transfer from Nylacast 
Ltd UK. 
Nylacast Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd is 
a joint venture created by Nylacast 
Ltd (UK) with a 56% majority 
equity, Swaziland Development 
Corporation (24%) and Multiplex 
Engineering (Pty) Ltd, a local me-
chanical workshop (20%). After a 
feasibility study co-financed by CDI 
in 1996, the partners decided to 
invest in Swaziland and to construct 
a state-of-the-art manufacturing 
plant producing self-lubricated cast 
nylon products to be used in almost 
every industry for plain gears, bear-
ings and slideways in machinery 
and equipment of many types. The 
Swaziland plant is able to produce 
250 tonnes per annum when oper-
ating at full capacity on a single 
shift basis. When demand requires, 
additional tonnage can be gener-
ated by increasing the number of 
shifts. 
Swaziland provides a very limited 
market. Instead, South Africa is the 
major market for the Nylacast pro-
ducts. Demand there for plastics, 
including engineering plastics, has 
been growing steadily. The total 
South African market was esti-
mated at 740,000 tonnes in 1994, 
up by 21% from 1993 and it is 
currently value at 10 billion rand 
(ECU 175.2 m). The neighbouring 
countries are not included in this 
figure, but these will benefit from 
all actions resulting in further 
growth in the South African mar-
ket. 
Nylacast produces 250 tonnes of self-
lubricated cast nylon per annum when 
operating at full capacity. 
t 
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first year of operation was R6.5m 
(ECU 1.14m) and the figure should 
reach R11.8m (ECU 2.07m) in year 
five. Test sales on the South African 
market have shown positive results 
and the management has positive 
expectations for the future of the 
new company. 
Although the key raw materials are 
imported, the project will have a 
positive development impact on 
the country as practically all the 
production will be exported. In-
deed, it not only brings a new 
industry to Swaziland but also 
transfers technology, creates job 
opportunities and generates for-
eign exchange earnings. CDI's assis-
tance has been threefold: the fea-
sibility study carried out successfully 
during the first half of 1996, the 
technical assistance for inspection 
of production equipment and the 
training of personnel at start-up. 
■I CDI Contact: Peter Ailing 
Cercle des Sécheurs: 
Moving towards 
extensive exports 
With the joint technical and finan-
cial assistance of CDI and the 
European Commission, the Cercle 
des Sécheurs (Burkina Faso) intends 
to professionalise its production 
and analyse the European export 
markets. 
Burkina Faso is a major producer of 
mangoes, its annual production 
exceeding 150,000 tonnes. Most of 
the mangoes are consumed in the 
country itself and about 20% are 
exported to neighbouring coun-
tries, particularly Niger and Côte 
d'Ivoire. About 1000 tonnes are 
exported to Europe. 
Founded in 1995, under the aegis 
of a Swiss NGO, the Cercle des 
Sécheurs (CDS) regroups eight small 
companies which are engaged in 
drying fruits and vegetables and 
which have taken on the form of 
an economic interest group (GIE). 
Its objective is to carve a niche in 
the international dry fruits and 
vegetables markets while building 
a solid base in national and sub-
regional markets. 
Together, the eight firms have a 
drying capacity of 160 tonnes for 
one full year of drying. However, 
mango drying only uses the infra-
structure for six months of the year 
during the production periods. This 
has led to the search for other 
products such as papaya, banana, 
onions, tomatoes for the purpose 
Together, the eight firms forming the 
Cercle des Sécheurs have a capacity to 
dry 160 tonnes of mangoes per annum. 
of making the equipment profit-
able. Together, the firms employ 
152 people and export a quarter of 
their production. 
To move into top gear as regards 
exports and move away from the 
only current distribution channel 
through 'Magasins du Monde' in 
Switzerland, Belgium, the UK and 
Sweden, the CDS must professiona-
lise its production and make every 
effort to respect the hygiene rules 
as stipulated by the EU. This was 
the basis of one of five requests 
that CDS made to CDI: namely the 
training of a person to be respon-
sible for quality and the develop-
ment of a HACCP system (Hazard 
Analysis & Critical Control Point) as 
well as the implementation of 
quality management in conformity 
with ISO 9000. Other interventions 
are underway: CDI support for 
modifications to the current man-
agement system as practised by 
NGOs for commercial enterprise 
management, support in drawing 
up a development strategy of activ-
ities as well as a marketing strategy, 
training those responsible for the 
technicians so that they are able to 
better master technical and admin-
istrative management. Finally, CDI 
will assist CDS with its marketing 
plan by carrying out a study of the 
local market in dry fruits, the bio 
market in three EU countries -
France, Germany and Belgium - by 
making a market test on a sample 
of targeted consumers and by 
drawing up a Communication Plan 
on the products to be exported. 
LÏÏÖI CDI Contact: Alioune Badara Ndiaye 
cdi-partnership 
Atlas, the leading 
industrial unit of 
concrete 
components in Haiti 
With the technical support of a 
French partner company and CDI, 
Atlas Construction has just opened 
its doors in Haiti. Already, develop-
ment perspectives seem excellent. 
Returning from France where he 
had worked for several years, a 
Haitian property developer quickly 
realised that the property market 
was 'profitable'. In fact, since the 
lifting of the embargo, several 
projects have started, notably, port 
construction in different towns by 
private enterprises, road rehabilita-
tion, repairs to shops and homes, 
and construction of public build-
ings, social housing and private 
homes. 
To be sure of the feasibility of his 
project, the Haitian entrepreneur 
approached CDI for the first time 
in 1996 and a study was co-fi-
nanced with the Caisse Française 
de Développement, the results of 
which proved promising. On this 
basis, he set up his company. Atlas 
Construction, and contacted one of 
the specialists in the sector, PPB 
Saret International (France), which 
is well known for its manufacturing 
method of pre-stressed and rein-
forced concrete structure compo-
nents. 
In the light of the interest of this 
project to the construction sector in 
Haiti, the French partner immedi-
ately took up equity in the new 
Haitian company (10%) and offered 
its technical assistance, notably by 
providing production techniques 
and training the technical and 
commercial staff. 
At the beginning of the year, the 
equipment used to produce con-
crete girders was mounted with the 
assistance of PPB and with the CDI-
backed support for the training of 
technicians. This summer, a second 
training session to improve com-
mercial skills has been co-financed 
by the CDI so as to allow the 
commercial staff to draw up a sales 
brochure integrating the technical 
and commercial elements. Compu-
ter software has been set up to 
facilitate production follow-up, the 
management of raw materials and 
finished product inventories as well 
as to make sales and order fore-
casts. IH CDI Contact: Sid Boubekeur 
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CDI Cooperation 
with Inter-American 
Institutions 
Fernando Matos Rosa, 
CDI Deputy Director, went on 
mission to Washington to 
meet with the officials of the 
Inter-American Bank (IDB) and 
to discuss those countries 
which are of interest to both 
institutions in the Caribbean 
region. During the discussions, 
the question of extended co-
operation was broached with 
the MFI (Multilateral Invest-
ment Fund) and the IIC (Inter-
American Investment Corpora-
tion), two institutions linked 
to the IDB. The first joint 
initiatives are being prepared. 
Institutional Cooperation 
for Africa 
During his mission to the USA, 
the Deputy Director also participated 
in a meeting with the institutions of 
the World Bank Group, the European 
Commission and the European Invest-
ment Bank. One of the first concrete 
results of the meeting is better coordi-
nation between the institutions parti-
cipating in the follow-up of projects in 
Africa. A follow-up meeting in Luxem-
bourg is planned. 
UK-Caribbean Industrial 
Twinning Programme 
The Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI), in cooperation with the 
Department for International Develop-
ment (DFID) and the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) of the 
United Kingdom are participating with 
the CDI in a new partnership pro-
gramme between companies in the 
UK and in Jamaica, Guyana and Do-
minica. The objective is to allow the 
Caribbean companies to benefit from 
a transfer of technology in the form of 
technical, commercial and financial 
partnerships. The targeted sectors are 
metal-mechanics, agro-industries, plas-
tics, wood, building materials, leather 
and textiles. The programme develo-
pers hope to conclude about fifteen 
partnership agreements shortly. The 
CDI will be mainly responsible for the 
identification and diagnostic reports of 
the Caribbean and British enterprises 
as well as the on-the-spot sectoral 
missions. It will also follow up the 
evaluation of these visits and the 
recommendations in terms of granting 
assistance for setting up or rehabilitat-
ing companies. 
VÊÊ CDI Contacts: Orlando Perez Diaz and 
Paolo Baldan 
Participation of African 
companies in 
International Food Fair 
To promote their exports to 
the EU, it is vital that ACP companies 
involved in fresh and out-of-season 
products and processed and semi-pro-
cessed products have access to the 
most important food fairs in Europe, 
including the SIAL (Salon International 
de l'Alimentation) which will be held 
from 18 to 22 October at the Parc des 
Expositions de Paris-Nord Villepinte. 
This fair is organised every two years 
in Paris at the same time as the IPA 
(The International Week of Manufac-
turing Processes and Equipment for 
the Food Industry). For the company 
manager, this is a unique opportunity 
not only to present their products but 
also to find out about the latest 
technologies in the sector. In associa-
tion with ADEPTA - a group of 200 
French companies responsible for agri-
culture, agro-industries, lumber, fish-
eries and packaging - the CDI selected 
ten ACP companies, primarily in the 
fisheries sector as well as in fruits and 
vegetables and processed cereals. 
These firms already have export ex-
perience and have also acquired a 
certain reputation on the European 
markets. During the fair, they can 
exhibit their products at the ADEPTA 
stand. ADEPTA has devised and pub-
lished a brochure presenting the ex-
hibitors, their particulars, the list of 
their products and a photograph of 
these as well as the type of partnership 
which is being sought. Furthermore, 
ADEPTA will organise an African cock-
tail reception in its own pavilion for 
the purpose of forming or strengthen-
ing contacts and enhancing the ¡mage 
of the exhibiting companies. During 
and after the trade event, the CDI will 
be able to provide its know-how by 
giving assistance in the field of mar-
keting and its technical support for the 
setting up of industrial partnerships 
identified during the event. 
^H CDI Contacts: Paolo Baldan and Paul 
Chotard 
The 'Briefs' on the 
Internet 
As from this summer, the 
briefs which appear in Partnership will 
be available on CDI's website on the 
Internet. The address is: www.cdi.be 
Twinning Programme -
Austria-Ghana-Zimbabwe 
The CDI, jointly with the Aus-
trian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and 
the Federal Chamber of Commerce, 
has launched an industrial twinning 
programme between Austrian indus-
trialists and SMEs in Ghana and Zim-
babwe. The programme aims at con-
solidating and developing selected 
existing companies in Ghana and Zim-
babwe by enabling them to gain 
better control over their unit operat-
ing methods. In addition, the pro-
gramme is expected to allow the 
Austrian companies to develop close 
partnership strategies with Ghanean 
and Zimbabwean companies so that 
they can improve their competitiveness 
and their global performance. 
IH CDI Contact: Paolo Baldan 
ACP-EU Seminar on 
Poultry in West Africa 
The meeting between indus-
trial partners in the poultry farming 
sector in West Africa held in June, in 
Abidjan, which was a follow-up to 
those organised in the Western Sahel 
and Central Africa, was a remarkable 
success. There was a record participa-
tion of 18 European businesspeople 
and 51 African counterparts from 
Benin, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Cape 
Verde, Ghana, Guinea Bissau and Togo. 
This meeting confirmed the undeni-
able economic weight of the poultry 
farming sector in the sub-region: 
20,000 workers, 1.1 billion eggs pro-
duced each year and 22,000 tonnes of 
chicken meat for a group turnover of 
CFAF 57bn. Besides the North-South 
perspectives, the seminar focused on 
setting up or strengthening national 
and regional professional associations 
as well as South-South technical and 
commercial cooperation. During the 
seminar, participants had the opportu-
nity to visit several local companies -
including modern farms - and to 
discuss with potential partners. The 
CDI expects to receive about 20 re-
quests for technical assistance and it 
has also encouraged certain group 
initiatives which have been decided 
by the professionals. These include 
setting up a common abattoir in 
Cameroon, and establishing - at sub-
regional level - a factory unit for fish 
meal and a laboratory for pest pathol-
ogy, analysis and the control of raw 
materials and food. A follow-up pro-
gramme will be implemented. 
Mi CDI Contacts: Chérif Touré and Alioune 
Badara Ndiaye 
Assistance to the Wood 
Sector in the Caribbean 
In June, the CDI and the 
Export Development and Agriculture 
Diversification Unit (EDADU), the 
agency for the promotion of exports 
and investment in the islands of the 
East Caribbean, concluded a financial 
cooperation agreement. Under this, 
the two organisations will jointly sup-
port about 15 key companies in the 
wood sector in the six countries in the 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean 
States (Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, 
St Kitts-Nevis, St Lucia, and St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines). The OECS is a 
common market that offers favourable 
conditions for commercial exchanges 
between the islands. The assistance 
will essentially be technical and com-
mercial and will allow the selected 
companies to improve the quality of 
their production so as to attain the 
standards required by international 
markets. 
^B CDI Contact: Orlando Perez Diaz 
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Congo Basin 
Corrigenda 
A nine-day workshop on 
Forest Policy Development 
was held in May in 
Yaoundé, Cameroon. 
Funded by the European 
Commission and conducted 
by the Economic Develop-
ment Institute of the World 
Bank, the workshop is part 
of a series of activities de-
signed to foster a common 
vision of the sustainable 
Conférence sur les Ecosystèmes de 
Forêts Denses et Humides d'Afri-
que Centrale (CEFDHAC). Experts 
on various aspects of tropical for-
ests from Canada, France, Belgium, 
Senegal, Cameroon and Congo 
(Republic) supported the Economic 
Development Institute of the 
World Bank in conducting the 
workshop. This event allowed par-
Participants at the Yaoundé workshop. 
management of the forest in six 
Congo Basin countries. 
This eighteen-month effort 
was launched in January 1998 with 
a meeting in Brussels of forestry 
ministers from the Republic of 
Congo, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Gabon, Cameroon, the 
Central African Republic and Equa-
torial Guinea. Critical areas were 
identified in which senior policy 
and management staff needed 
strengthening to enable them to 
develop and coordinate national 
forest policies. As an indication of 
the support of the governments, 
the Ministers approved the outline 
of a training/cooperation pro-
gramme. 
The Yaoundé workshop 
brought together senior policy 
and management officials from 
the six countries, as well as two 
important regional organisations 
involved in promoting the devel-
opment of forest policies in the 
Congo Basin: the Organisation 
Africaine du Bois (OAB), and the 
ticipants to explore the themes of 
industrialisation, sustainable man-
agement, and participation in the 
development and institutionalisa-
tion of forest policies. The need 
for cooperation among policy ma-
kers and managers throughout the 
Basin was an underlying compo-
nent of the discussions and tech-
nical presentations. 
The next step in the pro-
gramme will expose these same 
senior African officials and man-
agers to the ongoing efforts to 
achieve sustainable management 
of the Amazon basin forest. A 
study tour in Brazil later this year 
will be an opportunity to assess 
how others have addressed issues 
of sustainable management of the 
forest. African managers will also 
assess the extent to which Brazi-
lian strategies can inform forest 
policy formulation in the Congo 
Basin. 
A final workshop will 
synthesise these options to create 
a possible 'road map' for develop-
In issue 169 of The Courier (page 
14), the Prime Minister of Trinidad 
and Tobago, Mr. Basdeo Panday, 
was quoted as saying that his 
country has 'a minimum wage of 
TT$7 a day...' (page 14). In fact, 
the minimum wage in Trinidad 
and Tobago is TT$7 an hour. Our 
apologies for this error which was 
introduced during editing. 
On page 22 of issue 170, we 
stated that Mauritius had a child 
mortality rate of 17% (17 per 
hundred). The correct figure is 
17 per thousand. Our thanks to 
Doctor David Stevenson of Edin-
burgh for pointing out this error. 
ing and coordinating forest poli-
cies in the Congo Basin. It is the 
expectation of both the EC and 
the World Bank that the report, 
which the participants will prepare 
at the end of this series of activ-
ities, will be received by the gov-
ernments of the region and will 
contribute to concerted efforts to 
promote rational management of 
the forest. It is also expected that, 
as a result of participating in the 
programme, this small group of 
officials and managers will have a 
catalytic impact as the ministries 
and governments of the region 
are called upon to articulate co-
herent forest policies over the next 
few years. M M. Wachira (EDI/World Bank) 
World Bank 
poverty probe 
Michael Walton, Director 
for poverty reduction at the World 
Bank, briefed EU officials in June 
on a new approach within his 
organisation to combating pov-
erty. Given economic globalisation 
and its associated growth, the 
opportunity for tackling poverty 
had never been so good, he said, 
yet new inequalities were appear-
ing. The Bank's findings will be 
published in its World Develop-
ment Report 2000, and the subject 
will be the focus of the September 
2000 meeting of the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund. 
Mr Walton spoke of a 
favourable international situation 
to reduce poverty: most trade 
barriers had fallen, central eco-
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nomic planning was in retreat and 
the costs of communication had 
shrunk. The proportion of the 
world's population living on less 
than a dollar a day had consider-
ably diminished from 60% in 1975 
to just 20% by the mid-1990s.' 
Never has there been such an 
improvement in human history,' 
he claimed. 
Yet, almost in parallel, the 
last 30 years have seen a rise in 
inequality. This subject 'is back on 
the agenda of the World Bank,' 
stressed Mr Walton and it is not 
simply a question of consumption 
and income levels. The Bank is also 
taking a long hard look at other 
factors engendering poverty: 
health, education, vulnerability, 
crime, violence, drug-taking, social 
integration and exclusion. Mr. 
Walton drew attention to the high 
level of insecurity linked to the 
march towards globalisation. He 
noted, in particular, a big increase 
in the perception of (economic) 
insecurity in the UK. As for the 
East Asian crisis, he noted that in 
just one year, capital losses had 
amounted to $109 billion - about 
10% of the region's GDP. 
Consultation with civil so-
ciety in the fight against poverty 
has also moved up the World 
Bank's agenda. Mr Walton cited 
the Bank's efforts to consult with 
indigenous peoples in Bolivia and 
Peru. 'They want to engage in the 
global economy, but on their own 
terms', he stated. 
Finally, he emphasised the 
importance of 'good governance' -
including the strengthening of 
legal and institutional frameworks 
to deal with poverty, and the need 
for greater World Bank coordina-
tion with EU member states and 
other donors. The Bank, he said, 
was determined that its ongoing 
research into poverty should 'link 
up the thinking with innovative 
project-work.' ■■ DP. 
Commission 
approves HIPC 
grant for Uganda 
Commissioner João de 
Deus Pinheiro, responsible for the 
relations with the ACP countries 
confirmed, on Wednesday 22 July, 
The HIPC Debt 
Initiative 
The principal objective of the 
HIPC Debt initiative is to en-
sure that the adjustment and 
reform efforts of the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries are 
not constrained by continued 
high debt and debt service 
burdens. Analyses undertaken 
by the IMF and the WB show 
that, even after the full appli-
cation of existing mechanisms 
for debt relief and in spite of 
their efforts to pursue growth-
oriented policies, the debt 
burdens of a group of HIPCs 
will remain above sustainable 
levels over the medium term. 
The HIPC Debt Initiative is 
based on a commitment by 
the international financial 
community to take action to 
reduce these countries' debt 
burdens to sustainable levels, 
provided that the countries 
complete a period of strong 
economic policy performance. 
A key element of the initiative 
is its aim to deal with the debt 
problems of the HIPCs in a 
comprehensive way, including 
coordinated action by bilat-
eral, commercial and multilat-
eral creditors. Another key 
element is the new approach 
of assessing debt sustainability. 
On 6 July the Council, acting 
on a proposal of the Commis-
sion, adopted the regulation 
for the implementation of this 
initiative. 
the participation of the European 
Community in the Heavily In-
debted Poor Countries (HIPC) in-
itiative. This announcement was 
immediately followed up by the 
first concrete Commission action 
under the HIPC initiative, namely, 
the approval by the EC of a grant 
of ECU 4.59 million to relieve the 
debt of Uganda. This amount is 
the equivalent of the Net Present 
Value of special loans of the EC to 
Uganda. 
With this grant, Uganda 
will be the first country to benefit 
from the EC's participation in the 
HIPC initiative. The initiative will 
enable poor countries with good 
policy performance, which pursue 
or adopt economic reform pro-
grammes supported by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and 
World Bank, to escape from un-
sustainable debt. Thus, they can 
focus all their energies on striving 
for sustainable development and 
reducing poverty. 
The following countries 
are at the moment eligible for 
HIPC support: Uganda, Bolivia, 
Burkina Faso, Guyana, Côte 
d'Ivoire and Mozambique. 
The EC confirms, with this 
comprehensive package of debt 
relief through the HIPC initiative 
and the emphasis on structural 
adjustment, the importance it at-
tributes to good economic man-
agement and governance as a 
credible way to reduce poverty. 
Guinea Bissau: 
Commission 
approves 
emergency 
humanitarian aid 
The Commission has ap-
proved a decision granting ECU 1 
million of emergency humanitar-
ian aid to people in Guinea Bissau 
affected by the conflict that broke 
out on 7 June. The aid, organised 
under the auspices of the Eur-
opean Community Humanitarian 
Office (ECHO), will enable Eur-
opean NGOs to put into operation 
programmes to meet the needs of 
displaced people inside the coun-
try as well as the local population 
directly affected by the fighting. 
Since the beginning of the 
conflict some 250,000 people have 
fled fighting in the capital towards 
the main provincial towns (Man-
sõa, Bissora, Bafata, Gabu) and 
towards the Bijagós Archipelago. 
Most of these people are given 
shelter by their families or friends. 
The Commission has re-
minded all those involved of their 
obligation to respect international 
law, particularly as regards the 
right of access to victims and the 
distribution of aid. 
ECHO has set up an opera-
tional centre at Dakar to follow 
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events on the ground, which will 
be overseen by the Commission 
delegation to Senegal. The Com-
mission may decide to make 
further aid available, depending 
on further developments in the 
situation. 
Humanitarian 
aid for Sierra 
Leone 
In June, the European 
Commission approved a package 
of humanitarian aid worth ECU 1 
million for civilian victims of con-
flict in Sierra Leone. The aid, 
managed by the European Com-
munity Humanitarian Office 
(ECHO), is to enable four European 
NGOs to carry out emergency 
programmes over a two-month 
period. 
Sierra Leone's seven-year-
old internal armed conflict en-
tered a new phase at the begin-
ning of 1998. A Nigerian-led West 
African intervention force (ECO-
MOG) removed the country's mili-
tary junta from power in February, 
allowing elected President Ahmad 
Tejan Kabbah to return to Free-
town. He had fled to Guinea 
following his overthrow in May 
1997. Fierce fighting between 
ECOMOG troops and soldiers of 
the military junta and of the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF 
rebel movement) was reported in 
the east and north of the country. 
resulting in widespread insecurity. 
Junta and RUF soldiers have em-
barked on a grim operation of 'no 
living thing', deliberately target-
ing civilians who are victims of 
arbitrary violence, killing and mu-
tilation. Amnesty International has 
described the atrocities as among 
the worst it has recorded in Africa. 
Around 70,000 internally displaced 
people have fled either into the 
bush or to the main provincial 
cities under ECOMOG control. 
This funding is to enable 
the NGOs to continue work on 
behalf of civilians sheltering in the 
country's big cities. It covers basic 
and emergency medical aid, sur-
gery and rehabilitation for the 
injured and mutilated, as well as 
remedial feeding for infants. 
ECHO'S partners in this ac-
tion are Concern Universal, Méde-
cins sans Frontières-Belgium, Ac-
tion contre la Faim-France, Merlin 
(United Kingdom) and Handicap 
International (France). 
Some 150,000 Sierra Leo-
neans have also fled rebel attacks 
and atrocities into Guinea-Conakry 
and Liberia over the past four to 
five weeks. Several agencies in-
cluding the UN High Commission 
for Refugees are currently re-
sponding to their most pressing 
needs. 
South African essay prize-winners 
visit Brussels  ι „_.._ 
^^™ during the recent UK Presidency, the British Council, in 
collaboration with the Commission's Delegation in South Africa, the 
Read Educational Trust and the Independent Newspaper Group, 
arranged a national essay competition on the subject of 'Europe and 
South Africa in Today's World'. The first prize, sponsored by British 
Airways, Hilton Hotels and Eurostar, was a week in London, including 
a visit to the EU headquarters in Brussels. 
The joint first prize winners were two 16-year olds - Thembisa Fulani 
and Leonid Stoliarsky. They travelled to London in early July. For their 
day trip to Brussels, they took Eurostar trains operating through the 
Channel Tunnel. Their itinerary in the Belgian capital began with a 
visit to the European Parliament, followed by lunch at the Commis-
sion. In the afternoon, they toured the Mini Europe park which 
features small-scale replicas of many famous European buildings and 
monuments. 
EU foreign 
policy declarations 
Under its Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, the EU has 
recently issued a number of de-
clarations relating to ACP coun-
tries, including the following: 
Local elections in Mozambique 
(Declaration of 29 May) 
The EU believes that the 
building of democracy in Mozam-
bique is a process in which all 
Mozambicans should be involved. 
It regrets that the government and 
opposition were not able to reach 
agreement on the issues blocking 
wider participation in the munici-
pal elections, but acknowledges 
the right of RENAMO and other 
political parties, which was exer-
cised freely and democratically, 
not to participate in the polls. 
As the major donor for the 
election process, the EU is particu-
larly concerned at the potentially 
adverse effect on Mozambique's 
international image that any inter-
ruption in the reconciliation pro-
cess might bring about, and urges 
all parties to continue dialogue 
with a view to consolidating de-
mocracy as a prerequisite for eco-
nomic and social development. 
Violence in Niger 
(Declaration of 29 May) 
The EU has learnt with 
disappointment about the fresh 
eruption of violence in Niger and 
about the subsequent reaction of 
the Nigerien authorities such as 
restrictions to the freedom of the 
press. 
The EU further deplores 
the arrest of members of the 
opposition and of the indepen-
dent press and welcomes the re-
lease of some of them. It hopes 
that thorough investigations will 
be conducted into the accusations 
against the persons still remaining 
in custody and that they will have 
the benefit of due process of the 
law. The EU also expresses its 
concern about the initiatives of 
some over-zealous services who 
seem to act without the knowl-
edge of the competent authorities. 
These incidents can only disrupt or 
further delay the démocratisation 
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process in Niger to which the EU 
attaches the utmost importance. 
The EU calls on all parties 
to refrain from any actions which 
could undermine efforts to end 
the present political impasse and 
to engage in a constructive dialo-
gue with a view to restoring full 
democracy in the country. It hopes 
that the forthcoming local elec-
tions could prove to be a turning 
point in this respect. 
Attempted coup in Guinea 
Bissau 
(Declaration of 8 June) 
The Presidency, on behalf 
of the EU, strongly condemns the 
attempted military coup by some 
elements of the armed forces 
against the duly elected demo-
cratic institutions and representa-
tives of Guinea Bissau. 
The EU wishes to stress 
that, within a democracy, disputes 
should only be settled in compli-
ance with democratic principles. 
The EU calls for the rapid 
re-establishment of constitutional 
order and security in Guinea Bissau 
to prevent further bloodshed, and 
commends the efforts made by the 
Guinea Bissau authorities to avoid 
any further loss of civilian lives and 
to ensure protection to all EU 
nationals residing in Bissau. 
(Declaration of 16 June) 
The EU is gravely con-
cerned at the further deterioration 
of the situation in Guinea Bissau, 
following the recent attempted 
military coup. 
The EU is particularly con-
cerned at the reports of civilian 
casualties, both in Bissau and 
amongst those fleeing the fight-
ing. It calls on the mutineers to lay 
down their arms, thus enabling 
the immediate re-establishment 
of constitutional order and an 
end to further bloodshed. 
The EU further states its 
readiness to provide humanitarian 
assistance as soon as the condi-
tions on the ground make it 
possible to reach those who need 
it. 
Progress in Burundi 
(Declaration of 11 June) 
The adoption on 4 June by 
the Burundi National Assembly of 
a Constitutional Act and a political 
platform of transition is an impor-
tant step towards peace and na-
tional reconciliation. It is a signifi-
cant gesture which offers hope 
that the Burundians will pursue 
the efforts which they have be-
gun. This important step towards 
national reconciliation must be 
complemented by negotiations be-
tween all the Burundi parties, 
without exception, from both in-
side and outside the country. At 
this crucial juncture for the future 
of Burundi, the EU calls on all the 
parties due to be in Arusha on 15 
June in the framework of the 
regional peace initiative led by 
Tanzania's former President Julius 
Nyerere, to assume the important 
responsibilities they have to the 
people of Burundi, who have 
already endured so much suffering 
and are hoping for peace. 
(Declaration of 26 June) 
The EU welcomes the pro-
gress achieved at the first session 
of the Burundi peace talks con-
ducted from 15 to 21 June in 
Arusha (Tanzania), and the com-
mitment made by all parties re-
presented at the talks to engage 
in serious negotiations with the 
aim of resolving the conflict in 
Burundi. 
The Union welcomes the 
unanimous adoption by the par-
ties of a declaration which in-
cludes a commitment to resolve 
the crisis by peaceful means and to 
put an end to all forms of vio-
lence. The Union calls on all armed 
parties to honour the commitment 
to suspend hostilities by 20 July 
1998 at the latest. 
The EU strongly en-
courages all parties to return to 
the negotiating table on 20 July, 
ready to start a second round of 
talks in the spirit of goodwill and 
commitment to dialogue indicated 
by their declaration. The Union 
will continue to support the peace 
process and the efforts of Julius 
Nyerere to bring about a durable 
solution to the Burundi crisis. 
Nigeria post-Abacha 
(Declaration of 12 June) 
The EU attaches great im-
portance to its relationship with 
Nigeria in recognition of its pivotal 
regional and international role. 
Following the unexpected death 
of General Abacha, we hope there 
will now be an early and peaceful 
return to democracy with the 
election of an accountable civilian 
government which will restore 
peace, respect human rights and 
bring, at last, to the Nigerian 
people the benefit of the country's 
great wealth. 
The EU welcomes General 
Abubakar's call to all Nigerians to 
join in a process of reconstruction 
and reconciliation. This, together 
with the release of detainees and 
the restoration of the rule of law, 
would be important steps in a 
process leading to Nigeria's return 
to its rightful place in the interna-
tional community. 
The EU reiterates its wish 
for constructive dialogue with Ni-
geria, including in the context of 
the forthcoming ACP-EU post-
Lomé negotiations. The Union re-
mains ready to support Nigeria in 
its efforts to establish a democracy 
representative of the Nigerian 
people in all their diversity. 
Concern over Togo elections 
(Declaration of 24 June) 
The EU is deeply concerned 
at reports that authorities in Togo 
have suspended the counting of 
votes from the Presidential elec-
tions of 21 June. 
In view of the EU's assis-
tance to the electoral process in 
Togo, the Union urgently appeals 
to the authorities to resume the 
counting without delay, and to 
publish official election results 
which accurately reflect the voting 
of the electorate. 
Death of Maître Beye 
(Declaration of 29 June) 
The EU was shocked and 
deeply saddened to learn of the 
death of the UN Secretary-Gener-
al's Special Representative to An-
gola, Maître Alioune Blondin Beye, 
with five of his colleagues and two 
pilots, in an air crash near Abidjan 
on 26 June. 
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The EU pays tribute to 
Maître Beye's determination and 
ceaseless efforts over the last five 
years to bring about a peaceful 
solution to the Angolan conflict. 
The EU hopes that the 
death of Maître Beye will spur 
the Angolan Government and Uni-
ta to early completion of the 
Lusaka Protocol. A fitting memor-
ial to Maître Beye would be a 
genuine and lasting peace in An-
gola. 
ODA flows fall 
in 1997 
The Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) has reported that in 
1997 - a turbulent year for devel-
oping and transitional countries 
alike - both aid and other finan-
cial flows declined. 
ODA flows fell overall from 
$55.4bn in 1996 to $47.6bn in 
1997, a slump of more than 14%. 
More than half of this was due to 
falls in the exchange rates of other 
national currencies against the US 
dollar. It was noted that G7 mem-
bers of the OECD's Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) con-
tributed just 0.19% of their collec-
tive GNP to official development 
Official Development 
Assistance flows in 1997 
EU DAC members 
Country ODA Sm ODA/GNP% 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
Luxembourg 
France 
Finland 
Belgium 
Ireland 
Germany 
Austria 
United Kingdom 
Portugal 
Spain 
Italy 
1,635 
2,946 
1,672 
87 
6,348 
379 
764 
187 
5,913 
531 
3,371 
251 
1,227 
1,231 
0.97 
0.81 
0.76 
0.50 
0.45 
0.33 
0.31 
0.31 
0.28 
0.26 
0.26 
0.25 
0.23 
0.11 
Non-EU DAC members 
Norway 
Canada 
Switzerland 
Australia 
New Zealand 
USA 
1,306 
2,146 
839 
1,076 
145 
6,168 
0.86 
0.36 
0.32 
0.28 
0.25 
0.08 
assistance. This was in stark con-
trast to the other DAC countries 
(smaller industrialised countries) 
whose average contribution 
amounted to 0.45% of GNP (see 
table) 
As for private flows, hav-
ing reached an all-time high of 
$286bn in 1996, the figure for 
1997 was an estimated $206bn. 
The big drop is attributed largely 
to the Asian financial crisis which 
began during the second half of 
the year. 
Investing 
in Cape Verde 
Carlos Viega, the Prime 
Minister of Cape Verde, paid an 
official visit to Brussels on 22 June 
for meetings with the various 
European institutions. In the 
course of a round table, organised 
with the assistance of the Belgium-
Luxembourg/ACP Chamber of 
Commerce, Industry and Agricul-
ture, he delivered a presentation 
praising the economic situation in 
Cape Verde and underlining its 
'enormous business potential'. He 
made no secret of his aim which, 
like many other ACP states, is to 
attract as much private European 
investment as possible to his coun-
try. The development of the pri-
vate sector and the encourage-
ment of investment - described as 
a fundamental element in the 
government's strategy - should, 
he believes, in conjunction with 
the reforms undertaken since 
1991, enable the country to look 
to a brighter economic future and 
to face up to the demands of 
globalisation. 
The Prime Minister empha-
sised political stability and social 
cohesion - two aspects which he 
said had been consolidated in 
Cape Verde following the re-estab-
lishment of democracy and the 
adoption of a new constitution. 
He went on to describe the various 
facilities available to investors. 
These included reforms which had 
been implemented in the financial 
sector. Tax advantages and admin-
istrative improvements were in the 
pipeline, he indicated, and a 'one-
stop-shop' had been instituted to 
simplify the procedure for foreign 
investors. There were now guaran-
tees for the protection of capital, 
foreign exchange transfers and the 
repatriation of profits. A number 
of legal obstacles had been re-
moved and there was virtually no 
risk that assets would be nationa-
lised or expropriated. Legislation 
relating to the workplace, he 
argued, was particularly attractive. 
Efforts were continuing to 
strengthen the infrastructural fra-
mework as well as to improve 
training. 
Mr Viega was particularly 
anxious to underline his country's 
'rigorous' macro-economic policy 
which, he said, was designed to 
meet the imperatives of effective 
management. The principles being 
applied were similar to the con-
vergence criteria set out in the 
Maastricht Treaty (elimination of 
debt, better budgetary control, a 
more effective mastery of inflation 
and a coherent monetary policy). 
'It is our hope that investors will 
come to Cape Verde and take 
advantage of the excellent condi-
tions we can offer,' he conclu-
ded. K.K. 
Togo elections 
In July, the Commission 
sent a communication to the 
Council of Ministers proposing 
that the Togo government be 
invited to consultations under Ar-
ticle 366a of the revised Lomé IV 
Convention. This would be the 
first use of the provision, which 
was agreed in Mauritius following 
the mid-term review. 
The aim of the talks would 
be to undertake an in-depth ex-
amination of the situation follow-
ing Togo's Presidential election -
and if appropriate - to find a 
solution. Grave doubts have been 
expressed over the conduct of the 
poll and about the credibility of 
the published results. 
The article 366a procedure 
is available 'where one party con-
siders that another party has failed 
to fulfil an obligation in respect of 
one of the essential elements 
referred to in Article 5 of the 
Lomé Convention'. These essential 
elements include 'the recognition 
and application of democratic 
principles'. 
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Freedom of the 
Press throughout 
the World, 1998 
Report 
By Reporters Sans Frontières. 
Distribution: Dif' Pop, 21 ter, 
rue Voltaire, 75011 Paris. Fax 
(33 1) 43 72 15 77. 334 pp. 
ISBN 2-908830-36-1. 
This publication, the Annual Report 
of Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF), 
aims 'to break through the isolation 
pressing in on journalists languishing 
in jail', 'reassure those battling every 
day to preserve press freedom that 
their struggle has not gone unno-
ticed' and 'make the authorities 
guilty of violence and harassment 
face up to their crimes.' 
The bulk of the Report is devoted to 
alleged attacks on the news media 
during 1997, broken down by region 
and country. Those who believe such 
activities are the preserve of a small 
number of repressive regimes might 
be shocked to find entries for no 
fewer than 129 countries (including 
54 ACP and 8 EU states). Clearly, the 
scale of the problem varies enor-
mously. Some states have several 
pages devoted to them, detailing a 
consistent practice of violence and 
repression. Others appear on the 
'roll of shame' because of a single in-
cident - such as the sacking of an 
employee in the state broadcasting 
service. However, according to RSF, 
no more than 30 countries fully re-
spect press freedom with another 50 
respecting it 'more or less'. The situ-
ation is said to be poor in 80 states 
and extremely poor in at least 30 
others. 'The map of press freedom', 
we are told, 'coincides with that of 
democracy and respect for human 
rights'. 
In 1997, 26 journalists were killed in 
the course of their work. This is two 
fewer than in 1996 and about a 
quarter of the figure for 1994. While 
welcoming the decline in fatalities 
over the past few years, RSF argues 
there is no cause for complacency. It 
is particularly critical of the fact that 
those guilty of killing journalists are 
rarely prosecuted. 
The organisation also condemns the 
emergence of what it calls 'the pri-
vatisation of repression'. According 
to the Report: 'Political parties, trade 
unions, big companies, criminal 
gangs and religious fundamentalists 
- with the backing of unofficial po-
lice or private militia - have taken 
over from weakened central govern-
ments to silence recalcitrant journal-
ists.' 
Fighting Corruption in 
Development Aid: 
Supply Tenders 
by Roberto Provera, 110 pp (no pub-
lisher's imprint) 
In this booklet, based on the au-
thor's 'personal experience of thirty 
years in the field', Roberto Provera 
argues trenchantly against the 
'large-scale corruption' that he says 
exists in many bilateral development 
projects. He prefaces his case with 
the poignant tale of a young and 
idealistic manager in a manufactur-
ing firm. The manager ends up los-
ing his job because he refuses to 'lu-
bricate' the tender process with 
payments to well-placed local agents 
and his company fails to win valu-
able contracts. He is accused of 'tilt-
ing at windmills' (this theme is fea-
tured on the cover which shows Don 
Quixote brandishing his sword at a 
windmill sail). 
The booklet provides some interest-
ing details of how the tender 
process is said to be corrupted in 
practice. Depressingly, the author ar-
gues that the situation has worsened 
over the past 20 years. And while 
the Development Assistance Com-
mittee of the OECD issued a recom-
mendation 'on anti-corruption pro-
posals for bilateral aid-funded 
procurement' in 1996, he suggests 
that many OECD countries have 
done little to translate this into prac-
tical action. 
Undaunted, he goes on to make rec-
ommendations about how to tackle 
the problem. The most important 
role, he believes, should be played 
by the financing institutions who 
must 'exercise strict and rigorous 
controls through all phases of the 
tender.' In a special 'pat on the back' 
for the European Commission, he 
observes that 'this is precisely what is 
done by DG VIII for tenders financed 
by the EDF.' The EC is often lambast-
ed for its bureaucratic procedures -
but Mr Provera suggests there is an-
other side to this particular coin. He 
is concerned that a loosening of con-
trols, advocated by many, could 
make corruption easier. 
He also urges the industrialised 
donor countries to 'search their own 
consciences and admit that the re-
sponsibility for corruption is largely 
theirs. He offers some detailed sug-
gestions for maximising the trans-
parency of tender operations, in-
cluding effective sanctions against 
those who transgress. 
Economies africaines -
2ème édition: Analyse 
économique de l'Afrique 
subsaharienne 
(African Economies-2nd edition: 
Economie Analysis of Sub-Saharan 
Africa) 
by Michel Norm, Ed. De Boeck <S 
Larcier, 1998, 295 pp, Brussels, 165 
FF, ISBN 2-8041-2757-5 
Africa has the essential human and 
material resources that it needs for 
its development. But before embark-
ing on a new economic policy, it is 
necessary to analyse the reasons for 
past failures. This is the main focus 
of Michel Norro's volume, which 
takes an in-depth look, from both a 
historical and a comparative per-
spective, at the main factors of the 
sub-Saharan economy (agriculture, 
industry, external debt, the interna-
tional environment) 
African economies have been unable 
to break free of structures inherited 
from the past, based heavily on the 
exploitation of a limited range of 
natural resources. A dynamic devel-
opment policy, however, requires a 
sustained effort to diversify econom-
ic activity, boost efficiency and in-
crease productivity. There are signs 
that attitudes have been changing. 
In a continent that has suffered too 
many conflicts and laboured under 
the burden of corrupt and ineffi-
cient regimes, people are demand-
ing something better. With its young 
and dynamic population, public ad-
ministration (lacking at the time of 
independence) natural resources and 
open spaces, the continent has the 
means and the ambition to succeed. 
The question that arises, therefore, 
is why hasn't the renaissance 
begunTBH 
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European Development Fund schemes 
The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of schemes funded by the European 
Community under the EDF (Lomé Convention). 
Geographical breakdown 
The summary is divided into three groups 
• Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) country 
projects. 
• Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) 
projects. 
• Regional projects 
The information within each of these groups is 
given by recipient country (in alphabetical order). 
Information given 
The following details will usually be given for 
each development scheme: 
• The title of the project. 
• The administrative body responsible for it. 
• The estimated sum involved (prior to financing 
decision) or the amount actually provided 
(post-financing decision) 
• A brief description of projects envisaged 
(construction work, equipment supplies, 
technical assistance etc.) 
• Any methods of implementation for example, 
international invitations to tender). 
• The stage the project has reached 
(identification, appraisal, submission for 
financing, financing decision, ready for 
implementation) 
Main abbreviations 
Resp. Auth. 
Int. Tender 
Ace. Tender 
Restr. Tender 
T.A. 
EDF 
mECU 
Est. 
Responsible Authority 
International invitation to tender 
Invitation to tender (accelerated 
procedure) 
Restricted invitation to tender 
Technical Assistance 
European Development Fund 
(e.g. EDF 7 = 7th European 
Development Fund) 
million European currency units 
Estimated 
Blue Pages on the 
INTERNET 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg08/pabli-en/introbp1.htm 
Note: Participation in EDF schemes is strictly 
confined to ACP or EU firms. 
Correspondence about this operational 
summary can be sent directly to: 
Wir Franco Cupini, 
Directorate-General for Development 
European Commission 
G12 4-14, 200, rue de la Loi 
B-1049 Brussels 
Please cover only one subject at a time. SECTOR CODE DESCRIPTION 
AAz Planning and public administration 
AAa Administrative buildings 
AAb Economic planning and policy 
AAc Assistance to the normal operations of 
government not falling under a different 
category 
AAd Police and fire protection 
AAe Collection and publication of statistics of all 
kinds, information and documentation 
AAf Economic surveys, pre-investment studies 
AAg Cartography, mapping, aerial photography 
AAi Demography and manpower studies 
ABz Development of public utilities 
ABa Power production and distribution 
ABai Electricity 
ABb Water supply 
ABc Communications 
ABd Transport and navigation 
ABe Meteorology 
ABf Peaceful uses of atomic energy (non-
power) 
ACz Agriculture, fishing and forestry 
ACa Agriculture production 
ACb Service to agriculture 
ACc Forestry 
ACd Fishing and hunting 
ACe Conservation and extension 
ACf Agriculture storage 
ACg Agriculture construction 
ACh Home economics and nutrition 
ACi Land and soil surveys 
ADz Industry, mining and construction 
ADa Extractive industries 
ADai Petroleum and natural gas 
ADb Manufacturing 
ADc Engineering and construction 
ADd Cottage industry and handicraft 
ADe Productivity, including management, 
automation, accountancy, business, 
finance and investment 
ADf Non-agricultural storage and warehousing 
ADg Research in industry technology 
AEz Trade, banking, tourism and other 
services 
AEa Agriculture development banks 
AEb Industrial development banks 
AEc Tourism, hotels and other tourist facilities 
AEd Export promotion 
AEe Trade, commerce and distribution 
AEf Co-operatives (except agriculture and 
housing) 
AEg Publishing, journalism, cinema, 
photography 
AEh Other insurance and banking 
AEi Archaeological conservation, game 
reserves 
AFz Education 
AFa Primary and secondary education 
AFb University and higher technical institutes 
AFbi Medical 
AFc Teacher training 
AFci Agriculture training 
AFd Vocational and technical training 
AFe Educational administration 
AFf Pure or general research 
AFg Scientific documentation 
AFh Research in the field of education or 
training 
AFi Subsidiary services 
AFj Colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc. 
AGz Health 
AGa Hospitals and clinics 
AGb Maternal and child care 
AGc Family planning and population-related 
research 
AGd Other medical and dental services 
AGe Public health administration 
AGf Medical insurance programmes 
AHz Social infrastructure and social welfare 
AHa Housing, urban and rural 
AHb Community development and facilities 
AHc Environmental sanitation 
AHd Labour 
AHe Social welfare, social security and other 
social schemes 
AHf Environmental protection 
AHg Flood control 
AHh Land settlement 
AHi Cultural activities 
Alz Multisector 
Ala River development 
Alb Regional development projects 
AJz Unspecified ACP STATES 
ANGOLA 
Reconstruction support programme. 55 
mECU. Relaunch of economic and social 
activities. Improvement of basic social 
services and living conditions, poverty 
alleviation, increase of production and of 
basic communication possibilities, 
amelioration of basic infrastructures, 
participation in mine-clearing operations, 
support for demobilisation. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF ANG/6036/001 - AGz, AHz. 
Support for training of lawyers and 
academics in the Law Faculty of 
Agostinho Neto University (FDUAN). 0.8 
mECU. Training, supply of equipment. 
Project ¡n execution. 
EDF ANG/7018/000 - AFb 
BAHAMAS 
Road Rehabilitation of Queen's Highway 
on Acklins Island. Est.cost 5.2 mECU. 
EDF 2.2 mECU, Government of the 
Bahamas 3 mECU. Construction/ 
infrastructure, T.A. incl. studies. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF BM/7001/001 - ABd. 
BELIZE 
Improvement of Hummingbird Highway 
(2nd segment - Sibun River Bridge to 
Belmopan). Resp. Auth.: Govt, of Belize. 
Est. cost 13.7 mECU. Construction, T.A., 
studies. Project in execution. EDF 8. 
EDF BEL/6001/002-ABd 
Drugs Demand Reduction Programme. 
Est. cost 1 mECU. EDF part 0.3 mECU; 
Government of Belize 0.7 mECU. Training, 
T.A., supplies. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF BEL/7004/000 - AGc 
BENIN 
Improvement works on the Sémé-Porto 
Nova road. (12.711 km). Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère des Travaux Publics et des 
Transports. 20 mECU. Infrastructure works 
and installation of road signing. Work 
supervision by KFW (D). Works by int. 
tender. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7132 -ABd 
Support programme for structural 
adjustment (PAS -1997/99). Resp. Auth.: 
Ministre des Finances. 27,5 mECU. 
Strengthen the country's macro-economic 
policy. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF BEN/7200/003 - AAc 
BOTSWANA 
Sysmin - support to base metal industry 
(Copper-Nickel-Cobalt). Resp. Auth.: BCL 
Ltd., 33.7mECU. To deepen the shaft of 
the Selebi-North mine, to reach a new ore-
body, equipping it and carrying out new 
prospective drilling to identify new ore-
bodies. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF SYSMIN/BT 9999/001 - ADa 
Botswana Tourism Development 
Programme (Foundation phase). Resp. 
Auth.: Dept of Tourism (DoT), Commerce 
New projects and updated information in existing projects appear in italics 
and Industry. 1.91 mECU. Short-and long-
term T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF BT 5019/001 - AEc 
Trade Development Programme (Phase 
I). Resp. Auth.: Department of Trade and 
Investment Promotion. Est. cost 1.7 mECU. 
To support trade diversification and export 
promotion. T.A. Project in execution. EDF 
7. 
EDF BT/7008 - AEe 
Vocational training programme, 
Francistown. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Education. Est. cost 17 mECU. Vocational 
Teacher Training College and Vocational 
Training Centre (VTTC/VTC). Construction, 
supplies of equipment, T.A., works, 
feasibility study. Project on appraisal. EDF 
8. 
EDF BT/7004/001 - AFd 
Wildlife Conservation and Management 
Programme. Est. cost 7 mECU. Works, 
supplies, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 8 
EDFBT/6001/002-ACz 
Community forestry development. Est. 
cost 2 mECU. Supplies of equipments; T. 
Α., ¡nel. studies; training, NGO and 
community co-operation. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing: July 
1998. EDF 8. 
EDFBT/6021/001 - ACc. 
BURKINA FASO 
Support project for the reform of the 
pharmaceutical sector. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé -
Direction des Services Pharmaceutiques 
(DSPh) and CAMEG 1.6 mECU. Line of 
credit, works, equipment and T.A. Project 
in execution. EDF 7. 
EDFBK/7017-AGc 
SYSMIN -Rehabilitation of the Poura 
mine. Resp. Auth.: I.G.R.International Gold 
Resources Corporation. 11 mECU. Works 
by direct agreement. Supplies and T.A. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF SYSMIN BK/9999 - ADa 
Ouagadougou dam classified forest 
development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de 
l'Environnement et de l'Eau. Est. cost 1.200 
mECU. EDF part 0.300 mECU. 
Cofinancing with CFD (F), The Netherlands 
(possible). Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF BK/7023 - AHf 
Support for decentralisation. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère Administration Territoriale 
et Sécurité. Est. cost 2 mECU. Works, 
supplies, T.A., training. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF BK/7024 - AAb 
Support for the structural adjustment 
programme 1996-1997. General import 
programme. EDF 6.4 mECU. T.A. 
foreseen. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF BK/7200/004 - AAc 
Support for the judicial system. Est. cost 
1 mECU. Training of magistrates and 
improvement of judicial services. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7 
EDF/BK/7027-AAz 
Support for rural development. Est. cost 
24.2 mECU. Financing of action for rice-
growing, for support action, financing the 
rural environment and for information about 
markets. T.A, works and supplies. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 8 
EDF BK/7032/000 - ACa. 
Periodical maintenance of asphalt roads 
(594 km). Resp. Auth.: Ministère des 
Infrastructures, de l'Habitat et de 
L'Urbanisme. Est. cost 44 mECU. T.A., 
Works. Financing decision taken in July 
1998. Project in execution. EDF - 8 
EDFBK/6017/002-ABd. 
CAMEROON 
Support for the People of Lagdo. esp. 
Auth.: MINEPIA. 3 mECU.Preservation and 
improvement of the social-economic 
situation around Lake Lagdo. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF CM/6002/002 - ACa 
Regional economic integration 
programme in Central Africa - regional 
infrastructures. 98 mECU. Building of the 
Bertoua-Geroua Bulai road. Project in 
execution. EDF 6,7 and 8. 
EDF CM/7002/001 - ABd. 
Rural development project in the 
Lagone and Chari regions. Food supply 
security. Combatting poverty. Est. cost 9 
mECU. Construction, T.A., studies, 
supplies, training. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 8. 
EDF CM/5004/002 - ACh 
Programme of road maintenance 
(PERFED II). Resp. Auth.: MINTP. Est. 
cost 55 mECU. Construction, T.A., studies. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF CM/6031/002-ABd 
Support for the Structural Adjustment 
Programme 1998-1999. Est. cost 25 
mECU. Budgetary support. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF CM/7200/002 - AAc. 
08.06.98. 
Urban Development Programme 
(FOURMI II). Est. cost 3.5 mECU. 
Construction, T.A. incl studies, supply of 
equipment, training. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 8. 
EDF CM/7006/001 - AHb. 
CAPE VERDE 
Maio island rural electrification. Est. cost 
1.945 mECU. Improvement of living 
conditions. Supply of electricity, Works, 
supplies and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 
7. 
EDF CV/7009/000 - ABa.i 
Santo Antao water supply and 
sanitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Economic Coordination. 1.4 mECU. Works, 
T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDFCV/7011 -ABb 
Water distribution and sanitation In 
Praia - Phase 2. Est. cost 6.5 mECU. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Economic 
Coordination. Construction - infrastructures; 
T.A., including studies. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing: 
September 1998. EDF 8. 
EDF CV/5002/001 - ABb, AHc. 
Road Infrastructure for Santo Antão 
Island. Construction of the Janela road 
at Porto Novo. Resp. Auth.: NAO.Est. cost 
12.7 mECU; EDF part 9.6 mECU. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDFCV/7010/OOO-ABc. 
Support for the Structural Adjustment 
Programme. Est cost 9.4 mECU. 
Budgetary support, T.A. incl. studies. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF CV/7200/000 - AAb. 
CHAD 
Restoration of bridges that fall within 
the framework of the Second Transport 
Sectoral Programme. Resp. Auth.: MINTP 
Chad. Est. cost 4 mECU. Urgent work to be 
carried out to restore 15 bridges under the 
Transport Sectoral Programme. Works, 
T.A. Project in execution. Project on 
appraisal. Financing decision foreseen in 
September or October. EDF 7. 
EDF CD/6001 - ABd 
Support for Health Programme in Mayo 
Kebbi 1.98 mECU T.A. Training of 
doctors, medical supplies. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
Support for Water Policy. Est. cost 17 
mECU. Construction/ infrastructure, supply 
of equipment, T.A. incl. studies, training. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7-8. 
EDF CD/7003/001 - ABb 
Support for National Health Policy. Est. 
cost 35m ECU. T.A. incl. studies, supply of 
equipment, training, 
construction/infrastructure. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF CD/5011/003 - AGz 
Support for the Structural Adjustment 
Programme 1998-1999. Est. cost 16.8 
mECU. Budgetary support. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF CD/7200/002 - AAc 
COMOROS 
Sea-access to Moheli island. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Equipement - Direction 
Générale des Travaux Publics. 3.250 
mECU. Works, by ¡nt.tender.T.A.for further 
investigations, tender dossier and works 
supervision. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF COM/6006/7003 - ABd 
Technical Management Unit for the NAO 
for managing and coordinating 
Community aid. 1.7 mECU. Financing 
decision taken in June 1998. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF COM/7009/000 - AAz. 
CONGO (REPUBLIC) 
All projects suspended 
CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC) 
Rehabilitation Support Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Coordination and 
Management Unit. Est. cost EDF 84 
mECU. and an indicative amount of 6 
mECU from the Commission's budget 
under heading B7-5076 'Rehabilitation and 
reconstruction measures for developing 
countries'. Regions selected: Kinshasa's 
economic hinterland, the Greater Kivu and 
the two provinces of Kagai. Rehabilitation 
and maintenance of roads and farm access 
roads. Support for production and 
marketing, support for basic social 
infrastructure. T.A. and evaluation. Project 
suspended. EDF 6 & 7. 
EDF ZR/6033 - AAc 
Strengthening of the provisional health 
support programme. 45 mECU 
Rehabilitation of health service structures 
in Kinshasa, Kasai and Kivu. Support for 
the health service at the basic and 
intermediate levels. Reinforcement of basic 
juridical services. Works, supplies and T.A. 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing 1st half 98. 
Support programme for the preparation 
of elections. Resp. Auth.: Commission 
Nationale des Elections (CNE). 30 mECU. 
T.A., support for démocratisation. Project 
suspended. EDF 7. 
EDF ZR/6034/00 - AAc 
COTE D'IVOIRE 
Support for the structural adjustment 
programme (GIP V). Resp. Auth.: Ministry 
of Finance. 25.5 mECU. General import 
programme. T.A. Project in execution. EDF 
6&7. 
EDF IVC/7200/004 - AAc 
DJIBOUTI 
Support for the structural adjustment 
programme. General import programme. 
4.100 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF DI/7200/001 - AAc 
DOMINICA 
Eco-Tourism Site Development. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Trade Industry and 
Tourism (MTIT). Est. cost 0.558 mECU. 
Works, equipment and training. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF DOM/6002/001 - ACa 
Agricultural Diversification Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Diversification Implementation 
Unit. (DIU). 2.25 mECU. Production Credit 
Scheme. Abattoir Project, Citrus 
Processing Study, Shipping and 
Transportation System Project, Quality 
Assurance, Market Information Service, 
Export Credit Programme, Monitoring 
Evaluation, T.A. Works by ace. tender. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF DOM/7002 - ACa 
Elimination of solid waste. Resp. Auth.: 
Min. of Communications, Works and 
Housing. 1.65 mECU. Restoration of two 
depots for household waste. Installation of 
a new waste disposal depot. T.A. by 
restricted tender; works by ace. process. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF DOM/7003 - ABz. 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
Support programme to prevent 
STD/HIV/AIDS. EDF part 1.350 mECU. 
Training, T.A., supplies, evaluation. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF DO/7016-AGz 
Water supply and sanitation in the 
poorest areas of Santo Domingo. Est. 
EDF part 26 mECU. 
Construction/infrastructure, supplies, T.A. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
ABb, AHc. 
Project for the improvement of technical 
and professional education. Est. EDF 
part 13 mECU. Construction/infrastructure, 
supplies, T.A., training. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
AFd 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 
Conservation and rational utilisation of 
the forest ecosystems. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Agriculture. 5,070 mECU. Land 
classification and use master plan, national 
system of conservation units, forest training 
and research centres, T.A. and supply of 
equipment. Project on appraisal. EDF 6. 
EDF EG/6001 - ACe, ACe, ACi 
ERITREA 
Sector study on national water and 
irrigation potential. Resp. Auth.: Ministry 
of Energy, Mines and Water resources 4.5 
mECU. Assess the various demands for 
those resources, determine the potential for 
their sustainable development, present 
strategies for their development, and lay 
the foundations for their management. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF ERY/7002 - ABb 
Upgrading of the Nefasit-Dekemhare-
Tera Imni road. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of 
Construction. Est. cost 20 mECU. Road 
works. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF ERY/7004 - ABd 
Rehabilitation of transmission lines, 
substations and distribution system in 
Massawa area. Resp. Auth.: Eritrean 
Electric Authority. Est. cost 10-12 mECU. 
Works, supplies and T.A. Feasibility study: 
INYPSA (Sp). Financing decision foreseen 
in July 1998. Int. tenders no. 4320 and no. 
4321 for supplies and tender no. 4318 for 
works launched with a conditional clause. 
Respective deadlines for submission: 
22.07.98. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDFERY/7001 -ABa.i 
Livestock Promotion, support for the 
Improvement of the Sanitary 
Environment of the National Herd. Est. 
cost 1.2 mECU. Equipment, infrastructure, 
vaccines, training of veterinary services 
personnel. Projectin execution. EDF 7. 
EDF ERY/7005/000 -AGz, AFd 
Short-term assistance programme for 
reconstruction and restoration. 20 
mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF ET/7001/000. 
ETHIOPIA 
Rehabilitation of the Addis Ababa- Jima 
road, Addis Ababa-Abelti (180 km). 
Est. cost 80 mECU. Improvement of the 
road network. Works and supplies. T.A. 
Feasibility studies and dossiers projects 
preparation. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF ET/7005/002 - ABd Support programme for the transport 
sector (TSSP). Resp. Auth.: Ethiopian 
Road Auth. 2 mECU. Works, equipment, 
T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF ET/7005/001 - ABd 
Addis Ababa's water supply and 
sanitation. Resp. Auth.: Addis Ababa 
Water Supply Authority. AAWSA. Est. cost 
35 mECU. Works, equipment, T.A.,. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF ET 5006/002 - ABb 
Higher education development support. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education, NAO. 
Est. cost 1.999 mECU. Equipment, works. 
Project in execution. EDF 6, 7. 
EDF ET/7016/001 - AFz, AFb 
Rehabilitation of the Addis 
Ababa/Desse/Weldyia road. Est. cost: 
120 mECU. Construction/infrastructure. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
ET/7020/000 - ABd. 
FIJI 
New Rewa River Bridge and Town 
Bypass. Est. cost 12.3 mECU; EDF part 
10 mECU. Construction/infrastructure; T.A., 
incl. studies. Project on appraisal. 
Financing decision foreseen in September 
1998. EDF 6, 7. 
EDFFIJ/7012/000-ABd. 
GABON 
Support for the rehabilitation of the 
territory. Construction of the Lalara-Mitzic 
road. Auth. Resp.: Ministre de l'Equipement 
et de la Construction. 23.4 mECU. Mainly 
works, some supplies and service 
contracts. Project in execution. Tender for 
works to be launched in May 1998. EDF 8. 
EDF GA/7006/000 - ABd. 
GHANA 
Human resources development 
programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Local 
Government and Rural Development. 3.8 
mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A., 
evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7 
EDF GH/7003 - AFz 
Western Region Agricultural 
Development Project. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture. 12 mECU. 
T.A., buildings and training, supply of 
equipment. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF GH-ACa 
Woodworking Sector Development. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Lands and 
Forestry. 4.85 mECU. Training and 
equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF GH - ACc 
Transport Infrastructure Programme 
Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Roads & 
Highways. 54 mECU. Works, supplies, 
supervision, training. Axle load control 
equipment, consultancy studies, training of 
Highway Sector Staff. Project in execution. 
EDF 6 and 7. 
EDF GH 6001 ABd 
Small towns water supply project. Resp. 
Auth.: Ghana Water and Sewerage 
Corporation. Est. cost 15 mECU. 
Construction of water supply systems. 
Strengthening of institutions responsible for 
operations and maintenance. Consultancy 
services, including community mobilisation, 
preparation of tender documents and 
supervision of works, works contracts. 
Works. T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF GH/6006 - ABb 
Decentralised Cooperation Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 1.5 
mECU. Equipment, construction, training 
and current inputs of grassroots 
programmes. TA for implementation and 
evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF GH/7008 - AJz 
4th Microprojects Programme, 2nd 
tranche. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 
4 mECU. Improvement of health, water and 
educational facilities. T.A., evaluation and 
contingencies. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF GH/6102/000 - AHb 
Support for Structural Adjustment 
Programme, GIP V. 15 mECU. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF GH/7200/005 - AAc 
Rural electrification programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Mines and Energy. 9.5 
mECU. Supply and erection of electiricity 
lines, supervision, training. Project on 
appraisal. Financing decision expected in 
May 1998. EDF 7. 
EDFGH-Aba.i 
GRATIS (Ghana Regional Appropriate 
Technology Industrial Service), Phase 
III. Est. cost 3 mECU. Project on appraisal. 
Financing decision expected at the 
beginning of 1999. EDF 7. 
EDFGH-ABai 
Support to the Ghana Audit Service. Est 
cost 3.6 mECU. T.A. incl. studies, supplies. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF GH/7020/000 - AAc. 
GUINEA 
Pilot programme for the development of 
secondary towns. Resp. Auth.: Direction 
nationale de la décentralisation. 1.91 
mECU. Technical cooperation, TA and 
training. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF GUI 7008/000 - AHa.b 
Diversification Aid. The Agriculture 
Component. Extension of the Family 
Plantation Programme in Soguipah. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Water & 
Forests. 5.5 mECU. Cultivation of rice 
fields and rubber plantations and the 
development of transport infrastructures. 
Works, supplies, T.A. Project in execution. 
EDF 7 
EDF SYSMIN GUI/9999/000 - ACe, AGe, 
AHf 
Diversification Aid. The Road 
Infrastructure Component. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works and 
the Environment. 74.5 mECU. Works, T.A., 
supervision, studies. Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDF SYSMIN GUI/9999/000 - ABd. 
Urban health support project. Est. cost 
1.2 m ECU. T.A., studies Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF GUI/6005/000 - Agz 
The Dabola-Dinguiraye Programme 
(High Guinea). To increase the revenues 
of agricultural producers.13 
mECU.Training, construction/ 
infrastructure, T.A. incl. studies, supplies, 
support fund. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF GUI/6002/002 -ACa. 
GUINEA BISSAU 
Bridge construction in Sao Vincente. 
Resp.Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. Est. 
cost 27 mECU. Works and works 
supervision. Project on appraisal EDF 8. 
EDFGUB/7014/000-ABd 
Support for road maintenance. Est. cost 
8 mECU. Construction, T.A. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDFGUB/6013/001 -ABd 
Institutional support for the road sector. . 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. Est. 
cost 1.950 mECU. T.A. Project in 
execution. EDF 8. 
EDF GUB/6003/002 - ABd 
Construction of Municipal 
Slaughterhouses at Bissau, Gabu, 
Bafaté. Est. cost 1.91 mECU. 
Construction, supplies, T.A. incl. studies, 
budgetary support. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 8. 
ACh 
Rural and Semi-Urban Hydraulics 
Project. Est. cost 4 mECU. Construction, 
supplies, T.A. incl. studies, budgetary 
support. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
ABb 
GUYANA 
Rehabilitation of sea defences and 
shore zone management. Est. cost 20 
mECU. Construction, T.A. studies. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF GUA/6003/004 - ABd 
Support Programme for Economic 
Reforms. 5.29 mECU. T.A., feasibility 
study, training. Financing decision taken in 
June 1998. Projectin execution. EDF 8. 
EDF GUAT7200/003 - AAb. 
HAITI 
Support for the Structural Adjustment 
Programme II. 10.800 mECU. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF HA/7200/001 - AAc 
Support for the structural programme. 
Utilisation of satellite imagery for the 
exploitation of Haitian territory. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère de la Planification et de la 
Coopération Externe (MPCE). Est. cost 1.8 
mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF HA 7007/000 - AAz 
Support for decentralised cultural 
initiatives. Resp. Auth. Ministry of Culture. 
Est. cost 0.75 mECU. T.A., supplies. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF HA/7155/000 - AHi 
Road rehabilitation in the western area 
of the South Peninsula. Est. cost. 47.36 
mECU. Works, T.A. Project on appraisal. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7,8. 
EDF HA/7012/000 
Support Programme for Local 
Initiatives. Est.cost 1 mECU. T.A. incl. 
studies. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF HA/7013/000 - AAb. JAMAICA 
Northern coastal highway improvement 
project. Segment 3 (Ocho Rios - Port 
Antonio - Fair Prospect - 116 km). Resp. 
Auth.: Government of Jamaica. Est. cost 80 
mECU. Construction, T.A. Project in 
execution. EDF 7, 8. 
EDF JM/9999/000 - ABd 
Regional project - University of the West 
Indies. International tender no. 4268 
already launched for supply, in four lots, of 
electronic equipment for administration. 
Project in execution. 
Institutional strengthening and road 
rehabilitation. Auth. Resp.: Ministry of 
Transport and Works. Cost 13.5 mECU. 
Works, supervision and supply of vehicles 
and equipment. International tender no. 
4279 already launched for supply, in ten 
lots, of various equipment. 
Public sector modernisation. Est. cost 
1.95 mECU. Feasibility study, T.A. and 
training; institution building Project in 
execution. The feasibility study is currently 
being prepared. EDF 7 - AAb 
Savanna-La-Mar waste water project. 
Est. cost 15 MECU. Feasibility, works and 
supervision. Project on appraisal. Financing 
decision foreseen in 1999. EDF 8 - AHb 
Rural water supply - Phase 2. Est. cost 
10 mECU. Feasibility, works, supervision 
and T.A., incl. studies. Project on appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing: 1st half of 
1999. EDF 8. 
EDF JM/6003/001 -ABb 
Trade and Investment Promotion 
Programme. Est. cost 6 mECU. T.A., incl. 
studies; training. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing: end of 1998. EDF 8. 
EDF JM/5021/001 -AEe 
Small and Micro Enterprise Credit 
Scheme, 2nd Programme. Est. cost 5 
mECU; EDF part 4 mECU. T.A., incl. 
studies; training. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing: 2nd half of 1999. 
EDF 8. 
EDF JM/5020/001 -AAb. 
Poverty Reduction Programme (Social 
Investment Fund/Micro Projects 
Programme). Est. cost 53.6 mECU; EDF 
part 6 mECU. Supplies of 
equipment/inputs; T.A., incl. studies; 
training. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing: end of 1998. EDF 8. 
EDF JM/7001/001 - AHe. 
KENYA 
Farming in tsetse infested areas. Est. 
cost 14.6 mECU. Refine the techniques to 
trap the tsetse fly and develop better 
technologies to prevent infections. Monitor 
the environmental impact of the 
techniques. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDFKE/7011 -ACa 
Family Health Programme. Est. cost 
28.710 mECU. Reproduction health status 
of Kenyans family planning services 
broadened. EDF 14.81 mECU, ODA (UK) 
13.9 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 6 
EDF/KE7015-AGb 
Technical Education. 5 mECU. Raising 
the level of performance of existing 
teaching institutions. Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDF KE 6005/001 - AFb 
Trade Development Programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Export Promotion Council and a 
Special TDP Committee of private and 
public sector members and the European 
Commission. 4 mECU. Trade Promotion 
and Marketing Programme, Training, 
Equipment, T.A. and Monitoring and 
Evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF KE/7008 - AEz 
Small scale and informal sector 
enterprises. Est. cost 10 mECU. 
Development of micro-enterprises and 
informal sector of the economy. Project in 
execution. EDF 6 & 7. 
EDF KE/7009 - AEe.f 
Sultan Hamud-Mtito Road rehabilitation. 
Est. cost 30 mECU. To rehabilitate priority 
roads and establish sustainable 
maintenance organisation. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7 
EDFKE/7010/002-ABd 
Mai-Mahiu/Naivasha Road rehabilitation 
Est. cost 25 mECU. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 7. 
EDFKE/7010/003-ABd 
Community development. Poverty 
alleviation. Est. cost 12.5 mECU. Financial 
facility aimed at priority activities identified 
by local communities. Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDFKE/7018-AHb 
Support for the establishment of key 
functions and programmes at the Kenya 
Institute for Public Policy Research and 
Analysis (KIPPRA). Resp. Auth.: 
Ministries of Planning and National 
Development and Finance and Office of the 
President. 1.993 mECU. Training, 
Consulting and T.A. Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDFKE/7016/OO-AAb 
Establishment of sustainable tourism 
development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Tourism and Wildlife. 1.97 mECU. Advice 
on and design of a financially self-
sustainable Tourism Board. T.A., 
equipment, training. Projectin execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDFKE/7014-AEc 
Support Services Programme (SSP). 
Resp.Auth.: NAO - Ministry of Finance. 
1.795 mECU. Ad hoc support and project 
preparation, monitoring and evaluation 
facility. Framework contract. Support to the 
Office of the NAO of EDF. Training and 
equipment. Framework contract by 
restr.tender after short-list. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF KE 7012. 
Agriculture/livestock research 
programme. 8.3 mECU. Works and 
supplies. Project in execution. EDF 6. 
EDF KE/6003/001 - ACa 
LESOTHO 
Urban Water Supply and Sanitation. 
Resp. Auth.: Water and Sanitation 
Authority. Est. cost 4 mECU. 
Implementation of urgent water-supply and 
sanitation systems in the urban and peri-
urban areas. Feasibility study and contract 
document. Preparation for urgent water 
supply and sanitation intervention. Short-
lists to be done. Project in execution. EDF 
7. 
EDF LSO/7002 - ABb, AHa 
Transport infrastructure programme, 
phase I. 18 mECU. Construction, supplies, 
T.A., studies, training. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 8. 
EDF LSO/6016/001 -ABd 
Transport infrastructure - axle load 
control. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 
0.850 mECU. Construction, evaluation. 
T.A., equipment - restricted tender. Project 
in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF LSO/6016/000 - ABd. 
Urban water supply for six towns. Resp. 
Auth.: Government of Lesotho; Water and 
Sewage Authority (WASA). Est. cost 1.996 
mECU. Works, T.A. Project in execution. 
EDF LSO/7002/000 - ABb 
Assistance for the 1998 General 
Election. Resp. Auth.: Government of 
Lesotho; Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC). Est. cost 0.5 mECU. 
Supplies. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF LSO/7009/000 
LIBERIA 
Freeport of Monrovia emergency 
rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Government of 
Liberia. Est. cost 1.95 mECU. Supplies, 
engineering services and works. Project in 
execution. EDF 6. 
EDF LBR/5019/001 -ABd 
2nd Rehabilitation Programme for 
Liberia. Resp. Auth.: European 
Commission on behalf of the Government 
of Liberia. 27 mECU. Works, supplies, 
services. Resettlement and rehabilitation of 
refugees and rehabilitation of infrastructure. 
Project in execution. EDF 6. 
EDFLBR/7001/002-AAc. 
MADAGASCAR 
Road infrastructure rehabilitation. Resp. 
Auth. Ministère des Travaux Publics. 72.5 
mECU. Rehabilitation works, supervision. 
Project in execution. EDF 6 & 7. 
EDF MAG/7004 - ABd 
First decentralised cooperation 
programme. Resp. Auth.: National 
Authorising officer and Head of EU 
Delegation and authorised NGOs. 1.9 
mECU. Works. Purchase of equipment by 
direct agreement, restr. tender or int. 
tender. Project in execution EDF 7 
EDF MAG/7022/000 - AGz, AHz 
Support-training for rural development. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère du développement 
rural et de la réforme foncière. 1.200 
mECU. Developing the farmer's 
organisations role. Training, supplies and 
technical cooperation. Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDF MAG/7029/000 - ACb 
Decentralised training programme for 
regional private tourism operators. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Tourisme. 1.900 
mECU. T.A. training, evaluation. Project in 
execution. EDF 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
EDF MAG 6039 - AEc 
Professional organisation of rural sector 
and agricultural loans. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère de l'Agriculture et du Dév. Rural. 1.910 mECU. T.A., training, evaluation. 
Works, supplies, T.A. and services. Project 
in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MAG/7003 - ACa 
Support for Training Programme 
(FORMFED) Phase il. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Finance. 0.900 mECU. T.A., 
equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MAG/7028 - AFd 
Support for the Structural Adjustment 
programme 1997-98. 27 mECU. General 
Import Programme. Project in execution. 
EDF MAG/7200 - AAc 
Improvement of the income of the 
coastal population in the South-Western 
region. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de 
l'Agriculture et du Développment Rural. 
Est. cost 0.613 mECU. Increasing seaweed 
production. Recruitment, shipbuilding, T.A, 
equipment and training. Project in 
execution. EDF 6. 
EDF MAG/7024/001 - ACd, AHd 
Priority Health Action Programme. 
Support for a national health policy to 
alleviate poverty. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Health. 1.95 mECU. Project in execution. 
EDF 6. 
EDF MAG/6041/000 - AGe 
Priority health project. Support for a 
national health service to alleviate poverty. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. Est. cost 15 
mECU. EDF 8. Project on appraisal. 
EDF MAG/6041/001 - AGe 
Rehabilitation of the customs system. 
Resp. Auth.: Direction Générale des 
Régies Financières. Total cost 0.42 mECU. 
T.A., supplies. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MAG/7200/001 - AAc 
Support for Structural Adjustment 
Programme II. 
Est. cost 43.4 mECU. T.A. including 
studies, budgetary aid. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing: 
September 1998. EDF 8. 
EDF MAG/7200/002 - AAb 
MALAWI 
Soil conservation and rural production. 
Resp. Auth.: MOALD. 23 mECU. EDF 15.5 
mECU, local 1.3 mECU, counterpart funds 
5.7 mECU. Water supply, sanitation, supply 
of fertilizers, T.A. and training. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MAI/5001/002-ACa 
Support to the Forestry Department. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Natural Resources. 
4.4 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. 
Project in execution. EDF 7 
EDF MAI/5001/003-ACa 
Health Programme. Strengthening 
Health Ministry capacities in the 
framework of planning, decentralisation 
and equipment maintenance. Training, 
infrastructures, equipments and T.A. 18.7 
mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MAI/6009/002 - AGe 
2nd Lomé IV Micro-project Programme. 
Improvement of infrastructures in the 
farmer framework with the EC participation. 
Building, school's rehabilitation, health 
centres, water points. Est. cost 6 mECU. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MAI/7012/038 - AGz, AHz, ABb 
Land Utilisation Study. 1 mECU. Studies. 
T.A. survey. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MAI/6029 - AAg 
Karonga-Chilumba-Chiweta Road. Resp. 
Auth. : Ministry of Works and Supplies. Est. 
cost 25.2 mECU. Construction, supervision 
of works, training of technical staff. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF MAI/6022 - ABd 
Physical assets management in the 
health sector. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Works and Supplies. 6,45 mECU. 
Construction, supervision of works, training 
óf technical staff. Project in execution. EDF 
7. 
EDF MAI/7018/000-AGe 
Rehabilitation of Chipoka Port - Lake 
Malawi. Est. cost 3 mECU. Construction, 
supplies of equipment. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF 6022/001 -ABd 
Urgent maintenance to roads and 
bridges. Resp. Auth.: Government of 
Malawi. 1,994 mECU. Works. Supervision -
restr. tender. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MAI/6022/002 - ABd 
Programme for the prevention of 
HIV/AIDS among high risk groups. 0.780 
mECU. T.A., equipment, training. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MAI/7001/000 - AGz 
Community education programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Women and 
Children's Affairs and Community Services 
(MOWCAS), Ministry of Information, 
Broadcasting, Posts and 
Telecommunications (MOIBPT). Est. cost 
1,55 mECU. Training, workshops, 
equipment, T.A. Project in execution. EDF 
7. 
EDF MAI/6009/003 - AGb, AGe 
Feeder Roads Rehabilitation 
Programme. Est. cost 30 mECU. 
Construction/infrastructure, T.A., incl. 
studies, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 
8. 
EDF MAI/6021/004 -ABd. 
Safe Motherhood and Child Welfare 
Initiative. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 1.52 
mECU. Works, supervision of works, 
supplies of equipment. Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDF MAI/6009/004 - AGz. 
Private Sector Development 
Programme. Est. cost 1.8 mECU. T.A. incl. 
studies, training, supplies. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF MAI/7024/000 - AAb. 
MALI 
Support for the electoral process. Resp. 
Auth.: Commission Electorale Nationale 
Indépendante (CENI). Est. cost 1.95 
mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDFMLI/7019-AAc 
Geological and mining sector survey. 
Adm. Resp: Ministère de l'Energie et des 
mines. Est. cost 15 mECU. Aerial 
geophysical prospecting, geological 
mapping, mining prospecting, sector-based 
survey. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MLI/9999 - ADa 
Support for the central unit of the 
National Authorising Officer. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Affaires 
Etrangères. Est. cost 1.88 mECU. 
Improving the services of the National 
Authorising Officer in the programming, 
management and follow-up of the projects 
financed by the EDF. T.A., training, supply. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDFMLI/6007/002-AAc 
Support for decentralisation. Resp. 
Auth.: Mission de Décentralisation (MDD). 
1.3 mECU. Training, T.A., study. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MLI/7009/001 - AAz 
Support for the Planning and Statistics 
Unit of the Ministry of Rural 
Development and Environment. 
Est. cost 0.8 mECU. T.A. Financing 
decision taken in June 1998. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MLI/7024/000 - AAc. 
Support for the Transport Sector 
Programme. Est. cost 85 mECU. 
Construction/infrastructure, supplies, T.A. 
incl. studies, training. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 8. 
EDF MLI/7004/001 - ABd. 
Support for the Coordination of 
Development Activities in the Northern 
Regions. 1.85 mECU. Supplies, T.A. incl. 
studies, training. Financing decision taken 
in June 1998. Project in execution. EDF 8. 
EDF MLI/7025/000 - Alb. 
Support for the Structural Adjustment 
Programme V. 29.4 mECU. Financing 
decision taken in July 1998. Project in 
execution. EDF 8. 
EDF MLI/7200/004 - AAc. 
MAURITANIA 
Kaédi and Mederda water supply. Est. 
cost 2.2 mECU. Improvement of the living 
conditions. Works and T.A. Rehabilitation, 
strengthening and improvement of water 
systems. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF MAU/7012/000 - ABb 
Support for the programme to 
strengthen institutional capacity (PRCI). 
Resp. Auth. Ministry of Planning and 
Finance. 1.865 mECU. T.A. to strengthen 
the effectiveness of administration. Supply 
of equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MAU/7200/002 - AAc 
Rural development in rainy areas. Est; 
cost 4 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF MAU/7014/001 - ACb, ACg 
Oasis rural development in the Atar 
region. Est. cost 5 mECU. Works, 
supplies, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF MAU/7025/000 - ACb, ACg 
Diversification of irrigated agriculture. 
Est. cost 4 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF MAU/7015/001 -ACa 
Support for Structural Adjustment 
(Phase III). Est. cost 11.2 mECU. Τ. Α., 
incl. studies; budgetary aid. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF MAU/7200/003 - AAb. Coordination Unit for Programmes 
financed by the EU. Est. cost 1.9 mECU. 
T.A. incl. studies, supplies. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF MAU/6007/004 - AAc. 
Support for Population Censuses. Est. 
cost 3 mECU. Supplies, T.A. incl. studies, 
training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF MAU/7200/004 - AAi. 
Gold Survey. Est. cost 2.75 mECU. 
Construction/infrastructure, T.A. incl. 
studies, supplies, budgetary support. 
Project on appraisal. 
EDF 8. 
EDF MAU/7002/001 - ADa. 
MAURITIUS 
Irrigation of the Northern Plains. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 9 mECU. 
Works, supplies, T.A. Restricted tender for 
T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7 
EDF MAS/7002 - ABb 
Mahebourg market. Resp. Auth.: Ministry 
of Local Government. Est. cost 1.85 
mECU. To promote agricultural 
diversification, and also to upgrade the city 
centre. Feasibility study. Works, supplies, 
TA. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF MAS/7008 - ACe 
Phoenix-Nouvelle France road. Est. cost 
4 mECU. Upgrading the existing Phoenix- · 
Nouvelle France road to a dual 
carriageway. Works, T.A. Financing 
decision taken in June 1998. Projectin 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MAS/7010/001 - ABd 
Upgrading of sewerage infrastructure of 
housing estates. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Works. Est. cost 7.4 mECU. Rehabilitation/ 
provision of sewerage infrastructure to 10 
housing estates. Works. T.A. for 
supervision. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF MAS - AHa 
Training of police officers. Est. cost 0.43 
mECU. T.A. and training. Project in 
execution. EDF 7 
EDFMAS-AAd 
St. Martin sewage treatment plant. 
Provide adequate treatment of sewage 
from the Plains Wilhems area. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Environment and Quality of Life. 
Est. cost 15 mECU. T.A., services. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDFD MAS/7005/000 - ABz 
Technology Development in Private 
Firms. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Industry 
and Commerce. Est. cost: 2.9 mECU. T.A., 
monitoring and evaluation. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MAS/7013/000 
Anti-Erosion Programme in Rodrigues. 
Est. cost 5 mECU. EDF part 3.3 mECU; 
Government of Mauritius 1.7 mECU. 
Construction, T.A., supplies, training. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF MAS/6003/002 - ACb. 
Support for Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises. Est. cost 7 mECU. Budgetary 
aid, T.A. incl. studies, training. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF MAS/7011/001 -AAb. 
MOZAMBIQUE 
Socio-economic reintegration of young 
people. Est. cost 1.95 mECU. Supplies, 
T.A. and pilot actions. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 6. 
EDF MOZ/7017 - AHb 
Rehabilitation of the rural health 
system. Est. cost 22 mECU. Rehabilitation 
and renovation of 3 rural hospitals and 2 
health centres. Supply of essential 
medicines and equipment, T.A. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDFMOZ/7018-AGa,e 
Social reintegration in Zambezia and 
Niassa provinces. 5.6 mECU. Health, 
education, rural life (farming, fishing,setting 
up of micro-enterprises), urban economic 
development. The projects will be carried 
out by NGO's and the provincial authorities. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
Support for the structural adjustment 
programme GIP II. 15 mECU. Project in 
execution. EDF 7 
EDF MOZ 7200/001.-. AAc 
Support for the judicial system. Est. cost 
2 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF MOZ/7022 - Ajz 
Computerised system for the population 
register and issue of identity cards. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
Est. cost 1.995 mECU. Supplies, T.A. Int. 
Tender. Project in execution. EDF 6. 
EDF MOZ/7024 - AAz 
Private sector development. Resp. Auth.: 
Mozambican Government, NAO. Est. cost 
1.98 mECU. Studies, training, TA. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 6,7,8. 
EDF MOZ/7023/000 - AEe 
Support for municipal elections. Resp. 
Auth.: National Electoral Commission. Est. 
cost 9.5 mECU. T.A., equipment and 
materials. Tender no. 4298 already 
launched. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF MOZ/7027/Ö01 - AAc 
GIP III - General Import Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Government of Mozambique. 
Est. cost 60.9 mECU. Structural adjustment 
support. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing: June 1998. EDF 8. 
EDF MOZ/7200/002 
NAMIBIA 
Namibia Integrated Health Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health and Social 
Services. 13.5 mECU. Infrastructures, 
equipment, training and T.A. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF NAM/7007 - AGz 
Expansion of NBC transmitter network 
and production facilities for educational 
broadcasting. Resp. Auth.: Namibian 
Broadcasting Corporation. Est. cost 5.7 
mECU. EDF 5 mECU, local 0.7 mECU. 
Works, supply of equipment, technical 
training and technical consultancies. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF NAM/7005 - AFi 
Rural Development Support Programme 
for the Northern Communal Areas. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Water 
and Rural Development. 7.7 mECU. 
Strengthening of the agricultural extension 
service, training of extension officers and 
establishment of a rural credit system. 
Supply of office equipment, vehicles, 
agricultural inputs, T.A., training, 
evaluation. Projectin execution. EDF 7. 
EDF NAM/7011 - ACa 
Rural Towns Sewerage Schemes. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Local Government and 
Housing. 1.88 mECU. Works, supplies and 
T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF NAM/7015-AHc 
Namibia Tourism Development 
Programme. (Foundation Phase). Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Environment and 
Tourism. 1.882 mECU. Implementation of 
programme. Staff training. T.A. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF NAM/7010 - AEc 
Livestock Marketing Project. Resp. 
Auth.: Directorate of Veterinary Services -
Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural 
Dept., 3.75 mECU. Construction of 
buildings, water and road infrastructure, 
provision of equipment materials, tractors 
for quarantine farms in the Northern 
Communal Areas. All by ace. tenders or 
restr. tenders. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF NAM/7020 - ACa 
Support for the regional control 
programme against the Tsetse fly and 
trypanosomiasis (RTTCP), phase II. 
Resp. Auth.: Dept. of Veterinary Services, 
Min. of Agriculture, Water and Rural Devt. 
3.9 mECU. Construction of buildings and 
infrastructures, provision of equipment, 
vehicles, tractors. All by ace. tender or 
restr. tender. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF NAM/7020 - ACa 
Support for implementation of the Cross 
Border Initiative. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Trade and Industry. 5.370 mECU. To 
promote an strengthen Namibia's economic 
integration. T.A., supplies and line of credit. 
Project in execution. Int. tender no. 4319 
for supplies launched. Deadline for 
submission: 07.07.98. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/70012/22 - AEd.e 
AIDS Programme. Est. cost 1.5 mECU. 
Reduction of sexual transmission of 
HIV/AIDS. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF NAM/(REG)/8000/003 - AGz 
Seed production project. To support the 
establishment of an efficient, sustainable 
staple crop seed production system. Est. 
cost 2 mECU. Feasibility study to be 
carried out. Project on appraisal. EDF 8 
EDF NAM/7011/002 - ACa 
Rural development support programme 
(RDSP), Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Agriculture, Water and Rural Development. 
Est. cost 7 mECU. T.A. Project on 
appraisal. Financing decision foreseen at 
the end of 1998. EDF 8. 
EDF NAM/7001/001 -ACa 
Education programme. Est. cost 12 
mECU. Construction, supplies, T.A., 
training. Project on appraisal. Financing 
decision foreseen in July 1998. EDF 8. 
EDF NAM/7001/001 - AFa, AFb, AFd, AFi 
NIGER 
Support for the Structural Adjustment 
Programme 1997-98. Est. cost 15.8 
mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7,8. EDF NIR/7200/004 - AFe, AGe 
Institutional support for the NAO. 
Assistance to maximise the effectiveness 
of Community aid. Sectoral reforms and 
macro-economics. Est. cost 1.3 mECU. 
Project in execution . EDF 7. 
EDF NIR/7110/003-AAb 
Strengthening basic education in the 
Tillabéri department in the framework of 
the large-scale irrigation programme in 
the Niger valley.. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
National Education. 1.77 mECU. 
Construction, training, equipment, T.A., 
evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF NIR/7011/000-AFa 
PROFORMAR II. Resp. Auth. Ministère de 
l'Artisanat. Est. cost 1.85 mECU. T.A., 
supplies. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF NIR/7101/011 
Support for Structural Adjustment. Est. 
cost 15.8 mECU. Budgetary support, T.A. 
incl. studies. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF NIR/7200/005. 
AFz, AGz, AHz. 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
Human resources development 
programme, phase II (HRDP II). Est. cost 
20mECU. Construction of and 
improvements to educational buildings. 
Scholarships, training and T.A. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF PNG/6008/002 - AFb 
RWANDA 
Return and social reintegration of 
students currently still in the central 
and east European states. Est. cost 0.996 
mECU. T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7 
EDF RW/7012/002 - AAc 
The First Priority Programme for of 
Employment Creation (PPGE). Est. cost 
1.99 mECU. Construction/ infrastructure, 
T.A. incl. studies, supplies. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF RW/7012/003 - AHb 
SAMOA 
Rural water supply programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Finance. Est. cost 16.7 
mECU. Preparatory study, works, supplies, 
project management. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 7 and 8. 
EDF WSO/7002/000 - ABb 
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE 
Support for the Structural Adjustment 
Programme. 0.9 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF STP/7200/001 - AAc 
SENEGAL 
St-Louis regional development 
programme. 22.5 mECU. Job creation, 
lines of credit, T.A. to the S.M.E's, training 
studies. Health centres, clinics, medical 
equipment and consumables, training, 
information, T.A. to the Direction Régionale 
in St-Louis and to the Service des Grandes 
Endémies in Podor. Drainage network, 
sanitation. Environmental protection with 
wind breaks. T.A. Study of a water-
engineering scheme in Podor. Works by 
ace. tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. by 
restr. tender. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF SE/6002/7002 - ACa 
Support for the PNLS-MST (Phase III). 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Economics, 
Finance and Planning. Est. cost 3 mECU. 
T.A., works. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing end of 1998. EDF 8. 
EDF SE/7003/001 -AGz 
Direct Budgetary Support for Structural 
Adjustment. Est. cost 27.9 mECU. T.A., 
including studies, budgetary aid. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing: 
June 1998. EDF 8. 
EDF SE/7200/003 - AAb 
Rural Development in Podor. Transitory 
Phase 1998. Est. cost 0.7 mECU. Resp. 
Auth.: NAO. Formation, travaux, A.T. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF SE/6002/002 - ACa, Alb 
SEYCHELLES 
Victoria market rehabilitation. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Est. cost 1 
mECU. EDF 0.770 mECU, local 0.230 
mECU. Works and improvements. Project 
in execution. EDF 7. 
EDYSEY/7011 -ACb 
Anse Royale landfill. 2,85 mECU. 
Construction of a fully-engineered landfill. 
Works, supplies, T.A. Project in execution. 
EDF 8. 
EDF SEY - AJz 
Le Niol water treatment plant extension. 
1.35 mECU. Rehabilitation and extension 
of water treatment works. Works. T.A. 
Project in execution. EDF 8. 
EDF SEY - AFh 
SIERRA LEONE 
(All projects suspended) 
Improvement of Freetown - Conakry 
road link. Est. cost 30 mECU. 
Reconstruction of about 120 kms of road 
from Masiaka in Sierra Leone to 
Farmoreah in Guinea. Works and 
supervision. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF SL/7004 - ABd 
Sierra Leone roads authority (SLRA) 
support programme. Resp. Auth.: SLRA. 
22.5 mECU. To strengthen SLRA's 
management capacity, to support 
maintenance operations, rehabilitate 160 
km of road, provide training and equipment 
to enable local private contractors to 
increase their role in road works. 
Rehabilitation works, equipment, T.A. to 
SLRA. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDFSL/7002-ABd 
Management and protection of wildlife 
in Outamba Kilimi National Park (OKNP). 
Resp. Auth.: NAO. Est. cost 1.98 mECU. 
Development of sound management plan 
for sustainable protection of wildlife and 
ecosystem in park. Improvement of local 
infrastructure and community development. 
Works, supplies, T.A. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 7. 
EDF SL/7003 - AEi, AHi 
North West Artisanal Fisheries and 
Community Development Phase II. 1.98 
mECU. Technical cooperation in fisheries. 
T.A. and training. Financing date January 
97. EDF.7. 
SL/6004/001 -ACd. 
SOLOMON ISLANDS 
Guadalcanal road: Aola-Matau. Resp. 
Auth. Ministry of Transport, Works and 
Utilities. Est. cost 6 mECU. Works and 
supervision. Project on appraisal. Tender 
for a study expected to be issued in June 
1998. EDF 7. 
EDF SOL/7001 - ABd 
Population Census 1997. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Finance. 1.885 mECU. T.A. and , 
training. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF SOL/6001/000 - AAi. 
Programme Management Unit. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Development Planning. 
Est. cost 1.2 mECU. Institutional support. 
Supplies, works, services, T.A. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF SOL/6022/000 - AAz 
SOMALIA 
2nd rehabilitation programme. 47 mECU. 
Inter-sectoral approach. The project will be 
implemented by NGOs and T.A. Project in 
execution. EDF 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
EDF SO/6029 - AAc 
SURINAME 
Timber Institute. Control of logging and 
reafforestation activities. Est. cost 3.5 
mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7 
EDFSUR/7005-ACc 
Road from Nickerie to the Suriname-
Guyana ferry terminal. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Public Works. Est. cost 8.4 
mECU. Construction of 29.5 km road. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 6. 
EDF SUR/5602/001 -ABd 
Sysmin programme to upgrade and 
expand the electricity and 
telecommunications sectors. Est. cost 
20.72 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. Project 
on appraisal. Financing decision foreseen 
in June 1998. EDF 7. 
EDF SUR/9999/000 - Abai, ABc 
Rehabilitation and extension of the Port 
of Paramaribo, the 'Nieuwe Haven 
Terminal'. Est. cost 20.5 mECU; EDF part 
13.5 mECU. Construction/infrastructure; 
supplies of equipment/inputs; T.A., incl. 
studies. Project on appraisal. Financing 
decision foreseen in January 1999. EDF 7, 
8. 
EDF SUR/7013/000 - ABd. 
SWAZILAND 
Maize Marketing and Storage. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives. 1.555 mECU. Rehabilitation 
and expansion works by ace. tender. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF SW/5005/02 - ACa. 
Support for implementation of the Cross 
Border Initiative. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry. 1.5 mECU. T.A., 
training, supply of equipment. EDF 7. 
Project in execution. 
EDF REG/7012/024 - AAz Development of smallholder irrigation in 
the Lower Usuthu River. Est. cost 16 
mECU. Construction, supplies, studies, 
T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF SW/7007/001 - ACa 
TANZANIA 
Mwanza-Nyanguge Road and Mwanza 
urban roads rehabilitation, and 
Nyanguge-Musoma overlay. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Transport and Communications. 
Est. cost 55 mECU. Rehabilitation of 67 km 
of trunk roads (Nyanguge-Mwanza and 
Mwanza airport) and rehabilitation of 
Mwanza sewerage system (main works). 
Design study on-going. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF TA/6021 - ABd 
Mwanza Water Supply. Phase II. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Water energy and 
minerals. Est. cost 21 mECU. Works, 
pumping equipment, studies and 
supervision. Short-list done. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF TA/5005Í7) - ABb 
Irlnga Water Supply. Resp. Auth.: Ministry 
of Water, Energy and Minerals. Est. cost 22 
mECU. Pumping, treatment, storage and 
distribution. Works, equipment, design and 
supervision. Short-list done. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF TA/7009 - ABz 
Mwanza/Shinyanga-Nzega road 
rehabilitation. Resp. Auth. Ministry of 
Works. Est. cost 70 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 6, 7 and 8. 
EDFTA/7012-ABd 
Institutional strengthening for the 
education sector development 
programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Education and Culture. Est. cost 1.91 
mECU. T.A. (short term), training and 
equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF TA/7023/000 - AFd 
Special programme for refugee-affected 
areas. Resp. Auth.: Prime Minister's office. 
Est. cost 22 mECU. Rehabilitation of the 
Mwanza Airport runway, contribution to the 
Kagera road maintenance programme, 
improvement of the Kigoma-Nyakanasi 
gravel road (335 km). Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDF TA - ABd 
Institutional strengthening for improved 
water supply and sewerage services in 
four towns. Est. cost 1.985 mECU. T.A., 
training, works and supplies. Project in 
execution. EDF 7 
EDFTA/7014/000-ABb 
Support for the introduction of Value 
Added Tax. Resp. Auth.: Government of 
Tanzania. Est. cost 1,945 mECU. TA (restr. 
tender), training, taxpayer education, 
publicity, testing of procedures. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF TA/7200/003 - AAz, AAb 
Rehabilitation of the Mwanza Sewerage 
System. Est. cost 2.5 mECU, EDF part 2 
mECU. Construction/infrastructure; supply 
of equipment/inputs; T.A., incl. studies; 
training. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 7. 
EDF TA/7014/001 -ABb. 
Emergency (El Nino) Road Repairs. Est. 
cost 10 mECU. Construction/ infrastructure, 
T.A. incl. studies. Financing decision taken 
in June 1998. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF TA/7027/000 - ABd. 
Structural Adjustment - SAF IV. Est. cost 
61.9 mECU. Budgetary aid, T.A. incl. 
studies. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF TA/7200/004 - AAc. 
TOGO 
Aid for the voluntary reintegration of 
refugees from Togo. Resp. Auth.: Min. Du 
Plan. Est. cost 0.43 mECU. Project under 
the direction of CARE Togo. Socio-
economic contribution for the reintegration 
of 17,000 Togo refugees in their place of 
origin. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF TO/7006 - AHn 
Support for a group of producers in the 
Savanes region. Est. cost 1.8 mECU. 
Construction, supplies, T.A., training. 
Project in execution. EDF 5. 
EDF TO/6003/002 - ACa 
Development of basic mining 
information. 1.11 mECU. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère du Plan et de l'Aménagement du 
Territoire. Studies. Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDF SYSMIN/TO/9999 - ADa. 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
Training project for young farmers 
(AYTRAP). Assistance for the young 
farmer to create rural enterprises. Est. cost 
7.3 mECU. EDF 5 mECU. local 2.300 
mECU. Line of credit, T.A. and monitoring. 
Project in execution. EDF 6 and 7. 
EDF TR/7002 - ACa 
Support for Caribbean Business 
Services Ltd. (CBSL). Resp. Auth.: NAO. 
Est. cost 0.347 mECU. Support for SMEs 
through management advice and the 
transfer of technology. T.A. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF TR/7006/000 - ADe 
Rehabilitation of the L'Anse Fourmi -
Charlotteville road. Est. cost 3.5 mECU. 
Construction, T.A., feasibility study. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF TR/5013/000 - ADc 
UGANDA 
Water supply in Hoima, Masindi and 
Mubende. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Natural 
Resources. Est. cost 12 mECU. 
Rehabilitation of catchments, treatment 
plants and water distribution network. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDFUG/7010-ABb 
Third structural adjustment support 
programme (SASP 3). Resp. Auth. 
Ministry of Finance. Est. cost. 51.06 
mECU. T.A. Projectin execution. EDF 7,8. 
EDF UG/7200/002 
Uganda Blood Transfusion Service. 
Phase 3. Est. cost 2.5 mECU. Supplies, 
T.A. incl. studies, tidimng. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF UG/6012/004 - AGz. 
Human Resources for Health. Est. cost 
12 mECU. Construction/infrastructure, T.A. 
incl. studies, supplies, training. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF UG/6012/002 - AGz. 
AIDS and Reproductive Health. Est. cost 
8 mECU. Grants to NGOs and costs of 
Project Implementation Unit. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF UG/6012/003 - AGz. 
VANUATU 
Education development programme. 
Est. cost 7.5 mECU. To increase enrolment 
in junior secondary school and to improve 
the quality of education delivered. T.A., 
supplies, training. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 8. 
EDF VA/7005/001 - AFa. 
ZAMBIA 
Forestry Support Programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Environment. Est. cost 
1.6 mECU. Training supply of equipment, 
studies and T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 
7. 
EDF ZA/7009 - ACc 
Rehabilitation of the Kabwe-Kapiri 
Mposhi and Chisamba Road. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Works and Supply Est. 
cost 26 mECU. Works and supervision. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF ZA/6014/001 -ABd 
Capacity building in the Bank of 
Zambia. Strengthening of the banking and 
financial sector. Macroeconomic 
management and planning. Resp. Auth.: 
Bank of Zambia. 1,15 mECU. T.A., 
supplies and training. Project in execution. 
EDF 8. 
EDF ZA/7020/000 - AEh 
Technical assistance to the Roads 
Department. Resp. Auth.: Dept. of Roads. 
Est. cost 1.9 mECU. Provision of long-term 
T.A. to the Roads Department and 
implementation of a formal training 
programme for the department's 
professional and technical staff. T.A., 
studies, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 
8. 
EDF ZA/7022/000 - ABd 
Educational capacity-building 
programme. To plan and deliver effective 
and relevant education and training. 10 
mECU. Feasibility study, T.A., construction, 
budgetary aid and training. Project in 
execution. EDF 8. 
EDF ZA/7003/003 - AFz, AFh, AFi 
Urban Market Development. Est. cost 1.9 
mECU. Construction, T.A. including 
studies. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF ZA/7011/000-ACf 
Private sector development programme. 
Trade and enterprise support facility/micro-
credit project. 8 mECU. T.A., studies and 
training. EDF 8. 
EDF ZA/7010/001 - AEz, AEe 
Export Development Programme Phase 
II. To increase exports of non-traditional 
goods. Est. cost 6 mECU. T.A. and 
training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF ZA/5017/002 - AEd 
Assistance to the wildlife sector, phase 
II. Improvement in management of wildlife 
10 resources. Est. cost 10 mECU. Feasibility 
study. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF ZA/7002/001 - AEc 
Agricultural private sector development 
(SME) - microprojects. Est. cost 0.5 
mECU. T.A., study, credit facility. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF ZA/7023/000 ACa 
Economic management support 
programme, phase II. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development. Est. cost 4 mECU. T.A., 
feasibility study, financial aid, training. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF ZA/7018/001 -AAc 
Rehabilitation of the Monze-Zimba road. 
Est. cost 37.5 mECU. Construction, T.A. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF REG/7323/001 - ABd 
Improvement of theZambian Safe Blood 
Transfusion Programme. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Health. Est. cost 3.735 mECU. 
T.A., equipment, training. Project in 
execution. EDF 8. 
EDF ZA/7003/002 - AGd 
Drugs Master Plan Implementation. Est. 
cost 1.100.000 ECU. Supplies of 
equipment, T.A., miscellaneous. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF ZA/7019/000 - AGz 
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF IV). 
53.69 mECU. Financing decision taken in 
July 1998. Project in execution. EDF 8. 
EDF ZA/7200/005 - AAc. 
ZIMBABWE 
Minefield clearance in N.E. Zimbabawe. 
10 mECU. Rural development, clearance of 
landmines. Minefields survey. Works, 
supervision. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF ZIM/7004 - ACa 
Trade development programme -
import/export. Est. cost 9 mECU. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF ZIM/6001/002 - AEd, AEe 
Tourism development programme -
master plan. Resp. Auth.: Government of 
Zimbabwe. Est. cost 1 mECU. Feasibility 
study. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF ZIM/6008/002 - AEc 
Health sector development programme. 
Est. cost 14 mECU. Feasibility study. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDFZIM/7002/000-AGe 
Education sector support programme. 
Improvement of education system. Est. 
cost 14 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 
8. 
EDF ZIM/7009/000 - AFa, AFe 
Natural resources project. Est. cost 2 
mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF ZI M/7012/000 
Agricultural services and management 
project (ASMP). Est. cost 25 mECU. 
Works, supplies, T.A. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 8. 
EDF ZIM/7011/000 
Decentralised cooperation programme. 
Est. cost 5 mECU. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 8. 
EDF ZIM/7013/000 
Support Services Framework Contract. 
Est. cost 1.2 mECU. T.A., incl. studies. 
Improved effectiveness of NAO's office. 
Financing decision taken in June 1998. 
Project in execution. EDF 8. 
EDF ZIM/7016/000-AAc 
OVERSEAS COUNTRIES 
AND TERRITORIES 
BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS 
Beef Island airport terminal. Est. cost 
16.84 mECU. Works, supplies. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 6. 
EDF REG/6631/001 
Hamilton Lavity Stoutt Community 
College Learning Resource Centre. 
Resp. Auth.: Territorial Authorising Officer, 
Road Town. 2,484,200 ECU. Works. 
Construction of a learning resource centre 
for the existing HLS Community College. 
Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
7 OCT VI/005/6 - Afb 
FRENCH POLYNESIA 
Management of land and hydraulics to 
install young farmers. 1,234 mECU. 
Study. Project in execution. EDF 6. 
EDFPOF/6010/000-ACg 
MAYOTTE 
Water supply. Est. cost 7.2 mECU. Works, 
T.A., study. Main works completed. 
Supervision completed. Study on remaining 
works in execution. Project in execution. 
EDF 6 & 7. 
EDF MY - ABb 
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES - ARUBA 
Tourism development programme. 5 
mECU.Training, T.A., marketing in Europe. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7835 - AEc 
Technical Assistance to the National 
Authorising Officer. Technical assistance 
will be given to promote sound and 
effective management of external aid. 1.3 
mECU. T.A supplies Restricted tender. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDFNEA/7012/000 
Netherlands Antilles social action 
programme. Est. cost 13.2 mECU. Project 
on appraisal. EDF 7,8 
EDF NEA/7011/000 
Small Enterprises Stimulation 
Programme in the Netherlands Antilles 
(SESNA). 7.488 mECU. Financing decision 
taken in July 1998. Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDF NEAv7009/000 AAb. 
NEW CALEDONIA 
New aquarium. To increase the capacity 
and improve the infrastruture of the 
aquarium. Est. cost 4 mECU. Construction, 
T.A. and supplies. Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDF NC/6009/001 - AEc 
ST. HELENA 
Wharf improvement project. Resp. Auth.: 
Public Works and Service Department. Est. 
cost 1.743 mECU To increase the safety 
and efficiency of Jamestown Port by 
upgrading wharf facilities for passenger and 
cargo handling. Works, supplies. Project on 
appraisal. Financing decision foreseen at 
the end of 1998. EDF 7. 
EDF SH/7001 - ABd 
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS 
Water and sewerage in Providenciales. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works, 3.7 mECU. 
Water supply works and pipes. T.A. Project, 
in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF TC/7001 - AHb.c 
WALLIS AND FUTUNA 
Creation of improved structures for pig-
rearing. Resp. Auth. EDF authorising 
officer for the territory. Est. cost. 0.11 
mECU. To establish viable production 
structures adapted to market conditions. 
T.A., training, follow-up. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF WF/7009/000 - ACa 
REGIONAL PROJECTS 
AFRISTAT 
Support for AFRISTAT (economic and 
statistical control). 0.9 mECU. 
Improvement in the quality of statistical 
information. T.A., supplies and equipment. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7106/004 - AAc, AFd 
10 MEMBER COUNTRIES OF AGM -
BURKINA FASO, CAMEROON, COTE 
D'IVOIRE, GHANA, MALI, NIGER, 
NIGERIA, SENEGAL, CHAD, TOGO 
Promotion of a regional grain market in 
West and Central Africa. Resp. Auth.: 
ΝΑΟ-Mali. Est. cost 12 mECU. Creation of 
a regional grain market. Promotion and 
strengthening of initiatives by private 
operators. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/6175-ACf 
INTRA-ACP 
Strengthening of fisheries and 
biodiversity management in ACP 
countries. Resp. Auth. : ICLARM, Manila 
(Philippines). 5mECU. T.A., management, 
supply of equipment, data base creation. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/70012/016 - ACa 
COLEACP, Interim Project. Commercial 
development in exports and in the field of 
horticulture. Est. cost 1.86 mECU. Training, 
T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/6900/002 - AEe 
Business Assistance Scheme for 
Exports (BASE) Est. cost 30 mECU. To 
expand receipts from exports and tourism 
by improving enterprises' export 
competitiveness and trade facilitation skills. 
T.A. training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF REG/70001/020 - AEd. 
11 Support to regional cooperation for 
HIV/AIDS control. Est. cost 20 mECU. 
T.A., studies, supplies, equipment, training. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF REG/8000/004 - AGz, AGe, AGe 
Interuniversity support programme -
Level 3 - in French-speaking sub-
Saharan countries. Est. cost 1.976 
mECU. Training, equipment and 
educational material. Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7004/014 - AFb 
Support for Regional Economic 
Integration. Est.cost 1.75mECU. T.A. incl 
studies, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 
7. 
EDF REG/6929/003 - Alb. 
Installation of the African Virtual 
University (AVU). Est. cost 1.1 mECU. 
Institutional capacity building, training. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF REG/70012/35 - AFb. 
CARIBBEAN REGION 
Caribbean Postal Union. 
Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 0.5 mECU. 
T.A. and other action necessary for the 
creation of the Caribbean Postal Union. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7605 - ABc 
Caribbean Telecommunications Union. 
Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 0.5 MECU. 
T.A. for the accomplishment of the C.T.U. 
and the harmonisation of legislation on 
telecommunications within the Cariforum 
member states. Project in execution. EDF 
7. 
EDF REG/7605/001 - ABc 
Education policy and dialogue. Resp. 
Auth.: Cariforum S.G. 0.45 mECU. T.A. for 
regional common policies in three 
education areas: basic education, technical 
and vocational training, language teaching. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7607 - AFa.d 
Cultural Centres. Resp. Auth.: S.G. 
Cariforum. Est. cost 1.965mECU. Promote 
cultural identity and foster mutual 
knowledge of the rich cultural panorama. 
Restoration of buildings, supply of 
equipment, T.A. in artistic fields and 
management. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7610 - AHi. 
Tertiary level programme. Est. cost 5.946 
mECU. Upgrading tertiary level education 
and teacher training. Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDF REG/6628/001 - AFb 
Cariforum Regional Environment 
Programme. Resp. Auth.: SG Cariforum. 
Est. cost 11 mECU. Environmental 
management action, programme for 
protected areas and community 
development, management and expansion 
of marine and coastal park and protected 
areas. Terrestrial parks. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7613 - AHf 
Programming Unit Cariforum 
Secretariat. 0.725 mECU. Equipment, 
office supplies, T.A. Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7615-AAc. 
CARIFORUM Programming Unit. Resp. 
Auth.: CARIFORUM. 3.94 mECU. T.A. to 
the Secretary General of CARIFORUM to 
help in the allocation, preparation and 
implementation of regional funds under 
Lomé IV. T.A., supply. Project in execution. 
EDF 7 and 8. 
EDF REG/7615/001 - AAb 
Caribbean News Agency Development 
Programme. Resp. Auth.: Regional 
Authorising Officer. Est. cost 4.179 mECU. 
Establishing a CARIFORUM Information 
Network by setting up a coordinating centre 
and mechanisms and archives and 
increasing radio, TV and Cana wire 
services. T.A., supply. Project in execution. 
EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7605/003 - ABc 
COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE 
CBI 
Standardisation and quality assurance. 
Resp. Auth.: COMESA (Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa. Est. cost 
2,543 mECU. TA and training. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7321 -AEe 
Regional Integration in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. Assistance to COMESA 
Secretariat. 1.95 mECU. Training, supply of 
equipment, evaluation and services. T.A. 
short-term. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7316-AAc 
Regional Telematics Network Services 
(RTNS). Trade development. Est. cost. 
1.93 mECU. T.A. short-term by restr. 
tender. Publicity for the project, network 
implementation, maintenance and 
evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/RPR 517-AAc. 
CENTRAL AFRICA 
CIESPAC, Public Health Education 
Centre in Central Africa. 1.98 mECU. 
Student accommodation, equipment, 
scholarships. T.A. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7205 - AFb 
ECOFAC II, Forest ecosystems. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère du Plan. Rep. of Congo. 
Est. cost 16 mECU. Develop national and 
regional capacities for good management 
of forest resources. Works, supplies and 
T.A. Project in execution EDF 7. 
EDF REG 6203/001 - ACc 
CHAD-CAMEROON-CENTRAL AFRICAN 
REPUBLIC 
Ngaoundéré-Touboro-Moundou Road. 
Est. cost 85 mECU. Construction, T.A. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF REG/7203/001 - ABd. 
EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Statistical training centre for Eastern 
Africa in Tanzania. 
Resp. Auth.: Secretariat of the centre. 5 
mECU, Widening of capacity. Construction 
of class-rooms, offices and housing. Project 
in execution. EDF 5. 
EDF REG/5311(7)-AFb 
Combatting the tse tse fly in East Africa 
(Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda). 20 mECU. 
Evaluation, training and research. T.A., 
equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/736 -ACa, ACe 
Lake Victoria Fisheries Research 
Project (Phase II). Project headquarters in 
Jinja, Uganda at FIRI-Fisheries Research 
Institute. EDF part 8.4 mECU. T.A., 
supplies, training, monitoring and 
evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/5316/001 - ACd 
Tanzania rehabilitation programme for 
refugee affected areas and related 
infrastructure. Est. cost 20 mECU. 
Rehabilitation of roads and conserving the 
environment in refugee areas. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7322/001 - ABd 
Uganda - Kampala by-pass. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Works. Road construction. Est. 
cost 35 mECU. T.A. works. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7,8. 
EDF REG/6304/001 - ABd 
Support for economic integration. Est. 
cost 1.95 mECU. T.A., incl. studies; 
training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7162/000-AAb. 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF ECOWAS 
Guarantee Fund for Private Investment 
Financing in Western Africa. FGIPAO, 
Lomé. Creation of a Guarantee Fund to 
cover partially credit risks given by Banks 
to the private sector. Est. cost 22.5 mECU. 
EDF 3.8 mECU, Others: France, Germany, 
EIB., Commercial Banks (E.U.). 
Development Agencies. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7115 - AEz 
Regional programme to combat drugs. 
Est. cost 5.1 mECU. Elaboration of training 
programmes and national plans. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7135 -AGz 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF IGAD 
IGAD Household Energy Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: IGAD Executive Secretary. 
Est. cost 1.9 mECU. T.A. to initiate pilot 
projects in the area of household energy, 
define the role and organize the setting up 
of a regional unit to coordinate activities, 
and develop working relationships with 
national and sub-region institutions In 
IGADD's member countries. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG - ABa 
Development of the artisanal fisheries 
sector. The promotion of artisanal fisheries 
and fisheries trade. Improvement of the 
level of services available in the post-
harvest field of artisanal fisheries in IGADD 
member states. Est. cost 7.8 mECU. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7314/000 - ACd, AFd 
Grain marketing training programme. 
Resp. Auth. IGADD Executive Secretary. 
1.99 mECU. T.A., equipment, evaluation. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/5359 - ACa 
12 MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE INDIAN 
OCEAN COMMISSION (IOC) -
COMORES, MADAGASCAR, 
MAURITIUS, SEYCHELLES 
Integrated Regional Programme for 
Trade Development (PRIDE). Resp. 
Auth.: I.O.C. Secretariat. EDF 9.3 mECU. 
T.A. training, management. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 7503 - AEz. 
Indian Ocean University. Resp. Auth.: 
IOC. Est. cost 1,925 mECU. Training. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7506/000 - AFd 
Technical Unit for the Management and 
Coordination of Community Aid in the 
Indian Ocean Region. 1.3 mECU. 
Financing decision taken in June 1998. 
Project in execution. EDF 8. 
EDF REG/7509/000 - AAz. 
PACIFIC ACP STATES 
Pacific regional agricultural programme. 
Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Forum Secretariat-
Fiji. 9.265 mECU. Improvement and 
dissemination of selected crops, 
agricultural information and techniques to 
farmers. T.A. and supply of equipment. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG 6704/001 - ACa 
Pacific regional civil aviation. Phase II. 
Resp. Auth.: Forum Secretariat. Fiji. 4.9 
mECU. Supply of security, air traffic 
control, navigation and meteorology, and 
training equipment. T.A. Project in 
execution. EDF 6 and 7. 
EDF REG/7704 - ABc.d 
Pacific Regional Waste Awareness and 
Education Programme. Resp. Auth.: 
Forum Secretariat. 0.600 mECU. T.A. EDF 
7. 
EDF REG/7714 - AHf 
Air communications - upgrading of 
Fua'amotu Airport in Tonga. Resp Auth.: 
Ministry of Works. Est. cost 0.340 mECU. 
Construction, supplies of equipment. 
Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7704/001 - ABc 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF PTA 
Regional integration in East and 
Southern Africa. Assistance to PTA 
Secretariat. (Preferential Trade Area). 
Short and long-term. T.A., studies, training. 
Est. cost 1.5 mECU. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7316-AAb. 
SADC 
SADC Intraregional Skills Development 
Programme. Est. cost 12.5 mECU. 
Training. Skills development through 
specialised courses. Project on appraisal. 
Financing decision foreseen in May 1999. 
EDF 8. 
EDF REG/7435/000 - AFb, AFd. 
SADC Water and Land Management. Est. 
cost 4 mECU. Training, T.A. Project on 
appraisal. Financing decision foreseen 
early 1999. EDF 8. 
EDF REG/6415/001 -AFci. 
SADC Regional Vegetation Project. Est. 
cost 1.8 mECU. T.A., supplies, training. 
Project on appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF REG/7410/000 - ACb. 
SADC -Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, 
South Africa and Tanzania. Monitoring, 
Control and Surveillance (MCS) of Fishing 
Activities. Resp. Auth.: SADC - Sector 
Coordinator for Marine Fisheries. Est. cost 
13.3 mECU. To improve national and 
regional management capacity of marine 
fishery resources. Feasibility study, T.A., 
supplies. Project on appraisal. Financing 
decision foreseen by the end of 1998. EDF 
8. 
EDF REG/6406/000 - ACd. 
SADC- ECOWAS -ECOCAS 
Pilot project for sectoral industrial 
Forums: EU - SADC. Mining Forum -
MAT-CONSTRUCT-AGRO-IND. Admin. 
Resp.: CDI, Brussels. Monitoring and 
follow-up. 0.5 mECU. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7428 - ADb. 
ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE, NAMIBIA, 
SOUTH AFRICA AND TANZANIA 
SADC monitoring, control and 
surveillance (MCS) of fishing activities. 
Resp. Auth.: SADC - Sector Coordinator for 
Marine Fisheries. Est. cost 13.3 mECU. To 
improve national and regional capacity to 
manage marine fishery resources. 
Feasibility study, T.A., supplies. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 8. 
EDF REG 6406/000 - ACd 
SAHEL COUNTRIES 
Support to strengthen vaccine 
independence in Sahel Africa. 9.5 
mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7012-ACa 
MISCELLANEOUS 
CAMEROON, CENTRAL AFRICAN 
REPUBLIC 
Bertua-Garoua Boulai Road. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère des Travaux Publics (Cameroon). 
Rehabilitation and improvement of 
transport infrastructures between Douala 
and Bangui. Est. cost 50 mECU. 
Prequalification for services. Project on 
appraisal. EDF 6. 
EDF REG/CM/CA/7002/001 -ABd 
MALI-GUINEA 
Flood forecast and control, hydrologicai 
simulation for the Niger upper basin. 
Est. cost 6 mECU. EDF, 5.175. mECU. 
France (foreseen) 0.375 mECU. Denmark 
(foreseen) 0.15 mECU. Mali-Guinea 
(foreseen) 0.3 mECU. Flood forecast 
system, hydrological model of local 
simulation with parametric régionalisation, 
arning system via telecommunication and 
satellite teletransmission. Statistical 
studies. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. 
EDF REG. 6181 - AHf, AHg. 
BURKINA FASO, CAPE VERDE, 
GAMBIA, MALI, MAURITANIA, NIGER, 
SENEGAL, CHAD 
Regional environmental training and 
information programme. Resp. Auth.: 
Institut de Sahel in Bamako. 16 mECU. 
T.A. training, supply of equipment. Project 
in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/6147/001 - AFz, AHz 
BENIN, BURKINA FASO, COTE 
D'IVOIRE, MALI, NIGER, SENEGAL, 
TOGO 
Support for the West Africa Economic 
and Monetary Union (UEMOA). 
Promotion of regional economic integration. 
Resp. Auth. UEMOA Commission. 12 
mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7106/02-AAf 
Support for the ENAREF. 0.900 mECU. 
T.A., training, equipment. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7106/003 - AAc, AAf, AFd 
BENIN, CAMEROON, COTE D'IVOIRE, 
GHANA, GUINEA, TOGO 
Regional Programme to relaunch 
pineapple production in West and 
Central Africa. Resp. Auth.: Execution unit 
composed of one senior expert, T.A. and 
one junior expert. 1.995 mECU. T.A. 
studies, evaluation. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 7. 
EDF REG/7138-ACa 
GUINEA, GUINEA BISSAU, SENEGAL, 
MALI 
Support for the Rational Management of 
the Natural Resources of the Niger and 
Gambia Basins. Est. cost 23 mECU. T.A. 
incl. studies, construction/ infrastructure, 
supplies, training. Project on appraisal. 
EDF 8. 
EDF REG/6137/001 - AHf. 
ETHIOPIA, KENYA, TANZANIA, 
UGANDA, BURKINA FASO, CENTRAL 
AFRICAN REPUBLIC, CHAD, 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
African Wildlife Veterinary Project. Resp. 
Auth.:OAU - Inter-African Bureau of Animal 
Resources. 1.6 mECU. T.A., training, 
evaluation, contingencies. Financing 
decision taken in June 1998. Project in 
execution. EDF 7. 
EDF REG/5007/004 - AHf. 
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COUNTRIES AND OCTS 
Angola 
Rue Rainha Jinga 6, 
Luanda C.P. 2669 
Tel. (244 2) 303038 - 391277 - 391339 
Telex 3397 DELCEE - AN 
Fax (244 2) 392531 
Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean 
James Fort Building 
Hincks Street, Bridgetown. 
Tel. (1 246) 4274362 - 4297103 
Telex 2327 DELEGFED WB -
BRIDGETOWN 
Fax (1 246) 4278687 
Benin 
Avenue de Clozel, 
01. B.P. 910 Cotonou. 
Tel.(229)312684-312617 
Telex 5257 DELEGFED - COTONOU 
Fax (229) 315328 
Botswana 
P.O.Box 1253, 
North Ring Road, Gaborone 
Tel. (267) 314455 - 314456 - 314457 
Telex 2403 DECEC - BD 
Fax (267) 313626 
Burkina Faso 
B.P. 352, 
Ouagadougou. 
Tel. (226) 307385 - 307386 - 308650 
Telex 5242 DELCOMEU - BF 
Fax (226) 308966 
Burundi 
Avenue du 13 Octobre, 
B.P. 103, Bujumbura. 
Tel. (257) 223426 - 223892 
Telex FED BDI 5031 - BUJUMBURA 
Fax (257) 224612 
Cameroon 
105 rue 1770, Quartier Bastos, 
B.P. 847 Yaoundé. 
Tel.(237)201387-203367 
Fax (237) 202149 
Cape Verde 
Achada de Santo Antonio, 
C.P. 122, Praia. 
Tel. (238) 621392 - 621393 - 621394 
Telex 6071 DELCE - CV 
Fax (238) 621391 
Central African Republic 
Rue de Flandre, 
B.P. 1298, Bangui. 
Tel.(236)613053-610113 
Telex 5231 RC DELCOMEU - BANGUI 
Chad 
Route de Farcha, 
B.P. 552, N'Djamena. 
Tel.(235)528977-527276 
Telex 5245 KD 
Fax (235) 527105 
Congo (Democratic Republic) 
71 Avenue des Trois Ζ, 
B.P. 2000, Kinshasa. 
Tel. (by satellite) 00871 685 053 336 
14 
Fax: 00871 685 053 337 
Telex 581 154 62 21 DECEKIN ZR 
Congo (Republic) 
Avenue Lyautey (opposite Italian 
Embassy), 
B.P. 2149 Brazzaville. 
Tel. (242) 833878 - 833700 
Fax(242)836074 
Côte d'Ivoire 
18 rue du Dr. Crozet, 
B.P. 1821, Abidjan 01. 
Tel.(225)212428-210928 
Telex 23729 DELCEE - Abidjan 
Fax (225) 214089 
Djibouti 
11 Boulevard du Maréchal Joffre, 
B.P. 2477, Djibouti. 
Tel. (253) 352615 
Telex 5894 DELCOM - DJ 
Fax (253) 350036 
Dominican Republic 
Calle Rafael Augusto Sanchez 21, 
Ensanche Naco, Santo Domingo. 
Tel. (1 809) 5405837 - 5406074 
Telex 4757 EUROCOM - SD DR 
Fax (1 809) 5675851 
Eritrea 
Gainer Street 1, 
P.O. Box 5710 Asmara. 
Tel. (291 1) 126566 
Fax (291 1) 126578 
Ethiopia 
P.O. Box 5570, 
Addis Adaba. 
Tel. (251 1)612511 
Telex 21738 DELEGEUR - ET 
(251 1)612877 
Gabon 
Lotissement des Cocotiers, 
B.P. 321, Libreville. 
Tel.(241)732250 
Telex DELEGFED 5511 GO - LIBREVILLE 
Fax(241)736554 
Gambia 
10, 10th Street South, 
Fajara 
Tel. (220) 495146, 497846, 497847 
Fax (220) 497848 
Ghana 
The Round House, 65 Cantonments Road, 
P.O. Box 9505, (Kotoka International 
Airport), Accra. 
Tel (233 21) 774201 - 774202 - 774236 
Telex 2069 DELCOM - GH 
Fax (233 21) 774154 
Guinea 
B.P. 730 CONAKRY. 
Tel. (224) 464942 
Fax (224) 461874 
Guinea Bissau 
Bairro da Penha, 
C.P. 359, 1113 Bissau. 
Tel. (245) 251027 - 251071 - 251469 -
251471 
Fax (245) 251044 
Guyana 
72 High Street, Kingston, 
P.O. Box 10847, Georgetown. 
Tel. (592 2) 64004 - 65424 
Telex 2258 DELEG GY - GEORGETOWN 
Fax (592 2) 62615 
Haiti 
Delmas 60, Impasse Brave n°1, 
B.P. 15588, Petion Ville, Port au Prince. 
Tel. (509) 494480 - 493491 
Fax 490246 
Jamaica 
8 Olivier Road, P.O. Box 463, 
Constant Spring, Kingston 8. 
Tel (1 809) 9246333/4/5/6/7 
e-mail eucomhod@infochan.com 
Fax (1 809) 9246339 
Kenya 
Union Insurance Building, Ragati Road, 
P.O. Box 45119, Nairobi. 
Tel. (254 2) 713020 - 713021 - 712860 -
712905-712906 
Telex 22483 DELEUR - KE 
Lesotho 
167 Constitution Road, 
P.O. Box MS 518, Maseru. 
Tel. (266) 313726 
Fax (266) 310193 
Liberia 
EC Aid Coordination Office, 
UN Drive, Mamba Point, Monrovia. 
Tel. (231)226273 
Fax (231) 226274 
Madagascar 
Immeuble Ny Havana, 
B.P. 746 Antananarivo 101. 
Tel. (261 20)22 242 16 
Fax (261 20) 22 645 62 
E-mail delcemad@dts.mg 
Malawi 
Europa House, 
P.O. Box 30102, Capital City, Lilongwe 3 
Tel. (265) 783199 - 783124 - 782743 
Telex 44260 DELEGEUR Ml - LILONGWE 
Fax(265) 783534 
Mali 
Avenue de I'OUA, Badalabougou Est, 
B.P. 115, Bamako. 
Tel. (223) 222356 - 222065 
Telex 2526 DELEGFED - BAMAKO 
Fax (223) 223670 
Mauritania 
llotV, Lot 24, 
B.P. 213, Nouakchott. 
Tel. (222 2) 52724 - 52732 
Telex 5549 DELEG MTN - NOUAKCHOTT 
Fax (222 2) 53524 
Mauritius 
8th floor, Bâtiment St. James Court, 
Rue St. Denis, 
Port Louis, B.P. 1148 
Tel. (230) 2116295 (6 lines) 
Fax. (230)2116624 
E-mail. Europe@bow.intnet.mu 
Mozambique 
1214 Avenida do Zimbabwe, 
C.P. 1306, Maputo. 
Tel. (258 1 ) 490266 - 491716 - 490271 
Telex 6-146 CCE MO 
Fax (258 1)491866 Namibia 
4th Floor, Sanlam Building, 154 
Independence Avenue, 
Windhoek. 
Tel. (264 61 ) 220099 
Telex 419 COMEU WK 
Fax (264 61) 235135 
Niger 
B.P. 10388, Niamey. 
Tel. (227) 732360 - 732773 - 734832 
Telex 5267 NI DELEGFED - NIAMEY 
Fax(227)732322 
Nigeria 
Lagos 
Knorr House, 
Ozumba Mbadiwe Avenue (opposite 1004 
flats) 
Victoria Island 
P.M.B. 12767, Lagos 
Tel (234 1 ) 2617852, 2610857 
Fax (234 1)2617248 
E-mail: ecnig@infoweb.abs.net 
Abuja 
Tel.(234 9)5233144 
Fax (234 9) 5233147 
5233145-5233146 
Pacific (Fiji, Kiribati, Western Samoa, 
Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu) 
4th Floor, Development Bank Centre, 
Victoria Parade, 
Private Mail Bag, Suva. 
Tel.(679)313633 
Fax (679) 300370 
e-mail: eudelfiji@eu.org.fj 
Papua New Guinea 
The Lodge (3rd Floor), Bampton street, 
P.O. Box 76, Port Moresby. 
Tel. (675) 213544 - 213504 - 213718 
Fax (675) 217850 
Rwanda 
Avenue Député Kamuzinzi 14, 
B.P. 515 Kigali. 
Tel. (250) 75586 - 75589 - 72536 
Telex 22515 DECCE RW 
Fax (250) 74313 
Senegal 
12 Avenue Albert Sarraut, 
B.P. 3345, Dakar. 
Tel.(221)231314-234777 
Fax(221 )236885 
Sierra Leone 
Wesley House, 4 George Street, 
P.O. Box 1399, Freetown. 
Tel. (232 22) 223975 - 223025 
Fax (232 22) 225212 
Solomon Islands 
2nd floor, City Centre Building, 
P.O. Box 844, Honiara. 
Tel.(677)22765 
Fax (677) 23318 
Somalia 
EC Somalia Unit, 
Union Insurance House (first floor), 
Ragati Road, Nairobi, Kenya. 
Tel. (254 2) 712830 - 713250 - 713251 
Fax (254 2) 710997 
Sudan 
3rd floor  AAAID Building, 
Osman Digna Avenue, 
P.O. Box 2363, Khartoum. 
Tel. (249 11 ) 775054 - 775148 
Telex 23096 DELSU SD 
Fax (249 11 ) 775393 
Suriname 
Dr. S. Redmondstraat 239, 
P.O. Box 484, Paramaribo. 
Tel. (597) 499322 - 499349 - 492185 
Fax (597)493076 
Swaziland 
Dhlan'Ubeka Building (3rd floor), 
Cr. Walker and Tin Streets, 
P.O. Box A 36, Mbabane. 
Tel.(268)42908-42018 
Telex 2133 EEC WD 
Fax (268) 46729 
Tanzania 
38 Mirambo Street, 
P.O. Box 9514, Dar es Salaam. 
Tel. (255 51) 117473 (pilot) - 117474 -
117475-117476 
Telex 41353 DELCOMEUR TZ 
Fax (255 51) 113277 
Togo 
Avenue Nicolas Grunitzky 37, 
B.P. 1657 Lomé. 
Tel. (228)213662-210832 
Fax(228)211300 
Trinidad and Tobago 
The Mutual Centre, 
16 Queen's Park West, 
P.O. Box 1144, Port of Spain. 
Tel. (1 868) 6226628 - 6220591 
Fax (1 868) 6226355 
Uganda 
Rwenzori House, 1 Lumumba Avenue, 
P.O. Box 5244? Kampala. 
Tel. (256 41 ) 233303 - 233304 
Telex 61139 DELEURUG 
Fax (256 41) 233708 
Zambia 
Plot 4899, Los Angeles Boulevard, 
P.O. Box 34871, Lusaka. 
Tel.(260 1)250711 -251140 
Telex 40440 DECEC ZA 
Fax (260 1 ) 250906 
Zimbabwe 
6th floor, Construction House, 
110 Leopold Takawira Street, 
P.O. Box 4252, Harare. 
Tel. (263 4) 707120 - 707139 - 752835 
Telex 24811 DELEURZW 
Fax (263 4) 725360 
OFFICES OF THE 
COMMISSION IN ACP 
COUNTRIES AND OCTS 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Upper St George's Street, 
P.O. Box 1392, St. John's. 
Tel. (1 268) 462 2970 
Fax (1 268) 462 2670 
Bahamas 
2nd floor, Frederick House, Frederick 
Street, 
P.O. Box N-3246, Nassau. 
Tel. (1 242) 325 5850 
Fax(1 242)323 3819 
Belize 
1 Eyre Street, 
P.O. Box 907, Belize City. 
Tel. and Fax (501 2) 72785 
Telex 106 CEC BZ 
Comoros 
Boulevard de la Comiche, 
B.P. 559, Moroni. 
Tel.(269)732306-733191 
Telex 212 DELCEC - KO 
Fax (269) 732494 
Equatorial Guinea 
Route de l'Aéroport, 
B.P. 779, Malabo. 
Tel. (240 9) 2944 
Telex DELFED 5402 - EG 
Fax (240 9) 3275 
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba 
Scharlooweg 37, 
P.O. Box 822, Willemstad (Curaçao). 
Tel. (599 9)4618488 
Fax (5999) 4618423 
New Caledonia (OCT) 
21 Rue Anatole France, 
B.P. 1100, Noumea 
Tel. (687) 277002 
Fax (687) 288707 
Samoa 
4th floor, Loane Viliamu Building, 
P.O. Box 3023, Apia. 
Fax (685) 24622 
São Tomé and Principe 
B.P. 132, São Tomé. 
Tel (239 12) 21780-21375 
Telex 224 DELEGFED ST 
Fax (239-12) 22683 
Seychelles 
P.O. Box 530, Victoria, Mahé. 
Tel. (248) 323940 
Fax. (248) 323890 
Tonga 
Malle Taha, Taufa'ahau Road, 
Private Mailbag n° 5-CPO, Nuku'Alofa. 
Tel. (676) 23820 
Telex 66207 DELCEC TS 
Fax (676) 23869 
Vanuatu 
Ground floor. Orient Investment Building, 
Kumul Highway, 
P.O. Box 422, Port Vila. 
Tel. (678) 22501 
Fax(678)23282 
15 Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
France 
(Territorial collectivities) 
Mayottc 
St Pierre and Miquclon 
(Overseas territories) 
New Caledonia and dependencies 
French Polynesia 
French Southern and Antarctic 
Territories 
Wallis and Futuna Islands 
Netherlands 
(Overseas countries) 
Netherlands Antilles 
(Bonaire, Curaçao, 
St Martin, 
Saha, St Eustachc) 
Aruba 
Denmark 
(Country having special 
relations with Denmark) 
Greenland 
United Kingdom 
(Overseas countries and 
territories) 
Anguilla 
British Antarctic Territory 
British Indian Ocean Territory 
British Virgin Islands 
Cayman Islands 
Falkland Islands 
Southern Sandwich Islands 
and dependencies 
Montserrat 
Pitcairn Island 
St Helena and dependencies 
Turks and Caicos Islands 
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Angola 
Antigua & Barbuda 
It ih.ini.i-. 
Barbados 
Belize 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo 
Congo (ex-Zaire) 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guinea 
Guinea Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Jamaica 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Papua New Guinea 
Rwanda 
St Kites and Nevis 
St Lucia 
St Vincent 
and the Grenadines 
Samoa 
Sao Tome & Principe 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa* 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
Vanuatu 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
'Not all provisions of the Lomé 
Convention apply to South Africa 
1 6 OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Betel juice leaves its mark 
Violence may be a problem in Papua New Guinea but the blood-red stains 
you see on the pavements of Port Moresby and other towns in this Pacific 
nation are not as grisly as they might first seem. The 'culprit' is saliva, spat 
out by people who have been chewing betel nuts. 
These are widely consumed in PNG, and long-time chewers have strikingly 
red-stained teeth, revealed by their frequent broad grins. The nut comes 
from the areca palm and is said to be a mild narcotic as well as an aid to 
digestion. In pidgin it is called buai. It is never chewed alone, but is mixed 
with crushed-coral lime (cumbung) and mustard stick (daka). 
It is not illegal to consume betel nuts - indeed, as our picture shows, they are 
sold openly on the streets and in the markets - but the authorities are keen 
to curtail the habit in public areas. Prominent notices, displayed in government 
buildings and at airports, inform the public that betel nut chewing is banned in 
these places. 
The reason for these prohibitions has nothing to do with wider social concerns 
about the narcotic effects of the nut. The problem is that chewing stimulates the 
production of red-coloured saliva and the mixture eventually has to be spat out. If 
swallowed, it can provoke nausea. One doesn't need to be particularly fastidious 
to understand why such a habit is deemed to be anti-social in public 
buildings! Hi D.M. Democracy and good governance 
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